


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THE JURY

DAVID J. BREWER, *Washington, D. C.*

Perhaps nothing in our system of administering justice has received more encomiums than "the jury." By many it is regarded as the great factor in securing and preserving Anglo-Saxon liberties, and is looked upon with something of the veneration with which the Hindoo bows before his idol. Any talk of destruction, or even of change, seems almost sacrilegious. It is an ancient institution in Anglo-Saxon history. Its origin is lost in obscurity. Blackstone says that it has "been used time out of mind in this nation, and seems to have been coeval with the first civil government thereof." Some traces of the jury were found in nearly all the nations of Northern Europe which adopted the feudal system, and it probably came into its present form only by slow growth. But, however it arose, no one can doubt that it has a strong hold on the affections of all English speaking people. "In Magna Charta it is more than once insisted on as the principal bulwark of our liberties"; and though some eulogies may seem extravagant, it has been one of the most valuable institutions in our history.

Today it has become the object of attack and criticism. By not a few it is thought to have outlived its usefulness; they believe that it is the part of wisdom to abolish it entirely and to substitute some other mode of trial,—more, as alleged, in harmony with the spirit of the age. I do not agree with these radical views. Doubtless, in some respects, it may wisely be changed; but it is one

thing to modify and an entirely different thing to destroy. The impatient radical, when he finds defects in the actual workings of an institution, is apt to think that the only remedy is to abolish it. He sees only the defects, and fails to perceive the great substantial worth, or that some, perhaps even slight, changes may eliminate the one and preserve the other.

It may be well to note some of the essential elements in the jury system as it came to us from the mother country,—elements which have hitherto been generally preserved in their integrity by constitutional enactments, both State and national. And I am speaking only of the petit jury, as it is called, to distinguish it from the grand jury; the latter being the body which presents charges in criminal matters, and the former the one which, in both civil and criminal cases, is the trier of questions of fact.

And, first, the jury was composed of twelve persons. Why this number was selected is a matter of speculation. There is no magic in the number twelve. Yet we all know that certain numbers have had special recognition, particularly the numbers seven and twelve. There were the seven wise men of Greece, the seven wonders of the world, the seven deadly sins, the seven penitential psalms, the seven churches of Asia, the seven seals, seven trumpets, seven plagues, and seven golden bowls spoken of in Revelation. So, there were the twelve tables of Roman law, twelve tribes of Israel, twelve Apostles, and we number our months as well as our hours by twelve. Whether the number required for a common law jury was suggested by any of these uses of the number twelve or determined by any other fact or simply arbitrarily fixed, is a matter of speculation.

Secondly, the jurors were to be the peers of the party accused, or the parties litigant. No slave was summoned to sit on the trial of a freeman. In the times of Edward III. and Henry VI., the statutes provided that in a trial between a citizen and an alien the latter was entitled to a jury half of whose members were aliens, provided that number were to be found in the community; but these statutes long since fell into disuse. The peers of the realm claimed the right to be tried by the House of Lords. A

recent instance occurred in the trial of Lord Russell by the House of Lords on a charge of bigamy.

Thirdly, they were to be residents of the county in which the trial was had. They were to be from the "vicinage," and so rigorously was this rule enforced that for a while some of the jury were obliged to be returned from the hundred in which was the "Vill" or place where the cause of action was laid in the declaration. Coming from the neighborhood of the parties, they, as Blackstone says, "were supposed to know beforehand the characters of the parties and witnesses, and therefore they better knew what credit to give to the facts alleged in evidence."

Fourthly, they were not to be related to the parties, or interested in the result of the action.

Fifthly, they were to be free from prejudice or predetermined opinion of the merits of the controversy.

Sixthly, the decision was the unanimous conclusion of the twelve jurors. Other matters were also taken into consideration, but these are all I deem necessary to mention.

So far as the second, third, and fourth elements are concerned, they have not been the basis of much criticism, and are not open to any substantial objections. With reference to the second, it will not be forgotten that in this country all are on an equality. We have no slaves, no hereditary peerage; and there is no impropriety in requiring an alien, like all others, litigating in the courts of this country, to submit his controversy to the ordinary tribunal.

As to the third, it is well that jurors should be citizens of the county or district. It would be an unnecessary expense to summon them from a distant part of the State, and there is no good reason therefor.

As to the fourth, of course justice requires that they who are to decide a controversy should not be related to the parties or interested in the result of the litigation.

The first, fifth, and sixth are therefore the three elements which give rise to the main criticisms of trial by jury. And, first, as to the number twelve. As I have already stated, there

is no magic in that number, no mysterious reason why there should be twelve rather than eight or sixteen. The purpose in requiring a jury to be composed of several persons is to ascertain the average judgment of the community on the merits of the controversy. Through representations of the different vocations and different classes such average judgment will probably be secured. It is not likely to be expressed in the opinions of twelve doctors or twelve merchants or twelve farmers. But it would be futile to attempt to secure upon a jury even one representative of every form of industry and every class in life. Practically, the number should be large enough to secure a fairly average representation of the great body of citizens and not so large as to be unwieldy or expensive. It may well be that where a man's life is at stake or where the amount in controversy is large, twelve should not be regarded as excessive, but where lighter offences are charged or the amount in controversy is small, it would seem that the ends of justice would be subserved were there but six or eight jurors; and certainly time and money would be saved thereby.

The fifth has been the subject of much criticism—not that one can object to its principle, but only to the mode in which the desired result of impartiality is secured. It will be conceded that a juror should be impartial, that he should have neither bias nor prejudice for or against either party, that he should enter upon the trial of the case without fixed convictions as to the merits of the controversy and ready to be guided by the testimony and the law. But the time which is spent, not infrequently, in inquiring as to a juror's past life, in searching his present mental condition, and in ascertaining the extent of the information he has received concerning the case, has justly provoked severe criticism. In important cases weeks and weeks have been occupied in securing a jury. Especially has this been true in criminal cases. When one hears or reads about a case, he is apt to form an opinion, more or less fixed and definite, concerning it or some feature of it. Whether such opinion is so strong and settled as to make him unfit to serve as a juror or is only a casual general opinion—a

mere impression as it were—which in no manner interferes with his fitness for jury service, is a question which even the individual himself may be at a loss to determine. And to bring the condition of the proposed juror's mind before the judge, the examination by counsel is often long and searching, sometimes with the single view of securing a competent juror, and, again perhaps in the hope of laying a foundation for reversal should the juror be accepted and the verdict be against their client. Many a man who is summoned as a juror magnifies the strength of his opinion for the sake of avoiding jury service, and others, too conscientious to shirk a duty, do the same thing in order that there may be no mistake as to their fitness. Consequently, it not infrequently happens that the best qualified men are excused from the jury box, while those too ignorant to understand the significance of testimony, or too indifferent to be really trustworthy, take their places.

Before the day of the newspaper there was seldom any particular harshness or delay, for there was little trouble in securing competent men who had not even heard of the controversy. But now, with the press searching the corners of the country for every event of even trifling importance, it is almost impossible to find intelligent men in any county who have not heard something of every important case arising therein, who have not formed some opinion from what they have heard.

It is not strange that much condemnation is heard of these protracted labors in impaneling a jury and of the unfortunate results which sometimes appear. And there must be a change, either through the action of the legislatures or of the courts themselves. No man should be held disqualified because he has read the newspaper report of a transaction or even heard some of the witnesses speak of it, and from such reading or hearing has formed a mere passing opinion upon the case. No one for a moment supposes that the judge is disqualified or that he will incorrectly declare the law, although he may have heard the whole story of the transaction. No more should an intelligent, honest man be held disqualified from passing judgment upon the facts for the simple

reason that he has read or heard the story. Of course if he has a settled, positive conviction, that is reason for his excuse. There is something radically wrong in a system or practice which permits such a consumption of time, and often ends in bringing the most incompetent men on to the jury. While doubtless the presiding judge is often responsible for this result, there is a cause, inherent in the system, which must not be ignored, and that is the rule requiring unanimity,—the sixth element I have mentioned. Every one knows that in an important and hard case the struggle of counsel is to secure upon the jury one or more who are friendly to their client or in sympathy with the cause or interest with which he is identified, or who may be easily influenced by appeals to prejudice or sympathy. The intelligent business man, the mechanic, and the farmer too quickly respond to the voice of the judge demanding justice, and hence, if possible, they must be excluded and the ignorant, easily moved by appeals of counsel, secured. Let the rule of unanimity be abolished and the result determined by the conclusions of two thirds or three fourths of the jury, and this struggle after the single helpful juror will largely disappear. And why should it be deemed essential? Neither in legislative halls, among judges, in arbitration proceedings, nor in scarcely any other body called to make a determination, is it the rule. In my judgment, the great objection to the jury system, as it is administered today, and the one which more than any other threatens its overthrow, is this rule of unanimity. Were it abolished, less time would be wasted in impaneling a jury, and a better class of jurors would ordinarily be selected. More than that, the truth would be more certainly determined. How often in criminal cases do ten or eleven jurors yield to the obstinacy of the remaining and agree on a verdict for a lower degree of crime than they really believe the defendant to be guilty of! And in actions for the recovery of money how often is the amount of the verdict affected by the obstinacy of a single juror!

If the jury is to be preserved, some other things must be done, —things necessary to elevate its character, make it a fair repre-

sentative of the highest intelligence of the community or at least of the average, and not, as it now generally is, of the lowest intelligence. All know that the ordinary business man, the intelligent citizen, shirks jury duty with about as much zeal as he runs from a rattlesnake; that there are a multitude of loafers around a court room seeking the meagre pay which attaches to the position, who cultivate the lawyers, and become professional jurors. I make these suggestions as helpful in the matter. First, give them better compensation. As a rule they are paid no more than the ordinary day wages of an unskilled laborer, and it is generally true that poor pay brings poor service. Better eight jurors reasonably paid than a dozen poorly paid. Secondly, free the work of the juror from some of the disagreeable annoyances which now too often attend it. He should not be compelled to work more hours than the judge. To shut him up and keep him confined day and night is a crime against society. He is treated too often as an object of suspicion,—as though he were probably dishonest and must be specially shielded from temptation. Why should he be shut up while the judge is not? A bad man on the bench or in the jury box will surely find ways to be tempted, and few things are more calculated to degrade his office in the sight of the juror, and to bring out all the evil that is in him, than the consciousness that he is an object of suspicion. I have been nearly thirty-seven years on the bench, and take pleasure in recalling that, so far as it was possible, I always relieved the juror from confinement other than such as I myself submitted to; that I endeavored to make him in the discharge of his duties free from suspicion and annoyance. And I have not the slightest reason to doubt that the course thus pursued resulted not merely to the comfort of the juror, but in a better administration of justice.

Some of the changes which I have suggested, particularly that in respect to the number of jurors and the rule of unanimity, can only be accomplished through constitutional amendment. It is a very difficult matter to secure an amendment of the Federal Constitution, and not an easy one of a State constitution, and yet there is a growing effort to secure such amendments. Utah's

constitution provides for a jury of eight, and the validity of that provision was sustained by the United States Supreme Court in *Maxwell v. Dow*, 176 U. S. 581.

But the final question is, whether it is worth while to preserve the system, even with the amendments suggested. For myself, I believe in the jury, and that it should be preserved as a factor in judicial investigations, and for these, among other, reasons. It is a tribunal which comes into being with the occasion and vanishes with the end of the trial. The community soon forgets who sat upon it, and there is no building up of prejudice against the individuals who composed it. How seldom do we see in the papers any complaint of the jurors who try a case, while the judge who presides at the trial is often thereafter the subject of bitter attack!

Again, there are many questions whose determination cannot be according to any strict rules of measurement, and yet they must be settled. Is there any better way than, as it were, by asking the community how they should be settled? and that is done by leaving them to a jury, who, in theory at least, announce the average judgment. Take suits for personal injuries. Who shall say how much an arm or a leg is worth? An attempt to give, as judges are expected to give, reasons for fixing upon the precise amount would be futile. A jury hears the testimony, sees the injured party, and awards that which according to its combined judgment is fair compensation. And yet no one of the jurors might be able to figure out with pen and pencil exactly how he reached his conclusion.

So, also, there are many cases in which contradictory testimony appears, and it is a great relief to a judge, sitting from day to day and year to year, not to have to determine between conflicting witnesses, nor be called upon to state which he thinks has told the truth. The jury gives no reasons, simply states its conclusions, and seldom does any witness thereafter feel that by the jury, or any particular member thereof, his testimony has been wholly disregarded, and he in effect branded as a perjurer.

And, finally, it is of importance that the people as a whole

should realize that the administration of justice is a part of their work. We cannot too often repeat the statement that if popular government is to continue, all must take an interest therein, and realize that upon each one rests some share of responsibility ; and the administering of justice is one of the peculiar duties of government. So there should be brought home to every individual the thought that he is personally responsible for the way in which justice is administered ; and if from time to time he serves as a juror, he can but feel that he is partially, at least, discharging that responsibility, and is helping to secure a more perfect administration of justice in the community. There are other reasons, but the length of this article constrains me to stop. I have pointed out those which in my judgment render the preservation of the jury a matter of importance. Make such changes in its organization, its surroundings, and manner of work as will elevate its tone and character, while at the same time they do not destroy its essential features.

NEW EXCAVATIONS AT ÆGINA¹

ADOLPH FURTWÄNGLER, *Munich.*

The splendor of the ancient world is long since battered and decayed. But mother earth with kindly care has covered over what time and dissolution have spared. And now with inquisitive zeal we burrow into the earth's crust to bring to light what may assist us in gaining some conception of the glory of the past.

How Winckelmann would have rejoiced, if he could have lived to see the revelations of our day, when everywhere the ancient soil is opening and the genuine, real, old Greek art is rising, even though it be in fragments! In the last few decades a noble emulation has been kindled, in which each of the civilized nations is trying to discover the most and best possible relics of ancient art. This has come about since the seventh decade of the century just past, since Schliemann's surprising and brilliant achievements and the methodical archæological investigation of Olympia.

The excavation of Olympia under the patronage of the German Empire was the first work of this kind to be accomplished by a foreign nation on Greek soil, on a large scale, and from purely scientific motives. This has since been followed by many similar undertakings, such as the excavations of Delphi by the French, and of the Heræum at Argos by the Americans.

(1) Translated by Professor W. H. Carruth of the University of Kansas.

Indeed one is almost inclined to ask, Is there not too much excavating rather than too little? Are not those who are now so zealously disturbing the funereal repose of ancient civilization often altogether too unconscious of the responsibility that rests upon them? Does not the too hasty exhumation of ancient remains often destroy forever what the earth had so well preserved for us in its bosom?

I fear that every one who has any practical knowledge of the excavations that have been conducted in classic lands will feel constrained to answer these questions in the affirmative. Not only the mercenary diggers after treasure, who carry on their work by stealth, but even scientific investigators, despite the best intentions, have certainly often destroyed many things of value without being aware, and without being able to prevent it.

This happens even now occasionally, and especially in former times was a frequent occurrence at the hands of investigators of too limited experience. Gradually, however, a fund of experience has been accumulated, and is still increasing, which can be transferred from one to another by living tradition.

The scientific method of excavation is not learned at the author's desk nor in the study. And it was a great mistake, which was always sorely atoned for, to believe that any one who was a good interpreter of classic authors would also be able to meet all the requirements in the field of excavation.

The error is still committed today, for however much change and improvement may have been made as compared with former conditions, the right relation has not yet been established between scholastic and practical work upon the relics of antiquity. The old conflict between thought and action, which so long dominated Germany, has not yet entirely subsided. There still exists a gap, not yet entirely bridged, between classical scholars of the narrow, academic school and men who investigate by the fact,—by the spade. This division is most perceptible in the realm of our domestic German archæology,—and this greatly to the detriment of both sides! Only very recently has there been a serious effort made to establish concord.

In the realm of classical archæology the division was very sharp thirty years ago ; it was shown in the way in which Schliemann was depreciated by the scholars of that day. Schliemann, to be sure, was anything but a systematically trained scholar ; he was a dilettant and an enthusiast, but a man of action, and he revealed to a wondering world what unsuspected secrets were still concealed beneath the soil of Greece. It was characteristic of the situation, that the circle which stood by Schliemann from the beginning consisted, not of scholars, but of dilettants, who had learned to carry on investigations by excavations upon their native soil. From them Schliemann took his method, and from that moment classical archæologists also began to discover that even inconspicuous fragments have a historical value, and should be collected ; for, until that time, attention had been given only to such remains as bore some inscription or a picture susceptible of mythological interpretation. On the other hand, our domestic archæology, which depended on excavations, had long recognized the importance of even the most humble fragments.

Two young classical archæologists (Löschke and myself) took the next step, about the end of the seventh decade of last century, by making a critical historical examination of the mass of fragments that were brought to light by Schliemann in his excavations at Mycenæ, and published a selection from the results. With that work began a great development for this method of research within the field of classical archæology. Incessant efforts are now being made to extract from the soil of Greece the evidences of ancient civilization, and even the slightest remains are studied and applied in reconstructing the panorama of the past.

A similar change took place in Italy at about the same time. There, too, it was the domestic search for the remains of the oldest, so-called pre-historic, time which stood in opposition to classical archæology ; there, too, the latter finally learned from the former ; and from this concession dates a new epoch in Italian archæology.

It is a very characteristic fact that the well-known, distin-

guished, and discriminating archæologist, Heinrich Brunn, who lived so long (until 1865) in Rome, took no part in the actual investigation of the classic soil or in the excavations. He, too, like almost all the scholars of his time, paid serious attention only to those individual portions of the past, often separated from their real surroundings, which had some immediate relation to what was to be found in books, that is, to mythology, poetry, or antiquities. Things could not be properly judged when thus isolated, and this fact alone can explain Brunn's adoption of the erroneous theory that Greek vases are, for the most part, not genuine products of early times, but late imitations. His successor in Rome, W. Helbig, had already become an advocate of the new tendency; he established a union with practical archæology and excavation, and from this standpoint recognized immediately that Brunn's theory could be explained only from his lack of living touch with the details of actual excavations. Furthermore, Helbig was the first classical archæologist to shape the inconspicuous remains of the earliest times, brought to light by domestic research in Italy, into an historical picture of civilization.

Another instance of the division that formerly existed between experimental excavation and academic archæology is found in the achievements of the German scholar Ludolf Stephani, in St. Petersburg, notably during the sixth and seventh decades of last century. It fell to his lot to work up the results of the Russian excavations in the territory of the Euxine Greeks and Scythians. He performed his task entirely after the old fashion, that is, without paying any attention whatever to the excavations themselves. He chose from the material found whatever gave him themes for learned essays; but he had no idea that his proper task was to consider the entire collection from an historical point of view. He had really no respect for anything that was not already in books; monuments had no existence for him unless they were identified with the title of a book. He was a thorough scholar and had great merits, but he is a particularly striking example of the wide separation that existed, only thirty years ago, between narrowly academic archæology and the study of antiquity that was

built upon facts and discoveries and excavations, instead of upon books. And although the traces of this division are not, as has been said, entirely obliterated, yet there has been a general change : axe and spade have conquered, all along the line, the disposition to cling to the book and to the letter.

In Greece considerable excavations have been undertaken in all important places, such as Athens, Olympia, Delphi, Delos, Epidaurus, and Corinth, so that those who are seeking new and promising places for excavation are already obliged to be content with those of the second rank. Yet no one of the chief places is exhausted, and least of all the capital Athens, where much still remains to be done. Corinth, also, where the Americans are at work, still promises many a surprise, as there seems to be preserved here under the later strata much more from classic Greek times than could be expected from the reports of the destruction of that city by the Romans.

It is very human and natural that in this race for results the thing right before our eyes should be overlooked. Every one who sails into the harbor of Athens passes the wooded heights of Ægina, upon which the pillars of one of the noblest Greek temples tower into the blue atmosphere. There a group of travelers had the fortune some ninety years ago to find, almost wholly upon the surface and scarcely covered, the precious remains of pediment sculptures which soon after were to become an ornament of the newly founded Glyptotheca of King Ludwig of Bavaria.

Now, although it must be conceded that the superficial examination of those travelers could not possibly satisfy the demands that are made of a scientific excavation, as this is understood today, yet the place has not been touched from that time until the present. But it was evident that when the time came the possessor of the Æginetan sculptures had the chief occasion for desiring more thorough investigation.

Through the generous decision of his Royal Highness, Prince-Regent Luitpold of Bavaria, I was commissioned, in the spring of 1901, to undertake the delayed task and to make a

thorough investigation of the location of the temple by means of excavation.

Here, too, we meet another instance of that absence of connection, once so general, between archæological science and investigation by action, by excavation. A vast amount has been written about the remains of the pediment figures of Ægina; but in this entire literature one may look in vain for the suggestion that possibly something more might be found on the original site that would aid in their interpretation. Only the fragments set up in the Glyptotheca, and there catalogued, were taken into consideration, as though an increase of their number by a local investigation were not a possibility. The most positive conclusions were drawn and violent disputes conducted, but always on the assumption that all the possibilities were exhausted; neither one side nor the other conceived of the necessity of a thorough investigation of the place by means of the spade. I gained a foretaste of the possible increase of my material when, in the preparation of a new catalogue of the Glyptotheca, I discovered in the storeroom a considerable number of fragments, belonging to the collection, which had remained unknown till then.

The excavation was begun in the spring, and was completed in the summer, after I had been obliged to leave, by my colleagues Messrs. H. Thiersch and E. Fiechter.

It is a wonderful spot on which the temple stands, a spot such as can be found only in Greece. All about is the richest and most animated life—a life which, if we follow it utterly and absorb it wholly, sets every finest nerve within us vibrating, and the enjoyment of which, appealing to the eye, permeates our whole body, as it were, animating and thrilling our entire nature.

Standing on a projecting height one has a view of the entire Saronic gulf. The long and varied coast of Attica is right opposite; then one sees the harbors of Athens,—the Phaleron and the Piræus,—and between them the metropolis, Athens itself, in clear weather so distinct that the houses can be distinguished with the naked eye. And when the wind whirls up the dust on the great highway between Athens and the Piræus, one can see

the moving pillar of dust from the temple of Ægina across the waters. Besides, one can recognize Salamis quite near by, then the land of Megara, the Isthmus of Corinth, and then the mountains of the Peloponnesus, and in the background the higher mountain ranges of middle Greece, with snow-clad Parnassus. One feels that he is right in the centre of Greece: here Athens, yonder Corinth, and out across the sea the blue outlines of distant islands. What a rich, gay, and mighty life once throbbed between these points,—which can all be taken in at a glance!

And add to the form of the landscape the ever-changing color, in which the deep, intense blue constitutes the ground tone. And in addition to the color the absolutely intoxicating fragrance exhaled in spring by the spicy pines and blooming shrubs. The temple is surrounded by forest, the light, sparse forest peculiar to Greece, and so very different from our dense and massive German woodlands. Viewed from the land side of the island, the columns seem to rise directly out of the green foliage. But seen close at hand, the forest retreats respectfully, and the proud pillars tower free and lonesome into the pure blue heaven.

Thus they have stood for centuries. The walls of the cella and the small interior columns fell long ago, likewise the gable, the cornice, and the triglyph frieze. Only the great outer columns bearing the architrave stand erect. But destruction silently and surely pursues its course. Radical measures have already become necessary in order to prevent even the few upright columns that remain from falling; for wind and weather are assailing the soft limestone of which they are made. And what nature leaves, man will finish up entirely. We were able to see very clearly how in the course of the last ninety years, since Cockerell made his drawings, so much of the temple had been destroyed, not only by the forces of nature, but to a still larger extent by wanton visitors or mercenary natives. Indeed, it seems as though the century just past had done more harm than those that went before.

In the spring of 1811, as is well known, a party of travelers went from Athens to Ægina with the intention of making archi-

tectural studies of the ruins of the temple. The head of the little expedition was the English architect Cockerell. His companion was the German architect Haller von Hallerstein. They were joined by two other gentlemen. The scientific zeal of the young investigators was richly rewarded. We can imagine their astonishment and joy, when, on setting about the measurements of the ruins of the temple, and to this end turning over the scattered blocks, they immediately found portions of the precious sculptures, in Parian marble, which had once been the adornments of the pediments. Some of these figures must even have lain partially uncovered, as is shown by the excessive weathering of some of their parts. Evidently many of these figures, which had thus been lying open and exposed, had been carried away and destroyed before Cockerell's time. For while our recent excavations have yielded all manner of small pieces, heads and limbs, we have found no entire torsos. Hence we infer that the figures that are still missing were carried away before Cockerell's arrival, because they lay on the surface and could not fail to attract attention.

Inasmuch as Cockerell and his companions merely turned over the ruins of the building in order to collect all the fragments of figures lying among and under them, they finished their labor in a very short time. It never occurred to them to make a real excavation, that is, an investigation of the soil down to the primitive rock. Cockerell took the measurements of the members of the temple architecture lying about, but never dreamed of investigating the structures near by, portions of whose walls actually rose above the ground. He did not even uncover the temple cella and the immediate locality of the temple, and yet on the basis of his incomplete observations, he made arbitrary additions to his plans.

But the travelers succeeded in entirely concealing their treasure, the fragments of sculpture. The authorities of the island, the so-called *Primates*, were appeased by a trifling remuneration, and the sculptures were shipped first to Athens, then for greater safety to Zante, and thence to Malta. Crown Prince Ludwig of

Bavaria, enthusiastic as he was for everything Hellenic, sent the sculptor Martin Wagner from Rome to Zante; and he succeeded after many difficulties in acquiring possession of the fragments. They were taken to Rome, and Thorwaldsen undertook to restore them. His work was admired at the time and praised beyond measure for many years. But today we judge differently. Not only is the old style imitated but very superficially in the parts restored, not only were the fragments actually on hand at the moment not adequately used, while many restorations have long been recognized as erroneous, but everything was done that could be done to make the correction of the errors difficult, if not impossible, for all time. All the broken surfaces were worked down smooth, and the new portions put on with strong metal dowels. Consequently, we can never fit on new fragments with their broken surfaces, and the restorations cannot be taken off without endangering the antique portions. The warning voice of the Berlin archæologist Hirt, who advised executing the restorations in plaster only, was unfortunately unheeded. His suggestion, however, was the best, for it would not have done to leave the fragments wholly without restoration, as was the case with the torsos from the Parthenon in London. The Æginetan sculptures present figures in lively action, which could not stand at all without some additions. Consequently additions had to be made; and while restoration is all right in itself, it should be performed with the utmost care for the old surfaces of fracture, so that the restoration can be promptly changed in case of better knowledge. Hence it should be done only in plaster.

King Ludwig himself, as may be seen from his correspondence with Martin Wagner, intended, after acquiring the Ægina marbles, to order further investigations in Ægina, to learn whether more fragments were to be found, and he was anxious lest others should anticipate him in this. Nevertheless, his purpose was never executed, and no one else undertook the work. Indeed, the very thought seems to have been forgotten.

The excavation now finally undertaken by the son of King Ludwig, Prince-Regent Luitpold of Bavaria, has especially

endeavored to answer three important questions: Are there in existence more fragments of the marble sculptures now set up in the Glyptotheca in Munich? to what period does the temple belong? and to what divinity was it dedicated? We have succeeded in arriving at a decisive and satisfactory solution of all three of these problems.

To begin with the first, I believed that I might surely expect to find small pieces of the temple figures lying about; but I could scarcely hope that there were even heads still to be found. And yet the very first day of digging brought the unexpected. Cockerell, as we have already observed, had looked only upon the surface, without allowing himself to be allured into investigating the ruins of a structure whose walls rise a little above the ground, only a few metres southeast of the temple. Here we discovered a tolerably well preserved propylæum leading up to the temple highway, and in the soft sand that filled the ruin lay, right in a corner, two noble marble heads, and in another corner some excellent thighs and other members.

It is an indescribable sensation, after we have long and intensely cherished the thought of a certain subject and troubled ourselves over it, when finally chance or luck, or whatever we may call it, suddenly brings before our eyes that for which we had scarcely dared to hope. Excavating quite often brings this joy to the archæologist, but it is never stronger or purer than at the very beginning of the undertaking.

A like great joy once fell to my lot in Olympia in the autumn of 1878. I had been devoting myself most assiduously in Greece to the then very scanty remains of archaic art. My whole longing was directed toward works of archaic style, such as had not yet at that time been brought to light at Olympia, when one day, I had the privilege, trembling with joy, of lifting out of the earth the colossal and well preserved head of Hera from the old Heræum.

After this at Ægina, we found a quantity of fragments of marble figures, among them some hands and feet that were wonderfully lifelike in the execution. But complete bodies were no

longer to be found; these were not so easily covered with rubbish and earth, and had doubtless been carried away long before Cockerell's time. We found a particularly rich source of material in a cistern, on the east terrace, in front of the temple, which had once furnished the supply of water that was needed in the sacrificial ceremonies. In the sand which filled this deep cistern there was a large number of marble fragments from the temple roof and of groups of figures,—among them six more heads.

However, it is certain that not all of the pieces that were found belonged to the group of the pediment. In some of them this is quite evident, while in others there is room for doubt. There are heads and other portions of the warriors which greatly resemble the indubitable portions of the pediment in style and in their whole aspect, and yet cannot be a part of that group. However, a definitive judgment cannot be passed on this question until an examination can be made in connection with all the fragments in Munich. Yet this much is certain, that the unexpected increase of our material has also brought us face to face with new problems, and that much more is missing of the figures which once adorned the temple than was formerly supposed.

All the fragments of sculpture that we found, without a single exception, belong to the older classic epoch, and the most modern in style cannot be placed later than 470 B. C. The conclusion to be derived from this, that the palmy days of the sanctuary were passing at this date, was further confirmed by numerous other facts revealed in the later excavations.

But we have now a much clearer notion of Æginetan sculpture in the period of the Persian Wars than was possible before. And it is a marvelous art, a combination of close fidelity to the traditional laws of form with bold and new conceptions of nature, such as are scarcely to be met elsewhere. This faithful observation of nature and this ability to reproduce vigorous, healthy, human bodies, in movement and action, is really more appreciable in the separate fragments, arms and legs, hands and feet, than in the complete figures, because the examining gaze is more concentrated, and only the superior features of this

art are obvious in the fragments, while the defects also are seen in the complete figures.

In Munich, the first thing to do now will be to determine by experiments with the casts how far the newly found fragments fit those already in the Glyptotheca, and what new restorations they will warrant. It is already evident that there will be many important results.

The second question, with reference to the age of the temple, has been answered by the excavations with all the definiteness that could be desired. There has been a tendency in the history of Greek art to date everything as far back as possible. Thus it was thought permissible to place the temple of Ægina and its sculptures far back into the archaic period, into the sixth century. This was indeed inconsistent with the other established facts, and was founded on an utter misunderstanding of the old style of the Æginetan pediment, which is simply not archaic at all, but constitutes the transition stage just preceding the liberal style. Hence I never shared the opinion just mentioned, but always dated the sculptures from the time of the Persian Wars. The excavations have now established this view beyond all question.

It has been demonstrated that the temple, which is still partly standing, and the terrace surrounding it are a new construction built up over the remains of older structures; indeed the temple seems to have had several predecessors, each with its own independent altar. Now, in the "made ground" for the great terrace belonging to the new temple, articles have been found which are themselves not archaic, but belong to the period of the Persian Wars, and which therefore prove that the temple itself is no older than this period.

The earlier structures were built upon sloping, rocky ground. For the new temple a perfectly level floor was graded up and the archaic ruins left undisturbed beneath. This was fortunate for us, since many things from the archaic period were thus preserved. In general, it is a great advantage for us archæologists that the ancients were so careless and indifferent with reference to the remains of their own past, and left so much undisturbed.

It is fortunate that in the ancient sanctuaries order and cleanliness were so deficient according to our modern notions. For thus it comes about that we usually find in the lower strata of the sanctuaries heaps of old votive offerings which were cast away and left lying there.

Thus it was also in Ægina. The rubbish beneath the terrace of the new temple proved to be very rich in old articles from earlier centuries, even as far back as the Mycenean period. Here lay quantities of vessels of all sorts, which had once been brought hither as offerings, and many small figures of the divinity, molded in clay; further, also, ornaments of bronze and many other things. We find here a faithful reflection of the commercial relations of the Æginetans. For most of the votive offerings were not made on the island, but were imported. The Æginetans were very active merchants, who traveled widely. They competed everywhere with the other Greeks, and took part in the opening of Egypt to Greek trade. They were among those who founded Naucratis in the Nile delta. Our discoveries furnish a very pretty illustration of this fact. We found a series of vases in fragments which could come from no other place than Naucratis; they are of a specific, local Naucratic sort, and on some of them are inscriptions showing that they were really intended for use in the sanctuary at Naucratis, and only reached Ægina by chance.

In sailing to Egypt the Æginetans, of course, came into active relations with the Phœnician coast. These, too, have left their testimony in the rubbish of our temple terrace; the products of Phœnician industry are particularly numerous and well represented.

And our discoveries also give us an insight into the relations with the nearer neighbors. Even in the earlier time, it is evident that Ægina's attitude toward Athens was unfriendly, and, on the other hand, quantities of vessels of Corinthian and Argive manufacture were found.

But it is especially important to note that the discoveries about our sanctuary take us back in uninterrupted course to the second

millennium, the period of Mycenaean civilization. Evidently worship was carried on without interruption in this place from that early age down.

On this ancient sacred spot a splendid new structure was erected, in the period about 480 B. C.,—the temple whose pillars are in part still standing, with the smooth terraces round about it; before the east front a large, broad, new altar, the foundation of which we rediscovered; further, a splendid entrance gate, the propylæum, and then to the southeast, without the gate, and abutting on the terrace, a series of apartments for the priests.

We found the battered remnants of the older structures in the "fill" for the new terrace, especially the members of a fine old Doric structure, well-preserved even to the colors, and strikingly resembling, in outlines and technique, the old, pre-Persian temple of Athena on the Acropolis at Athens. Indeed, there is a remarkable general similarity in the history of the sanctuary of Athena on the Acropolis at Athens and that of our Æginetan sanctuary, save that everything in Athens is, of course, on a larger scale: in Athens, as well as in Ægina, an ancient limestone temple of similar outline; in both cases older structures upon an uneven rocky height; but after that in both cases the building of magnificent terraces, the preparation of a broad level place by grading, beneath which the remains of the earlier time are left lying. And then in both cases the erection of a splendid temple.

In Athens the new grounds were begun, as I believe, very soon after 480 B. C., through the initiative of the great statesman Themistocles, the hero of those days. The similar undertaking at Ægina, also, must fall in the period of the Persian Wars, and most probably here, too, about the year 480 B. C. In Athens the construction, which was begun on a gigantic scale, was soon interrupted and left unfinished, until much later Pericles resumed the work. In Ægina the new structure, which was kept in much more modest dimensions, was completed without interruption.

The excavations at Ægina have also given the answer to the third question which we proposed above. They have also

revealed to us to what divinity the sanctuary belonged. Formerly there were only guesses on this subject. The most widespread opinion, and the one most generally accepted in recent times, was that the temple belonged to Athena, because this goddess is represented in the middle of both pediments directing the combats of the heroes. But, of course, this was not a demonstration.

It was thought that certain boundary stones of the sanctuary of Athena constituted a still more reliable evidence, but this also proved to be deceptive, for those boundary stones had been found at a great distance from the temple, and could not possibly have belonged to it. Previously the opinion had been held that it was the temple of Pan-Hellenic Zeus, which was founded by Æacus. Cockerell always held to this belief, although others had long before recognized that this was impossible, and that the temple of Zeus must have been situated on the summit of the highest mountain on the island,—Mount Oros.

At the time of the discovery of the sculptures the question was the subject of lively debates. A merry fellow in the circle of foreigners in Athens at that time, the consul Gropius, indulged his sportive vein to the extent of cutting on a block of marble in the temple of Ægina a votive inscription to Zeus Panhellenios. This forgery, intended only as a joke, was actually taken for genuine, and the perpetrator seems then to have lacked the courage to own up to it. Even the scholars of the great French "*Expédition de Morée*" published the inscription as genuine; but L. Ross, a real expert in inscriptions, immediately pointed out the forgery. In our recent excavations we found the stone again, lying with the inscription face down. The lettering is not different from that of the numerous other modern inscriptions by means of which modern visitors from every land and clime have immortalized themselves at the expense of the beautiful old temple ruin,—disfiguring it shockingly. In fact it is scarcely conceivable how any one could ever have taken this sportive forgery seriously.

However, forgeries are curious affairs. If they support any

wish, any hope, any preconceived opinion, they are thereby secured against prompt discovery.

But our excavations brought to light, finally, a genuine inscription, which gives the name of the divinity,—a splendid old inscription, the record of the construction of one of the predecessors of the present temple, an older temple with an altar. The inscription was worked into the eastern supporting wall of the temple terrace. The name of the divinity given by this record was a great surprise,—not Zeus, not Athena, not one of the great Olympian deities at all, but an almost wholly unknown goddess, Aphæa, turned out to be the occupant of this nobly situated sanctuary, so richly adorned with works of art. This is a very clear suggestion of how defective and scanty our knowledge really is of the divinities that were actually worshiped by the Greeks in the classical period. The goddess Aphæa is mentioned only three times in all Greek literature, and these from the late period of compilation. And yet she had a stately sanctuary and a temple which may well have passed, even in ancient times, as one of the most beautiful far and wide, and which lay upon a height overlooking the sea, where every one sailing for the hospitable harbor of Athens must needs pass by.

But it was this very Athens that broke Ægina in her bloom, and trod her under foot. And the same fate befell the goddess of the Æginetans, Aphæa. The divinities of the Athenians all became famous, while Aphæa dropped out of sight. Only in a few late compilers is her memory preserved.

But once it had been different; once Pindar, the great poet of the select and noble circles, composed a hymn in celebration of Aphæa, not from pure poetic impulse, but, as was the custom of the time, on a definite request from some one else.

The history of our Æginetan temple, as it is revealed to us by our excavations, established the cause of this request with great probability. The dedication of the new, resplendent temple of Aphæa occurred in the very best years of the poet Pindar, who at the very same time composed many a eulogistic ode for the Æginetan aristocrats who won in the national games. At the

solemn dedication of the splendid new structure Pindar's hymn was in all probability sung.

Unfortunately, not a single verse of this poem has been preserved to us. We can but conjecture that Pindar alluded to the legend connected with Aphæa, the contents of which are known to us at least in the form given to it by Nicander, a learned poet of the Hellenistic period. As is well known, Hellenistic poetry searched for remote and forgotten local traditions, in order to draw new subjects from them. Nicander worked up, in one great poem, all the legends in which a transformation occurred. Accordingly he treated among others the story of Aphæa. Only a late prose abstract of it has come down to us.

According to this authority, the goddess Aphæa is identical with the great Cretan goddesses Britomartis and Dictynna; and these two, in turn, were usually identified with Artemis. The essential feature of the matter is, that these goddesses were conceived of as chaste virgins who shun all men. But we know that these goddesses were by no means regarded in their worship as merely the guardians of virgins; on the contrary, they are, first of all, the guardians of women in childbirth, and in general of women in all their distinctively feminine interests. They are represented as virgins only because this thought of them is more elevated: as stern and lofty divinities, they remain unconquered even by man. The conception that virginity is something more lofty and divine than motherhood is as primitive as it is widespread. The Christian Church, also, is familiar with this thought. But these goddesses were represented as actually the guardians of children. And in our sanctuary of Aphæa we found ancient images from the Mycenean period showing her with a child or two in her arms.

The legend of Britomartis current in Crete is that being a chaste virgin she fled from the love-suit of King Minos, escaping only with great difficulty by springing into the sea from a cliff. These three goddesses, Britomartis, Dictynna, and Aphæa, were in all probability conceived of as dominating the waves of the sea. They were the goddesses of a population that had much

to do with navigation. Their worship was developed in the period of Mycenean civilization, in which navigation and the sea in general played so great a rôle, as we know from the monuments. The legend that a divine, feminine being springs into the sea is found frequently, and was originally intended to signify merely the goddess's dominion over the sea.

Britomartis is said, according to Nicander, to have fled thereafter to Ægina. But even the sailor who carried her over the sea in his boat beset her with his love, and she escaped him only by springing ashore. Here she took refuge in a grove; and the grove meant is the pine wood in which the temple at Ægina is situated. Here she vanished, and here the Æginetans built the sanctuary for her, and called the goddess Aphæa, because at this spot she became "aphanes," that is, "invisible." The legend, therefore, rests upon popular etymology, and this upon an undoubtedly false interpretation of the name of the goddess. What the name may have meant originally we do not know.

But her character is revealed, partly by the features of the legend quoted, and partly by the discoveries we made in the sanctuary. These indicate a goddess of a broad, general character who assists women in all their feminine trials.

In actual popular belief and in their worship, the Greek divinities were much more alike than might appear from the confusing variety of names and legends. Many divinities with entirely different names, genealogies, and legends are after all in the essentials of belief and worship identical. There were many others essentially like Aphæa in ancient Greece. And it is especially the sanctuaries of these divinities which are apt to be richly supplied with votive offerings from early times. In early Greek religion the feminine element was, as it appears, the more important. Probably this is a result of the matriarchate which prevailed in the primitive stage of civilization. In public worship the effects of this continued to be felt for a long time, and the excavations, which simply show us the real living factors of faith expressed in the votive offerings, bear witness everywhere to this

predominance of the feminine element in the earlier Greek religion.

The images, the little popular figures of the gods, which are so numerous in old sanctuaries and tombs in Greece, are almost without exception those of female divinities, and aim to do no more than to emphasize the universal, feminine character of the divinity. In the earliest period they are entirely lacking in especial and distinctive symbols. Only gradually, and not until the sixth century, do they become somewhat more individual, that is, types individualized by characteristic attributes.

Aphæa never reached this stage of development. An individual type was never created for her. In the sixth century we find in her sanctuary, alongside the unindividualized images of feminine form, images of the closely related Aphrodite, probably imported, and dedicated at this altar as suitable votive offerings. But an individual type of Aphæa was never created.

The goddess remained in an earlier stage of development. Epic poetry, which wove the gay and glittering garb of legend about the simple creations of faith, neglected Aphæa. She remained a local divinity, familiar only to the Æginetans. But it is precisely in such local phases of worship that we find the most primitive and unaltered elements, rather than in connection with the great and universally recognized divinities. The excavations in Greece have especially advanced our knowledge of Greek religion by restoring to life, through inscriptions and votive gifts, many a being of local faith who had partly or altogether disappeared from the literature preserved to us.

Even in antiquity, attempts were made to simplify the confusing variety of ancient local forms of worship by trying so far as this was possible to interpret the local divinities as phases of the great gods who were generally recognized. But in judging this attempt we must bear in mind that the very essence of the original conception of the divinity is apt to be involved in the local worship.

Modern mythological investigation has often made the mistake of interpreting the names and characters of the local divinities as merely disguised manifestations of the great national gods, while at

the same time flattering itself that it has made a great achievement. This mistake was based upon the silent assumption that the cycle of the great Olympian gods celebrated in epic poetry had always existed as such, and that whatever appeared to stand outside this group must be shown really to belong to it; the local divinities, it was assumed, were merely masks of the great and well-known gods, under which they chose to disguise themselves.

According to this assumption Aphæa would be simply Artemis disguised under that local name. A similar theory of identification was proposed in antiquity. While the Æginetans themselves identified Aphæa, as it seems, with the Cretan goddesses Britomartis and Dictynna, the pan-Hellenic view regarded them all three as merely forms of Artemis. However, we know that the religious worship on the island of Crete itself made a strict distinction between Artemis and the goddesses just named, and also that the Æginetans worshipped their Aphæa as a goddess wholly distinct from Artemis. The tendency to identify, to gather various individual local divinities under one common and universally recognized name, is always a secondary and relatively late phenomenon, even though it began early in ancient times.

Our excavations show that the Æginetans clung with great love to their goddess Aphæa and dedicated many votive offerings to her throughout the entire golden age of their state, that is, until they were subjected by the jealous Athenians. She had as early as the sixth century a beautiful temple of early Doric architecture, most nobly executed. By just what mishap we do not know, probably fire, it was destroyed. Somewhere about the year 480 B. C. the splendid new structure was erected, the columns of which still stand. It is the period of the battle of Salamis, in which, as is well known, the Æginetans so distinguished themselves that the prize of bravery was awarded to them.

It was long ago conjectured that the erection of the temple was connected with the battle of Salamis. Now that we know that Aphæa was the divinity of the temple, more probability attaches to a conjecture recently put forth by Solomon Reinach. In the description of the battle of Salamis by Herodotus, it is said

that along with the Athenians the Æginetans also claimed the honor of having been the first to attack, and thus to precipitate the battle. To them, Herodotus continues, appeared suddenly the spirit of a woman, demanding in a loud and reproachful voice how long they proposed to continue to row backwards, whereupon they advanced to the attack. The Æginetans cannot have failed to put their interpretation upon this apparition, which Herodotus suppressed. In accordance with their belief, it must have been Aphæa who appeared to them, the goddess sacred to sailors, and ruler of the sea, whose sanctuary lay right opposite the scene of the battle, in a straight line to the south. As pious worshipers of this goddess, the Æginetans could not but feel that they were seen by her, since her holy place looked out upon the locality of the decisive battle. And so it would have been easy for them to imagine the goddess as appearing to them in person in order to inflame their courage. And this may have been the incentive for restoring her ruined temple.

This must have been done promptly and with great energy, and the structure together with the sculpture that ornamented it finished in a very short time. For considerations derived from the history of art fix the time as either shortly before or shortly after 480 B. C. In front of the temple the older structures were removed, and a great, level terrace constructed, partly paved; the enormous new altar was pushed as far as possible from the temple toward the eastern end of the east terrace. The temple was constructed in the main of native limestone, but the roof and its ornaments, and especially the figures of the pediments, were made of marble,—of course the beautiful marble from the island of Paros, which at that time was the exclusive material for all finer works of sculpture, and could be very easily brought to Ægina by boat. The best artists of Ægina were commissioned to work out the sculptural adornments of the temple. And, as the remains preserved to us show, they did their work with the utmost application of their highest powers. We can feel in looking at these statues how the sculptors exerted themselves to produce the best and most perfect work possible. We perceive in them the pride of

the Æginetans who had just won the prize of bravery in competition with all other Hellenes, and were here aiming to outdo all the others in art also.

In point of fact, many and excellent as are the works of ancient art brought to light by recent excavations in Greece, on the Acropolis at Athens, in Olympia, in Delphi, and elsewhere, nothing has appeared superior to our Æginetan sculpture, in all around perfection and in its entire artistic quality, indeed nothing anywhere near equal to it.

When the Æginetans had to decide with what groups they should adorn the gables of the new temple of Aphæa, there could be no question that the scarcely individualized figure of the goddess herself and the legend concerning her offered no suitable subjects. Indeed, art always preferred the divine beings who had been made humanly vivid and personal by the national poetry to the more general and not individualized beings around whom centred the local forms of worship. Furthermore, we must remember that the moving spirits in founding the temple were without doubt those proud aristocrats of Ægina whom Pindar so often lauded, and who found their highest joy in battle and the games. Their especial pride was in the early heroes of the land, the Æacidæ, who played so large a part in the national poetry, among them Ajax and Achilles. It was not deemed safe to fight the battle of Salamis without first securing the protection of the Æacidæ. A ship belonging to the Æginetans was sent expressly to fetch the images of the Æacidæ in order that they might lend their aid in the battle. The ship returned with the images just before the opening of the battle.

The deeds of the Æacidæ, which were in the mouths of all singers, were doubtless the best subject for the adornment of the pediments of the new temple. And the goddess who conducted these combats was, of course, Athena, celebrated everywhere in poetry as the ruler of battles.

Thus it came about that the temple of Aphæa, the guardian goddess of women, was adorned with figures representing Athena and the combats of heroes.

Ægina seems to have remained a flourishing and independent state for only a few decades after the completion of the new temple. By the middle of the fifth century her power was broken and she was subjected by Athens. And at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, Ægina was entirely destroyed by Athens and the native inhabitants expelled from the island. Although part of them returned later, the island never recovered from this blow. After that the whole region about the temple of Aphæa became a desolation. Though originally surrounded, as our investigations have shown, with flourishing villages and splendid buildings, the temple was soon left solitary, and only a few pious pilgrims continued to make their way up to it. The excavations have shown clearly how suddenly the desolation of the temple and its surroundings must have come about. The remains of considerable and valuable votive offerings all come from the time immediately after the restoration of the temple; afterwards almost nothing of importance was contributed; even the small and insignificant offerings cease almost entirely from the time of the expulsion of the Æginetans.

The Athenians did their work thoroughly. They did not rest until they had completely suppressed the Æginetans, who at that time, as bold traders, were venturing from their little island to enter into competition with Athens. But they could not prevent the fame of the brave people of Ægina from speaking to us from the ruins, even after these many centuries. To make this speech clear and intelligible has been the purpose of our modern excavations. But the purpose will not be fully attained until the results of the excavations are published in more complete and detailed form.

We raised the question at the start, whether there is not too much done in our day in the line of excavation, whether the material obtained by this means does not come too rapidly and in too great quantity to be properly dealt with. This danger is certainly a real one. Indeed it is beyond question that much important new material resulting from excavations disappears without having done the least good, either on the spot where

found or in the storerooms of local as well as central museums.

But this will be less and less the case in proportion as care is taken, on the one hand, that excavations shall be conducted only under the supervision of a numerous, scientific corps, and on the other hand, that the results shall always be published in detail. In both these respects we still often come short of the mark. But no economy is more misapplied in connection with excavations than the economy in scientifically qualified persons to conduct them. And, furthermore, a publication is indeed often promised, but then spun out at length or not completed at all.

The officials in classical lands who have the authority to grant permission to undertake excavations ought to make it a strict rule to grant such permission only when adequate scientific control of the work is guaranteed, and when a prompt publication is promised with sufficient assurances of completion.

Whoever undertakes to disturb the last repose of an ancient civilization and to call the past from the earth again ought to be aware that he is assuming a heavy responsibility. The future will judge more and more severely of those who have taken that responsibility too lightly. For the time is no longer far distant when no important ancient place will be left for excavation, and the regret will be bitter that work was not done more precisely and more cautiously before, when there was a riotous abundance.

We wish for Greek excavations steady progress, as large a number as possible of practically trained, scientific workers, and thorough organs of publication.

WOMEN AND WORK IN ENGLAND

HELEN BOSANQUET, *London.*

One of the most interesting, as well as difficult, problems of the present time is the twofold relation of women to the family life and to the industrial world. The difficulty lies in reconciling the two relations, which are apt to present themselves as hostile claims, and in their hostility to make women's lives ineffectual in both spheres. At first sight, indeed, the difficulty seems to be from the nature of it insuperable. There is no doubt that in divers ways the woman's position in the family tends to make her inefficient as a wage-earner, and it is one of the axioms of commonplace reflection that the woman who has entered the arena of industrial or professional life is spoiled for her duties as wife and mother. And experience, as usual, is quite ready with illustrations to corroborate the dicta of commonplace reflection. She shows us thousands of women who are actually spoiled for home life by their work in the factories and workshops of industrial life, and we do not always wait to consider whether this result is essential to all kinds of labor, or only incidental to particular forms. But there is, I believe, good reason to hope that the hostility is really a transient phase, a difficult point in the passage to a more or less complete reconciliation.

If we glance at the development of the position during the last century or so, we find a very definite movement, from a time when the two aspects of a woman's life were not obviously distinguished, to the present state of obvious conflict. When

“domestic industry” was still prevalent, the industrial unit was the family working as a whole, and the income of the family fell naturally to its head, who organized the work. There was normally no question as to whether or not the woman was economically independent, whether or not she could earn enough to support herself. The family was industrially the more effective for her contribution to the work, as, indeed, for that of the children also; but there would seldom be any division of the income amongst the coöperators in the work. And it would be a matter of course that the women of the house should assist in the man’s duties, probably making it in most cases the first claim upon their time, and leaving housework and children to be cared for in the intervals. With the removal of industry from the home into workshop and factory has come, also, a sharp division between the man’s work and the woman’s, and between the man’s income and the woman’s. And not only has there grown up with this division the question as to how far the woman is self-supporting, but in so far as her work takes her away from the home, the difficulty of combining domestic and industrial duties has become more apparent.

But even a casual consideration should suggest that the change is not necessarily altogether for the worse. Domestic industry, or, as it is now called, “home work,” has very decided evils of its own; and it is in itself an immense improvement to free the home life from the disagreeable, and often unhealthful, concomitants of manufacture. Where work is undertaken, the home and everything else, including health and comfort, are apt to be subordinated to it, while the hours of work are undefined and often excessive. The conflict between the domestic and industrial functions of a woman is none the less intense when carried on at close quarters, and a woman is not necessarily engaged in making home happy because she is enclosed within four walls.

What has happened is, that with the disappearance of domestic industry the conflict has become more apparent, has shown itself, indeed, as the contradiction which it always was; and this

leads us to look for the further development which may bring with it the reconciliation.

In considering the movement here outlined more in detail, I shall continue to emphasize these two aspects of the question,—the relation to the industrial world and the relation to the family, or, as we may also call them, the economic aspect and the domestic aspect.

The first question, then, and perhaps at the present moment the most important question to be asked about women's work is whether it is such as to maintain the worker properly; that is, whether the wages, or remuneration of whatever kind, is sufficient to ensure a livelihood throughout life. It is a question which hardly arises in a normal state of affairs about men's work; the man who is not at least self-supporting is accounted a failure, something abnormal, and though the older economists used to teach us that wages tended to fall to a subsistence level, they never taught that they fell below this.

But with women's wages the case is different. To a large extent, they earn merely what is called in familiar language "pocket money wages"; a mere contribution towards the support or amusement of the worker, which is generally assumed to be supplemented from some other source. Too often the assumption is a comfortable fiction, but it serves to veil very unpleasant facts, and to justify much that would be unjustifiable in any truer sense; above all it keeps in the background the importance of the "living wage," which is rightly held to be so vital when men are concerned. And yet the question is—if possible—even more important with regard to women than with regard to men. The well-being of the next generation is so intimately dependent upon the physical and moral well-being of the women of this generation, that the existence of large numbers whose health has been undermined by overwork and insufficient nourishment is a serious danger to the community at large. Moreover it is indisputable that the number of the women who are overworked and underfed is very much greater than that of the men in the same condition, both from the superior efficiency

of men as wage-earners, and from their greater persistence as consumers. Gradually, however, it is coming to be recognized that if women are wage-earners at all, they should earn enough to maintain themselves, and this recognition is being accompanied, as one might expect, by an actual improvement in women's powers of earning.

Let us consider, a little more closely, what is meant by saying that a woman should be able to earn by her own work her own maintenance. It does not mean, of course, that every woman should be a wage-earner. The married woman who manages the house, and bears and brings up children may fully earn her living, though she receive no money wage; and one of the hopeful signs to which I shall call attention is the diminution of married women's wage-earning in England.

Nor does it mean merely that the wage shall be sufficient for present subsistence. It must be taken into account that owing to irregularity of work or illness, periods will probably occur in every woman's life, when she is unable to earn (apart from any question of married life), and true subsistence wages must make it possible for her to provide for these. Again, there will be a period of old age when she will not be in a position to support herself, and for this, also, she should be able to provide. This is the very least that is necessary. As a matter of fact, many women are called upon to support young children as well as themselves, and should be in a position to do so efficiently. How far are these conditions fulfilled?

Looking at the question historically, we have no room for doubt that there is a great improvement to record. We have already noted that early in the last century the idea of a subsistence wage for women could hardly have existed. The textile industries cover a large part of women's work, and with regard to these we may quote the following passage from a Report of the Labor Department of the Board of Trade: "Under the old hand-loom system, when both men and women worked the loom, there seems to have been no question of difference of payment for the same work. The women did a lighter kind of work

than 'able-bodied men,' and were paid the same rate as the 'old men and boys' who did the same kind of work * * * Although, however, paid the same rate for the same work, women and girls were rarely owners of their looms, and their fathers and husbands usually drew their wages under the domestic system."

In such industries as these, which are fairly typical, the work of the women became differentiated by the introduction of the power-loom, which afforded what was considered lighter and more suitable work, and drew them from the home into the mill. It was natural that their earnings in the mill should be at first more or less based upon what they had been at home; and it is a good measure of the advance we have made since then that between 1833 and 1897 "the wages of girls under eighteen in spinning mills have increased by about 50 per cent in Dundee, and 100 per cent in Belfast," while the wages of adult women in spinning mills have risen about 70 per cent in Dundee, and 90 per cent in Belfast; and the wages earned by women in the weaving factories in Dundee and Belfast are more than 50 per cent higher than those of men weavers in 1833.¹

A similar differentiation of the women's work has gone on in most industries, though there are still some cases in which the family maintains its position as the industrial unit. In certain districts, for instance, notably in the Northern counties and Scotland, it is found necessary for agricultural purposes that the family should contain a certain proportion of women workers, who do different work from the men, and are paid at much lower rates. It is probable that in these cases the women seldom earn subsistence wages all the year round; while on the other hand, without their coöperation the family would stand a poor chance of obtaining employment. In certain manufacturing trades, again, such as tailoring, where home work still lingers, the man is apt to utilize the work of wife and daughters, with the result that, so far as the family earnings can be analyzed,

(1) *Changes in Employment of Women and Girls*, p. 65.

the share due to the women is less than a subsistence wage, though they increase the man's power of getting through the work.

But though in the vast majority of trades the men and women of a family work independently of each other, it does not follow that the differentiation of the woman's labor from that of the family always brings with it economic independence. Unless there are openings for her in skilled industries, into which she succeeds in finding her way, she continues to earn insufficient wages, which have to be supplemented either by the family or from external sources, in order to afford a maintenance. Where her work lies outside the home, and is not necessary to the efficiency of the principal wage-earner, it happens perhaps more frequently that the division with the family is complete, and that the supplementation comes from the outside. These conditions, we must repeat, tend to make much clearer the real economic position of women, and so to indicate the lines along which we may look for further improvement.

Together with this differentiation of work, and, indeed, resulting from it, is the further differentiation which is withdrawing the married woman from the labor market, and leaving her free to devote her attention to the home and to the children. This is a movement that is obviously more likely to take place in the absence of domestic industry. When the nature of the work is such as to take a mother for long and fixed hours away from home, the evils are more noticeable. Instead of dividing her time between domestic and industrial work, to the detriment of both, she must practically choose between them, with the happy result that in England, at any rate, she is choosing more and more to devote herself to the home. Unfortunately the movement is still young, and to a large extent the choice continues to fall the other way. "Although the tendency is towards the diminution of married women's labor, the minimum percentage is obviously extremely high still. * * * In such towns where nearly all the girls under twenty, and half the women between twenty and forty-five are engaged away from home, we may naturally look for a

high infant mortality, and expectation is justified by the facts.”¹

What, we may now ask, are the actual earning powers of women in England? In the census of 1891, (the results of the last are not yet available,) there were in England 11½ millions of women over ten years of age, and of these 3,945,580 were returned as “occupied,” that is, as engaged in some trade or profession. The professional women are comparatively few, and though some of them, especially teachers, may earn actually less than some of the wage-earners, we shall leave them out of our present consideration.

By far the largest industry continues to be that of domestic service, although there is strong reason to think that a decreasing proportion of women are willing to enter it. In reality, domestic service includes a number of industries, differing very much in the kind of skill required; and this alone would make it impossible to arrive at any general statement as to earnings. The difficulty is increased by the great difference, also, in the amount of skill required, ranging from the art of the trained cook or waitress down to the clumsy ignorance of the rough “general,” or maid-of-all-work. So that for our present purpose all that we can say is that in domestic service, at its best, a woman may not only live well during her working days, but may make ample provision for her old age, and, if necessary, for others dependent upon her; while, at its worst, the life is hard and uncertain, with no possibility of providing for old age or sickness. “The young ‘slavery’ of the lodging house or the coffee shop has to work harder, and under more unfavorable conditions, perhaps, than any other class in the community. The rough-mannered servant girl, accustomed to service with rough-mannered employers, has little before her as she grows older. As soon as she reaches an age when she wants more than a very small sum in wages, she is dismissed and replaced by another young girl. Her previous experience is against her amongst mistresses looking for older servants, and the customs of well-ordered, or at least conventionally ordered, households, often do not attract the girl her-

(1) *Board of Trade Report on Employment of Women and Girls*, 1894.

self. This class of girl in a very few years disappears from the rank of domestic servants, and in doing so, is generally in a worse position than the factory girl in the same grade.”¹

Between these extremes lie the great majority of servants for whom the life, with all its drawbacks, is fairly safe and comfortable, with a money wage which makes a small amount of saving possible. In the report quoted above, the average wage of indoor servants in England is estimated at £16 a year; an average which, it should be remembered, represents comparatively few who are very highly paid, and comparatively many somewhere near the average. Any comparison of these earnings with those of other industries is made difficult and uncertain by the fact that so large a part of the remuneration takes the form of maintenance; but here, as elsewhere, it is obvious that the rate of wage obtainable is chiefly determined by the amount of skill possessed, though no doubt other qualities, such as temper and honesty, become more important than in other industries.

The next largest industry, or set of industries, in which women are engaged, is the textile. The most important of these is the cotton industry as carried on in Lancashire and Cheshire. In a report issued by the Board of Trade in 1893,² we find the average weekly wage of women in the cotton industry given as 15s. 3d. This average, however, includes much subsidiary and comparatively unskilled labor; and to take the industry at its best we must look to the earnings of the weavers, where we have averages ranging from 20s. to 28s., according to the number of looms tended and the particular district.

The cotton industry is one in which, from a variety of reasons, women have always occupied a better and more independent position than in other large industries. In the report just quoted, the average wage of 151,263 women employed in twenty-three industries (including cotton) is given as 12s. 8d. a week; rather

(1) *Board of Trade Report on the Money Wages of Indoor Domestic Servants*, 1899.

(2) *General Report on the Wages of the Manual Labor Classes*.

more than half the average amount earned by the men in a similar group of industries. If we take this average as fairly representing that earned by a very large number of women, we may now ask what sort of relation it bears to their necessary expenditure; assuming that this is not supplemented from other sources.

It is a question that can be answered only in general terms, owing to the different cost of living which prevails in different parts of the country. But we shall not be far wrong if we begin by putting the cost of food for a single woman living alone at about 7s. a week. Of course there are many who spend less than this on their food, but the probability is that they are not maintaining themselves in a state of health and efficiency. Women, again, who are not working or taking active exercise of some sort do not, of course, require so much nourishment as those who are; and members of a family or friends living together will spend less for food per head than when one lives alone: there is less "waste." But for an active woman living alone, the amount requisite to keep her in strength is hardly less than 7s.

The other serious items in her expenditure are house-rent, fire and light, and clothing. The former is the most uncertain, varying from 2s. 6d. or 3s. in London, down to 6d. or 1s. in the country; perhaps an average of 1s. 6d. will be somewhere near the mark; though this, again, is often reduced by the possibility of sharing a room. Fire and light will vary from summer to winter; and the expense of clothing, the least burdensome of necessary expenses in these days of cheap clothing, with the capacity of the individual in managing her wardrobe. Taking all into consideration, we should say that not less than 10s. a week represents the normal necessary expenditure of a woman maintaining herself and living alone, without any luxuries or amusements except such as can be had gratis.

The surplus 2s. 8d. (in our average of 12s. 8d.) is what remains to be applied either to luxuries and amusements, or to provision against times of illness, out of work, and old age. As a matter of fact, it is generally, perhaps inevitably, applied to the former,

and the necessary claims of the latter met by supplementation, either from friends or from poor law and charity. But if we take into consideration the irregularity which prevails in almost every industry, and the uncertainty of women's health, it is difficult to see how, with the best of management, the 12s. 8d. could be made a true subsistence wage, covering all the normal chances of life. And when, as so often happens, the woman has either children or relatives to maintain or assist, the insufficiency of the wage becomes gross.

So much for the average. The problem becomes more acute when we look at some of the factors of which the average is composed. It would not be fair to say that it is composed of extremes. Great numbers of women do earn from 10s. to 15s., but the numbers who earn considerably less are also very great, even when we leave out of account the very young and the very old. It is the mass of unskilled, inefficient women and girls earning from 5s. to 7s. a week which contributes most to our "problems of poverty," and forms the despair of charitable workers. On the other hand, there is a growing class of skilled and efficient women earning from 15s. to 30s., or even more, which brings hope into the situation and suggests better things for the future.

Perhaps London affords the most striking instances of both extremes; certainly it is in London that the worst effects of women's industrial inefficiency are to be found. Many industries are carried on there by means of cheap female labor, which could hardly exist elsewhere, unless, indeed, machinery were used instead; and there is an increasing tendency for the worst kind of employers to move into already overcrowded districts, to make their fortunes out of the work of half-starved women and girls. There are in London a host of miscellaneous trades, some of them employing large numbers, in which not only is the pay low, but the work is also very irregular, often ceasing altogether for several months in the year. Such, to instance a few, are jam-making, bottle-washing, tea-packing, tinfoil work, the commoner kinds of box-making, bootmaking and machining, and the

very large, semi-domestic industry of the charwoman, as carried on in the poorer districts.

Now, on any independent basis, the lives of the women and girls engaged in these trades is an impossible one.¹ What they earn is barely sufficient to feed them while they earn, and for a considerable part of the year they earn nothing. Seven shillings a week is an ordinary recognized wage, and 5s. quite common. But what can a woman do with 7s. a week in London, with a rent to pay of 2s. 6d.? The employers, if they think about it at all, will tell you that she lives at home with her parents and is partly kept by them, and in some cases this is true. But in London young people are quick to leave the overcrowded family, and if a woman over twenty-five is found living with her parents, it is generally because she has to help them as well as support herself. The majority, of course, marry; but too often that means sooner or later an increase of their burdens, either through widowhood or through a bad choice of a husband. The least skilled and worst paid girls are naturally those who marry most recklessly, and are, therefore, the most likely to be called upon to maintain their husbands, or at least their children. It is said that in London alone 185,000 women are heads of families, and though some of these may have independent means, the majority will be dependent for themselves and their families upon what they can earn or receive from external sources. The lot of many of these women is difficult in the extreme. While young, if they have fair health, their high spirits are developed into recklessness by the irregularity of their work, which involves an alternation between excessive toil and absolute idleness; and the unskilled factory girl is rough and uncivilized to a degree which promises ill for the family life for which she is afterward to be responsible. With the bearing of children, following upon such a girlhood, there comes too often the additional burden of ill-health; and when, besides the functions of wife and mother, she

(1) Of course there are exceptions even in these trades, when the employer organizes his business in such a way as to pay his workers properly. His example is enough to prove that the evil is not a necessary one.

has to perform those of wage-earner, also, it becomes literally impossible for her, in the absence of all previous training, to be in any degree equal to her responsibilities.

The position changes entirely if we turn now to consider the women who are able to earn more than the average wage. These are partly to be found amongst the women of superior organizing ability who act as forewomen, or heads of departments, in large establishments; and for these there is a growing demand which is hardly met by the supply. In laundry work, for instance, a woman with any organizing power can easily find employment in which she will earn from 30s. to £2 a week; or if her powers are in any way exceptional, two or three times as much. But the qualities requisite are comparatively rare, and there is a tendency for such situations to fall into the hands, either of men, or of women from the professional classes.

For the most part the higher wages are being earned by women who have acquired skill by definite training in the workshop. Dressmaking and millinery in the higher branches afford openings for large numbers, but the long training required, and the unwillingness of parents to maintain the girls while learning, prove a great obstacle; while in their less skilled forms these industries are overcrowded and poorly paid. But there are also many smaller skilled industries which are absorbing a constantly increasing number of women and girls; and it is these which, in London at any rate, often afford the most promising opening. In such trades as vellum-binding, jewel-case-making, fancy box-making, the better kinds of confectionery-making, cigar-making, upholstery, printing, etc., the earnings may range from 15s. to 30s. and upwards, and the work be done under much better and quieter conditions than in the large factories. Many quiet girls, whose parents would be reluctant to let them associate with the rough factory hands,¹ find congenial companionship in the smaller

(1) I am referring here only to the factory hand of London. The workers in the textile factories in the North are generally a greatly superior class.

numbers of the workshop, as well as greater regularity of hours and labor.

But work of this kind all involves some years of training before the skill requisite to a competent worker can be acquired; and one of the next steps forward in popular education will be to induce parents to see the desirability of such a training. Sometimes it will involve an immediate economic sacrifice, though it is one which will be amply repaid in the future; but the demand for skilled workers is so great that frequently the wages paid during the years of probation are as high as those which can be earned in unskilled industries where the maximum is reached almost immediately. But it generally happens that the little girls, as they leave the schools, drift into the nearest factory for want of some one to take an interest in their future; and at fourteen years of age it is natural that they should be quite satisfied with 5s. a week, and without a thought for the future. Much might be done for them at this point in their lives by the energetic school manager or district visitor who would suggest good work.

Of those who are, at the present moment, interesting themselves in the improvement of women's industrial position there may be said to be three schools: those who put their faith in legislation, and would even go so far as to enact a minimum wage; those who believe in the power of trade-unions; and those whose chief hope lies, as suggested here, in better industrial training. There are also those who are enthusiastic for leaving things as they are, in the half-conscious hope that more women will be forced into domestic service; but their policy is too negative to constitute a school. The day has not yet come when there is any prospect of attempting to regulate wages by law; but to a certain small extent the trade-union movement exists amongst women, and though it makes little progress it is deserving of our notice, especially in its bearing upon the relation between men and women in the same trade.

When men and women work in the same trade, there seems no doubt that the right policy for them is to belong to the same

union. This is the policy followed in the textile trades, and it has doubtless influenced the position of women for good, as well as diminished the dangers of rivalry between them and the men. It is the policy adopted also in the Cigar-Makers' Union, again with advantage to the position of the women, notwithstanding the fact that a lower rate of wage is demanded for them than for the men. Where, on the other hand, the men exclude women from their union, as in printing and upholstery, they generally take the line of excluding them also from all but the subsidiary and worst paid branches of the work.

The following figures with regard to women and trade-unions are taken from the Board of Trade "Report on Trade-Unions" in 1899.

At the end of 1899, there were altogether 139 unions open to women, with 120,488 female members, or 6.7 per cent of the total membership of all trade-unions. Of these 90.6 per cent were in the textile trades; and of all the women engaged in factories and workshops the number in unions was rather more than one in ten. Twenty-eight unions consisted exclusively of women, with a total membership of 8,285; and there were fifty-six unions in which female members were more numerous than males.

There have been many attempts to organize unions amongst the women, and many failures, especially when the attempt has been made from outside. In 1896 there was a Dressmakers', Milliners', and Mantlemakers' Union with six members, and a London and Provincial Domestic Servants' Union with 294 members; but both ceased to exist shortly afterwards. The reasons why women find it so difficult to combine except in conjunction with men would be well worth studying. Partly, I think, they would be found to lie in the fact that most women tend to regard their industrial work as a merely secondary interest; and partly, again, in their lack of mutual confidence.

Consider now the question of the relation between the woman's earning powers, and her position in the family. There is no doubt that one reason why a girl's parents give the prefer-

ence to unskilled over skilled trades is, that it seems a waste to spend a long time in learning to do work which will be abandoned after marriage. Nor is it only uneducated parents who argue thus, though a girl's chances of marriage are less certain in the professional than in the artisan class. If every woman married, and if no woman were ever called upon to earn again after marriage, there would be more force in this argument than there actually is. But it is a cruel and short-sighted policy which makes a woman's subsistence depend upon the chances of marriage, and which neglects the certainty that a very large proportion even of married women will sooner or later be thrown back upon their own resources.

Moreover, the training and discipline involved in learning to do good work are not wasted even from the point of view of the home life. Quickness of eye and hand, preciseness of attention, method and punctuality, in short, disciplined intelligence,—these are the qualities developed by all skilled labor; and who will deny that they are also qualities required in the home? It is the undisciplined, unskilled woman who makes the neglected home and children, because she has never learned to do anything well.

But there is another and even more important way in which a good industrial training reacts favorably upon the family life. I have already noted that it is the unskilled worker who marries recklessly, and who will most often be called upon to support husband and children afterwards; and it is most noticeable that a girl with a good trade in her hands marries later, and is more deliberate and particular in her choice. Those who argue that to make women industrially efficient will be to make them support their husbands in idleness, have quite overlooked the effect of a disciplined intelligence upon the choice of a girl who is not driven to seek an illusory refuge in marriage from poverty and hard toil. It is the girl who feels the alternative of a quiet independence open to her who chooses a good husband for herself, and a good father for her children.

There is one industry, domestic service, which is often thought

to be peculiarly appropriate as a preparation for the duties of married life. To a large extent it no doubt is so. In a well-managed household the servants must learn and practice much that will be of use to them in their own homes afterwards. But there will also be much that cannot be of any use to them, while they may also learn habits of self-indulgence and extravagance which will make the life of a poor man's wife seem doubly irksome. It would be an interesting study to observe how far it is the case that women who have been domestic servants do carry with them into their own homes habits and ideals which are better than those of women who have always lived amongst their own people. One thing is certain, that the woman who has been in service before marriage is at a disadvantage, if she has the misfortune to be left with children to support, as compared with the woman who has learned a trade. She has to choose between parting with her children in order that she may return to service, and attempting to earn a living by unskilled work.

The ideal at which I think we should aim, and towards which we seem to be tending, is that every woman should have the power of earning a sufficient living, but that she should withdraw from industrial work upon marriage, at any rate during the years in which the children are needing her active care. But though the tendency is in this direction, there is still a great deal of industrial work done by married women, chiefly outside the home, but to some extent within also. The reasons for this persistence are very various. Sometimes it is due to the pressure of poverty. Where the man's work is badly paid or irregular, the woman's earnings are needed to supplement his; or, again, among the lowest class the men look to be supported more or less entirely by the women. But it very frequently happens, also, that the women deliberately prefer work, at the factory or shop, to the monotony of home life, especially if they have been used to it before marriage. There is, for instance, a constant flow of girls from the Midlands to the manufacturing counties to look after the children and homes of women who are working in the textile factories, and who would rather earn the money to pay a servant

than do the housework themselves. No doubt this is partly because a woman's earnings, however small, do more to make her feel that she has preserved her independence than the unrecognized work of housewife and mother; while it is not only the uneducated mind which is apt to feel that a shilling earned is a greater gain than a shilling saved. But the main reason is still that the life at the mill, amongst fellow workers, is more attractive than the life at home.

The evils of married women's work are deeply-rooted, and of a nature to affect the whole community. The wastefulness of the housekeeping and the discomfort of the home are perhaps matters which chiefly affect the husband; and if he is made uncomfortable enough he will doubtless use his influence to bring about a change in this respect. But the injury done to the rising generation is far-reaching in its consequences. The law has done something to make the neglect of infants more difficult, by the prohibition of work during the four weeks after childbirth; but children need a mother's care for much longer than that, and are likely to suffer both in their affections and in their health from being left to the care of strangers.

But it is in "home work," the representative of the older "domestic industry," that we must look for the worst effects of married women's work; including here all the women who are "heads of families." If a woman leaves home to go to work, she does generally make some attempt to provide a substitute; if no servant can be kept, the children are sent to school or a "crèche," or a neighbor undertakes to look in and give them their meals, or the eldest girl is kept at home to look after the little ones. Occasionally it may happen that they are locked in and left alone, but there are few mothers who can bring themselves to this, and public opinion would be strong against those who did. At any rate the home, such as it is, is reserved for the purposes of family life. But when once the work has invaded the home, it brings with it innumerable evils. The inexperienced may picture to themselves the mother seated quietly sewing by the fireside, watching over the children who are playing about

her feet, and preparing a cheerful welcome for the returning husband ; and they will ask whether this is not a thousand times better than that the mother should go out to work. Yes ; but the picture is not drawn from real life. Here is one that is, and which, moreover, is fairly typical of the home industry as carried on in London. A small upstairs room, black with the dirt of many weeks' standing, and a thin, worn woman working at a table set in the window to catch the light ; she is making match-boxes at $2\frac{3}{4}$ d. the gross, and the room is sickening with the smell of the sour paste which she is using. The remnants of a meal are strewn on the table and bed, all tainted with the sour paste. One of the sheets, hardly recognizable as white, is used to tie up a great bundle of the boxes, ready to be taken to the shop ; another pile of boxes lies on the floor of the room drying. The woman, as she talks, never looks up from her work nor checks her fingers in their busy manipulation of card and paste ; for toil as she may, she can never earn more than a few shillings a week. The children, pale and dirty, hang listlessly about the room ; one, prematurely old, stands at the table and adds her little help towards increasing the family income. The work will go on till late at night, with hardly an interval to snatch a meal, and no time to pay any attention to the claims of cleanliness. And it is nearly always so with these home industries, when there is any serious attempt to earn a subsistence wage by them ; they are so badly paid that there can be no question of dividing the time between them and the children ; they mean the absolute neglect of everything else. The case is different, of course, when the men of the family are in good work, and the women only work now and again for "pocket money" ; and it is partly because of their competition that the labor of women is so badly paid.

This question of how far the work of married women injures the position of women in the labor market is a complicated one ; it seems fairly certain that where they do poor work, and are content to take poor wages, they are distinctly injuring those who must depend for their living upon what they can earn at the

same kind of labor. We may quote at this point from a Board of Trade Report already referred to:—

“The effects on married women’s labor in the South and in the North are by no means similar, the causes of such employment being different. In the North there has been a large trade demand for female labor that could not be satisfied even by the absorption of all the girls and unmarried women. Married women have hitherto been attracted by the high wages obtainable in the textile trades, more especially in the cotton trade. The women in the North, therefore, have not been inclined to regard industrial employment merely as a means of livelihood for the short period preceding marriage; they have regarded it as their occupation in life far more than domestic management. They work, not merely for a minimum standard wage, but aim at a considerable margin for saving or for greater comfort in living. All these causes tend to make them better workers and to develop industrial ambition. In the South of England, where factory industries are of but small magnitude and the demand for domestic servants is much greater, the attitude of working girls is entirely different. As a rule they look forward to marriage as releasing them from industry. In the upper industrial grades this generally proves the case for a time; the girl rarely aims at becoming a very efficient worker, and when, in later life, she finds herself left to support herself through the death or breakdown of her husband, she finds herself unable to do more than to compete for the odd jobs to be obtained in residential districts. In the lower industrial grades, it frequently happens that girls remain at work after marriage, owing to the small earnings or irregular employment of their husbands. In both cases the effect on industry is the reverse of advantageous, the married labor being of a poor kind.”

We began by saying that the twofold relation of women to the family life and to the industrial world tended to make them ineffectual in both relations. The result of our survey would seem to be that this is chiefly the case when the industrial work in question is of a low order, requiring little skill. When, on the contrary, the work is skilled, and consequently well paid, not only does the training and discipline react favorably upon the woman’s power of managing her home, but she is also less likely by reckless marriage to place herself in a position where she will have to carry on her work to the detriment of the family life.

Before leaving the subject, we must note that the contrast we

have drawn between the domestic work of the wife and mother and that which is more strictly industrial, should not make us lose sight of the true economic nature and value of the former. A woman is none the less earning her living, and in the noblest sense, because she is working without a money wage; but the fact that she does not compete for her work in the labor market, nor measure her exertions by what she can get for them, makes it difficult to apply ordinary economic considerations to her position. And, of course, it is fairly open to question how far even married women, who are presumably fulfilling the most appropriate duties, are always earning a true subsistence in the sense we have defined. The wife who wastes her husband's earnings, or the mother who lets her children grow up undisciplined or feeble, is on a level with the unskilled worker in other industries, and, like them, is apt to fail of independence in her old age. On the other hand, when her duties have been well and skilfully performed, it is seldom that husband and children do not recognize their debt to her and provide for her whole life.

In conclusion, a woman will always suffer under the economic disadvantage of having to change her occupation when she undertakes the duties of family life; but the change, though disadvantageous from an economic point of view, should be a great gain to her life as a whole. What we have to aim at in educating our girls is, that the loss should be as little as possible; and this is best attained when the industrial training develops qualities which can be afterwards turned to good account in the home life.

FRENCH IMPRESSIONISM AND ITS INFLUENCE IN EUROPE¹

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The movement begun in French painting, in 1860, may be considered now as terminated, or rather as having entered upon the stage of criticism. For every movement in art has endless repercussions, and cannot be limited; we may say that it is finished only when its essential developments have all been manifested, and when its secondary applications begin. For the purposes of study, criticism is obliged to survey a movement of art from its dawn to its zenith. Impressionism is still a living force in France and in Europe. Its combative, creative period, however, is ended. It may be already looked at from a distance that permits impartial criticism; the results of it may be stated, and its further extensions foreseen. From the present it belongs to the tradition of French painting; and one of the objects of this essay will be to show wherein, precisely, impressionism is by its technique and its ideas "traditional" in France, despite the fact that it has been violently contested, and that an unmerited ridicule has been heaped upon it which even today has hardly ceased.

Impressionism is the outcome of the efforts and the ideas of a group of artists who, about 1855, gathered around Edouard Manet. The name itself of their school, however, is due to Claude

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Monet, and was generally adopted, in 1860, under the following circumstances. The landscape painter Claude Monet, one of the friends of Edouard Manet, had sent to the Salon a landscape conceived according to a peculiar technique and called, simply, "Impressions." This painting was refused, together with all those which the friends of Manet had submitted. The Emperor Napoleon III. was not opposed to the refusal decreed by the academic painters who composed the jury, but he ordered that the rejected works be grouped together in a hall by themselves, which was baptized the "Salon des Refusés." The personality of Manet and of his friends had already made public talk and had greatly outraged the feelings of the official painters. The crowd poured into the despised Salon to amuse themselves at the expense of these "ridiculous" works. The painting of Claude Monet, in particular, excited the public derision, and, after its title, they called all those who painted according to that technique, "Impressionists." Gradually criticism began to make use of the term in articles devoted to the subject, and desired to find in it a formula for what Monet never had in his mind. The painters cherished this epithet which chance had bestowed upon them, and proudly adorned themselves with it, precisely because it was due to raillery. As to the essential theory of this group of innovators, it is properly to be ascribed, not to Manet, but to Claude Monet. Edouard Manet, in all his first period, was a realist sprung from Goya and near neighbor to Courbet. Under the influence of the work and the opinions of his friend, he painted those pictures of his second period which are "impressionist" works. It is, accordingly, to Claude Monet that the title belongs of chief and theorist of the school with which we are occupied; and I shall immediately set forth its principles in order that I may be able to use with clearness the term, at the best inexact enough, which serves to define them, and which, for convenience in argument, I shall employ in the following pages.

According to Claude Monet, objects have no color of their own, but solely that which is imparted to them by the reflection of the sky and of the enveloping atmosphere. The aim of painting

is to reproduce these reflections and so to analyze them as to give the exact impression of the color of the objects represented. It is through an illusion that we speak abstractly of the color of flesh, of foliage; in reality, we do so only as we recall the color of flesh in sunlight or in a room; of foliage in shade or in full light at noon-day, because the tones (or hues) of the flesh or the foliage are absolutely dissimilar under the two circumstances. Our memory chooses one of these circumstances, and fixes, in accordance with that which it has chosen, the name of the color which it applies to flesh or to foliage. A tree is not green, a nude woman is not rose color, except at moments determined by the light. Painting, then, is the study of the variations of atmospheric light. There is no *fixed* color whatever. How shall we study these infinitely subtle variations? By getting as near as it is logically possible to the solar light itself. The seven hues of the prism do not act separately in nature; they blend, they are present in all coloration, and may always be found there. Analysis shows that all coloration contains them *juxtaposed*, and that upon our retina their parallel vibrations are recomposed in a single color-tone. It is because of these vibrations that we have the sensation of atmospheric transparencies and of perspective planes; and according to the greater or less density of the layers of air charged with iridescences the tonalities of different objects vary. Thus we have the perception of perspective. A group of trees near by is green. Seen at a distance of a hundred metres, it is bluish, because of the density of the luminous layers of air surcharged with the reflections of the illuminated azure of the sky. Why, then, should not the painter avail himself of these scientific conceptions, in order to attain to an absolutely true expression of light by proceeding in a manner similar to the luminous waves themselves? Claude Monet accordingly determines, in the first place, to eliminate by degrees all merely factitious colors, and to limit himself to the seven colors of the spectrum. Next, he resolves to paint without mixing these colors, the mixture of which always returns to gray; and in order to leave them their full intensity, he juxtaposes them upon the canvas in minute

touches. With the view of putting on these touches in a logical way, he considers first what the surrounding reflections are, because the waves of light, when striking upon surfaces, react upon one another. Accordingly, the coloration of the principal source of reflections should determine the principal portion of these touches upon the canvas; for example, blue should predominate if the illumination comes directly from the sky, orange and red if it is from a fire, green and yellow if it is from a screen of foliage lighted up from behind. With this in mind, Monet frequently made a study of tables spread under the trees (one of his favorite "motifs"), and noted the subtle breaking up of the many-colored lights upon the white surfaces of the table linen. It is plainly seen that *white* does not exist by itself; it is, indeed, as science teaches, the fusion of the entire spectrum. It is plain, also, that, upon the canvas seen near by, all the colors of the rainbow are juxtaposed, and that two paces away our eye acts as it does in the presence of nature; that is to say, it recomposes these color-tones upon the retina, and thus is able to give to our minds the conception of a table-cloth as *white*, according to the very method of nature. The ideas of Monet are, therefore, strictly conformed to those of Helmholtz and of Chevreul.

But no more does black exist. Black is theoretically the absence of color. Even in the night there is no black. This idea leads Monet to suppress black and to observe that in shadows colors continue their vibrations, weakened but still existent. He contends, for example, that the shadow parts of a haystack in a field are colored with as many colors as the lighted parts, but in a different key, as an air in music may be transposed from the major to the minor. Up to that time painters had considered shadows merely as parts fitted to make the lighted portions more brilliant, and painted them with made-up colors, of a red or blackish color-tone, without transparency. From very few painters does one receive the impression of a natural shadow; it seems that if one suddenly modified their forms, and lighted them up differently, their faces would appear as if daubed with black on one side. With very few painters, for instance, does white linen

seen in the shade give the true sensation of its color-tone. Monet, then, paints shadows with as much variety as illuminated parts. Frequently in his canvases, we observe that the shadows are obtained simply by a closer accumulation of touches, and that is precisely what takes place in nature; science demonstrates that the shorter and denser luminous waves are the more obscure. Monet observes also that orange and blue are the most frequent vibrations of light and of shadow; orange harmonizes yellow and red, blue absorbs violet and its derivatives. By basing the symphony of tones upon these two colors, a true harmony in landscape is surely obtained. The most intense black is expressed by blue. I have used the terms symphony, harmony, scale, color-tone: these are terms common to music, and in reality the painting of Monet is very much akin to this art. The landscapes of Monet are symphonies in color constructed upon simple themes. He has given a very definite expression of his theory by painting several series of twenty views of the same subject,—a haystack, a group of poplars, a cluster of willows lighted up, the angles of a cathedral, studied in twenty different lights, from dawn to moonlight. The subjects are nothing, the one actual subject is the study of light. Monet is a simple man, without intellectual pretensions, who believes himself to be a pure realist. He works at his canvases, changing them hourly, having brought them in a carriage, and he works at them in that way each day, according to the hour, finishing them all together. But this man is a visionary of genius, and he penetrates so deeply in his contemplation of light, that he gives to his symphonies a significance almost pantheistic through the study of the vibration of atoms. At every instant a point is reached where reality dissolves into pure radiance, matter is volatilized, and the art of Monet yields sensations analogous to those of music and of lofty lyric poetry.

Finally, we are to infer from the ideas of Monet that the line, as drawing defines it, is an error, an artificial means of determining forms. Everything in nature is a succession of perspective planes and surfaces which join on to one another; nothing is abruptly terminated by a contour, and the vibration of the

atmosphere envelops everything and drowns the contours which the weakness of our mind is constrained to create. In this point statuary is nearer the truth than painting, for its successive surfaces are limited only by the luminous vibration. Painting, then, should not outline objects or figures by a conventional handling which sharply detaches them, but treat them so that from the lighted parts of a figure to the shaded parts, even to the deepest shadow, the light should insensibly diminish, without one being able to determine the precise point where it appears to leave the figure. To sketch is to establish the perspective planes and their reciprocal values. And since the perspective is established only by the color-tones, to sketch is to paint, and that is, first of all, to find out the color-composition of the atmosphere.

Such are the main ideas of Claude Monet and the impressionists. It will be observed that they are concerned exclusively with the technique of painting and not at all with its intellectual side. Nevertheless, the choice of subjects of these painters is very characteristic. It is limited to modern realism, to the story-like representation of modern things. Impressionism does not occupy itself either with composition or with style in the sense in which the older artists understood it. But I ought to say, at once, that this manner of conceiving art is entirely distinct from the theory itself of Monet. Realism is in no wise bound to the impressionistic manner, which may be applied to all subjects. It happened that Monet inaugurated his way of painting in a generation which came after romanticism, and which was in love with realism. Courbet had already painted in this mood. Manet's art came from Franz Hals and the Spaniards, and when he sought "themes" for the expression of impressionism, he continued quite naturally to select those contemporary personages which he was painting before. It is, therefore, important to state with precision that impressionism is *an evolution, exclusively technical*, of French painting. It was conceived at a time when authors, as well as artists, were absorbed with realism. The greatest friend of Manet was Emile Zola. At this period Courbet and Manet were combatting, in defence of the ^{of} painting of contemporary subjects, the ideas of

the official school, which inherited the traditions of Rome and of David, and which rejected as base and unworthy all art which dared to turn aside from mythology and historic painting. Zola, the Goncourts, Flaubert, were in like manner combatting the sentimental novel. By an instinctive sympathy, by the mutual attraction of their spirit of independence, and, because of the ridicule which was lavished upon them, these writers and these painters were drawn together. The question of impressionism is distinct from the tendency to see the end of art in the expression of the time. To confine our attention, for the moment, simply to the theories of technique of impressionism, let us recall their antecedents,—for there is no sudden chance-discovery in art. Monet gave this conception definite expression, but others had presentiments of it. It is found in certain frescoes of Andrea del Sarto, in Memling, in the Byzantine mosaic, in its earliest stage. Among the moderns, it is found almost complete in Watteau. The “Embarkation for Cythera,” for example, is a painting which shows that Watteau had perfectly grasped the division of color-tones as Monet understood it. Turner, likewise, had this method in mind in many of his paintings where the shadows are colored, and where there is never any black. Finally, Delacroix reflected upon this problem, and a fragment such as the nude woman kneeling in the foreground of the celebrated “Crusaders Entering Constantinople” is an example even of the theory. At a near view, one sees that the parts of the back in shadow are modeled by a succession of strokes of blue, which, being the complementary color of yellow, with which the lighted parts are painted, admirably express the warm color-tones of the flesh in shadow. This theory of “complementary colors” has been taken up and pushed to its logical consequences by a group of young painters of whom I shall say a few words presently. It has for its basis the reaction which the juxtaposition of two tones produces in our eye, for example, blue and orange: a third tone springs forth, so to speak, from the collision of the other two; and by bringing about this collision one is able to cause a sort of special vibration upon the retina. Delacroix had foreseen this principle, but purely

by the sensitiveness of his vision ; Claude Monet had the merit of establishing its invariable rules. As to the question of drawing without lines, by perspective planes blending figures with the atmosphere, Velasquez and Rembrandt, and above all the latter, have given admirable examples of it, as contrasted with the Italians and the Germans, who have always delimited their figures by outlines, and have regarded drawing as the principal medium of their art, color being an agreeable accessory to it. This comes from their propensity to idealism and to the predominance of thought in painting. For them color is the sensuous element of their art, while drawing alone defines the meaning and the intellectual design of the painter. The colorists, those who are disposed to find in color itself a symbolism and a source of æsthetic emotion, are led to deny the preponderance of the line,—an artificial element, since in reality nature does not exhibit it. The idealists have always preferred the line, a human medium, and the realists, faithful to nature exclusively, have always preferred color. Moreover, the example of Monet clearly shows that there is a moment when the intense contemplation of nature ceases to be realistic, and becomes poetic ; and there is here, at bottom, only an artificial distinction. But it is beyond doubt that from the point of view of technique, since the study of light is admitted to be the ideal of certain painters, the theory of drawing by areas is the true one. The name “ painters ” should be reserved, perhaps, for men like Rembrandt or Monet, and another term found for those who, like Signorelli or Burne-Jones, wish to subordinate painting, properly so called, to the expression of ideas,—religious, philosophical, or literary. But the discussion of this would take us too far, and away from our present subject.

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The theories of Claude Monet excited unbounded indignation in the studios of official and classic art. They attacked, indeed, the entire instruction of the professors of the school of Rome on three essential points : the suppression of the line, the suppression of fixed color, lastly, the rejection of the ideal of the “ noble

subject" in favor of the direct study of reality. The third point raised a storm of wrath in the time of Courbet, and afterwards in the first period of Manet. The study of nature, at that particular time, was slighted by the Academy and its instruction. Artists were occupied only with the study of the nude, and with the pursuit of a pretended nobility of forms, which allowed only certain poses and certain proportions. The accessories, backgrounds of landscapes, were generally painted in an artificial manner, never from nature. Work was never done except in the light of the studio. Paintings made in the open air were unknown. Landscape was looked upon as quite a secondary kind of work, and the representation of a peasant or a laborer was entirely excluded. The "noble subject" was mythology, allegory, or an episode of history, Greek, Roman, or biblical, treated of course without any archæological accuracy. It may be imagined, then, how revolting were the ideas of the realists to the Academy, which had already been offended on another account by the romanticism of Delacroix, the landscapes of Rousseau and of Troyon. The realists were looked upon as coarse and low creatures from the very nature of their conception of things. But when Manet revealed his manner, a revival of Hals and of Goya, the scandal became still greater. Around that fiery realist of original insight there gathered a certain number of personalities, very unlike each other, whom history has made inseparable, and who must be counted henceforth in impressionism, although they did not all of them adhere to it in their works. At the "Salon des Refusés" of 1860 were to be seen Manet, Claude Monet, the Dutch Jongkind, the American Whistler, the engraver Bracquemond, the painter-engraver Legros, Eugène Lavieille, and Fantin-Latour. All have become today famous and respected. To these must be added two men who are among the greatest painters of our age,—Degas and Renoir,—and the landscapists Camille Pissarro and Alfred Sisley, who were not represented in that Salon. And Monticelli must be given a place apart, an isolated painter having affinity at once with Watteau, with Delacroix, and with impressionism, by his technique and his imagination. He died very poor, leaving

some admirable sketches, in which there lives a world of dream-like figures, painted with a vague and strange magnificence.

The violent quarrels of the "Salon des Refusés" lasted thirty years! Up to his death, which occurred in 1882, Edouard Manet exhibited in the Salons, always exciting ridicule. In the end, however, he imposed respect. One of his paintings, the "Bon Bock," had a great success. Manet is a painter of genius, a maker of easel pictures of magnificent vigor, who has left evidences of his power in all the forms of painting, portraits, still-life, marines, and genre work. His first manner seems to have been inherited from Goya; it is sombre with vivid contrasts of extreme boldness; the most beautiful works which he then produced are the "Toréador tué," "Lola," "Le Fifre," the "Christ aux Anges," the "Bon Bock," some portraits, notably that of Emile Zola and that of the artist's sister-in-law, Mme. Eugène Manet, who, under her maiden name, Berthe Morisot, was an impressionist "aquarelliste" of the most delicate refinement. The second manner of Manet, inspired by Claude Monet, is very luminous in harmonies of whites and blues; it depicts bargemen on the Seine in summer, scenes at public balls, portraits of workmen and of daughters of the common people, wherein he has fixed forever the whole soul of the Second Empire. The "Bar des Folies-Bergères," the "Musique au Jardin des Tuileries," the "Régates à Argenteuil," "Nana" (after the novel of Zola), "Olympia," are among the "chefs-d'œuvre" of this great master of the modern character, an artist of splendid fertility, and one who, by the amplitude of his style, the accuracy of his vision, and the intense originality of his manner, is the greatest painter of the end of the nineteenth century, as Puvis de Chavannes is its greatest decorator. The influence of Manet was enormous; he almost created modern illustration, and all our painters owe something to him. Yet it may be said of him that he died prematurely, without having given out his full measure.

Emile Zola, Duranty, Goncourt, Antonin Proust, courageously defended Manet and his friends, among whom we must not forget Bazille, a young painter of great talent, who was killed in

1870, and Caillebotte, who left some interesting pictures. Caillebotte bequeathed to the Luxembourg Museum at Paris a whole collection of impressionist works six years ago. He had bought of his friends all these paintings, many of which are beginners' pieces; but among these are some admirable ones; and the hatred against the new school is still so great that the Academy did everything to make the State refuse the legacy. It was accepted only because of a certain number of paintings of older schools which Caillebotte had also bequeathed, on the expressed condition that the whole legacy should be accepted, or nothing. Had it not been for this circumstance, doubtless, there would not be today a single impressionist work in the museums of France. The opposition was so strong that several professors of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts, members of the Academy, wished to tender their resignations, declaring that they would take serious offence "if there should be admitted into the museums works which were the negation of their art as they taught it." This circumstance gives one a curious idea of the stubborn opposition to impressionism. The innovators had bitter experiences. They were treated as fools, and nobody bought their pictures. They suffered all sorts of injustice. A novel of Zola, "*l'Œuvre*," admirably recounts these struggles, and gives a very accurate picture of the situation of impressionism at this period. A merchant, M. Durand-Ruel, who was a man of taste, dared to buy the paintings of these reprobates. He aided them at their beginnings and afterwards he made a fortune out of the venture. Today a Claude Monet brings twenty thousand francs. The tenacity of these artists was necessary in order that their ideas, at first comprehended by a hundred persons, should gradually become disseminated. After Manet there is a group of three great painters: Claude Monet, to begin with, a landscape painter of splendid power, next Renoir and Degas. Renoir is an agreeable painter whose art comes directly from Watteau and from Boucher. A painter of women and of flowery landscapes, he is a harmonist of charm and of delightful variety. He is the painter preëminently of the effects of sunlight sifted through foliage, of changeable stuffs, of

heads of hair with the light falling upon them, of laughing faces, of blue waters, of women at the theatre; he is gifted with a sprightly and exquisite grace. Degas is an intense realist, almost a caricaturist, with superb power as a draughtsman; superior above all in the rendering of the modern character. His "danseuses," his women at the bath, are marvels of truth. He comes very near to Ingres in the masterly sureness of his drawing. He gives expression at once to the grace and the defects of modern nudity, to the brilliancy and the absurdity of the scenes of the theatre. He is a pastellist of the first rank, a master in technique and in analytical power, a marvelous delineator of true movements, of emotions, and of attitudes. His color is far from having the brilliancy of that of Renoir and of Monet, the boldness of that of Manet; it is rather subdued and obtained by refined processes. Monet is a poet, Renoir a dreamer, Degas a psychologist. Near these three superior artists must be placed Sisley and Pissarro, who have painted numerous landscapes of a beautiful and original coloring. Berthe Morisot, who was a rare artist and a woman of superior intelligence, Miss Mary Cassatt, the sole pupil of Degas, the author of vigorous and knowing paintings, Lebourg, a landscapist whose work is characterized by subtle harmonies, Fantin-Latour, author of superb portraits and of symbolic scenes in which dwells a dreamy grace, an artist of great elevation of spirit,—finally, Alphonse Legros, a draughtsman and painter of considerable merit, who has established himself in England, and has won there a high position.

This impressionist school was considered as a sacrilege. In reality, it was much more traditional and more French than the academic art. That was the product of degenerate Italianism, introduced into France by the school of Fontainebleau, and reduced to system by Louis XIV., by the creation of the school of Rome, by the propagation of a false ideal, neo-Greek and neo-Roman, which is quite opposite to the true direction of the French genius. Realism, as Manet and his friends conceived it, is infinitely more natural to France than is mythologic art. Degas joins on directly to Clouet, to Debucourt, to the "petits-mâîtres"

of the eighteenth century; Renoir to Watteau, to Boucher, to Lancret, to Fragonard; Monet joins on to Claude Lorrain and to Carle Vernet, while the principal representatives of classicism since 1850, Delaroche, Cabanel, Bouguereau, Robert Fleury, Gérôme, and others like them, join on to nothing but the bad Roman school of Bernini, of Primatice, and their successors. In that school there is no life, no spontaneity, no feeling, but only a cold and often factitious science of correct drawing,—poor color, absence of sensibility, a pursuit of the beautiful in a proportion modeled on the Greeks, as if the Greeks themselves had not been first of all realists in truth of movement. In this school but few men of genuine talent may be counted, like Henner and Hébert, like Jean-Paul Laurens, the only original and remarkable historical painter who has come out of the official instruction. The French academics have neither the qualities of color and of drawing of men like Manet, Degas, Monet, or Renoir, nor the qualities of style and of ideality of men like Burne-Jones, Watts, Rossetti, or Böcklin. They are mediocre artists, and their enmity is as much towards painters like Gustave Moreau, Millet, Corot, or Puvis de Chavannes as against the impressionists, because these masters have given proof of an independent originality. Corot was a harmonist who took pleasure in two or three color-tones. Puvis de Chavannes, likewise, reduced his fresco decorations to a few color-combinations, but he was a very near neighbor to the impressionists, whom he admired, as shown in his care for transparent shadows and simplifications of design. In certain canvases of Millet (the "Rainbow" at the Louvre) are found anticipations of Claude Monet, and even in Gustave Moreau there are frequent traces of an analytical decomposition of color-tones.

Impressionism, then, may be considered, on account of the high merit of certain of its adepts, and on account of the originality of its technique, as well as its conception of the modern spirit, as the last great movement of the French school in the nineteenth century, and as a return to the tradition of the eighteenth and of the sixteenth centuries, in opposition to the degenerate Italian spirit, which was the product of the seventeenth century and the first

Empire, consular and Roman. Manet is dead ; Monet, Degas, and Renoir have shown the full measure of their powers. From this time forward one may study the influence of this school.

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It is very considerable in France and in Europe. First of all a revolution in technique, impressionism has succeeded in stamping its principles deeply upon the whole contemporary French school. After the first impressionists came men who thought of applying its theories, while freeing themselves from the realism which had been coupled with it by circumstances ; and there resulted from this some beautiful works. The most significant of these men, certainly, is Albert Besnard, the greatest living French painter, if one thinks of him as the junior of Renoir, of Monet, and of Degas. Besnard began as a realist-impressionist, gifted with an exceptional virtuosity. He pushed to its furthest limits the study of reflections upon the human physiognomy. He is fond of conflicting lights, painting objects illuminated by the moon and by a lamp, or by two opposing lights, and in this direction he has accomplished wonders. He is a painter in love with color, he revels in it with incredible audacity. But he is also an astonishing draughtsman, nervous and thoughtful. Little by little he has expressed his soul and his dreams, and has now attained to the creation of easel pictures in which lives simply his love of light, and at the same time of decorative works, wherein very lofty thoughts find expression without impairing his qualities as a painter. Aquarellist and pastellist of the first order, unrivalled painter of horses, orientalist, marine painter, portraitist, Besnard has given evidence, in his immense production, of a genius as versatile as it is attractive. He is a poet whose visions are luminous and impassioned. Paris possesses several of his decorative pieces of a style absolutely modern, at the Ecole de Pharmacie, at the Sorbonne, at the Hôtel de Ville ; and recently he has decorated the chapel of the village of Berck with a series of evangelical scenes in which the Christ appears modernized with singular power. Besnard marks

plainly the transition from realism to subjective art. He has all the accomplishments of the impressionists, but he bestows them upon works of lofty thought. He was able to understand the precious discoveries in technique, while completely freeing his imagination and soul from the narrow bounds of realism. This assemblage of qualities has made him the complete painter, the most respected master of the new generation. In the Salons he along with Mr. Whistler is the most copied. It is extremely striking to note the revolution which impressionism has made in the Salons. Monet, Renoir, Degas, have never exhibited there, in spite of the conviction of Manet, who desired that impressionism should appear as a legitimate experiment in art, entitled to the same distinctions as others. They have always exhibited by themselves. Although celebrated, they have never received honors, and the official painters pretend to ignore them. But though they are absent from the Salons, they are still present there in the crowd of canvases in which one recognizes their technique; and it must surely end in their being admitted. One sees there only landscapes in blue and orange, silhouettes caught from the life, bright color harmonies, portraits boldly composed. Sombre paintings are in the minority. It may be surmised that all of the younger generation are partial to these excommunicated artists. Mythology is of the past, models are no longer seen, because the painters have taken to making the peasants, the workmen, pose out of doors and in their ordinary clothes. Claude Monet has a legion of copyists, and Degas also and Besnard, so that the school is humiliated in its own sanctuary. Maurice Eliot, Gaston La Touche, Henri Le Sidaner, Henri Martin, may be considered as strict impressionists. Quite recently, a group of artists, the most important of whom are René Ménard, Lucien Simon, Charles Cottet, Edmond Aman-Jean, Lévy-Dhurmer, have exhibited some beautiful works, wherein the feeling for the inward life, for the soul, is quite opposed to realism. But from the point of view of technique, impressionism has influenced them profoundly. "It has cleaned up the palette," said Puvis de Chavannes. And, indeed, it has

given all the young people a horror of the formulas of the studio, love of the open air, love of truth and of beauty freed from conventionalities, and from this point of view its services have been immense. Its applications are very considerable. The most curious of them was made to the poster by Jules Chéret, who was a printer by trade, lived a long time in London, at the period when the poster was made in black and white, invented a way of adding red to it, then the other colors successively, made himself a painter, and became one of the first pastellists and decorators of his time. Chéret seems to have been influenced by Fragonard; he is a ravishing colorist. He has created a type of the Parisienne, the daring grace of which is inimitable, and has made a series of red chalk drawings which recall the finest work of the eighteenth century. But the poster will remain his title to renown. This "moving decoration of the street" has been for twenty years a feast for the eyes: it has been universally admired and copied. Chéret is a pure impressionist, in his juxtaposition of bright colors, and in his constant application of the principle of complementary combinations. But all modern illustration likewise bears the stamp of these principles; the sketches in the journals of Steinlen, of Forain, of Toulouse-Lautrec, proceed from them, not only in the modernized and caricaturist way of looking at things, but still more in the manner of disposing the personages and of coloring the prints.

Lastly, a group of artists has taken up the theories of Manet from a point of view purely scientific, and has given curious examples of the effects of the juxtaposition of color-tones. They have tried painting by the massing together of minute round touches, which has brought them the name "les pointillistes." They have gone to excess in their principle by giving it a vexatious scientific character which does not at all accord with the spontaneity of art, but certain of them are interesting, notably the Belgian painter Théo van Rysselberghe, who has a good deal of talent. Impressionism has also contributed enormously to the development of printing in colors and of lithography. Finally, it may be said that if realism is a theory insufficient to create a style, precisely

because it suppresses the idea of style in order to commend the study of character and the direct transcription of aspects, the combination of realist and impressionist technique has modified contemporary vision. It is difficult to say exactly in what, since we have to do with a negative influence. I mean to say that the example of Renoir, of Monet, or of Degas has above all things shown what must not be done, and has left to the free personality of each artist the task of discovering for himself his true course. In commending, for its single rule, the contemplation and the love of nature, this school has imparted to young people a salutary aversion for all those æsthetic precepts which warp the mind, and would reduce dissimilar temperaments to one sole, arbitrary way of conceiving things. Here we have the best result of impressionism. In the modern works one is aware of certain characteristics: there is more freedom in the attitudes of personages, more brilliancy in the colors, more of what is natural, more ease, freshness, more attention to atmospheric effects, even in the case of painters who seem to have no relation at all to the first impressionists. It is upon the artistic sensibility, much more than upon the subjects, that these spontaneous artists have had their influence. They have revived vision, especially from the point of view of landscape. After the decorative and stylistic landscape of the seventeenth century, after the romantic landscape, they have brought in a new era, completely original. Special mention must be made of J. F. Raffaëlli, who belongs to impressionism by his drawing, and who found while painting the outskirts of Paris, so characteristically, a kind of barren landscape in which he is incontestably the master.

Abroad, the influence of impressionism has been considerable, and will last for a long time to come. Notably in Belgium, it may be said that it has raised up quite a school, which has broken with the traditions of the Academy of Antwerp, where a sombre, historical style of painting is held in honor, to turn resolutely towards light and the rendering of nature. The most fascinating of the Belgian impressionists is certainly Emile Claus, some of whose works are almost as beautiful as those of Claude Monet,

and who has painted Zeeland, the country of canals and of polders, with an astonishing feeling for light and for the picturesque. Albert Baertsoen, Willaert, paint the old Flemish cities, especially Bruges and Ghent, after the impressionist methods. Mlle. Anna Boch, Heymans, Verstraete, are remarkable open-air painters. Finally, "pointillisme" is joined in Théo van Rysselberghe with great practical knowledge of composition, and while painters like Xavier Mellery and Fernand Khnopff are allied to the idealist art of the English Pre-raphaelites, the majority of the new Belgian painters are above all interested in light and its changing effects.

There should be mentioned, in addition, among the Dutch, Mesdag, Toorop and Zilcken, Henry de Groux, Victor Gilsoul, Eugène Laermans, James Ensor, George Lemmen, as artists connected with the impressionist modernism by their technique and their manner of composing. Painting is in a flourishing state in this little country of Belgium. Modern art has here revived the old tradition of Flanders, at once realistic and mystic; and one is surprised at the abundance of the production and the originality of the temperaments.

In England, impressionism is hardly to be considered, because it is so closely bound to realism, and the Pre-raphaelites have come to the front with an art completely idealistic, in which the line predominates as well as subjects poetic, symbolic, and legendary. Nevertheless the school of Glasgow has recently appeared as a vigorous and drawing reaction, with such artists as Lavery, Lorimer, Johnston, Lionel Walden, who send to the French Salons works admirable for their brilliancy and spontaneity. In England Alphonse Legros has established himself, an austere painter, an etcher of sturdy truthfulness. It is there also that one of the most brilliant painters of the period works, John Sargent, an American by birth, quite analogous to Besnard in the brilliancy and sumptuous fancy of his portraits, a masterly draughtsman, a virtuoso of profound knowledge, understanding how to restore in his portraits of women the careless elegance of the eighteenth century. The influence of impressionism is beginning to extend itself gradually in England. In Germany

it has already great power. Over against the romantic and symbolist painters who sprang from Böcklin, and of whom Franz Stuck is at present the truest representative, a school has been founded upon the initiative of the highly gifted realist Max Liebermann, of Gotthardt Kuehl, and of some others, whom impressionism has profoundly influenced, and who at certain points connect themselves with the psychologic art of Adolf Menzel and of the great portraitist Lenbach, all aiming to restore the true tradition of German art, in opposition to the Düsseldorf Academy, imbued with mythological neo-Italianism. In Denmark, the most remarkable painter, Kroyer, is all absorbed with impressionist theories. In Norway, the same is true of the landscapist Fritz Thaulow, who is a master in the art of rendering bubbling waters and the transparencies of the night. In Sweden, the most important painter, Anders Zorn, landscapist and portraitist of fiery talent, is likewise an impressionist next door at once to Degas and to Besnard. In Italy, one of the principal artists is Jean Boldini, who has affinity at once with Whistler, with Helleu, and with Degas: it may be observed that the decorator Michetti is also engrossed in the problem of impressionism, in his technique. In Spain, closely related to Zuloaga, who is himself a worthy heir of Goya, there has been revealed but lately the fine talent of Sorolla y Bastida, who is manifestly influenced by Manet and by Monet. In Russia, there is no remarkable painter whatever excepting the religious decorators, who are obliged to keep up the Byzantine and mystic style. Lastly, in America, besides John Sargent, who lives in London, but whose fame remains undiminished in his native country, one finds quite interesting painters, such as Alexander, an exquisite "féministe," Harrison, the eminent marine painter, and Mr. James Whistler, a man of genius who is, perhaps, the greatest living painter of Europe at the present day. Mr. Whistler began his career with the impressionists, and has remained their friend. He shared for a long time in the ridicule which was directed against them. Nevertheless he does not participate in their ideas. He takes as much pains to conceal his methods of

work as they take to disclose theirs. He is a mysterious, isolated character; an intense modernist at once and a strange poet, he shows profound affinity with Edgar Allan Poe. His nocturnes, his portraits, his marines, are works which defy analysis, and appear, according to the saying of a contemporary, as if "painted with the ether upon a mirror." He envelops his figures in an atmosphere of dream. In regard to technique, Mr. Whistler has prodigious knowledge; he knows all the secrets of color. He is very sparing, however, in the use of it; almost all his figures are bathed with shadow, and one is lost in the effort to analyze the substance of his paintings, of his inimitable blacks, of his shadows, of which one cannot tell the composition, of his grays at once golden and silvern, recalling those of Velasquez. Such an artist stands in no relation to any theory or epoch; nevertheless, Mr. Whistler himself draws by perspective planes and not by lines, and although in the haughty power of his style he resembles the old masters,—Rembrandt above all, and Reynolds,—yet with a very curious immateriality, he is also profoundly modern in his way of composing and presenting his figures. He is a poet-magician who goes deeper into mystery than Prudhon or Eugène Carrière, but he is truly the contemporary of the impressionist in his aversion for the academic style and symbolic art. (We smile at his ringing tilts with Ruskin, where these two great spirits, one proudly aristocratic, the other generously touched with liberalism, clash against each other so wonderfully.) Whistler was the friend of Manet, of Degas, and also of the poet Stéphane Mallarmé, who has written poems and prose as unlike realism as possible, and who was, notwithstanding, the faithful ally of the impressionists.

It appears, then, that the great French movement has influenced two principal painters of the Europe of today, without taking into account the second-rate artists. This renovation of technique has been manifestly salutary. It has been encouraged by the critics,—and it is only fair to recall them to mind,—Zola, Duranty, Goncourt, Burty, Proust, Castagnary, Huysmans, Mallarmé, Roger Marx, and Gustave Geffroy, who courage-

ously defended the innovators and explained their views during all the period in which they were being maltreated. At the present hour, we are beginning to obtain a glimpse in France of the school which will succeed to impressionism, by making use of its labors and applying them to conceptions of a higher range intellectually than realism. The new painters appear to be much taken with a form of art, concentrated, very emotional, quite psychological, suggesting thoughts by harmonies. The landscapist Le Sidaner is perhaps the one among the young French painters who has the most profound appreciation of the silent sentiment of nature. René Ménard is an elegiac poet of high distinction. Emile Wéry, Lucien Simon, Charles Cottet, and André Dauchez are four vigorous realists, who, nevertheless, know how to instill a subtle sentiment into their works. Eugène Lomont and Maurice Lobre are exquisite "intimistes." Antonio de la Gandara, a Spaniard, naturalized Frenchman, Jacques Blanche and Paul Helleu are elegant and vigorous modernists influenced by Whistler, as is also Edmond Aman-Jean. Gaston La Touche and Henri Martin resemble Besnard, and show a great liking for the poetical treatment of decorative work. This assemblage of fine talent, rich and varied, to which must be added the idealists Lévy-Dhurmer and Georges Desvallières, and the historical painter Georges Rochegrosse, owe much to impressionism.

In the future, then, this school will be looked upon as a spontaneous reaction from the academic spirit, which had assumed a deplorable importance in France, and as a return to the study of nature; as a great advance made in the search after the properties and the subtle mysteries of light, and lastly as the final overthrow of the Italian æsthetics and of the idea of instruction in art, against which protest, as well as Besnard or Monet, artists like Eugène Carrière, who is isolated from all movements and an admirable "intimiste," or like the sculptor Auguste Rodin, who is infusing new life into all sculpture. The impressionist painters will leave behind them magnificent pieces of color, of an absolute originality, which in the museums of the future will be witnesses to their potent sincerity of vision. As for realism and modernism, which have the merit of creating the

contemporary art of illustration, so novel, so lifelike, so free,—these are questions open to discussion like symbolism or mythologic art. The impressionists may be blamed for restricting themselves too narrowly to realism, but because they were engrossed above all else in their study of processes, their subjects were of small importance to them : the result of it is that they afford little matter for thought and feeling, and that when looking at the paintings in which all the wealth of their preceptive insight is accumulated, one sometimes feels keenly the lack of complex expression and the absence of style, which contrast strongly with the lavish expenditure of talent. Manet and Degas were great observers. The others have more eyes than soul, and in our day of subtle psychology one instinctively seeks the opposite. But without the hardy initiative of this group of men, we should not have been able to attain to the psychologic art, now appearing, without painfully traversing all those prejudices which they have swept away. We owe them, therefore, our profound gratitude. They opened the roads, they made them smooth, they gave direction to a wholly new period, corrected dangerous errors, and gave the moral example of a noble independence and a tireless energy in their work, dreading neither poverty nor injustice. These are the sufficient grounds upon which the impressionist movement is entitled, as much by the works it has produced as by the ideas it has promulgated, to enter into the history of the fine arts and to take its place in the list of the more important manifestations of French pictorial art ; closing the nineteenth century as romanticism had begun it, and, notwithstanding the realism of its beginning, opening to the twentieth century a broad avenue of approach to the arts of painting, of music, and of poetry, by demonstrating that the vibration of luminous ether phenomena is the source of all the real aspects of life ; by strengthening, through the analysis of light, the idea which is beginning slowly to make its way, that, namely, of the mysterious unification of all the forms of sensation, color, sound, rhythm, in the one sole and same conception of Art, superior to the empty distinctions of idealism and of realism,—the twofold aspect of one and the same Beauty.

THINGS MUNICIPAL

EDMOND KELLY, *New York City.*

The November defeat of Tammany Hall reaches in importance far beyond the limits of New York, for it indicates that even in a population largely composed of unacclimated foreigners the people can be counted on. But the narrowness of the majority also indicates that the number of citizens who are disposed to support a machine avowedly created to misgovern the many for the benefit of the few, is formidable. The moral issue raised in New York was confused, it is true, through the acceptance of the Tammany nomination by a man who has stood heretofore for good government. This deliberate effort to rescue Tammany from defeat committed the candidate to a career of treachery; he had either by giving good government to be treacherous to the friends who nominated him, or by giving bad government to be treacherous to the friends he had deserted, as well as to himself and to the light that was in him. And the evil he did was the more pernicious in that it corrupted others; for many of those who had fought evil from their birth, as he had professed to do, abandoned the good cause persuaded by his specious arguments. And yet, in spite of this, the people voted right. Seth Low is mayor, and Travers Jerome is his district attorney. With such men in such places New York City may hold up her head again.

But a short day of triumph must not be followed by a long night of complacency. Good government has triumphed before, and

its triumph has been brief. The iniquities of Tweed brought about the downfall of Tammany in 1870, and yet within a year Tammany was in power again. The next victory of reform, under the banners of the county democracy, was hardly more enduring. In 1893 the same elements which have just elected Low elected Strong by a far larger majority, and yet the very next election brought back Tammany again, stronger than before. Tammany *expellas furcâ, tamen usque recurret*.

Was it the belief that, in view of these discouraging results, our only course was to reform Tammany from within that induced so many of our well-meaning citizens to vote its ticket? If this were so, then were our plight indeed unfortunate, for the attempt to reform Tammany would be as puerile as the attempt to make a vegetarian out of a Bengal tiger.

What are we to do to maintain the advantage that has been gained, to make the defeat of Tammany permanent? The answer to this question concerns not only New York, but every city in the Union, and no apology should, therefore, be necessary for devoting a few pages to its consideration.

Government may be defined as the body of rules which men are compelled by association with one another, consciously or unconsciously, to adopt: an isolated savage has no need of government; but the moment men cease to be isolated, they have to agree upon the conditions under which their mutual relations are to be determined. The story of the development of government from the individual to the family, from the family to the tribe, from the tribe to the city, and from the city to the state has been told too often to need repetition. But as regards the modern city, it may be said that almost all the problems peculiar to municipal politics are due to crowding. During the last century, men and women have become so crowded in cities that a new series of problems have presented themselves. Upon an isolated farm, the disposal of waste is not a matter involving much or any difficulty, but when men and women are crowded, not only horizontally on the same plane, but perpendicularly in as many as twenty planes, one above another, the problem

becomes intense, and may be said to be still unsolved. The machinery for bringing food from the country districts to a metropolis of three million inhabitants, the distribution of the food amongst these inhabitants, and the disposal of the resulting waste are sufficiently complicated to require the application of all our science and of all our skill.

One of the chief difficulties that presents itself, at the outset, arises from the fact that our cities have grown with a rapidity that has made methods for transportation, distribution, and elimination inadequate. We are always at work, therefore, in enlarging or adding to our water mains, gas conduits, sewers, tramways, and all the other factors which contribute to this gigantic task; and we are only beginning now to discover that the methods which were adequate at the beginning of the last century are no longer adequate at the beginning of this one.

And inadequacy is to be found not only in our municipal engineering; it is to be found also in our municipal politics. We still allow ourselves to remain under the dominion of false notions regarding government, and these false notions are to a large extent due to the confused meanings of the words we habitually employ in discussing things political. The very word "government," for example, contains in itself a notion that is no longer true. Of old, cities and nations were *governed* in the strict sense of the word, that is to say, a few men who constituted an aristocracy, or sometimes one man who constituted a despot, *governed* the city or the state; and this despotic or aristocratic government is inseparably associated in our minds with coercion. Today, therefore, we associate with the word "government" the idea of coercion, though government should not and does not—except for the criminal classes—involve necessarily the idea of coercion, to any material extent.

In one sense it is true that the government does exercise coercion, even in the most republican of governments; it has, for example, to raise taxes, and as few men pay taxes with alacrity or pleasure, government must have an organized force for collecting the taxes. The government must also administer justice, and

enforce its judgments, even against the most law-abiding citizens.

But there are branches of government, and it is to these branches that attention is in this article most particularly called, in which there is no element of coercion whatever, for example, the post-office. There is no law obliging a New York merchant to send his correspondence by the United States post-office; he is perfectly free to send it by special messengers, and if he does use the post-office, it is because the post-office furnishes him a much more economical method for distributing his correspondence than any which he can employ by his unassisted efforts. Government has over the individual in such a matter as the transportation and distribution of letters the advantage that by carrying a very large quantity of letters every day, and by distributing these letters in the most economical way, the government can do for two cents what would cost an individual, in some cases, more than a hundred dollars; and people have become so accustomed to have the transportation of their letters done for them by the government that they no longer recognize that it constitutes a glaring instance of practical socialism. Many departments of municipal administration also illustrate this view. No man, for example, if his house catches fire is bound to call in the fire department; but, as a matter of fact, the immense superiority of the machinery supplied by the city for extinguishing fires over the resources of any private individual, sends every citizen to the fire alarm before he has had time to discuss the question in his mind. Nor, again, is any man obliged to use Croton water in New York; he may, as the Athenians do, pay for water from a suburban spring; or, following the example of most of our rich neighbors, import water from the banks of the Rhine. Nevertheless, most of us are contented with the kitchen tap, and we daily utilize the collective resources of the city, without thinking that in so doing we are branding ourselves as practical collectivists.

Now this municipal ownership of water-works, which we take for granted in most of the cities of the United States, raises annually a storm in the English Parliament. For London is sup-

plied with water by private companies, and every year the County Council goes to Parliament for permission to substitute municipal water-works therefor, pointing out that the water furnished by private companies is neither cheap nor pure; and every year Parliament resounds with the profound philosophy of Herbert Spencer, with dissertations on the functions of government, and with time-worn allusion to the "thin end of the wedge." So that after a great deal of time wasted in some false doctrine long drawn out, and a great deal of obvious hypocrisy, the net result to London is either a flat refusal or a less ingenuous defeat by burial in committee. If, however, we are able to eliminate from our minds, for the time, the false notions of government that we have imbibed from our cradle, and which are daily fortified by such a philosophy as that of Herbert Spencer, and by selfish or, more euphemistically, so-called vested interests, and consider how an intelligent population of three millions can most economically provide themselves with the necessities of life, it will not be easy to find any difference between the distribution of letters and that, for example, of coal, ice, or milk.

The task which the post-office sets out to perform is to take all the letters which all the citizens of New York desire to have carried and distributed, to transport them daily to the towns and places to which they are addressed, and to distribute them amongst the citizens of these towns and places, respectively. If this task were attempted by individuals instead of by the nation at large, there would be as many rival companies engaged in the carrying and distributing of letters as there are now rival tradesmen engaged in the carrying and distributing of coal, milk, and ice,—each with his own supply of horses and wagons, and each covering very much the same ground as his rival; so that instead of having one postman deliver letters door by door, as today, we should have our letters delivered as our milk is, by a number of different dealers, each of whom has customers in every street, and perhaps no two customers in any one. The extravagance of such a system is clearly shown by the fact that the carriage of a letter which would cost the individual over one hundred dollars, were he

to undertake it himself, is done for him by the government at the cost of two cents. If, therefore, our citizens were not possessed by the false notion that government necessarily involves coercion, and if their minds were not obstructed by false economic theories of "laissez faire," and if they could have confidence in the honesty of their government officials, it would be difficult to see any valid reason why the necessities of life which do not involve difficulties of manufacture should not be distributed through the instrumentality of the state.

The economic theory of "laissez faire" is doubtless doomed; but false economic theories take a long time to die, especially when they are bolstered by vested interests; and so it may be a long time before the public mind is sufficiently aware of the errors that attend this doctrine, to be prepared to take into consideration what would seem today so erratic a plan as the distribution by the state of the necessities of life. But even were the public mind prepared for the consideration of such a programme, the mal-administration that marks our municipal government in the United States would of itself be regarded as a sufficient obstacle. It is, however, submitted that upon this point the public mind stands as much in need of enlightenment as upon the question whether government is necessarily coercive or not; for it may well be asked, Why should the majority of the citizens of New York want good government when the majority has little to gain from good government and a great deal to gain from bad? This question may seem paradoxical, and yet a few moments' consideration will perhaps justify it.

In the first place, we must be clear as to what we mean by the majority. The majority of the citizens of a city are not those who read "The International Monthly"; they are the men who generally vote for Tammany Hall in New York, and for the machines which misgovern St. Louis, Philadelphia, and the other large cities of our Union. The citizen votes for the government from which he expects to derive the most individual advantage. This advantage may consist in the dollar that is paid for his vote on election day, of the place which is promised him or one of

his friends in the police force or in the street cleaning department, or of the favor which he or one of his friends expects, whether in the building department, in the gambling hall, or in the liquor saloon. The majority has little or no interest in the regular tax rate; on the contrary, it indulges in a secret satisfaction at seeing the rich man pay for a poor man's government; it is not enlightened enough to understand the value to it of clean streets, pure water, or of an economical or hygienic system for disposing of sewage and other waste. The things, therefore, which Tammany has furnished to the majority of the city of New York are the things of real value in the eyes of this majority. How otherwise, then, can the majority, in the absence of such exceptional conditions as prevailed in November, be expected to vote? Nevertheless, there are material benefits arising from intelligent and honest government that this very majority, so persistently supporters of Tammany Hall, would understand and vote for. It would understand a three cent fare instead of the present five cent fare on the elevated and the tramway systems; it would understand fifty cent gas instead of gas at \$1.15, as at present paid; and it would understand the economies that would be effected by the municipal distribution of the principal necessities of life.

This statement must not be understood as a serious proposition to introduce into any municipal programme the idea of municipal distribution of coal, ice, and milk.¹ The unfitness of

(1) Since the foregoing was written, the *Daily Telegraph* has published an account of an interesting municipal experiment that is being made in the borough of Battersea. The high mortality among infants in the borough has induced the borough council to organize a bureau for the sale of sterilized and humanized milk. The cost of this article in the hands of private industry amounts to fourteen shillings a week for a single infant,—a price wholly beyond the purse of the non-wealthy. The Battersea municipality hopes to provide precisely the same article for one shilling and sixpence a week, and it proposes to do this without much or any cost to the borough. It is estimated that if the borough feeds not more than 100 infants a week, the loss to the borough will be about fifty pounds a year; if it supplies 200 infants a week, the undertaking will clear expenses; and if the number reaches 400 a week, there will be a profit. The cost of fitting up the necessary premises will not exceed 600 pounds. Under these circumstances, it is to be hoped that the experiment, if successful in Battersea, will be widely adopted.

the public mind is too well recognized to make such a programme practical. But the public mind is not altogether unprepared for the municipal ownership of gas and tramways; the success of such ownership in England is too universally known for any question to arise as to the practicability of such public ownership; the principal obstacle to such ownership in the United States is the bad government that prevails here.

But if it is reasonable to attribute this very bad government to the fact that in our great cities the majority has no stake in good government, and if by adopting some of these progressive measures this majority could be given a sufficient stake in municipal administration to wean it from the political machines which it has hitherto supported, might it not be well in our municipal campaigns to talk a little less in future of reform, which the vanity and hypocrisy of some so-called reformers have rendered odious, and a little more of progress, which can immediately bring material and tangible benefits to the working man?

If we compare the programme of progress with the programmes which have been presented from time to time to our distracted citizens, it will not be difficult to understand why so many look upon improvement in municipal government with despair. Some years ago reformers were persuaded that the whole evil lay in the fact that municipal, state, and national elections took place on the same day, thereby causing municipal issues to be sacrificed to national,—the city ticket sacrificed to and carried by the national ticket. "If municipal elections," said they, "could only be separated in time from national elections, the city would be rescued from the professional politician, and the two great machines could no longer degrade municipal office by making it a mere reward for partisan service." When, in 1893, Tammany Hall was beaten in New York State this question of separate elections was made a principal plank of the reform platform, and separate elections were promptly secured. Already, however, separate elections are found not to secure good government; Tammany got back to power in spite of them; and Ithaca has discovered, forsooth, that separate elections cost over

\$600 per election! Its thrifty citizens, therefore, have propounded plausible reasons for abandoning them. The example of Ithaca seems likely to be eventually followed by many if not all the cities of the State.

Again, English cities, which prior to 1834 had the worst municipal government in Europe, and since the great Municipal Reform Act of 1834 have probably the best, are governed by Councils, the mayor having practically no power. In Minneapolis this system has prevailed, and has been found by many students of political science to work well. Nevertheless, a new charter for Minneapolis has just been submitted in which the power which has heretofore been exercised by the Council is transferred to the mayor, in imitation of the plan which has secured for us such abominable consequences in the city of New York! In New York we began with a strong Municipal Council and a weak mayor. The Municipal Council, being as bad as the worst element in New York City could make it, was gradually shorn of its powers, which were conferred upon the mayor. The evil element in New York then concentrated its attention upon the election of a bad mayor; and the abuse of power by a bad mayor having become intolerable, the power was once more taken away from the mayor and given to the Council. The Council having once more justified its unfitness for power, the power was again withdrawn from the Municipal Council and transferred again to the mayor, thus restoring the city to conditions which put and keep a Devery in control of the police force.

Again, in an article published in the "Forum," in February, 1899, an effort was made to draw a lesson from the organization of the city of Paris, with a view to reaching a conclusion as to the usefulness of boroughs and their functions, respectively. It was there pointed out that for such matters of pure business as are public works, centralization was the best plan. The whole experience, not only of Paris, but of London, also demonstrates this; whereas, with respect to those matters in which it is important that the enthusiasm and public spirit of private citizens

should incite the public official to more vigorous exertion, as, for example, in such work as that of hygiene, education, and charity, the borough system was found to be of inestimable value, furnishing as it does in Paris committees consisting of both officials and private citizens, in which the tendency towards perfunctoriness in the official is counterbalanced by the zeal of individual philanthropy, and misplaced zeal, on the other hand, is prevented by professional experience from wasting itself in useless and sometimes harmful enterprises. Nevertheless, the charter of New York State has lately been revised so as to break up the centralization of the department of public works and to introduce centralization into the board of education.

Again, some of the best intentioned citizens believe that salvation is to be found only in what is termed "home rule." They clamor for emancipation from the interference of state legislatures, and think good government can be secured only by making the citizens themselves of every city responsible for it. The theory is undoubtedly a sound one, but it becomes inoperative in view of the fact that the majority of the citizens have so small a stake in good government that they cannot be trusted to secure it; and thus "home rule" results in such deplorable abuses that recourse is had to state boards, and when government by state boards becomes intolerable an outcry is again raised for "home rule." Those who believe in state boards may well turn their eyes in the direction of Denver, of which the board of public works, of fire, and police, are all appointed by the governor of the State, and where the corruption in the police force is not excelled by that of New York. And those who believe in "home rule" may well remember that the reformer who secured this privilege for New York in 1870 was William Tweed.

It is useless to pile up further instances of the folly which tinkers with charters and leaves the glaring, colossal source of the evil alone. So long as the majority which governs New York is ignorant or indifferent, the government will be just what such a majority is entitled to, and no tinkering with the instruments of

government can make it permanently very much better. A well-known banker and reformer of New York City was once heard to ask a committee organized for the desperate effort to rescue the city from Tammany Hall, whether it was not possible to devise some charter which would secure good government of itself, and thus relieve him and his fellow committeemen from the annual annoyance to which they were then subjected. The answer made to him was to the point: "When you, sir, can organize a scheme upon which your bank will work of itself without you or any one else giving attention to it, then it will be possible to frame a scheme upon which the business of the city can be administered without you or any one else giving attention to it. Not before!"

Municipal administration is a gigantic business, requiring as close attention on the part of those for whose benefit it exists as that of the private banker or the manufacturer or the merchant; and it is because the average citizen has not a sufficient stake in the government to make it of as much importance to him to attend to the government affairs as to his own business, that his private business is attended to, while public business is left in the hands of Tammany Hall.

But the notion that distinguishes between public and private business is itself false and immoral: it is false because there are no matters about which an individual is more profoundly concerned than health, education, and security to life and limb,—with respect to all of which we are absolutely in the hands of our government;—and it is immoral because it disregards the happiness of the neighbor in that it is essentially the policy of every man for himself.

But it has been intimated that so long as government is as bad as it is in our American cities, we cannot afford to increase the scope of the evil, and that by giving the government more to do we should be thereby increasing its capacity for evil. Is this so?

Bad as the municipal government is in New York, is not the fire department efficient in putting out fires? Has not the dock department received from an investment of \$6,508,292.50, up to 1898, annual rentals of \$462,226. or 7 1-10 per cent upon the

outlay? Is not the water department efficient in securing us water? Or, if it is sometimes inefficient, does it not furnish New York with better water at a lower price than the private water companies of London? If we want an illustration of what a town can do for its citizens, without repeating the well-known story of municipal improvement in such towns as London, Birmingham, Manchester, and Glasgow, let us consider the achievements of a little town in England, called Leek. This town has reduced the charges for water, which under private ownership were two shillings and sixpence, to eightpence, under municipal management, for domestic purposes, and to sixpence for the purposes of trade; and last year, in spite of these lower charges, the debt incurred in the purchase was extinguished, so that from this time forth the rate can be still further reduced if it is considered desirable to do so. In 1845 the price of gas in Leek was nine shillings and sixpence per thousand cubic feet; today under municipal management it is two shillings and sixpence. At this rate the town is lit free of cost, with a surplus profit of twelve hundred pounds.¹

Nevertheless, municipal affairs in Europe are attended by very much the same lack of consistent action as in the United States. The Local Government Board in England, for example, does not object to local authorities acquiring markets, nor to their providing what may be regarded as adjuncts of the market, such as cold-air stores and refrigerators, but the Board declines to allow local authorities to manufacture ice for refrigerators, or to sell ice except for use in the market itself.

Again, the Local Government Board objects to a local authority advertising the attractions of its town, but it does not prohibit a town undertaking a remunerative business and applying the profits derived therefrom to the cost of advertising, which would otherwise apparently be an illegal expenditure.

Again, local authorities have been allowed to establish an electricity supply business in connection with their electric plants,

(1) *Annals of the American Academy*, Nov. 1900, p. 147.

but they have been carefully forbidden to engage in the sale of electrical fittings, although they manufacture these fittings for their own use.

Mr. Emile Garcké, in referring to these matters, asks, "Can it be possible to conceive a greater confusion of ideas with regard to the principles which should govern the powers to be given to local authorities?"

In France, there is very much the same confusion, vacillation, and uncertainty. So far as Paris itself is concerned the absence of anything like a policy of municipalization is due to exceptional conditions. Prior to the elections of 1900, the majority of the Municipal Council were Socialists, and it might reasonably have been expected that such a Council would pass measures looking towards the municipalization of public functions. Many things, however, conspired to prevent this: in the first place, the city was bound by contracts for a term of years which made progress in the direction of municipalization difficult; in the second place, the Municipal Council in Paris does not profit by the extended powers given to municipal councils by the general law of 1884.

From the days of Etienne Marcel, the central government has stood in fear of Paris, and this fear has not been diminished by the events of 1789, 1830, 1848, and 1870. The Municipal Council of Paris, therefore, is practically under the tutelage of the prefect, who is appointed by the central government; there is no act of the municipal government which the prefect cannot annul. If the Municipal Council refuses to vote certain articles in its budget, the prefect can insert them notwithstanding its refusal; and even in those cases where the prefect is required to consult the Municipal Council, the prefect can disregard the vote of the Council when given.

Lately the Municipal Council believed itself to have discovered gross irregularities in the department of charities ("assistance publique"), and voted the discharge of the official responsible therefor. To this vote the prefect did not even give the courtesy of a veto; he treated it with the silence of contempt,

and the official whom the Council attempted to discharge, remains today in undisputed possession of his office.

The elections of 1900 were carried by the Nationalists, that is to say, by a heterogeneous combination of Monarchists and Republicans united against the government by hatred of the Jews in general and of Dreyfus in particular.

Under these circumstances, there is little to learn in Paris regarding the question of municipalization. Other towns in France, though their Municipal Councils enjoy the larger powers granted by the law of 1884, have been nevertheless prevented by the central government from making much progress in the direction of municipalization.

The efforts of the town of Roubaix to extend the field of its operations, afford a good illustration, not only of the kind of programme which a municipality might adopt, but also of the kind of argument which is currently used against it.

Of all the hardships which poverty involves none is perhaps more bitter than that a man should see his wife die in agony because he has not the money with which to buy the medicine necessary to relieve or to restore her.

Mindful of this, the Municipal Council of Roubaix, on the 13th of October, 1892, passed a resolution, by a unanimous vote, in favor of the creation of a municipal pharmacy. The report which preceded this vote declared that "if there is one thing more monstrous than another, it is the liberty allowed to man to speculate upon the illness of his fellow creatures, by refusing them the means of recovering their health unless they pay four times the original cost thereof. It is the duty of a municipality to its people to put an end to such a state of things; the more so, since such a pharmacy would not involve a penny of extra expense." This resolution was vetoed by the prefect. A year afterwards the Municipal Council passed a second resolution to the same effect, and the second resolution was again vetoed by the prefect, on the ground that the law of April 5th, 1884, did not authorize municipal trading.

This matter was brought before the Chamber of Deputies on

the 20th of November, 1894. The Premier, M. Dupuy, in support of the action of the prefect, argued, first, that the resolution was an improper one, because it violated the vested rights of the druggists of Roubaix; secondly, that such pharmacies were a matter for charity, and not a matter for municipal administration; and thirdly, that it was a dangerous step towards municipal collectivism. In other words, it was the "thin end of the wedge."

The Municipal Council a third time voted this measure. On this occasion the matter was referred to the Council of State, and on the 3rd of August, 1894, the Council of State decided that a municipal corporation had not the right to manufacture or to sell drugs, and that the establishment of a municipal pharmacy therefore violated the principles of the law of the 5th of April, 1884.

Numerous efforts of other municipalities in the direction of municipal trading have met with the same action on the part of the government; and yet, by a singular inconsistency, departments have undertaken the business of fire insurance. For example, the Departments of the Ardennes and the Meuse, the Marne and the Somme, have departmental fire insurance bureaus; the most successful of them all being the "Caisse départementale des Incendies de la Marne."

On the other hand, there is no legal objection to municipalities undertaking the distribution of water, or the manufacture and distribution of gas. Indeed, in some localities, the municipal manufacture of gas has been attended by great success. For example, the town of Tourcoing undertook to manufacture its own gas in 1879; it has invested a total sum of 3,242,000 francs in the enterprise, and this entire amount will have been paid up in 1909: the average price of gas has been lowered from 22½ centimes to 12 centimes per cubic metre. The consumption of gas rose from 3,000,000 cubic metres in 1880 to 6,280,000 in 1889. During this last year the gross receipts amounted to 1,148,229 francs; the expense to 662,055 francs; and 167,105 francs were put aside to meet interest and sinking fund, and a net profit on the exploitation was declared of 319,068 francs.

The whole matter has been lately reviewed by the Council of State, February, 1901, upon the question how far municipal councils were justified in voting sums of money in aid of coöperative enterprises; and the Council of State has laid down the general proposition that municipal trading is permissible only in connection with what may be termed necessary monopolies; that is to say, in enterprises which require the exclusive use of the public streets; as, for example, the distribution of water and gas.

In many respects a strong parallel exists between municipal conditions in Paris and municipal conditions in New York. We observe the same election from small districts returning members, few of whom could be elected upon a general ticket. The absence of what might be called a programme of municipal progress leaves nothing for the Council to do but to dabble in national politics, which are altogether beyond the scope of its legitimate action. As a matter of fact, in 1900, the election of the Municipal Council in Paris was conducted on national rather than on municipal lines. The Nationalists, who now constitute the majority, have no policy save to oppose the ministry; and this the Municipal Council is powerless to do.

In Paris, therefore, as in New York, the intervention of national politics into municipal elections is fraught with evil; in Paris, as in New York, the personnel of the Council is injuriously affected by division of the electoral body into small election districts; and its efficiency is still further impaired by the fact that the Council has not sufficient powers to justify strong men in accepting nominations thereto. Last, but not least, in Paris, as in New York, there is no programme of municipal progress.

If now we turn to the better governed cities of England, we find that although there, as with us, the election districts are small, the large power of its municipal councils attracts to it men of ability and position, and the adoption of a distinctively municipal programme secures the election of councils which are altogether independent of national politics. London furnishes a singular example of a city which regularly returns a Conservative majority to Parliament, and a Liberal majority to the Municipal Council.

There seems to be no explanation for this, except that London is the town of all towns in which municipal elections are conducted upon a municipal programme. And the municipal programme of London is a programme of progress.

In conclusion, therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that in order to secure permanent government to New York, we must offer to its citizens not only what the *καλοὶ κάγαθοί* believe to be the best for them, but what the citizens themselves want and will vote for. To this end we must bear in mind that the members of Columbia University do not represent to the dweller of Five Points the only source of political wisdom; on the contrary, accustomed as the latter is to seek warmth and society in the liquor saloon, it is not unnatural that he should imbibe with his evening dram some of the moral notions which pervade liquor saloons, and look with suspicion upon professors who inhabit the serene heights of Morningside. Reform is a word he abhors: charity is to him still more detestable; and all reform measures that smack of charity arouse, not enthusiasm, but disgust. The *free* pharmacy, for example, suggested by the French Government to Roubaix is precisely the thing which the self-respecting man resents; he does not want charity, but justice. And that a community of men should deliberately allow a few to grow wealthy out of the needs of the many,—out of traffic in such necessary commodities as gas and water,—is neither wise nor just.

Let us offer our fellow citizens in all ranks of life an equal share in such municipal functions as experience in other less intelligent countries proves that we can undertake without danger; let us treat our fellow citizens as our partners in these municipal undertakings, and we shall secure a coöperation which alone can render permanent our November victory.

TENDENCIES IN GERMAN LIFE AND THOUGHT SINCE 1870.¹

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If we desired to characterize with a word the course taken by civilization since about the time of Goethe's death, we might perhaps say that it has been toward developing, refining, and perfecting the material content of life, whereas the culture, the mind, and the morality of men themselves have by no means progressed in the same degree. Implements and means of exchange, machines and social institutions, scientific knowledge and its methods, the constitutions of States, the technical side of every art, and the forms of commerce and of finance have been developed to an unprecedented degree of complexity and effectiveness, and yet no one will assert that *mankind* has been thereby correspondingly refined, uplifted, and spiritually enriched. The intrinsic worth of material things has advanced much more rapidly than the intrinsic worth of men. It is self-evident that there are untold exceptions to this extremely general impression that we have formed of the development of civilization during the last seventy years; but, on the whole, all observers will agree with regard to the increased *externalization* of life that has come about, with regard to the preponderance that the technical side of life has obtained over its inner side, over its personal values. The various civilized countries, the various fields of interest, intellectual as well as

(1) Translated by W. D. Briggs, Ph. D., of the Western Reserve University, Ohio.

material, and the various periods stand in very complex relations to this tendency ; and, according to the degree in which they embody it or compel reactions against it, are we enabled to determine the character of the intellectual and spiritual conditions of each country and of each period.

We are by no means justified in considering the last three decades in the history of the German mind as in some manner belonging together, from the circumstance alone that the political unity of Germany dates from about this time ; for, indeed, the spiritual unity of the German States has not been greatly enhanced by their political unity. Yet the war of '70-'71 does really denote a turning-point in the inner development of Germany, an internal transformation, the cause of which is to be sought in the altered position that she has occupied as a world power since that time. Herein we may see how qualitative changes are brought about by quantitative. The rôle that Germany had to play in the world, the sphere of action that she had to occupy, were suddenly become very great. It is quite conceivable, from the psychological point of view, that the primary consequence of this was an externalization of interests ; on the principle that individuals and groups of individuals, on obtaining a sudden accession of power and importance, will first employ this in the direction of the *material* enjoyment of life. Only through a reaction and a process of gradual transformation do the newly acquired powers become of service in the advancement of finer and more spiritual interests. As a matter of fact, it is to be noticed that the improvement brought about in the last twenty or thirty years in the immediate surroundings of the middle classes, which one may with justice regard as at once the result and the cause of a practical materialism, is nevertheless even now beginning to provide a basis for every kind of æsthetic refinement and for culture generally ; the adornment of dwellings, together with the interest that results from this in all the decorative arts, and especially in the industrial arts, that greater care for externals, which nowadays even among German scholars is no longer looked upon as a betrayal of the goods of the spirit, the finer pol-

ish acquired by social conventions, the greater amount of travel,—all these are, to quote Karl Marx, “ideological superstructures” of that increased material well-being, in which the advance of Germany manifested itself as in its initial and most material stage.

In addition to this, Germany must now provide an economic foundation for its political prestige: the tremendous growth of German industry is the consequence of the events of 1870 and 1871. The powers of the mind have been forced to serve the purposes of pecuniary gain in a manner previously unheard of in Germany, and, governed by extraordinarily active competition, national as well as international, to allow all other things to become subordinate to material interests. As the result of this, *technique* has become of late years the sole concern of most producers and consumers, and in a way that is most ominous for the inner and spiritual development of the nation. It is completely forgotten that *technique* is a mere means to an end, and its perfection is extolled as though it were one of the great objects of the human race; as though telegraphs and telephones were in themselves things of extraordinary value, despite the fact that what men say to each other by means of them is not at all wiser, nobler, or in any way more excellent than what they formerly entrusted to less rapid means of communication; as though the electric light raised man a stage nearer perfection, despite the fact that the objects more clearly seen by means of it are just as trivial, ugly, or unimportant as when looked at by the aid of petroleum. This primacy of technique has infected even the purely intellectual branches of knowledge: in the historical sciences, as in that of experimental psychology, investigations, essentially worthless and, as regards the ultimate end of all research, most unimportant, frequently enjoy a quite disproportionate degree of recognition, provided only that they be carried out by means of perfect methodical, technical processes. In the arts, which, in this period, are more intimately connected with the movements of civilization in general than they were during the earlier decades of the century, this interest in technique has likewise become developed to an extraordinary degree; nevertheless,

in them, earlier than in other departments of life, has the threatened externalization of the mental attitude as to the real meaning and purpose of works of art begun to weaken. In the execution of music, virtuosity, whose object is to place the special talents of the performer in the strongest light possible, has given way to the nobler ideal, according to which the composition and its objectively perfected delivery constitute the aim of the concert, not the creating of astonishment at the gifts of the artist. In painting, the interest in the technical problems of color and space, of light and atmosphere, which derived a special stimulus from France, exercised a wonderfully beneficent influence. It soon became evident that the special significance of art did not lie in purely technical perfection, but rather in the meaning of the objects depicted, in their reduction to the clearest formula whereby both the fulness and the inner necessity of their form and position in space, as well as the spiritual essence of which they are the expression, may be fully comprehended. This emphasis upon technique, however, has taught the public that painting does not exist in order to tell stories, to perpetuate amusing situations, or to compete with photography, but that it has, on the contrary, a very special function of a purely artistic nature, and is to be fulfilled only through its means. And, finally, in poetry there has grown up during the last few years, though at first only in smaller groups, a profound feeling for the technical side, particularly of lyrical poetry, and with it has come an inevitable reaction against lyrical dilettanti, who for several decades flooded the market with this kind of writing. Herein, however, it had been clear from the beginning that lyrical technique not only had to do with the correctness and the rhythmical qualities of the verse, but signified, also, a very special kind of subjective shaping of the content of life, a transformation of emotional raw material, which could be accomplished only through the fullest possible command over all means of expression.

Thus, in the art of the last decades, so far at least as concerns its more advanced representatives, the emphasis placed upon technique has been of value only because this technique was very

soon relegated to its proper position, and regarded as a mere means whereby definitive, subjective values might be attained,—whereas in other fields it is still considered to possess a final value, in itself thoroughly satisfactory. In proportion to this feeling progresses the externalization of life, which depends upon the perfection of things rather than upon the perfection of men, and which, during the period under consideration, has assumed such sharply defined aspects as a result of the sudden enlargement of the spheres of industry and of national power.

I shall here likewise remark that two great spiritual movements of the last few years evidently rest upon an appreciation of the fundamental reaction that has been brought about, namely, the preponderance of the objective over the subjective. These two movements are the ethical and the pedagogical. By the ethical movement I mean that very comprehensive one that has as its object the systematic raising and ennobling of mankind, which is to be distinguished from the social-ethical, which I shall discuss later. Both of these have in view an ideal of inner culture that is to be pursued with means quite as technically complete, with a purpose quite as keen, as the development of external civilization has prescribed. The very perfection of the object has displayed the imperfection of the subject, and has shown that the development of the latter should, no more than that of the former, be left to chance, to instinct, to the aimless course of nature. If one only considers the extraordinary pains taken with the pedagogics of children as well as of adults, how all possible branches, from the teaching of philosophy to the education of the color-sense, from nursing the sick to instruction in gymnastics, are pressed into its service,—if one considers all this, one cannot fail to recognize the example set by modern technique with its all-embracing helps, nor can one escape the conviction that there must still be put forth a special, conscious effort, in order that men may attain that degree of perfection wherein they have been anticipated by material changes.

Inasmuch as this rapid development of external civilization was brought about principally by means of industries conducted

on a large scale,—so that we are justified in asserting that, in the last thirty years, Germany has become, from an agricultural State, one founded on industry,—it has assisted the outbreak of the greatest popular movement of the century, namely, the rise of the Social Democrats. The numerical increase in the ranks of the German laborers, brought about by the flourishing of these great industries, their aggregation in the large industrial centres, the uplifting of their mental and spiritual life through an improvement in their material welfare, which frequently took place quite suddenly, and through the struggle to bring about this improvement,—all this has united German laborers in the pursuit of a single object, has caused them to entertain the dream of a domination of their class, and has thereby created a popular ideal, such as has not existed in similar intensity and breadth for centuries, provided we pass over those enthusiasms aroused temporarily, such as in the “*Freiheitskriegen*,” and in 1848. The socialistic ideal, developed in Germany more logically and more singly than in any other country whatever, has there exerted its influence far beyond the laboring classes. I shall follow out only a few of the inner forces that bring about this phenomenon, and only so far as they are especially connected with the period that has just passed, and as they involve, not revolutionary, economic problems, but spiritual motives. The idealized picture of the future that the Socialists hold forth is an essentially rational one in the highest degree: extreme centralization, nicely calculated adjustment to each other of demand and supply, exclusion of competition, equality of rights and duties,—all of these features must not only appear to the laborer who already sees before him in some large factory an organization adapted to its purpose in similar perfection, one that works without internal friction, but must also attract a great many of those severely logical minds that are ever striving to form rational conceptions of things. With this satisfaction of the demands of logic, however, is bound up—and it is in this union that the prodigious strength of socialism consists—a satisfaction of purely emotional demands: on the one hand, are those profound

but vague communistic instincts that have lurked in the depths of the soul from the very earliest periods of our race history; on the other, and particularly in the more highly developed among us, are feelings of justice that have their foundation in the social conscience, and from the standpoint of which there is to be perceived no other remedy than the socialistic one for the capitalistic exploitation of labor. To be sure, it may be said that between socialism and the interests of the laborer there exists no intimate and necessary connection, that socialism is, perhaps, but a very primitive, a very ill-adapted means to the desired end, and that together with it there might possibly be devised many others whereby these interests might be secured and social distress obviated. Nevertheless, this union has for once been historically formed, at any rate in Germany; the party of the Socialists is the only one that represents unconditionally and exclusively the interests of the laboring classes, and whoever desires with equal ardor to advance them can accomplish his end only by allying himself with this political organization. In the public mind, this union is so complete that one can hardly express one's unreserved sympathy with Labor as against Capital without being immediately set down as a Socialist.

Besides the ethical impulses of justice and sympathy, which form the basis of the socialistic ideas of the more highly educated, there are to be discerned all sorts of motives that are closely associated with them. Many persons are actuated by a diseased longing to experience new sensations, and they feel the power of attraction that everything paradoxical and revolutionary is always capable of exerting upon numerous members of a nervously excitable and degenerate society. With this is often connected a fantastic and effeminate mental state, a vague desire for unity and universal brotherhood; in other words,—to refer to a type that we find truly unsympathetic and that is gradually vanishing,—we might call it parlor-socialism,—a coquetting with socialistic ideals whose realization would be most unendurable to these very dilettanti; unendurable, chiefly on grounds that have always made a large part of society refuse to listen to the discussion of socialistic prin-

ciples, namely, æsthetic grounds. Many a man would make without hesitation the immediate renunciation of luxuries and conveniences that a socialistic régime would demand of him, provided he saw plainly that the morality and happiness of the multitude required him to do so; but with far greater difficulty would he bring himself to submit to those specifically æsthetic annoyances that the typical "person of refinement" experiences on physical contact with the people, to whom the "honorable sweat of labor" clings. As for the rest, the interest in socialism, which only a few years ago manifested itself in incessant public and private discussion, has of late sensibly decreased. This is partly due to the fact that people imagine that the danger from socialism has passed, inasmuch as the Social Democrats have more and more given up their revolutionary ideas, and trust rather to the quiet and self-determining evolution of conditions; in other words, are on the way to become a reform party on the basis of the existing social order. We cannot, of course, be certain that they will not retrace their steps along the former revolutionary line. The other extremely important social impulse that has come into existence in opposition to socialism will soon occupy our entire attention.

It is to be noticed in connection with this subject, however, that not only the interest in socialism itself, but also the interest in social questions in general has in many circles, after its sudden flaming up, become quite as suddenly almost extinguished. The fact that this interest was at all felt by the class above the laborer is apparently to be explained by the same spiritual movement to which the philosophy of Schopenhauer owes its wide dissemination. The origins of this movement are to be sought very far back, namely, in the decline of Christianity as regards its importance for the soul. This importance may be expressed by saying that Christianity supplied a *final object* to life. Above everything relative, above the fragmentary character of human existence, above the limitless structure of means, and means to means, something rises here that is final, definitive,—the salvation of the soul. Here life has found its point of rest, which cannot, as can everything

else, reveal itself as a mere means to deeper lying ends of a personal, social, or material character. Although Christianity has lost its power over innumerable souls, it has, nevertheless, left in them the yearning for an absolutely final object of all life and action,—a consequence of that adaptation which has come about in our stage of civilization through the long-continued satisfaction of this profound need of the soul. The specifically modern feelings, that life has no meaning, that we are driven hither and thither in a mechanism built up out of mere preliminary stages and means, that the final and absolute, wherein consists the reward of living, ever escapes our grasp,—these feelings are the legacy of Christianity, which has implanted in countless men of today the yearning after a final object, yet no longer renders possible its attainment. The passion for technique that has come over us is only one phase or symbol of the internal state of all mankind, is a desperate attempt on their part, through the external refinement, development, and complication of the means of life, to deceive themselves with regard to the fact that these are merely means, justified and consecrated by no final purpose. The philosophy of Schopenhauer is the clearest formulation of this state of affairs. To him, the Will appears to be the basis of human life as of the world in general, and indeed in the absolute sense, so that all things are simply phenomena produced by a dark, restless, impelling force, outside of which there is nothing. For that very reason is this force condemned to eternal discontent, since at every point to which it attains, it meets nothing but itself, and at every point in its development it must enter upon the same striving, upon the same state of forth-impulsion. The teaching that man in regard to his whole being is Will and nothing more is the most logical and complete expression of the idea that there is no final end in life; for, if there be nothing outside of Will, then this Will can never attain ultimate satisfaction, since at any time it can grasp only itself, and so is confined to a circle, wherein there is no point of rest. After Schopenhauer was made known in the sixties to the general public, and in the seventies the writings of E. von Hartmann had spread abroad the

philosophy of the Will as the final reality of existence, it became evident, in the profound and extended effect produced by these teachings, that for countless persons the last word had been spoken, and the formulation of their deepest needs accomplished; to be sure, a formulation that was accompanied by no solution,—that, on the contrary, in virtue of its theoretical clearness regarding these needs, made them at once definite and inevitable.

The lack that men felt of a final object, and consequently of an ideal that should dominate the whole of life, was supplied in the eighties by the almost instantaneous rise of the ideal of social justice. Suddenly men became aware of the miserable estate, crying almost to Heaven, of the proletariat, the plundered condition of the working classes, the injustice done them, the destruction of their family life, their physical and mental degeneration, consequent particularly upon the labor of women and children,—all of which had hitherto remained as unknown to the upper classes as though all this had taken place on another planet; it was as though the soul of man had acquired an organ that up to this time it had not possessed, and that reacted upon these conceptions with entirely new feelings, and with the suggestion of entirely new social ends. The social conscience awoke, and seemed to supply to existence a new and definite purpose, a new evangel, that might become a centre round which should cluster all the ideals of life. Practical and ethical as well as theoretical forces were intermingled in this field. For, all at once, it was seen that it was society, the sum of all social groups, from which we derived every inner and outer good as a loan, that the individual was but the crossing-point of social threads, and that he, by a devotion to the interests of all, merely discharged an obligation of the most fundamental character,—by a devotion that had as its primary object the most oppressed and undeveloped portion of society, which, nevertheless, through its labor supported the whole. Men suddenly recognized the absolute frivolity and falsity of the principles of the social “laissez aller”: the principles, namely, that, through the natural harmony of interests, society, as a whole, will pursue the right

path if the individual looks after his own welfare absolutely without regard to others; that the oppressed deserves to be oppressed, since the very fact of his being so proves his unfitness for a higher condition; that the difference in station between rulers and ruled corresponds closely and correctly to the amount of energy that each person contributes to life. Now it was perceived how completely the accidents of history, the chances of birth and of environment, the great advantage possessed by the capitalist over him who has only the strength of his hands, convert this apparent justice into a very caricature of justice. In short, the watchword, "the social question a moral question,"—supported, on the one hand, by a scientific understanding of the overwhelming importance that social forces have, even as regards the life of the individual, and on the other, by the great politico-social measures that relate to the protection of the aged or infirm laborer,—possessed itself even of those who were enemies of socialism, as well as of those who stood aloof from it, and seemed to provide us, not with *an* ideal, but with *the* ideal itself. The depth and passion with which this ideal was seized upon, however, appear to have been due to that state of the inner life which we have already described, and which reached its climax in the reception accorded to Schopenhauer; the absence of an ultimate end, of an absolute ideal of life, the thirst for a definitive value that should sum up in itself all the details of existence,—such an ideal as just this conception of the Socialists furnished, by virtue of its all-embracing extent and its vague boundaries.

I have already referred to the fact that this social interest that existed in the upper and middle classes has declined in a perceptible degree, a fact that is comprehensible in an ideal that, if I am right, owes its influence over many persons not so much to its own positive force as, in a great measure, to a subjective lack of and longing for an ideal of some kind. It declined partly as the result of the exhaustion of those souls for whom this line of moral development was in truth not quite natural, and, further, through the rise of an opposite ideal, that of individualism, which about the year 1890 began to compete with the socialist ideal. I unite

the discussion of this with that of a phenomenon that helped to bring it forth. There were, and there are now, among us a number of persons who are in every way individualists by conviction, who see in the freedom and development of the single personality, indeed in the aristocratic rule of the strong over the weak, the final meaning of all social government, and who at the same time belong to the social-democratic party, because they regard socialism as the necessary transition stage to a just and enlightened individualism. As a result of division into classes, of confirmed prejudices, of a misuse of power on the part of the higher and of the undeveloped state of the lower groups, the actual relations of individuals, according to their power and influence in society, constitute a complete reversal of their relations according to inner worth. Hence society must first be cast into the smelting-furnace of socialism, in order that the separate members of it may stand over against one another without historical or accidental prejudice or detriment, in order that all may have equally favorable conditions for development, so that whatever each is in life may be an accurate measure of his original and freely developed energy. For those who hold to this belief, the conditions of the present, far from being too individualistic, are not individualistic enough, inasmuch as they permit innumerable influences to affect favorably or unfavorably every person,—influences, namely, that do not arise in or correspond to his own nature and energy; and this inequality can be corrected only by means of a general and socialistic leveling. So socialism, as a preliminary stage or condition instrumental in bringing about an extreme individualism, has been for a number of years the formula for a spiritual movement whose supporters, it must be admitted, are accustomed to deal with ideals of a purely abstract possibility, and hence not to attach sufficient importance either to the profound emotional opposition between these two principles or to the difficulties involved in the concrete details of their plans. Often, moreover, a doubt of the physical and spiritual excellence of the higher classes exerts an influence in this direction; they seem in many cases to be so decadent, so exhausted and neurasthenic, as to be unable to bear the future

upon their shoulders, as to render it necessary, on the contrary, that the nation, in order to preserve itself, should submit to the domination of the fresher, less worn-out, but, to be sure, less refined, classes of the people. An internal migration of nations, as it were, must take place, wherein the proletarian elements shall assume the same rôle over against the "bourgeoisie" that the youthful and barbarian German hordes assumed so many centuries ago over against the decrepit Roman Empire.

The principal spiritual reaction against these socialistic and democratic tendencies is connected with the name of Friedrich Nietzsche. It was not his intention, however, that this reaction should be either political or especially social in character. He attacked, on the one hand, the decline in the worth of personality and rank, which he ascribed to the domination of altruistic and democratic ideals, and, on the other, that externalization of life which was one of the immediate results of the political evolution of Germany, of the consequent predominance of the economic life, and of the imperative interests of the great masses of the people,—all of which he observed most clearly. All of Nietzsche's teaching, in so far as it has formed the basis for broader spiritual movements, rests upon a conviction of the *natural distance* that exists between men. If we grant that there are strong and weak, wise and stupid, refined and vulgar, beautiful and ugly men, and that the annihilation of these differences is but the dream of a child, then the worth-accent in the life of mankind can rest only upon its highest examples. Every idealistic attempt that regards as the centre of interest the average of the social organism, the majority, in other words, the mediocre and the laggards, must lead to a degeneration of the species. For the advancement of the species proceeds from its best and highest individuals as a starting-point, and the body of the people follow them only slowly and at a great distance. The rank of every society is determined by the best that it can produce, not by the level of its average; only the first shows the degree in which the species approximates the ideal set before itself,—that ever highest stage of social development, for which everything lower serves.

as underpinning and indirection. These conclusions follow naturally from the feeling of worth, and can no more be subjected to the ordinary processes of proof and disproof than can those of an opposite character. But from them it follows, again, that the highest must advance without expending his energy upon those who are below him; since only so can the man of a given stage of development be pushed to the wall to make room for a higher stage of the same development. The decadence of the present day, its lack of force and of great personalities, Nietzsche attributes to the reversal of all standards of value, to the metathesis of ideals that was initiated by Christianity and that reached its highest point in modern democracy. Instead of seeing in the victorious and dominant individual, the man of powerful and highly advanced personality, the end and individual goal of society and of history, we call only him "good" who is unselfish and resigned, who lives for the weak, the suffering. Instead of pressing on and upward, even the strong, those who are by nature commanding and self-dependent, even they turn their eyes below. The servile insurrection in moral ideals has attained its object, and the common man, the man of the herd, has imposed *his* wishes and *his* ideals as a moral code upon the higher and the highest members of the race.

These ideas were now eagerly taken up by many who saw in them the justification of an unrestrained egoism, and who considered that they gave an absolute right to develop in the highest degree the personality of the individual in defiance of all social and altruistic claims. The phrases, "superior nature," "distance from the multitude," became a standard under which were concealed countless arrogant, brutally selfish, and obscure tendencies. The rapid extension and diversification of the relations of life, of interests and activities, that Germany experienced after 1870 had loosened an extraordinary number of ties and restraints that were of a conservative and beneficent character,—had in particular weakened the reverence on the part of our youth for the principle of authority; and with this there were, of course, bound up, as in all emancipations that are not entirely justified

from within, a proportionately blinder imitation and suggestion of new gods and new idols to adore. The prodigious freedom that seemed to follow from Nietzsche's teachings, the overthrow of all hitherto existing moral standards founded upon altruism, sympathy, activity in behalf of society, constituted a peculiarly appropriate formula for the congregation of the new German youth, who were striving after the unrestricted and the unlimited; and this was so much the more true because the positive content of this new freedom, namely, the right of the strong and unusual character to be a law unto itself, must have been particularly attractive to young men who all too easily allowed the wish to become such a character serve as a substitute for its fulfillment. There was added to this Bismarck's overwhelming influence, the growth and results of which made plain to our eyes the incomparable significance of historical forces as embodied in the individual, a significance that far outshines that of impersonal institutions and of majority-legislation, the means through which democracy and socialism promised to determine the course of history. Proceeding from such a state of mind, from an empty individualism, rather desirous than able to accomplish, there has developed among us, in the past few years, a passionate longing on the part of young men for originality, a longing to "be otherwise" at any cost, for the paradoxical in literature, in art, in criticism, and in social intercourse. In all these phenomena, which are perhaps not so very numerous, but which in virtue of their loud and exceptional character seem to be more common than they really are, the striving is far less after endowing the individuality with a solid content than after an emphasis upon the externals of the individuality, upon difference from others, upon astonishing by contrasting one's self with others.

Quite recently some of the attempts of this sort have been classified under the collective title of "secession." This was a name originally applied to associations of artists in certain large cities, to form which younger men, inspired by the best modern art, allied themselves in order to hold their own exhibitions as

distinct from the official displays; for the latter were largely dominated by groups that were behind the age and had become conventional, that followed the taste of the public instead of educating it to an understanding of modern artistic ideas, to which it was not accustomed. What people in general know of these modern ideas they owe principally to these secessionists. Now that this word "secession" has won a more general signification, and is applied to what is modern, individual, differing above all from the conventional, all sorts of unpleasing phenomena are included in it, especially in industrial art and in the designing of artistic furniture. Here this false individualism holds its true orgies, in that one strives to make every piece of furniture into an individual work of art,—wherein its function as a mere foundation and background for *men*, for their residence, movements, and intercourse, is completely lost to sight. Modern furniture pushes itself forward as of *prime importance*, as though it were in possession of a complete æsthetic personality, and it is consequently unendurably prominent and presumptuous, instead of withdrawing itself, as furniture should do, and as that of the best periods always does, into the quiet and peaceful generality of a conventional style, against which individual modification should display itself very discreetly. This most modern mania for originality in this field, as in that of literature and of daily life, involves an enormous inner contradiction; that which in essence and tendency is quite local, personal, only for the time being, becomes the general plan, the universally practiced mode and pattern. All of these ways of expressing one's self in words, behavior, and things created, are throughout characterized at bottom by the assumption of exhibiting a unique personality, and contradict their own premises by their multiplication, in that every one gives expression to his originality of character in the very same way.

And now, returning to Nietzsche, in order to give the right diagnosis of significance as regards the spiritual life, and especially the right prognosis, we must emphasize the fact that this inculcation of libertinism and egoism, which has obtained for him his

favor with the public, is due only to a very crude misunderstanding of his teachings. It is not subjective pleasure that Nietzsche commands men to seek, but exactly the reverse, the *objective completeness* of being, in strength, nobleness, gentleness, beauty, intellectual power; and it is a matter of indifference whether these qualities bring to their possessor pleasure or pain. In these qualities themselves, and in the evolution of mankind in general toward the possession of them, lies the meaning of existence, and not in their consequences, whether for others, for society, or for the individual self. Indeed, the attainment of these goods is possible only through the severest inner discipline, through the greatest rigor exercised towards one's self, through complete renunciation of every enjoyment for enjoyment's sake. "It is only education through great sorrow that has up to this time brought about all the advancement of mankind," he says in the work that forms the centre of his system. He is so far from being an Epicurean and Cynic—as his critics have adjudged him to be on the strength of his followers' misunderstandings—that, on the contrary, he condemns most severely all that is disorderly and effeminate, that he derives all the decadence of the present day from the lack of a certain ruthlessness towards one's self and towards others, from the disappearance of reverence and authority, from a vulgar striving after the happiness of all. It is true that those qualities in which the significance and worth of mankind consist are present only in certain individuals, and their highest development, whereby is determined each epoch's measure of value, exists only in a few isolated individuals. But this is only the form or way in which the highest development of the race is realized; it constitutes no criterion by which to judge this development, which has a value in and for itself, and which is a final object, not merely a means through which may be obtained any personal or social ends that have in view happiness or contentment. It is evident that Nietzsche must in consequence be an aristocrat: not for the sake of aristocrats as such and their selfish safety and pleasure; nor again for the sake of the people in general and the lower classes, who perhaps—for so has Plato been interpreted—

would find themselves best off under an aristocratic organization of society; but simply because the objective worth of mankind as a species can be brought to its highest stage of perfection only through an aristocracy. Thus Nietzsche has introduced into our spiritual development two ideas bearing on social philosophy that are of great breadth of application. He advocates an aristocratic organization of society, informed neither by the egoistic spirit that we find in a modern government by nobles nor by the spirit of altruism, the being a servant of the great, unthinking multitude, but one that is the necessary form or result of the realization of objective perfections, beauties, and deepenings of the human life. And he further teaches that the interests of the race do not coincide with those of society, as the men of today, living under the ægis of the social idea, have regarded as so unquestionably self-evident. The social interest, that is, the interest taken in a social group that has been developed historically, and especially in the lower classes of it, is only *one* of the possible forms or means to the evolution of the race, the elevation of the human type; and the latter may very well require for its attainment other means: an interest in the qualities of men as things of objective worth, or in the individuals who are the bearers of this objective worth, who are the representatives of a higher mankind.

The social agitations and disturbances of the last decades have doubtless deepened and broadened the moral sense in many souls. In very many they have transformed the selfishness that arises from class feeling into a willingness to renounce, inwardly and outwardly; they have, even where they did not succeed in doing this, at least brought about a definite attitude toward these social demands, a theoretical recognition of these claims, and an uneasy conscience if they be not satisfied. But, besides all the value and importance of social ethics, overlooked or misunderstood by Nietzsche and his adherents, we must not fail to observe that the specifically spiritual deepening must suffer at the hands of this sharpened social consciousness. For, however optimistically one may regard the working class, its interests rest, on the one hand, on purely material considerations,—not only justly,

most justly, but with the claim that these material interests should become an ethical demand upon the higher classes; yet in the scale of spiritual values they always stand far down, and involve, from their very nature, an externalization of existence, in comparison with which Nietzsche's opposition represents the reaction of the purely spiritual life. On the other hand, the attempts of the laborer to obtain an education and to lift himself up to the realms of the ideal are in the highest degree worthy of recognition and of the greatest sympathy; but this sympathy, again, from its very nature, calls for an unquestionable descent on the part of the highly educated from their own level. Inasmuch as the cry for a leveling, for a reapproximation or the educational poles, is raised against that modern differentiation which drives intellectual strata ever farther apart, the tragic relation develops; that which elevates the lower groups lowers the higher. This conflict runs through the entire history of society, since that equality, which, shot through with differentiation, gives its plan to human existence, is no longer that naïve, organic equality peculiar to primitive social conditions, but an ethical demand that manifests itself as a reaction against the dismemberment of society, against the established division of labor, against the fundamental separation into groups and classes. To put it more generally: the entirely distinct development of conditions and needs in the various divisions of society has as its final consequence this, that one and the same tendency and even common and universal interests, may require diametrically opposed measures.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

CONTEMPORARY FRANCE
WITH RESPECT TO AN ENGLISH WORK:*

ANDRÉ LEBON, *Paris.*

It is always difficult for a foreigner to comprehend thoroughly and to describe the conditions of the political life of a people to whom he is bound neither by descent nor by interest,—more difficult still when the foreigner is an Englishman, and when he has to speak of France; of the nation which certain historic differences of opinion, of several centuries' standing, and a radical difference in temperament and civilization keep as far removed as possible from his own people. Nevertheless Mr. Bodley has succeeded! From the inquiry which for more than eight years he has laboriously and impartially conducted both at Paris and in the provinces, and among all classes of the French people, a volume has resulted which, in the varied richness of its facts, in the accuracy of its information, and in the good sense and moderation of its appreciations, belongs among the best works that have been produced in the domain of contemporary political literature. No publicist who desires to study the details and secret mechanism of our institutions and their operation; no psychologist who intends to become initiated into the complexities of the French mind; no statesman who wishes to inquire into the

(1) T. E. C. Bodley, *France, an Essay on the History and the Operation of French Political Institutions.* Paris: Guillaumin, 1901.

* Translated by Mr. W. S. Hayes of the University of Vermont.

strength and the weakness of our political life,—that part of it which is visible, as well as that which is invisible, at least at the first glance,—can afford, henceforth, to neglect Mr. Bodley, when in search of the essential elements, and even the very groundwork, of his reasonings and his calculations.

Mr. Bodley is not merely exact; he is in sympathy with France, a well-wisher of the French people, and he does not endeavor to conceal his sentiments. Beneath the superficial turbulence of political parties he has perceived the solid, peaceful qualities of the race; under the revolutionary loquacity of demagogues and the defamatory excesses of the press he recognizes the profoundly conservative—if, indeed, they are not habitual—instincts of the masses of the electorate, and the mutual tolerance, closely akin to skeptical indifference, which prevails in individual relations. He is not backward in pointing out the primary failings of the French, how their conception of liberty consists chiefly in wishing to annoy those who do not think as they do; how their creed of equality is applied principally to the denial of hereditary privileges of all sorts, while it accommodates itself very readily to numerous and varied social distinctions and hierarchies; how they have not advanced toward the realization of their ideal of fraternity without an extraordinary series of excesses and of prescriptions,—ever since, indeed, the amelioration of manners suppressed the political guillotine and the disarmament of the national guard, immediately after the Communist insurrection of 1871, made popular revolts impossible. But, at the same time, Mr. Bodley knows right well how to put his countrymen on their guard, as often as the occasion arises, against their inborn tendency to Pharisaism or systematic disparagement. He does not hesitate to proclaim, for instance, that the multiplicity of officials is less burdensome in France than the “devastating scourge of lawyers” in England, that the fiscal system is less meddlesome and less vexatious at the east than at the west of the English Channel, and that, everything considered, the “most complex product of civilization on the surface of the globe,” the “eldest daughter of the Church,” though today a laic and anticlerical Republic, offers to

the attentive regard an example of one of the two or three best governed—or, more exactly, best administered—countries in the universe.

Thus Mr. Bodley does not understand, and does not excuse, the pessimism that he has observed in the greater part of the writers and the orators in France who are interested in public affairs. He returns repeatedly to this subject, and is ever afflicted by it. "The critical spirit which caused the Revolution," he writes in his introduction, "has never ceased to be active in the nation; but under the Third Republic it took the shape of an acute and contagious pessimism." And, in another connection, after having justly remarked that this intellectual malady is blighting many other countries at the dawn of the twentieth century, he sees therein the indication that "there is some lack of equipoise in the government of the country." This "something which causes pessimism is," he adds farther on, "the combination of parliamentary government with administrative centralization," and, still farther on, he discovers another cause. It cannot, he declares, be otherwise in a country "where the indifference of the majority to political affairs is the salvation of the people."

In order to understand fully, in this particular, the slightly sibylline thought of Mr. Bodley, it is necessary to consider his work as a whole, and especially the master idea which dominates it. Like all attentive observers, he has been impressed by the multiplicity of purely political revolutions that France has had since 1789,—three Monarchies, two Empires, and three Republics, at the least,—and, by the survival, nevertheless, in strong contrast with these violent changes, of the administrative, financial, religious, and judicial institutions with which Napoleon I. endowed the country at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In common with the majority of the English of the present time, Mr. Bodley has conceived for the great Emperor an excessive retrospective admiration, and for the sole reason that a large part of Napoleon's work has endured; escaping not only the Restoration and the Monarchy of July, but also the return of the Republic, both

in 1848 and in 1871. Mr. Bodley is strongly inclined to believe that of all these forms of government which have followed one another in such rapid succession, the First Empire alone satisfied the varied needs of the country, and that today, also, it alone would satisfy them. "The principle of the referendum," says Mr. Bodley, "is an aspiration that is always latent in the French people and which is brought to the surface not in the least by cabals or by an oratorical propaganda, but by periodic currents of popular feeling, and if one of these currents happens to set in * * * France will be capable of giving herself over to the man, however obscure, whose acts or deeds shall have kindled the imagination of his people." Now, that which, to the mind of Mr. Bodley, contributes towards secretly maintaining this aspiration and towards rendering this eventuality always possible, is the fact that the administrative machine, which is so conceived as to be operated by an extraordinarily strong and concentrated central power, exists in all its parts, with the important exception of precisely this initial motive power. "Authority should proceed from above, confidence from below," was a saying under Napoleon I. As a matter of fact, if confidence was at times shaken, especially at the period of military reverses, authority did not cease to make itself felt, and harshly too, right up to the abdication at Fontainebleau. But that authority no longer exists. On the contrary, instead of an exceptionally energetic will and of an intelligence all but universal, there are now only certain ephemeral ministers, whose precarious hold on power depends on the whims of a parliament that is not broken up into parties, but has crumbled rather into a powdery mass of groups that are incapable of producing great things or of keeping great men in power, that are very apt, on the other hand, to subordinate the public interest to the private interests of the politicians who compose them, and that insinuate themselves to this end into the machinery of government,—not merely for the sake of giving their followers places, but in order that, when once placed, they may enslave them to their hatreds and to their ambitions. The machine survives, therefore, but it is out of order, each of its parts receiving hence-

forth a different or divergent impulse. Hence the national uneasiness, hence also pessimism.

That there is truth, and much truth, in this theory, admits of no doubt. It would assuredly be possible to improve it in certain respects. If a part of the powerful creations of Napoleon I. has endured, it is precisely that part which had its roots in the remotest traditions of ancient France; if French democracy inclines periodically towards the referendum and a dictatorship, it is because this is true of all democracies that aim at perfect equality, in all countries of the world, in all epochs of history, when, having removed, in their upward march, all imaginable forms of aristocracy, they no longer find on their way hereditary castes or established bodies that are interested in maintaining the public liberties. Taken as a whole, the facts observed by Mr. Bodley and the remarks that they suggest to him are none the less exact. Nevertheless, even if the facts explain the social or political uneasiness, they do not give the key to the pessimism of contemporary publicists. France has suffered at other times either through her own fault or through the imperfection of her institutions; but the leaders of the thought of the nation freed her from her troubles and led her in the struggle for an ideal of which the mere contemplation caused her to forget her present miseries. If it is not so at this time, it is due to causes more profound and complex than a mere discord between the political constitution of the country and its administrative institutions. These causes Mr. Bodley has either really not seen, because only a Frenchman who has lived through the war of 1870 and the thirty years which followed the treaty of Frankfurt can have felt them, as is fitting, to the very depths of his being; or has really perceived them, but since he wrote in the midst of the late internal disturbance of the country, has not wished to emphasize them, through extreme moderation and good will.

Contemporary France was, in fact, born of two contradictory currents of aspiration of which it has been possible, for some years, to believe that they would eventually mingle their waters, so as to form a single stream, but concerning which we must ask our-

selves today if one is not going to swallow the other completely up in its vortex. On the one hand, we have the democratic movement, which, scarcely outlined during the Revolution and thwarted by the copy-holders' organization of the first half of the last century, conquered its charter by the sudden establishment of universal suffrage, in 1848, though it but very recently manifested its final tendencies and really became conscious of its power. On the other hand, we have the contraction of the national consciousness and the vigorous effort at military reconstruction which followed the disasters of 1870 and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine.

That there is a divergence, indeed even a radical contradiction, between the two movements, no one can seriously question. Doubtless we may have seen certain democracies affected by "imperialism" and engaged in extending the frontiers of their influence and of their sway beyond the territories conquered by their ancestors; but, in order to go thus far, it was necessary that these democracies, while still young and during the ascending period of their ethical development, should suffer both from overpopulation and an excess of economic production which should lead them, consciously or unconsciously, to procure new outlets. It is none the less true, as a general rule, that the democratic mind has an aversion to the cares of the exterior greatness of a country, and that the big electoral battalions give their attention and apply their energy principally to the realization of interior or social reforms. And it is not merely in the instinctive or deliberate choice of an end to be pursued that democracies are distinguished from other political societies; it is also—it is above all—in the choice of means: they are commonly unable to assume the heavy charges of a permanent military establishment, such as a state must possess in order to maintain a uniform foreign policy. If, nevertheless, they at times submit to such charges, were it only through love of parade and tinsel, they are quite unprepared to adopt the rigorous military and social discipline, without which an army, however numerous it may be, is as incapable of deliberate offensive as of prolonged defensive action. Since, finally, the diplomacy of a country is effective only in so far as its rivals

or enemies know that it is supported by a disengaged and formidable armed force, the democracy, by reason of its spontaneous and fatal development, tends to suppress, or at the very least to paralyze, the two essential instruments of foreign policy.

This has never ceased to be the state of affairs in France. In a series of remarkable studies recently published in the "*Revue des Deux Mondes*," M. Goyau has thoroughly demonstrated the fact that the veritable Republican tradition, however far back we may search for it in the revolutionary past, has always consisted in a more or less vague humanitarianism, in a belief, touching by virtue of its simplicity, that the ideas of peace and of a republic would be propagated throughout the world, and in a constant wish to bring about universal disarmament by itself setting the example. Thus, on the eve of the war of 1870, at the time of the last general elections of the Second Empire, the suppression of permanent armies figured in the first rank of the democratic demands.

Sedan has changed all that, or at least has momentarily retarded the normal evolution of Republican thought. The very men, Gambetta and Jules Ferry, not to name others, who openly advocated disarmament in 1869, had the cruel task of presiding over the destinies of France during the heroic days of the National Defense. After the war, whether as responsible ministers or as the props and inspirers of the ministers in power, they had the magnanimity to acknowledge that their youthful dreams were no longer opportune. As much with a view to putting France in a condition to repel an eventual foreign attack as to allowing her to pursue the course of her glorious international destinies, they applied themselves to a double task. At the same time that they endowed our democracy with all the public liberties necessary to its working, and until then denied the country by the governments of copy-holders or lovers of authority that had preceded the Third Republic, they provided France, by means of universal military service,—the organization of reserves, etc.,—with the most formidable instrument of war she has ever known. Feeling then that such an instrument can be kept in order only

by use, that it rusts and disintegrates during inactivity, that the popular imagination itself has need of being exercised if it is to accept the sacrifices in men or in money which such a system implies, they flung the country by main force, it might be said, into great colonial undertakings, against its real desire. It is thus that there was seen to spring up and survive in France a genuine paradox, of which, we believe, there is no other example in history ; namely, the most extreme liberty of discussion, if not of license even,—in Parliament, the press, meetings, the elections,—and a very large, highly disciplined, and silent, permanent army, whose development all parties were agreed in fostering, while they kept silent as to the indispensable conditions of its existence.

But paradoxes have but one period in history. Gambetta and Jules Ferry have disappeared, and with them the greater part of the men whom the war of 1870 had so profoundly afflicted. The generation which remembered those sorrowful events by reason of its own immediate experiences and sufferings, is now drowned in the rising flood of young people who know the past only by hearsay. Tunis, Indo-China, Madagascar are conquered and pacified, and there is no longer any brilliant occupation for that army but recently so pampered, since the world no longer offers unoccupied spaces for new operations; the dismissal, then the death, of Bismarck, who was considered, rightly or wrongly, as a perpetual menace to the peace of Europe, has rendered less poignant the apprehension of outside aggression; and the Russian alliance, by giving to the country a sense of security, perhaps excessive, and by putting off indefinitely the prospect of an armed conflict, has especially tended to relax the springs of the national consciousness. The democratic flood is returning little by little to its normal course, from which the events of 1870 and the firm will of the men of that time had caused it to deviate for a score of years.

A recent internal crisis, born of a trial too famous to make it necessary to retrace its history, or even to name it, has facilitated the unfolding of all the germs deposited in the soil of France by the democratic tradition. Mr. Bodley is astonished at the action

of the parliamentary Socialists in that affair, and sees therein the proof of their incapacity to pursue, without allowing themselves to be turned aside, the realization of their so-called social ideal. "It is not for a foreigner," says he "to judge whether the French collectivists supported that cause as defenders of the capitalists of the most individualistic race in the world, or indeed as disinterested avengers of a judicial error. However this may be, the attitude of their journals had no more to do with the scientific doctrine of socialism than have many other movements over which the French Socialists, fortunately for society, have the habit of scattering their forces." Agreed, and the grand pontiff of German socialism, Liebknecht, had already condemned more severely even than Mr. Bodley, the conduct of the Millerands and the Jaurès. But we have no need to be preoccupied with the scientific exigencies of theoretical socialism. From the point of view of our French politics, anxiety for which is more pressing, it cannot be ignored that our advanced parties have clearly discerned the profit they might draw from an agitation of the sort: the veil is now rent which protected the military establishment from too harsh a light; the wall is overthrown which sheltered it from incessant violent discussions not in keeping with its serenity; the scruples and the fears are scattered by means of which the country was made to accept the charges necessary for its maintenance.

There, and nowhere else, is found the real origin of the pessimism pointed out by Mr. Bodley. Thinkers worthy of the name, those whom party bitterness does not blind, are troubled in their faith and in their affections. They are disquieted by the fact that, after thirty years of a Republic, there should not have been formed in the French democracy a public spirit capable of adapting itself to the infinite complexity of the conditions of existence in contemporary France. They no longer believe, as before this latest political experiment, in the omnipotence of abstract formulas and principles. They do not feel that by favor of history, and as a partial compensation, a sort of practical empiricism has sprung up in France which may atone for the absenc

of doctrines and ideals. They assert, as every one may safely do, that the pretended force in this propagation of the Republican idea and in these aspirations toward universal peace is only a myth, that no one in Europe has dreamed, or is dreaming, of adopting the institutions that France has acquired in the course of so many internal or external commotions, and that the wars of lucre or of ambition are still as frequent and as ferocious as ever. They fear that, what with a declining birthrate and an increasing inclination to diminish her military efforts, France is already the dupe of an absurd philosophical mirage, and will soon become all too easy a prey of nations less advanced in civilization, of races in the full possession of their physical vigor. And every one will readily admit that all these problems are by no means to be discussed "with a light heart"; every one will understand also that,—as France is now about to make her choice between the two ways which are opening before her,—either to continue to pretend to reconcile her national hopes with her democratic evolution, or deliberately to sacrifice the former in order to devote herself to some Helvetic conception of her organization and of her destinies,—every one will understand, we repeat, that France is hesitating and reflecting, and that she has lost to some extent her old-time illusions and transports.

PROFESSOR LOUNSBURY ON SHAKSPERIAN CRITICISM.¹

BRANDER MATTHEWS, *Columbia University, New York.*

It was about a century ago that Goethe wrote an essay which he entitled "Shakspere and no End"; and it was almost half a century ago that Lowell called a paper "Shakspere Once More." And at no time in the longer period has there been any slackening of the full current of Shakspertian criticism and commentary, which is always at flood and always brimming over the levies. In the past two or three years, we have been able to profit by the large speculations of a Scandinavian critic, George Brandes, by the coördinating investigations of a British biographer, Mr. Sidney Lee, and by the more popular presentation of the results of research by an American man of letters, Mr. Hamilton W. Mabie.

It might seem that everything has been said, and said more than once; and it might be supposed that there was nothing left for any later inquirer to investigate. But those who best know the subject are most keenly aware that there are certain aspects which have not hitherto been adequately handled. There is no book, for example, which does for the Elizabethan stage what

(1) *Shakespearean Wars: Shakespeare as a dramatic artist, with an account of his reputation at various periods.* By Thomas R. Lounsbury, L. H. D., LL.D., Professor of English in Yale University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: Edward Arnold, 1901.

Mr. Haigh has done for "The Attic Theatre" and what the late Eugène Despois did for "Le Théâtre Français sous Louis XIV." What is even more astonishing is the fact that although Shakspeare is the greatest dramatist the world has ever seen, great not only as a poet in the study, but even greater as a playwright on the stage, there is no treatise in which his dramaturgic craftsmanship has been analyzed by an expert in the things of the theatre, understanding the conditions of the rude playhouse for which Shakspeare prepared his masterpieces.

Quite as tempting as either of these topics is a third, which has now rewarded the attention of Professor Lounsbury. This is the history of Shakspeare's reputation as an artist,—as a dramatic artist. Nowadays we have no doubt that Shakspeare was a dramatic artist, and that when he chose to take the trouble, and when he had a theme which called forth all his interest, he could reveal himself as the greatest of all dramatic artists,—a consummate craftsman and the master of every technical device. Indeed, there is today a feeling among us that Shakspeare is practically faultless,—a feeling so strong, so Professor Lounsbury notes, as to be almost tyrannical. But Voltaire thought—or at least said—that Shakspeare was a savage with flashes of genius; Milton credited Shakspeare with warbling native wood-notes wild; and the more or less academic criticism of Shakspeare's contemporaries was voiced by Ben Jonson when he told Drummond that Shakspeare wanted art.

What did Ben Jonson mean by this not unfriendly assertion? Why did Milton think that Shakspeare could sing by ear only? What led Voltaire to dismiss Shakspeare as a savage? To answer these questions requires a careful tracing of the successive phases of literary criticism; it calls for a conscientious study of the transformations of literary theory, as one generation follows another, and overturns the idols of its predecessor. For any one undertaking this arduous task, a threefold qualification is needed; he must be a scholar, a critic, and a historian,—a scholar in the solidity of his learning, a critic in the delicacy of his perception, and a historian in his ability to marshal his

material and in his command of the narrative art. Professor Lounsbury not only possesses these treble requisites, but he superadds another which doubles the value of the rest,—he has also a sense of humor, which plays along his pages, and which makes it easy for us to read what has been written with the most painstaking toil.

“Criticism,” said Mr. Goldwin Smith a few years ago, “is becoming an art of saying fine things;” and indisputably criticism had better mind its own business and refrain from impertinent epigram. But if the literary historian has done his work as thoroughly as any dry-as-dust could do it, there ought surely to be no objection if he can lighten his labor with a smile. Professor Lounsbury is a master of exact scholarship; he is as minute in his research and as precise in his report as any Teutonic philologist; but he is able to record the result of his inquiry with a Gallic ease. He can give an agreeably artistic presentation of an investigation which has hitherto been inexorably scientific. This it is which gives Professor Lounsbury his position of preëminence among the living historians of English literature. Others there are who write lightly, and others, there may be, who have a knowledge as deep and as wide; but no one else is there who has the happy combination which Professor Lounsbury displayed in his illuminating biography of Fenimore Cooper, in his luminous studies of Chaucer, and now in this enlightening consideration of the strange vagaries of Shaksperian criticism.

For us, at the beginning of the twentieth century who are inclined to think that every preceding generation has judged itself by the judgment it passed on Shakspeare, the story that Professor Lounsbury has to tell in these pages is one of the most curious in the whole history of literature. And what is most striking is the evidence here brought together to show that the plain people, as Lincoln called them, have been better judges of what is best than are the professed critics. The plain people persisted in flocking into the theatre when Shakspeare’s plays were acted; they did this when these comedies and tragedies were new and fresh; they do so now three centuries later. They knew what they liked, and

the protests of the professed critics could not make them dislike the best of Shakspeare's plays. It was not the plain people who were astray; it was the representatives of education who made spectacles of themselves,—Rymer, at one time, and Doctor Johnson at another. Professor Lounsbury proves this beyond all question; and then he declares that there is perhaps no better illustration "of the superiority of judgment sometimes shown by the great mass of men to that arrogantly boasted of by the select body of self-appointed arbiters of taste and guardians of dramatic propriety."

In the course of this history of one of the most interesting controversies in the long annals of criticism, Professor Lounsbury sets forth with a fulness never before attempted the theories of dramatic art advocated by the classicists, and not finally disestablished until the triumph of the romanticists a century or so ago. He considers the so-called unities of Action, of Time, and of Place; and he incidentally declares that Shakspeare knew about them and rejected their bondage intentionally save in a single play,—“The Tempest,” in which he observed them as though to show that he could work freely within their limitations whenever he chose to do so. Professor Lounsbury also takes up the intermingling of the comic and the tragic, which was always painful to classicists of the severest sect; and he discusses the representations of violence and bloodshed on the stage,—representations which the classicists held in horror. He shows further that while Shakspeare saw life clearly and saw it whole, and while Shakspeare's moral sense was far more enlightened than that of any of his contemporaries, he refused resolutely to adopt the narrow formula of so-called Poetic Justice, preferring always a larger vision.

It is in his final chapter that Professor Lounsbury is able most amply to discuss “Shakespeare as Dramatist and Moralist”; and it is in this chapter, even more clearly than elsewhere in the book, that he best reveals the robust common-sense which is really as necessary as the insight of a critic and the equipment of a historian. It is the same sturdy and invincible common-sense which domi-

nated his admirable "History of the English Language." And if there is any one subject about which foolish folk will persist in chattering more superabundantly than about Shakspeare it is the English language. A book on either subject which is as sane as it is scholarly, as sincere as it is acute, is something to be profoundly thankful for; and therefore is it that we now owe a double debt of gratitude to Professor Lounsbury.

TRUSTS, TRADE-UNIONS, AND THE NATIONAL MINIMUM

SIDNEY WEBB, *London.*

Nations, it is to be feared, learn little from books or college lectures, or even from magazine articles. We may, indeed, go so far as to say that, in some subjects at any rate, they learn only from experience,—a good teacher, if only the fees were not so heavy! It took three visitations of Asiatic cholera to teach English towns the elements of municipal sanitation. Two whole generations of academic demonstration failed to convince the United Kingdom that it was impolitic to tax the food of the people: it needed a calamitous famine to drive the lesson home. What, however, for my present purpose is more important is that there is a converse to this statement. Every striking change in the economic organization of a nation teaches it some lesson. What is it that the American public is likely to learn from the advent of the Trust?

I pretend to no intimate knowledge of the industrial circumstances of the United States. But some twelve years of observation from afar, guided by two visits of three months each, convince me, at least, that the relations of Capital and Labor in America differ remarkably from those in England. This is a case in which the looker-on may possibly see, if not more of the game than the actual players, at any rate some points which escape their notice. I shall, therefore, attempt to describe, first,

what seem to me characteristics common to both countries, and secondly, certain momentous differences between them.

Let us notice, to begin with, how entirely both countries have departed from the industrial organization described by the classic economists. It pleases me to remember that Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" and the Declaration of Independence were given to the world in the same year. I do not propose to discuss to what extent the argument and philosophy of both these master-pieces may have been influenced by the industrial organization then common to England and New England. What is brought vividly and dramatically to our minds by the formation of the so-called "Billion Dollar Steel Trust" is the extent of the change which has come over the economic status of the mass of the nation. A century and a quarter ago, when Jefferson and Adam Smith were writing, it could be taken for granted that the normal state of things was for every man to become, in due course, "his own master"; it could be assumed that the work of the world was, for the most part, done by men who were moved by the stimulus of making "profit" as distinguished from wages or salary; it seemed a scientific fact that values were determined by the mutual exchange of the commodities and services of independent producers. It was on these assumptions that the classic political economy was based. What is more important to us today is that, both in England and in the United States, the public opinion of the educated and prosperous classes still makes much the same assumption. Neither the prosperous Englishman nor the prosperous American can rid himself of the feeling that it is open to every one to become a profit-maker, that no one need long remain a mere wage-earner, and that it is, therefore, not really of vital consequence to the nation how those members of the community who happen temporarily to be wage-earners are actually living. The opening of the twentieth century sees, perhaps, some weakening of this assumption. England pays more and more attention to its factory legislation. I do not now find the prosperous American, as I did twelve years ago, believing and explaining, by way of apology for the slums of Chicago or New

York, that all the slum-dwellers could get out of them if they chose. What he now says and believes is that these are only "dagos," that at any rate every native-born American can rise to a higher place, and that the status of the hired laborer is, therefore, on the American continent, still something transient, exceptional, and relatively unimportant. He is still revolted by any glimpse of American democracy as a "democracy of the 'hired man.'" Yet surely nothing is more certain than that in the United States, as in Western Europe and Australia, the hired men do, and must necessarily continue to, form at least three fourths of the population. This is a fact which the advent of the Trust, the supremacy of business conducted on a large scale, the rapidly increasing concentration of nearly every kind of industry, can hardly fail to drive home to the mind of the American, as to that of the English citizen. He will, for the first time, become aware of himself as one of a democracy of hired men.

We shall be conscious, too, by whom we are hired. It has long been a fond dream, both in England and in the United States, to prove by some mysterious juggling with wage and price statistics, that wealth is getting more equally distributed, that the proportion of small competences is increasing, and that the number is growing of those who, as stockholders or interest receivers, share in industrial profits. This has, for forty or fifty years, been an amiable delusion of the statistical philanthropist. It is now dispelled. The dramatic concentrations of capital exhibited by the Rockefellers and Pierpont Morgans, like the visible accumulations of the English ducal ground-landlords, have forced upon everybody's notice the indisputable testimony of death duty statistics. The only point in dispute is whether wealth-concentration has as yet gone further in England or in the United States. This is, of course, not to deny that some or all of the property-less masses have, during the past fifty years, found their conditions of life improved. But the advent of the Trust is making both England and America realize, as they have never realized before, that in both countries nine tenths of all the realized property belongs today to a class that comprises only one

tenth of the population,—that ninety per cent of the citizens, the great mass of the people, share among them, even including their little homes and furniture, and all their much-vaunted hoards, only ten per cent of the capital wealth.

But if the advent of the Trust makes us conscious of ourselves as nations of hired men, it necessarily compels us to realize that the conditions of our hiring are all-important, not only to ourselves individually, but to the community as a whole. "Every society is judged," as Mr. Asquith, our late Home Secretary, said the other day,—“and survives, according to the material and moral minimum which it prescribes to its members.” Note that word “prescribes.” As hired men, we find ourselves graded in elaborate hierarchies, from the sweat-shop hand or day-laborer, right up to Mr. Schwab at a million a year. But four fifths of us are manual-working wage-earners, filling our dinner pails and keeping our families, out of earnings which may be anything from five to fifty dollars a week. These earnings depend on our successful bargaining with our employers,—employers who used to be men like ourselves, but who, as we now realize, are, for the majority of us, gigantic capitalist corporations, huge joint-stock mills, railroads, shipping combines, and “Billion Dollar Steel Trusts.” Between these employers and the individual workmen there has hitherto been assumed to be “freedom of contract,” secured to us by the Constitution of the United States or by the contemporary general principles of the law in the United Kingdom; and this freedom of contract was inaugurated, and is today still usually defended, as being in the highest interests of the wage-earner himself. “The patrimony of a poor man,” says Adam Smith, “lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing that strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property.” But the conditions of industry have somewhat changed since 1776, and the “Billion Dollar Steel Trust,” though it does not appreciably alter the circumstances, is opening our eyes to them. We see now, what the college professors have gradually become conscious

of, that freedom of contract in the hiring of labor may mean something very like the compulsion of one party to serve the other, on terms nominally contractual but virtually fixed by overwhelming omnipotence. When the conditions of the workman's life are settled, without interference by law or trade-unionism, by absolutely free contract between man and man, the workman's freedom is delusive. Where he bargains he bargains at a hopeless disadvantage; and with regard to many of the terms most important to his health, comfort, and industrial efficiency, he cannot bargain at all.

This conclusion will carry with it such momentous consequences, and is as yet so imperfectly realized, that it is worth while to think it over. Let us consider how the wage-contract is actually entered into. Leave out of account, to begin with, any period of bad trade, when mills are shutting down or running only short time, and armies of unemployed are looking for work. Assume that things are in equilibrium,—that there is only one place vacant, and only one "hand" applying for it. Watch carefully the play of motives acting on the two minds, that of the "man with the dinner pail" seeking employment, and that of the employer or foreman with a place to fill. Suppose the workman to demur to the wage offered by the employer. There is, we assume, absolutely no other spare hand in sight. To leave the vacancy unfilled may cause some inconvenience in the mill. To complete the orders in hand, some of the other men may have to work more overtime. The delivery of the goods may even have to be delayed, the year's output may be diminished, and the year's profits may be fractionally less than they would have been. But in the meantime the capitalist or his agent is not actually affected in his daily life. He and his family go on eating and drinking as they did before. At most, the matter is a trifling one to them. Thus, the capitalist can afford to wait until the workman returns in a humbler frame of mind. And this is just what the workman must do. What is only a trifling matter to the capitalist is to the workman his whole livelihood. Moreover, he cannot wait. Even if he stands out one day, he has thereby lost

that day. His very subsistence depends on his quickly coming to an agreement. If he is obstinate, consumption of his little hoard or the sale of his furniture may delay the catastrophe. Sooner or later slow starvation forces him to come to terms. And, since success in the "higgling of the market" is largely dependent on the relative eagerness of the parties to come to terms,—conspicuously so if this eagerness cannot be concealed from the antagonist,—capitalist and workman always meet, in the absence of law or effective trade-unionism, on unequal terms. Moreover, the capitalist knows the cards and the workman does not. Even in the rare cases in which the absence of a single workman is of any real consequence to the employer, this is usually unknown to any one but himself. He, too, knows the state of the market, and can judge whether it might not even suit him better to slacken production for the moment. The isolated individual workman bargains in the dark. Add to this the fact that the workman is not trained in the art of bargaining, which is the daily business of the employer, or the constant task of an expert specially trained for the particular work of hiring men. Thus, in the bargaining between a capitalist corporation and the individual laborers whom it hires, the laborers stand to lose at every point. They are as certainly "done" in the deal as is the greenhorn playing poker with a transatlantic gambler.¹

So far we have been assuming that the labor market is in equilibrium, and that only one hand applies for one vacant place. But at what periods, and in what trades is so perfect an equilibrium to be found? When great corporations are concentrating their works and shutting down unnecessary mills; when new processes or new machines are displacing labor; when industrial crises, changes of fashion, or the mere shifts and gusts of international commerce cause our production to wane, now in this branch, now in that,—what freedom has the hired man? When

(1) For the latest and most explicit statement of the process of industrial bargaining, see *The Case for the Factory Acts*, with preface by Mrs. Humphry Ward. Richards: London.

the unemployed are crowding round the factory gates, it is plain to each one among them that, unless he can induce the "boss" to choose him rather than another, his chance of subsistence for weeks to come may be irretrievably lost. Bargaining, in any genuine sense, there can be none. The "boss" has but to pick his man, and name the price,—even if he does so much as name the price. Once inside the gates, the lucky workman knows that if he grumbles at any of the surroundings, however intolerable; if he demurs to any speeding up, lengthening of the hours, or arbitrary deductions; or if he hesitates to obey any orders, however unreasonable, he condemns himself once more to the semi-starvation and misery of unemployment. The alternative to the foreman or gauger is merely to pick another laborer out of the eager crowd at the gate. The difference to the capitalist corporation is nil.

But much more remains to be said. To the capitalist corporation the wage-contract is simply a question of so many dollars to be paid. To the workman, it is a matter of placing, for ten or twelve hours out of every twenty-four, his whole life at the disposal of his hirer. What hours he shall work, when and where he shall get his food, the sanitary conditions of his employment, the safety of the machinery, the temperature and atmosphere to which he is subjected, the fatigue or strains that he endures, the risks of disease or accident that he incurs,—all these are involved in the workman's contract, and not in his employer's. These are matters of as vital importance to the wage-earner as are his wages. Yet about these matters he cannot, in practice, bargain at all. Imagine a weaver, before accepting employment in a Massachusetts cotton mill, examining the proportion of steam in the atmosphere of the shed, testing the strength of the shuttleguards, and criticising the soundness of the shafting belts; a Pittsburg mechanic prying into the security of the hoists and cranes or the safety of the lathes and steam hammers among which he must move; a work-girl in a Chicago sweat-shop computing the cubic space which will be her share of the workroom, discussing the ventilation,

warmth, and lighting of the place in which she will spend nearly all her working life, or examining disapprovingly the sanitary accommodation provided; think of the man who wants a job in a New Jersey white lead works testing the poisonous influence of the particular process employed, and reckoning in terms of dollars and cents the exact degree of injury to his health which he is consenting to undergo. On all these matters, at any rate, we must at once give up the notion of freedom of contract. In the absence of any restraint of law, the conditions of sanitation, decency, and security from accident in the various enterprises of the United States Steel Corporation or the Standard Oil Company, the Western Union Telegraph Company or the Pennsylvania Railroad, are absolutely at the mercy of the rulers of these great undertakings. They decide these conditions of life for the millions of workmen whom they employ,—and thus, to this extent, for the American nation,—as arbitrarily (and, it is to be hoped, as humanely) as they do for their horses. “In the general course of human nature,” remarked the shrewd founders of the American Constitution, “power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will.”¹

These features of the lot of the hired man are common to England and America, and, indeed, to every country in which capitalist industry and production are found on a large scale. We must, in intellectual honesty, recognize the fact. But this is not to say that the condition of the hired man is either good or bad, or better or worse than in bygone times. It is different from what it was when industry was carried on by the village blacksmith, different from that described by Adam Smith, different from that which Jefferson knew. The dinner pail may be fuller,—as regards whole sections of the community, it can certainly be proved to be fuller,—but there has been a change of relative status. Meanwhile, let us accept the result in the great wage-earning class as we now know it,—a community of hired men; a relatively small proportion of skilled artisans earning “good

(1) *Federalist*, No. lxxix.

money"; the great mass living on wages, in England of seven dollars, in the United States of ten or twelve dollars, per fully employed week; while below these come the unskilled laborers and most women workers, existing, in greater or smaller numbers, under conditions of "sweating,"—authoritatively defined as "earnings barely sufficient to sustain existence, hours of labor such as to make the lives of the workers periods of almost ceaseless toil, sanitary conditions injurious to the health of the persons employed, and dangerous to the public."¹ Into one or another of these three categories come seventy or eighty per cent of the whole population. Such are the free citizens of the United States; such are the loyal subjects of Edward the Seventh of England. We hate to think about it, but it is so; and the advent of the Trust is going to make us realize that it is so.

What effect will this growing consciousness of industrial subordination have upon public opinion? Let me confine myself, for a moment, to the English side of the problem. In England we developed a capitalist industry a couple of generations earlier than did the United States. Though the time for trusts and great railroad combinations had not yet come, the new mills and mines which, at the end of the eighteenth century, spread over the northern and midland counties were the leviathans of their day, and great was the power which they wielded in the labor market. Complete "freedom of contract" prevailed. The result, as every one knows, was the terrible "white slavery" of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, when generation after generation of workers in the factories and coal mines were stunted and maimed, brutalized and degraded, and hurried into early graves by the long hours, low wages, and insanitary conditions of those halcyon days, in which, as has been said, "it was not five per cent, or ten per cent, but thousands per cent that made the fortunes of Lancashire." But England grew alarmed, amid all its profit, at the rapid degeneration of whole sections of its people. By the untir-

(1) *Final Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Sweating System*, 1890.

ing efforts of the philanthropists, factory law after factory law was passed, setting limits to freedom of contract, and substituting, for individual bargaining between man and man, definite, common rules on every point deemed of prime importance to the welfare of the operatives. These common rules, securing a reasonable minimum of leisure, safety, and sanitation, applied at first only to the textile and mining industries, and are, to this day, not yet coëxtensive with the English wage-earning class. Nor do they apply to wages. But there grew up, after 1824,¹ in all the principal English industries strong trade-unions, which enforced, by the instrument of collective bargaining, new, common rules supplementing those laid down by law. The employers in each trade were numerous and divided. Differing among themselves in wealth and magnitude of business, as well as in personal character, they proved unable to present a solid front to the trade-unions. The result is that, in the course of the last half century, some of the principal and most successful branches of English industry—notably cotton-manufacture, coal-mining, ship-building, engineering, and the building trades—have come to be regulated by codes of common rules, enforced partly by law and partly by collective agreement. The rates of wages, like the hours of work and the fundamental conditions of safety and sanitation, are, therefore, no longer at the mercy of individual capitalists. There exists, in each trade, a sort of minimum standard, fixed practically by general agreement among the whole body of employers, on the one hand, and the whole body of workmen, on the other, below which it is found impossible for any employer to descend. He may break away, but he discovers presently that it no more pays him to outrage the public opinion of his trade than to infringe the factory law. In England, the general opinion of the community acts, in all well-organized trades, as a real, though curiously intangible check upon the capitalist. Public sympathy is always on the side of a stable and highly organized trade-

(1) S. and B. Webb's *History of Trade-Unionism*. Longmans: New York.

union defending itself against any encroachment on the common rules, or reduction in rates. Great corporations like the London and Northwestern Railway find themselves pulled up sharp by the peremptory interference of the Board of Trade, when they are guilty of any conspicuous tyranny over their employees. Even in the late engineers' strike, where the men lost sympathy because they were believed to be resisting machinery, and the employers won all along the line, the final agreement formally recognized the right of collective bargaining and the need for common rules, while the result has been the establishment of a new tribunal of the trade to maintain these rules,—a joint tribunal, in which, for the moment, the associated employers doubtless have a larger influence than the associated workmen, but one to which every individual employer, no less than every individual workman, finds himself practically subject. This collective rule of the whole trade over every individual employer in it, as well as over every individual workman, is typical of most of the industries in England in which there are great employers, or strong capitalist corporations. Moreover, the law, where it purports to control, really does control, even the greatest corporation. Hence neither our philanthropists nor our workmen fear the Trust. England's industrial peril lies in quite another direction.

The worst conditions of employment in the United Kingdom occur in those industries carried on by small employers, or desolated by home work, which have either escaped as yet from the ever widening scope of the factory laws, or in which such laws are not yet effectively enforced. Here philanthropic sentiment has hitherto been evoked by the spectacle of the small master, struggling to rise in the world, and unable to afford to his sweated employees either wholesome workshops, decent sanitation, or a living wage. These unfortunate workers, incapable of effective organization, have hitherto failed to obtain the same help from public opinion or the same measure of protective legislation that Parliament concedes to the politically active cotton operatives or coal miners, who need it far less. Unfortunately, too, the efforts to secure effective factory laws for these workers are at present balked by the

doctrinaire resistance of many of the leaders of the movement for "women's rights." Thus, the sweated trades, in spite of their disastrous effects on the community as a whole, are given, at present, a positive advantage in the competition for the world-market. The absence of any collective regulation enables the employers so to use their superiority in bargaining for the hire of their labor as to reduce its condition even below subsistence level. These trades are, in fact, parasites on the rest of the community, drawing from the more prosperous sections, in one form or another, a continual "bounty" with which to eke out their starvation wages. Fortunately, the great staple industries of the kingdom, in which relatively good conditions prevail, gain so much in efficiency by their very regulation that they go on, notwithstanding this virtual bounty to the sweated trades, increasing in extent and prosperity year after year. What loses ground in England is any industry which escapes the beneficial effect of collective regulation, but which for some reason fails to get the bounty implied in industrial parasitism. The most conspicuous example is English agriculture, which is constantly falling more and more behind not only the great regulated trades such as cotton and coal, but also behind the miserably inefficient sweated trades, fed by parasitic bounty.¹ Thus, what is most urgently needed in the United Kingdom, and what is most likely to spring from our growing consciousness of the weakness of the hired man, is not any interference with the great employers or their capitalist combinations,—which are, at present, the least uncontrolled of our industrial forces,—but an extension of the strong arm of the law on behalf of the oppressed workers in the sweated trades.

Models for such action are afforded both by New Zealand and by Victoria. The time is not far distant when we shall see in London, as already in Melbourne, wage-boards for all the sweated trades, formed partly of employers and partly of wage-

(1) For the whole argument as to industrial parasitism, see S. and B. Webb's *Industrial Democracy*. Longmans: New York.

earners, and empowered to fix minimum rates of piece-work wages, below which it will be illegal for any employer to hire a hand. We shall, in fact, begin at the bottom of the industrial army, which suffers, not from great capitalists, but from small masters,—not from the newest methods of industrial organization, but from the belated survival of old-fashioned ones. These wage-boards, beginning, as in Victoria, in the sweated trades, will, also as in Victoria, not rest there. New Zealand points the way. More and more nearly do we approach the stage at which the conditions of employment,—wages as well as hours, sanitation as well as protection from accident,—if not fixed by authoritative decision of joint committees representing all the workmen and all the employers, are settled by an arbitrator's decree to which both parties find themselves compelled to submit. This will long be veiled in the United Kingdom, where reforms usually arrive in substance before they are called by their names. Yet English public opinion is already much impressed by the fact that in Victoria and in New Zealand the standard minimum conditions of employment,—rates of wages as well as hours and sanitation,—which the community thinks fit to require from time to time in each particular trade, are promulgated as law, and enforced by the criminal courts. The nineteenth century in the United Kingdom has seen the extension of the factory law to sanitation and decency, hours of labor, and protection against accidents in a select set of trades. The result of our growing consciousness of the weakness of the wage-earner, in his bargaining with the great capitalist employer, is to bring us, at the opening of the twentieth century, to the threshold of the Legal Minimum Wage for every branch of industry. Note again Mr. Asquith's word "prescribes."

But the result in the United States may possibly be quite otherwise. The great capitalist corporations of the United States differ as widely from those of the United Kingdom as do the laws and the trade- and labor-unions of the two countries. In England, as I have said, the great capitalist is, and feels himself to be, effectively under control. The trade-unions, if inferior in strength

on a fight to a finish, are in a position to offer him stubborn resistance. The law is unquestionably his master. And public opinion, not altogether on either side in the conflict, passes with great rapidity, and with irresistible force, into opposition to any serious attack on the current Standard of Life. The American capitalist corporation is, and feels itself to be, in a very different position. American philanthropy has never been stirred by the sensational evils in cotton and coal which brought about the English factory and mining laws. Legal regulation of the conditions of labor, where it exists at all, has been, and continues to be, an alien element in the American system, doubtfully constitutional and hesitatingly enforced. The indispensable administrative organization for any real enforcement of standard conditions is nearly everywhere lacking. Nor does public opinion wish it otherwise. Throughout the whole century, and right down to our own day, it has been possible to retain the complacent assurance, not too obviously contradicted by fact, that the native-born American, of Anglo-Saxon or Teutonic descent, was always able to rise to a position of command, and to earn a relatively good living. There is no evidence that the concentration of industry in great capitalist corporations, or the vast accumulation of wealth in the hands of a small class, has yet had any injurious effect on wages or on the other conditions of employment. On the contrary, there is some reason to think that so far, at any rate, as foremen and skilled workers are concerned, the change in industrial organization may be to their pecuniary advantage. In the comparatively few sections of labor in which the workmen's organizations have any real strength,—these being usually the higher grades, with some approach to a monopoly of skill or high technique,—it may well suit the capitalist corporations to buy off opposition by increased wages, which could not, in any case, make an appreciable difference in the total cost of production. Public opinion, moreover, keenly interested in the greatest possible development of the national industry, and strongly prejudiced against the interference of "labor-unions," will continue to operate against any effective strike. Thus, the rulers of

the great capitalist corporations are, within the industrial sphere, really able to do what they like with their own. When all the employers in a single industry from California to Maine combine into a single corporation, this leviathan is, indeed, perhaps the most perfect example of freedom that the world has ever seen. In the employment of labor, especially of a low grade, such a giant corporation may impose very nearly whatever conditions it chooses. Its power of "disciplining" any recalcitrant hand, or even a whole community, is terribly potent. It can shut down here and build up there, without let or hindrance. It can maintain whatever brutalizing or deteriorating conditions of labor that it thinks profitable to itself; it can disregard with impunity all precautions against disease or accident; it can exact whatever degree of speed at work it pleases; it can, in short, dispose of the lives of its myriads of workers exactly as it does of those of its horses. The workers may "kick"; there may be labor-unions and strikes; but against such industrial omnipotence the weapons of the wage-earners are as arrows against ironclads. This will be all the more certainly the case because it will suit the leviathan, as a matter of convenience, to come to terms with the small minority of skilled and well-paid workmen, who might have stiffened the rest. This is the condition of monopolist autocracy into which every great industry in the United States seems fated to pass, and to pass with great rapidity. A few thousands of millionaire capitalist "kings," uniting the means of a few hundreds of thousands of passive stockholders, and served by perhaps an equal number of well-salaried managers, foremen, inventors, designers, chemists, engineers, and skilled mechanics, will absolutely control an army of ten or fifteen millions of practically property-less wage-laborers, largely Slavonic, Latin, or Negro in race.

Now I do not predict, as a leading American economist is said to have done, that this freedom in autocracy will, within twenty-five years, produce an Emperor of America. But it is not difficult to see that, unless the United States learns a new lesson from the advent of the Trust, it is preparing for itself a

twentieth century such as Washington would have shuddered to think of. From the purely "business" point of view, even when reinforced by all the scientific economics of the college professor, there seems nothing to stop the triumphant progress of this capitalist autocracy. The great capitalists have no doubt thought this out, and are confident of their future profits. But what American capitalists always seem to undervalue is the influence exercised upon their profits by wide political movements. How little the Pierpont Morgans and Rockefellers of the time thought about the Abolitionists! Yet the outcome of the abolitionist agitation upset a great many capitalist schemes. Even the Bryan presidential campaign of 1896 cost the capitalists many millions in diminished trade, slackened output, and diverted energy. And so, the outsider ventures to predict, the advent of the Trust will lead to quite unforeseen hindrances to industrial development and quite unexpected deductions from capitalist profits, arising from the kind of civilization which it will produce and the political reactions which it will set up. Let us, therefore, examine more closely what America has to fear from the rule of the Trusts.

Notice, to begin with, that the advent of the Trust almost necessarily implies an improvement in industrial organization, measured, that is to say, by the diminution of the cost of production. Just as it was a gain to the community, from this point of view, for the myriad small masters to be merged in the relatively few capitalist employers, so it is a further gain to merge these capitalist employers into great Trusts or Corporations. The Standard Oil Company and the United States Steel Corporation represent, in fact, an improvement in industrial technique. So far as their organizations prevail, the world's work is done with less labor, less friction, less waste, than it was under the arrangements which they have superseded. There may be other disadvantages, just as there were other disadvantages when the handloom was superseded by the power-loom. But we must not let the drawbacks obscure the element of real progress. The rule of the great capitalist corporations secures the best possible organization of the work of the world.

But will the public be allowed to get the benefit of this industrial improvement? Is it not to be expected that the Trusts will put up prices against the consumer, and so levy a tax upon the world compared with which the exactions of government sink into insignificance? This danger seems to me exaggerated, and comparatively unimportant. It must be remembered that anything like absolute monopoly of production in the staple needs of the mass of the people is unknown, and practically impossible. The main products of the world are produced in too many different countries, under too many different industrial systems, standing at too varying grades of civilization, for any absolute combination into a single hand. A Trust may, indeed, easily come to dominate a single market. The remedy for any oppressive raising of prices is, then, to abolish the customs tariff, and to call in the foreign producer. The monopolist Trust, even in countries that freely open their ports to foreign products, can no doubt make large profits. But its profits will represent chiefly the economies in production brought about by its own formation. The consumer will not have to pay more than the consumer of the same article in countries not subject to the Trust, except by the amount of the freight, and probably, as we shall see, not even by so much as that. Hence we may expect the increasing dominance of the Trust to make for the abolition of protective duties. It is, indeed, not the consumer, as consumer, who need particularly fear the Trusts.

The competent, "pushful," native-born American will get on all right under this capitalist autocracy. He will, indeed, have to give up the chance of becoming his own master, and, practically, that of "making a pile." But what will be virtually the civil service of industry, the great salaried hierarchy of the Trusts, will offer a safer and, on the average, a better paid career for industrial talent, than the old chances of the market. Every man of skill and energy, competence and "go," will be wanted in the gigantic organization of the new industry. Brains will be at a premium. From the skilled mechanic right up to the highest engineering genius, from the competent foreman up to the

brightest railroad organizer, from the merely practiced chemist up to the heaven-born inventor or designer,—all will find, not merely employment, but scope for their whole talent, not merely remuneration, but salaries such as the world has seldom seen. And in serving their employers, they will be at least as directly serving the community as they are at present.

It is when we come to the great mass of wage-earners,—the ten or fifteen millions of day-laborers and ordinary artisans,—that we see the really grave consequences of industrial autocracy. These men, with their wives and families, must necessarily constitute the great bulk of the population, the “common lump of men.” It is in their lives that the civilization of a nation consists, and it is by their condition that it will be judged. And, though the great ones never believe it, it is upon the status, the culture, the upward progress of these ordinary men that the prosperity of the nation, and even the profits of the capitalists, ultimately depend. What is likely to be the Standard of Life of the ordinary laborer or artisan under the great industrial corporations of the United States?

Now one thing is definitely proved, both by economic science and business experience. If the wages of common labor are left to “supply and demand,” and are not interfered with by factory law or effective trade-unionism, we shall witness no improvement in the present conditions of life of the Pennsylvania miner, the Chicago sweat-shop hand, the day-laborer on the railroad, or the girl seamstresses sewing for dear life in New York tenement garrets. On the contrary, we shall see these conditions of life generalized over the whole range of common labor, male or female. We shall find wages everywhere forced down, for the ordinary, common, skilled worker, to their “natural level,”—that is, to the barest subsistence of the human animal from day to day. With this state of things will necessarily go the corresponding life, such as we see it already in the Pittsburg or Chicago slum. It is, however, needless to amplify the picture. To what awful depths of misery and demoralization, brutality and degradation, humanity can, under “perfect freedom,”

descend, we are scarcely yet in a position to say. Is this to be the contribution to economics in the twentieth century, of the country of Jefferson and Washington?

Fortunately for the world, the United States is not likely to make this experiment. The millions of common laborers, however poor and degraded they may be, or may become, are yet citizens and voters,—are, moreover, the inheritors, even if of alien race, of glorious traditions of manhood and freedom. That uncontrolled personal power which several centuries of struggle have displaced from the throne, the castle, and the altar, is not likely to be allowed to rule in the farm, the factory, and the mine. As yet, the American citizen still believes himself to be free, and sees not the industrial subjection into which he is rapidly passing. But it is not to be supposed that he will witness unmoved the successive failures of trade-unions and strikes, the general reductions in wages which will mark the first spell of bad trade, the manifold dismissals and “shuttings down,” the progressive degradation of his class. He will take up every wild dream and every mad panacea. He will be tricked and outvoted again and again. But, if so, the result will be a “class war” more terrible than any the world has seen, and one in which, though the ultimate victory will be with the common people, American civilization may go back several generations.

Yet America ought to avoid this catastrophe. The experiment has already been tried, and the remedy is known. If the people of the United States will but do that most difficult of all things,—learn by the experience of other nations,—they may get out of the Trusts all the advantages which these offer, without suffering the terrible calamity in which they unwittingly threaten to overwhelm American civilization. The remedy lies in what we in England are beginning to call the “Policy of the National Minimum.” We must give up the idea of individual freedom of competition, which the combinations of capital have proved to be illusory, and take up, instead, the higher freedom of collective life. We must get back as a community what we have lost as individuals.

The Policy of the National Minimum translates itself into

four main branches of legislative and executive activity. There will have to be a national minimum of wages. The Trusts, or the other employers, will be under no legal obligation to employ any person whatsoever. But if they do employ him or her, it will be a condition of every contract, not to be waived or ignored, that its terms shall not be such as will impair the efficiency of the citizen or diminish the vitality of the race. To engage labor at wages insufficient to repair the waste of tissue caused by the employment is demonstrably to injure the community as a whole, and will be prosecuted as such in the criminal courts. Those whose labor is not worth the national minimum,—the aged, the crippled, and the blind; the mentally or morally deficient; the epileptic; and the chronically feckless and feeble-minded,—will be maintained by the community. Of all the ways of maintaining those unable to earn a full livelihood, by far the most costly and injurious is to allow them to compete in the labor market, and thus to drag down by their very infirmity those who are whole. There are still people, of course, who simply cannot imagine how a legal minimum wage could possibly be enforced, just as there were, sixty years ago, economists who demonstrated the impossibility of factory laws. As a matter of fact, the legal minimum wage can be seen in force today both in Victoria and in New Zealand.

There will be a national minimum of leisure and recreation secured by law to every citizen. It will be an implied condition of every contract of employment, rigidly enforced by law, that it shall leave untouched sixteen hours out of each twenty-four for needful sleep, recreation, exercise of mind or body, and the duties of citizenship and family life. Any attempt by man or woman to sell for wages any part of the sixteen sacred hours will be blamed as virtual embezzlement, since this part of the twenty-four hours day must be regarded as necessarily reserved for the purpose of maintaining unimpaired the efficiency of the race. Any employer purchasing them, or allowing them to be spent in his mill or mine, will be prosecuted and punished, as if he had incited to embezzlement or had received stolen goods.

There will be a national minimum of sanitation, enforced not merely on real estate owners or occupiers, but also on local governing authorities. The nation will find it preposterous that any city, merely out of stupidity or incapacity or parsimony should foster disease, or bring up its quota of citizens in a condition of impaired vitality. The power of the community as a whole, will, somehow or other, be brought to bear upon every backward district, compelling it to lay on pure water, to improve its drainage, and to take such action, even by municipal building if need be, that no family in the land shall have less than "three rooms and a scullery," as the minimum required for health and decency. Along with this must go the adequate provision of medical attendance, skilled nursing, and hospital accommodation for the sick. Within a generation of the adoption of such a policy, the death rate and sickness experience shows a reduction of one third of what is at present endured as if it were the decree of Providence.

There will be a national minimum of education,—not merely in the provision of schools, but in genuinely compulsory attendance at them. Besides schools and colleges of every grade, there will have to be an adequate "scholarship ladder," securing maintenance as well as free tuition for every scholar proving himself or herself fitted for anything beyond common schooling. And this provision will be enforced by the national power upon local school authorities as well as upon parents and employers. What right has any part of the community to allow any part of its quota of citizens to be reared in ignorance or to suffer even one potential genius to be lost to the community?

It is my deliberate opinion that only by the enforcement of some such national minimum of subsistence, leisure, sanitation, and education will the United States escape degeneration and decay. Where life is abandoned to unfettered competition, what is known as "Gresham's Law" applies,—the bad drives out the good. To prevent this evil result, is, as America will discover in the twentieth century, the main function of government. To enforce the national minimum will, moreover, not interfere with the profits of the exceptional man, while it will enormously

increase the prosperity of the community. Nor does it abolish competition. What it does is to transfer the competitive pressure from the actual means of subsistence of the masses (where it works little but harm), to the intellect of every one who has any, in the degree that he has it (where it sharpens the wits).

This remedy for the dangers of the Trusts—the policy of the national minimum—involves, it will be seen, a great extension of government activity, a great advance in the efficiency of both legislative and executive machinery, and no little change in constitutional forms. All this will be difficult enough. Moreover, the consumer, as consumer, remains unprotected. It may, therefore, well be easier, in one industry after another, to take over the Trust into direct public ownership, as one nation or another has already done in the case of railroads, telegraphs, telephones, ocean cables, steamboat lines, water, gas, electric and hydraulic plants, and what not. One way or another the people must collectively control the industry by which they live, or both freedom and civilization will disappear.

THE ARMENIAN QUESTION AND EUROPE¹

ARCHAG TCHOBANIAN, *Paris.*

Some years ago the massacres in Armenia aroused, throughout the civilized world, a great feeling of indignation against the Butcher, and a pitying sympathy for victims that were devoted, as Paul Adam expressed it, "to a misfortune without parallel." From 1894 to 1896, all independent and generous minds in Europe and America were profoundly interested in this sorrowful problem, of which they demanded an immediate solution. But now that we hear no longer of massacres and that the mind of the two worlds is absorbed in more recent and urgent political complications, the Armenian question seems to be completely forgotten. It no longer engages the attention of parliament or press, and with the exception of a noble few who are still cordially devoted to their cause, no one seems to be any longer interested in the Armenians. "More massacres, then more of the Armenian question" is the general thought. Philanthropists believe, for their part, that the massacres have ceased, and consider themselves as discharged from their duty towards this most unfortunate of all peoples.

This is a grievous mistake. In the first place, it is not true that blood has ceased to flow in Armenia. The Sultan no longer cuts the throats of ten thousand men in three days, as at Constantinople in 1896, or at Van in 1897; he no longer roasts his victims, as in the case of the three thousand shut up in a church at Orfa in 1895.

(1) Translated from the French MS. of M. Tchobanian by Ira W. Howerth, Ph. D., of the University of Chicago.

"The great slaughters of former times," wrote the late Léon Marillier, in an able article in "L'Echo de la Semaine," "are now hardly possible,—that would make too much noise and scandal,—*but they massacre in detail.* More time is necessary to reach the end by this new method, but with a little perseverance the end will be attained, and perhaps even more surely." The Sultan continues to follow out his plan, which consists in suppressing the Armenian question by suppressing the Armenian population of his Empire; only he employs more quiet and discreet methods: interdiction of the Armenians from communication between the provinces, and, in consequence, the arrest of all commercial activity; full liberty granted to the Kurds and Turks to kill the Armenians, to carry off their cattle and their harvests, to outrage their women, to appropriate their houses, their lands, and their agricultural implements. Hence famine, sickness, poverty, ruin, emigration, and from time to time a return to the old system of killing by wholesale, although executed in relatively modest proportions—three hundred persons massacred at Khasdom two years ago, two hundred at Spashank a year ago. All that goes to make up the crime of "lèse-humanité" against which the universal conscience protests, continues to be perpetrated in Armenia under conditions even more dangerous and revolting, because more veiled and cowardly.

But even on the supposition that the era of massacres is definitively closed, and that the systematic persecutions by which the Turkish Government has oppressed the Armenians have been brought to an end, does this mean that the Armenian question must be considered as settled? That would be a manner of reasoning as unjust as it is erroneous. There are, however, both in Europe and America, a number of people who reason in this way. They are very good people, but they do not see the question in its true light. Wounded to the heart, one fine day, by the story of the massacres perpetrated in Armenia, they gave vent to their indignation and demanded the cessation of these outrages; and since they believe that the outrages are ended, they imagine that the question is settled.

The question, however, is not simply one of putting an end to the massacres. Official Europe, which in the Congress of Berlin formally engaged to protect the Armenians against their persecutors, could do that by a wave of the hand, and it does not take even that trouble. Apathetic toward the martyrdom of small peoples, divided by contradictory interests, Europe has remained passive with respect to the long and infamous butcheries which have diminished in intensity only through the natural force of circumstances. In its essence, the question consists in transforming the governmental and administrative régime of which these massacres were only the fatal results. The Armenian question existed before the massacres, and it continues to exist in spite of the cessation of the great butcheries. Indeed, before the tragic events of 1895 and 1896 the Armenians suffered. The Marshal von Moltke, who lived many years in Turkey, and who was not a Turk hater, spoke as long ago as 1836, in his letters on Turkey, of "the unjust and cruel persecutions directed against the Armenians by the Turkish government." From the day that he conquered the Armenian, the Turk has always oppressed the people of this country, so long deprived of its independence. While availing himself of the qualities which make it the working and productive element of the Empire, he has always tried to crush the soul and spirit of the Armenian people under unjust laws and methodical persecution. He has made this people undergo the same fate to which the Greeks, the Servians, the Roumanians, the Montenegrins, the Bulgarians, and the Maronites were once subjected. All of these peoples, however, had the good fortune to be assisted by Europe in their efforts at deliverance. Following the Russo-Turkish War, the Armenians addressed a prayer to Europe to aid them in obtaining the liberties necessary to enable them to live worthily and to develop themselves fully. Europe approved their prayer and formulated in the Sixty-first Article of the Treaty of Berlin its desire to see a régime of justice established in Armenia; but this Article has always been a dead letter. The situation of the Armenians grew worse after the Congress of Berlin. Furious at their audacity in

demanding reforms, the Turkish Government increased its persecution, officially encouraged the Kurds to kill and pillage their Armenian neighbors, and multiplied the obstacles in the way of the moral and material development of the Armenian people. The Armenians addressed themselves more than once to the Porte to secure, peaceably, the application of Article Sixty-one,—and to Europe, praying it to carry out its promise of protection. Their advances met with no response. Then, and in consequence of all these things, the fatal step was taken. The idea of defending the rights of the Armenian people by revolutionary means was born and developed in the minds of the younger generation of Armenians inspired by the principles of European civilization. Secret committees were formed, and the people were urged to oppose their persecutors by armed resistance. Bloody collisions in different places,—Erzerum, Marsovan, Sivas, and finally Sasun,—took place between the Turks or Kurds and the Armenians. At Constantinople some hundreds of Armenian patriots appeared before the Sublime Porte to demand the immediate execution of the reform projects which Europe had proposed to the Sultan after the massacre of Sasun. The Sultan replied to the propositions of Europe and the demands of the Armenians by extending the application of systematic massacre to all parts of Armenia.

All these terrible calamities have befallen the Armenians because they demanded, in accord with Europe, the establishment in their country of an administrative régime founded on the principles of Occidental civilization. Has one the right, then, under these conditions, to consider the cessation of massacres as a solution of the Armenian problem? The problem can never be considered as solved until Europe forces the Turkish Government to execute reforms in Armenia which will establish there a permanent and regular condition of things, preventing of itself, and forever, the revival of massacre and persecution.

It is not difficult, however, to explain why philanthropists, the world over, have looked upon the Armenian question in so naïve a manner. The civilized world was interested, in general, during the Armenian crisis, not in the Armenian people

itself, but in the sufferings of this people. They were moved by the story of the outrages committed in Armenia, just as one is moved by a great epidemic or a disastrous flood. The civilized world does not know the Armenian people, or knows it little and badly. And this ignorance on the part of the civilized world has been perhaps more cruel to Armenia than has the sword of the Turk. Isolated by their independent Church, by their national language, by their ethnic type,—distinct although issuing from the Aryan family,—the Armenians have been unable to find in any nation of Europe that cordial and active sympathy which the Servians and the Bulgarians, Slavs and Orthodox, found in Russia, or the Catholic Maronites found in the France of Napoleon III. Nor have they received the sympathy which the civilized world manifested toward the Greeks when they, struggling under the same yoke, turned their eyes toward Europe,

The civilized world was unjust. A monstrous crime like the Armenian massacres ought certainly of itself to interest generous-hearted people, but when the victim of this crime is a nation which has rendered some service to civilization, and which is still capable of contributing to the work of the world, the misfortune of such a victim should arouse the philanthropists, not only from the point of view of outraged humanity, but also, and especially, from the point of view of the higher interests of compromised civilization.

The civilized world, with the exception of a few well-informed and clear-sighted minds, did not see the question in its true light. There were some, even, in the press of Europe who, far from rendering justice to this people, overwhelmed it with reproaches. They represented it as a rotten element unworthy of liberty,¹ as a mass of sharpers and usurers, although ninety per

(1) It has been remarked that the same epithets were applied to the Bulgarians, and even to the Greeks, during their struggle against the Turk. The faults and vices which a long slavery under the degrading yoke of the Turk had fastened upon the character and morals of a part of these people were also exaggerated, generalized, and used as arguments by the friends of the Turk in Europe. The Bulgarians, as well as the Greeks, however, have shown that their detractors were astonishingly deceived.

cent of the Armenians are farmers, artisans, and small traders, and although usurers are found in Asia Minor among the Turks, the Jews, or the Greeks as well as among the Armenians. They have emphasized, in exaggerating them, the faults of a certain class, and have attributed these to the entire people. I am not a Chauvinist. The love that I bear to my race is not made up of a blind and fanatical admiration. I know that our people are not free from faults; but these faults are the inevitable result of a long period of slavery, and they are a reproach not to the enslaved, but to those who forged their chains. I do not believe it is fair or just to see only the filthiness of a man shut up in a fetid dungeon. The heart of such a man must be considered, and the heart of the Armenian people has remained sound and healthy. The only reason for my devotion to my race is that I consider it an element of life, as a force in civilization.¹

It is because this heart has remained sound and healthy that the noble sentiment of human dignity can be awakened in the bosom of this people enfeebled, but not degraded, by Turkish oppression, and that it has made a bold strike for liberty. Certain Europeans have accused the Armenians of having, by their subversive movements, destroyed the order (!) of Turkey, and of having drawn upon themselves the calamity which has befallen them. It is possible to question the prudence or wisdom of this or that attempt of the Armenian revolutionists; and among the Armenians themselves there are men who disapprove certain bold strokes, magnificent in themselves and honorable to the race whose courage they put to so stern a test, but disastrous in their consequences, in that the Butcher, as cowardly as he is ferocious, in order to take his revenge upon the revolutionists, whom he was not able, in general, to seize or cause to submit, cut the

(1) In a letter addressed to *Pro-Armenia* and published in the last number of the journal founded by MM. Quillard, Clémenceau, Anatole France, F. I. Pressensé, Jaurès, and de Roberty to defend the Armenian cause, M. L. de Contenson, who has traveled in Asia Minor and knows the Armenians very well, destroys in a few lines of judicious observation the calumnies directed against the Armenian race.

throats of hundreds and thousands of peaceful and unarmed persons,—men, women, and children. But this patriotic movement in itself, this endeavor of the Armenian people to shake off chains as abject as heavy, this effort of a whole people to induce Europe to do for Armenia what it had done for the Greeks or Bulgarians, this desire for an autonomous existence, for the possession of which this people sent its representatives to the Congress of Berlin, fought heroically at Sasun, at Van, at Zeitun, and fell upon the Turkish bayonets at Constantinople,—all this is the most natural and praiseworthy thing in the world. And Europe ought not only to approve, but to support the revolt, because this rising against the Turk is not wholly the fruit of an awakened national sentiment among the Armenians, stirred by the remembrance of their proud past, but it is also a result of the long and noble lesson which the civilized world taught the young men of Armenia who studied in the universities of Europe and America, and of their own country, under the guidance of the American missionaries and French teachers. They have learned in all these centres of happier influences and ideals to hate the unlawful condition of slavery, and the Turkish yoke that maintains it, and to dream of a better régime, when their people may live like the great, free nations of which it has assimilated the spirit, and in which its past (as is demonstrated even in this sad present) renders it worthy of inspiring that sympathy and that esteem which Europe, as I have already said, has bestowed so lavishly upon the Greeks.

The Armenians make no pretense of comparing themselves with the Greeks, who were in the past the greatest of all peoples. But if the Greek was the founder of Occidental civilization, the Armenian was one of its most valiant defenders, and I think that it is unjust that his humble but significant rôle should be misunderstood or forgotten. The modern world is still grateful to the Greek for having victoriously resisted the invasion of the Persians, for having delivered Europe from the domination of the Asiatic. But in this task the Armenian was to the Greek a constant and important auxiliary. The history of Armenia is only the story of a continual resistance to the movement of Asia towards Europe.

Before embracing Christianity the Armenian was not yet precisely conscious of his rôle. He thought only of defending his native land against the enemies of the Orient as against those of the Occident,—against the Persians as against the Romans. It is true that already the spirit of the race was turned towards the Occident. It was the Greek that drew it. Tigranes the Great, the ally of Mithridates, caused numerous statues of Greek divinities to be brought from Athens to enrich the Armenian temples,—and invited rhetoricians, musicians, and dramatic troupes in order to acclimate the Attic arts in his capital at Tigranocerta. His son Artabazus composed, in Greek, tragedies which were still played in the time of Plutarch, who speaks of them with praise. But it was especially after the adoption of Christianity that the Armenian people definitively allied itself with the Occidental world. Directly on the route, as it was, of all Asiatic invasions, it received the first shock, and by a resistance as obstinate as destructive, embarrassed and often delayed the march towards Europe. Armenia struggled for two centuries against the great Persian Sassanids, who wished to crush and assimilate it, but who did not succeed. It fought against the Arabs, the Turcomans, the Tartars, the Mamelukes, the Turks. It fought to defend its national existence and at the same time the Occidental ideas with which it was impregnated, and which perilously isolated it in the midst of these great, sanguinary races. It constituted the advance guard of European civilization in the Orient. The crusaders in their struggles against Islam found a spontaneous and enthusiastic assistance in the princes of Armenia Minor, who provided them with troops and provisions,—in this Armenia Minor which, according to Marco Polo, who visited it in the thirteenth century, “was governed with much justice and economy,” and of which “the port Payas was the magazine of all the precious merchandise and of all the wealth of the Orient, * * * like the ports of Oriental countries.” Here, moreover, is what Pope Gregory XIII. says of the Armenians, in his bull, “*Ecclesia Romana*,” of the year 1384: “Among the other merits of this Armenian nation toward the Church and the Christian Republic, this in particular is eminent and worthy of

special remembrance, that when formerly the princes and the Christian armies were on their way to the Holy Land, no nation and no people more promptly and with more zeal than the Armenians rendered them its aid in men, in horses, in arms, in food, in counsel; in a word, with all their strength, with the greatest fervor and fidelity, the Armenians aided the Christians in these Holy Wars."

It was on account of this attachment to Occidental civilization that the Armenian people ended by losing completely its own independence. The Kingdom of Armenia Minor formed a sort of prolongation of Europe into the Orient. Its ports were in constant intercourse with Venice, Genoa, Marseilles. Its intellectual and political relations with Europe were of the closest intimacy. The Græco-Roman influence dominated in arts, in literature, in manners, in the organization of the court, the army, and the Armenian magistrature. Finally, the royal family of the Rhupenians having no longer a male descendant, Armenia Minor offered its throne to the French family of Lusignan. The Mamelukes and the Turks, furious at seeing in their neighborhood this nucleus of European civilization, redoubled their attacks and succeeded at the end of the fourteenth century in destroying this ancient little Kingdom of Armenia, which was crushed only after two centuries of desperate conflicts, and which received no assistance from Europe in this final and supreme crisis.

To all these services rendered Europe by the rôle which the Armenian has played in his own country, we must add those which have come from the important part which he has directly taken in Occidental civilization through the illustrious men which Armenia has furnished to European civilization. Nerses, the heroic captain who rendered invincible the armies of Justinian, was of Armenian origin; and it was to an Armenian, Proeresius, the greatest rhetorician of Athens in the fourth century, the teacher of St. Gregory Nazianzen, of St. Basil, and of Julian the Apostate, that Rome, which he had eulogized in one of his discourses, erected a statue with the following inscrip-

tion, "*Regina rerum Roma regi eloquentiae.*" The Armenian formed one of the essential elements of the Byzantine Empire. "One sees them (the Armenians) everywhere at Byzantium as in the camp," says M. Rambaud in his book entitled "*L'Empire grec au X^e siècle.*" "Everywhere their warlike valor is prized. That was the great epoch of the close relations existing between the Basilei and all these little quasi-independent Christian princes from upper Asia Minor, who were always in conflict with the khaliffs and their emirs, and who maintained valiantly the long struggle of the advance guard against their eternal enemies, the Mussulmans." "The Armenians," writes Schlumberger, "played in this epoch (the tenth century) a great rôle in Byzantium. It was then a warlike race, and the most adventurous among its sons drifted to Constantinople,—some fleeing from the persecution of the Mussulmans or the hatred of the clans, others going to seek their fortunes in the territory of the Empire,"¹ "The Armenians," says the Arab chronicler, Abulfaraj, "formed in all the wars an excellent infantry for the army of the Basileus, fighting constantly with courage and success on the side of the Romani." "Some of the most remarkable men of the war of Byzantium, the Lecapeni, as well as Mleh, true national hero, founder of the Theme of 'Lykandos,' are of Armenian origin, and the throne of the lower Empire has been occupied by ten Armenian emperors, of which some, as Leo V., Basil II., and especially John Zimiskes, are among the greatest figures of Byzantine history."²

In modern times the Armenian has continued to play the same rôle in Poland, in Hungary, in Russia, and in Egypt. The Armenian emigrants who established themselves in Poland after the fall of the dynasty of the Bagratidæ of Armenia (in the eleventh century) have given to this country poets, artists, diplomatists,

(1) *Nicephorus Phokas*, by G. Schlumberger.

(2) Herr Gelzer, the German Byzantine savant, thinks that the period of the Armenian emperors was the most glorious in the history of the lower Empire.

and military men of the first rank. In 1410 all the Armenian nobility fought with the armies of Ladislas Jagello, and in the battle of Grunwaldt contributed to the victory. In 1683, in the great war of the Austrians against the Turks, five thousand Armenian soldiers fought valiantly with King Sobieski at the gates of Vienna against the Turks. Russia was able to crush the Persian and the Turk only when advised by Armenian diplomats like Israel Ori and by the assistance of generals of Armenian origin,—Madatoff, Loris-Melikoff, and others,—who, seconded by the Armenian population of this country, wrenched from Mussulman domination the Caucasus over a great part of Persian and Turkish Armenia. It was an Armenian, Nubar Pasha, who by diplomatic skill was able without war to withdraw Egypt from the odious Turkish yoke, and to introduce there a European administration which has regenerated that country. Adamian, the greatest tragedian which the Orient has produced, and whom Russian criticism has proclaimed the superior of Salvini and Rossi in the interpretation of Hamlet, was an Armenian, as was also the marine painter Aivazovski and the mineralogist Andréas Artzrouni, who have just died and who enjoyed a European reputation. Even in the Ottoman Empire, in spite of all the obstacles which have prevented the free development of his faculties, the Armenian has always constituted a lively and fruitful element. It is he who, with the Greek, has cultivated in Asia Minor commerce, industry, and agriculture.

The Armenian, we may add, has always been distinguished by his commercial aptitude. With the Phœnician and the Greek, the Armenians were in antiquity preëminently a commercial people, and they have always remained so. Their great goddess, Anahit, patroness of Armenia, who was entitled the “Mother of Gold,” the “Dispenser of Wealth,” was above all the protectress of commerce and agriculture, the protectress of labor. Since their native land is situated upon the great thoroughfare from Judea to Europe, and since they have access by the four rivers, Euphrates, Tigris, Aras, and Halys, to Chaldea, to Syria, to Persia, and to Constantinople, the ingenious and active

Armenians have, from the most remote times, gone to sell the products and the manufactures of their country into these foreign lands, and to transport the merchandise of the Orient into the countries of the Occident. Today, in the Caucasus and in Persia, commerce is almost entirely in the hands of the Armenians; and in Turkey, in spite of the very unfavorable conditions, the crushing competition of the Europeans and the rivalry of the Greeks and the Jews, they still constitute one of the most important commercial elements.

The fine stuffs, the embroideries, the tapestry, the jewelry which are admired in Europe as Turkish products are almost exclusively made by Armenians. The architectural beauties of Constantinople are due in great part to Armenian genius. The marvelous mosque of Suleiman, the Ottoman Santa Sophia, is the work of the architect Sinan, of Armenian origin; and Armenian architects, the Balians, constructed the palaces of Tcheragan, of Begler-beg, and that of Dolma-bakcheh, "which might be taken," says Théophile Gautier, "for a Venetian palace—only richer, vaster, and more highly ornamented—transported from the Grand Canal to the banks of the Bosphorus"; and they were Armenian hands which raised the palace of Yildiz-Kiosk itself, where dwells the man who had three hundred thousand Armenians massacred.

This is something of the work which this race has accomplished. I may now say a word in regard to its character, because it has a very decided, a very original one. If the Greek is characterized by his intelligence, by his worship of plastic beauty, and by his dream of a harmonious and noble life, the Armenian is characterized by an indestructible tenacity of faith in himself, by an open attachment to his traditions and national beliefs, and by the worship of a simple and laborious life. The family among the Armenians has preserved the rigid purity and the pious discipline of the ancient patriarchal conditions. The Armenian Church is perhaps that one among all the others which has best preserved the simple spirit of the Church founded by Jesus. It is this passion for simplicity which has sometimes brought the Armenian into opposition with the Byzantine spirit, devoted as

this is to a complicated theology and to a luxurious and refined art. The Armenians were the promoters of the iconoclastic movement of Byzantium, and there are yet some Armenians who constitute the nucleus of that modern sect of Paulicians which contains the germs of some of the principles which later became the basis of the Protestant Church.¹

I have put its tenacious faith in itself at the head of the characteristics of the Armenian race, and in fact nothing else is so strong with it as the attachment to its native soil and to its ethnic traditions, and the resolve to defend these to the death. The great Corneille, without knowing it, paid a compliment to the race in choosing, to magnify Christian heroism, an Armenian figure, Polyeucte. Against the Roman as against the Persian, against the Arab as against the Turk, the Armenian has always shown the firmness of Polyeucte, and his spirit of sacrifice. Quite recently, during the massacres, when the Turks tried to force the Armenians under threats of death to embrace Islamism, the whole race manifested the spirit of Polyeucte. Hundreds of girls threw themselves into the rivers and over precipices to escape apostasy and shame, and aged priests have been seen who, with a stoical courage, preferred to be killed outright or roasted at a slow fire rather than to renounce the faith of their fathers.

I should point out here that this attachment to their faith is not a sentiment of pure Christian fanaticism, but above all it is a love for the "Armenian" faith, for the "national" Church, and it is a passion and veneration for the religion of "their ancestors." It is the love of the race *for itself*; for in spite of the many sufferings and humiliations which it has undergone in the course of its long and eventful history, this race is proud of itself. It feels that it has strength. It prides itself on having for the founder of its country the first champion of liberty, Haik, who

(1) The doctrine of the Paulicians was a singular mixture of dualism and Christian mysticism. Their manners were austere. Their attachment to the writings of Paul explains the simplicity of their ecclesiastical organization and their horror of the clerical hierarchy, of holy images, of ceremonies, and of orthodox pomp. F. H. K., *Grande Encyclopédie*.

was the first among the chiefs of the tribes brought under the yoke of the tyrant Belus to rise against him, and who killed the tyrant in an heroic fight, thus teaching his children to love liberty above all things and to sacrifice everything for it. And it believes strongly that it was the first among the nations to embrace the Christian religion. According to its great historian, Moses of Khorene, Abgarus, King of Armenia, was converted to Christianity during the life of Christ, with whom, according to the legend, the Saviour entered into correspondence, and sent him two of his disciples, Thaddeus and Bartholomew, with his image miraculously reproduced upon a handkerchief. In spite of the multiplied and powerful influences which it has undergone, this race preserves a strong and clearly defined individuality. It has a language of its own, one of the richest and most subtle, which in its ancient form was able to reproduce in a magnificent way the masterpieces of Byzantine, Syriac, and Hebrew literature, and which in its modern form has reflected, without losing the beauty of the original, the pages of Flaubert, Goncourt, and Anatole France. It has a special style of architecture that possesses a gracious and subtle charm in its rural simplicity. It has its own alphabet and calendar, and finally an independent Church. This powerful attachment to itself has not prevented the Armenian people from showing an open spirit to all the progress of the Occidental world, and a promptness to assimilate it. Fifty years after the discovery of Gutenberg, Armenian emigrants, established at Venice and at Amsterdam, made use of this invention by constructing some Armenian characters and printing some manuscripts of the old Armenian authors,—a translation of the Gospel, Mystic Meditations, Chronicles, Treatises on Magic, etc. Toward the end of the seventeenth century, a pious Armenian who had set out alone from the depths of an Armenia plunged in ignorance and servitude, in order to institute in Europe an intellectual centre for his countrymen, founded at Venice the Convent of St. Lazarus, where some generations of learned monks, following the example set by Mekhitar, published Armenian translations of the works o

Homer, Sophocles, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Virgil, Horace, Cicero, Corneille, Racine, Bossuet, Klopstock, Milton, Byron, Schiller, etc., and initiated their compatriots of Armenia in the literary and artistic movement of classic and modern Europe, while their colleagues of the Convent of Vienna inaugurated an historical and linguistic Armenian *critique*, after the scientific method of the German school. No people in Asia Minor was more prompt than were the Armenians in awakening from the intellectual torpor which Turkish domination had spread over all the countries where it existed, or more apt in absorbing the ideas of modern Europe. The Armenians were the first among the indigenous peoples of the Ottoman Empire to found a periodical ("Archalonice araradian," a journal in the Armenian language published in Smyrna about 1850). It was an Armenian, Naum, who founded at Constantinople the first theatre on the European plan which was seen in Turkey, and in which he had operas and dramas played by Italian troupes, and later Armenian translations of European plays, as well as original plays written by Armenian authors and presented by Armenian actors. It is by following the example of the Armenians that the Turks have a press and a theatre. It was Armenian actors who played for the first time in the seraglio or at the public theatres European plays translated into Turkish by Armenian writers, while Tchouhadjian created Ottoman dramatic music in his pretty operettas entitled "Leblebidji Horhor," "Arif," etc. The founder of the young Turkey, Midhat Pasha, had for his advisers the Armenians, Odian and Servicen, who, after having endowed their people with a constitutional reform modeled after that of France of '48 (which, tolerated by the Sultan Abdul-Aziz, is today almost completely suppressed by the Sultan Abdul-Hamid), wished to contribute to the good of all the population dwelling in the Ottoman Empire, while burning with their fathers' desire to obtain for Armenia an administrative autonomy by the establishment in all Turkey of a constitutional and liberal instead of a theocratic and despotic government. All the liberal tendencies of the nineteenth century, the generous aspirations of French romanticism, the patriotic enthusiasm of the

Italian "Carbonari," the social theories of the German, French, and Russian liberals, have found a rapid and powerful echo in the Armenian element. Nalbandian, the great revolutionary thinker, was the disciple and intimate friend of Bakounine. Osganian, one of the most impetuous liberal publicists, who fought in 1848 upon the barricades with the French revolutionists, was closely allied with Mazzini and Cavour, of whom he was at one time the secretary. And the Armenian race is, among all the races of Asia Minor, the one which sends the greatest number of young men to the universities of France, Germany, Russia, Italy, and America. Even in these days, this people gives brilliant proof of its supple and fruitful spirit, of its faculty of assimilation and creation. A young Armenian, M. Manouelian, a pupil of M. Mathias Duval, has made some valuable histological researches which have lead to the important hypothesis of *nervi-nervorum*,—researches of vast importance, which place the young Armenian savant in the first rank of the histologists of our epoch. Another Armenian, M. Edgar Chahine, revealed a magnificent talent for painting and engraving, and has shown a powerful originality in a series of etchings and drypoints, which has made him, according to the opinion of eminent critics like Roger Marx and Gustave Geffroy, one of the masters of this art. A third, M. Levadjian, a pianist of great merit, is attempting to enrich European music by some original compositions in which the sad and complex soul of the Orient vibrates. To the Turks who have believed themselves able to suppress the Armenian people by cutting the throats of the poor, unarmed peasants by the thousands, this people could give no better response. Immediately after a formidable catastrophe, it has shown in a convincing manner its indestructible intellectual vitality. It opposed to the massacring talent of the Turk its talent for creation. This response, moreover, is a sort of "revanche morale,"—while we are waiting for the other.

I shall conclude this study by referring to a service of quite a different order which this people renders Europe at this very hour. Recently the Germans obtained a concession for

constructing a railway to Bagdad, the Russians a concession for railways into the basin of the Black Sea, and the French to Damascus. When Asia Minor is covered by a broad network of railways, it will be relieved from the present melancholy condition of decay in which the Turkish régime maintains it, and will become as formerly a paradise of civilization. And this phenomenon, which will be amongst the most beautiful of the twentieth century, will be due to the blood shed by the Armenians. These concessions which the Sultan has accorded are the only ransom for the massacres of Armenia which he pays to Europe.

What will be the attitude of Europe toward the Armenian people when it penetrates into the Ottoman Empire to reorganize and to regenerate it? Will its locomotives pass over the dying bodies of this people and give them their "coup-de-grâce," or will Europe remember, perhaps, all the sufferings which this unfortunate people has endured on account of its ideas (which are those of Europe), and accord it the elementary liberties which it desires to obtain in order to take up once more its task as a good laborer and a valiant soldier in the cause of civilization? I am led to believe that to this question, which the Armenian people anxiously asks across the horrors of a martyrdom too cruel and too prolonged, the response of Europe will be the response of justice.

TENDENCIES IN GERMAN LIFE AND THOUGHT SINCE 1870¹

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This result of differentiation, and of the unity or equality based upon it as a demand or tendency, of necessity displays itself among us with especial harshness, because, on the one hand, the rapid increase in wealth and in external culture since 1870 has led to more emphatic and intensified social contrasts, while, on the other hand, this advance, essentially founded upon the labor of the masses, and the extraordinary increase in the population of Germany, during this same period, have brought into existence leveling tendencies and a number of interests in which all classes share. The characteristic interaction of forces within one of these interests is shown by the German woman movement. However far this movement proceeds among the upper classes, it is the result of the fact that the modern division of labor has deprived women of a great many household functions, wherewith their life was previously filled and made efficient and contented. This replacing of actual labor in the household through machines, purchasable articles, and so on, has progressed rapidly among us during the last decades. Except as regards the bringing up of children, it may be said that to countless women the sphere of the household no longer affords a satisfactory employment

(1) Translated by W. D. Briggs, Ph. D., of the Western Reserve University, Ohio.

of their energies. At the same time, they have for the most part remained confined to this sphere, and under such circumstances useful powers of every sort must either suffer atrophy because undeveloped, or be the cause, in their reaction, of all kinds of mischief. The foolish old maid, the mannish and emancipated female, the hyperæsthetic woman, whose sensitiveness borders on perversity, these are the sacrifices made by a civilization that has restricted the historically established sphere of woman's activity, or has entirely deprived her of it, without at once opening up new fields for her. This, in connection with the increased difficulty of providing food for a non-productive human being, is the source of the middle class woman movement, which has to do with the social liberation of women, that is to say, with the opening to them of fields from which they are now excluded by law or by custom,—the higher and lower trades, the holding of office, the practice of medicine, and the purely scientific careers. But if the woman of the middle class seeks a field of activity outside of the home, the woman of the proletariat displays exactly the opposite tendency. She goes to work in the factory at an age when she still has great need of the protecting atmosphere of the parental house; the married woman is not only withdrawn by her labor from her immediate duties to home and children, but also the effect of this labor is to undermine the physiological conditions of a sound posterity. Consequently the economic independence of the woman of the lower class is for her, as for society in general, a source of the greatest evil, and the problem is now being investigated of how to surround her, by legal and other means, with beneficent and restricting regulations. In other words, the woman of the proletariat has not, as has the middle class woman, too little, but on the contrary too much social freedom,—however badly it may stand with her individual freedom. This economically independent activity, which is to the one a curse, would be to the other a blessing. Both conditions go back to the same cause,—the present method of industrial production, which has with so mighty a force driven the woman of the proletariat from the home, and has confined the woman

of the middle class within it, while her sphere of action is diminished. These two problems run so counter to each other that the Social Democrats, who call the first the "lady question," regard it partly with indifference, partly with enmity, because the opposition which these two kinds of phenomena display conceals from them the identity of their cause.

As regards the "bourgeoisie," the woman question has now developed among us along the line already indicated, which can be understood from the peculiar expansion of our relations since 1870, and which we shall see dominating in many other fields, namely, externalization and reaction against externalization. The economic motive referred to may, in particular cases, sufficiently justify the woman movement, yet, with reference to civilization in general, many other points of view must be recognized. As far as we are concerned only with useful, that is to say, productive activity, women simply enter the callings hitherto occupied by men, and compete with them, performing the same services and with the same objects in view. Through this nothing is won for the qualitative advance of civilization; on the contrary, it results at the most only in the accomplishment of a greater amount of work of an average quality and of an unoriginal character. Aside from this, it means a declassing of women, since in this field it is unavoidable that masculine attainments should be made the ideals of the women, and that they should appear as mere apes of the men. Accordingly, as a matter of fact, one hears often enough as the highest praise of a woman's achievement that no one could tell that it was not done by a man. Doubtless this represents a somewhat crude and superficial stage in the whole evolution of the woman question, yet this was the stage in which it first appeared among us, and in this stage it still essentially remains among the leaders of the woman movement; for the central idea is, in every case, the demand for the same rights that men possess, and an assertion of a productive capacity equal to that of man. There are already coming into existence, however, over against these considerations, here and there, ideals of a deeper and more profound character, and which are

espoused by advanced and unprejudiced persons. If I understand them aright, these persons contemplate as an end the evolution of a specifically feminine culture; that is to say, they hope that the feminine mind, if it be allowed to work without restraint, will create special problems and supply their solution,—achievements that are impossible to the masculine mind, on account of its psychological structure. All that we now possess of methods and of knowledge, rules of commerce, forms of art, kinds of religious life, means of intercourse and of coöperation, have been produced by men. We cannot say that our civilization is, in the true sense of the word, asexual, as it were, neither masculine nor feminine in character; on the contrary, it is rather of a thoroughly masculine character. Almost all of our higher occupations, because they are filled by men, have been made to fit the masculine kinds of achievement, the masculine intelligence, the masculine tension of feeling and will. The result is that they offer no suitable activities and positions for beings as differently organized as women are. In order that women should find such positions, there is need of entirely new analyses and syntheses of the elements that go to make up life. To ignore the peculiar organization of women and to attempt to find a place for them in the masculine scheme of things, instead of utilizing them for certain lines of work for which no man is fitted, is just as foolish and superficial as it would be to confine persons of special gifts to unskilled labor. Woman's characteristic bodily and mental qualities demand special forms of activity in order that the highest civilization be attained; the management of the household, which took a form adapted to them, and in which they found no competitors in men, has hitherto supplied the desired kinds of activity, and for this must now be substituted other fields, correspondingly transformed, and yet to be discovered. It is very probable that, in the administration of justice, in medicine and art, in the interpretation of history, in business matters, and in religious affairs, indeed in technique, in the narrower sense, distinctly feminine shadings are possible; and that these may produce changes and transformations in the highest degree fruit-

ful. A few very slight and fragmentary proofs of this are to be observed, here and there, at least in the domain of art : there are some women writers among us who are not ambitious to write "like a man," but who are proud of the specifically feminine note. The same thing appears to be true, though it is less easily proved, in the case of women painters. A purely feminine product, possible in its whole significance to women only, a new variety, nay, perhaps even a new world of culture, is the highest, and it seems to me, the most spiritualized ideal that has proceeded from the woman movement.

Now, one can believe in this tendency and yet be of the opinion that equality with men in regard to business occupations and positions is a necessary transitional stage, from which women will advance to the differentiation spoken of. Whatever opinion individuals may hold on this point, however, it may be stated as the fundamental conviction of all, perhaps without exception, of those in Germany who, without being blinded by party passion, have thought earnestly on the woman question, that a consideration of the organic differences, spiritual as well as physical, between the sexes, must serve as the immovable basis for any programme adopted by the movement for the advancement of women. To explain away the profound generic difference between the masculine and feminine souls is tantamount to depriving life of one of its finest and most powerful attractions ; if man is a being whom both nature and civilization have conspired to differentiate, then this masculinizing tendency displayed by women lowers the sum of these differences, and consequently of life itself, in a far greater degree than could be attained by any other leveling tendency whatsoever. And this further implies a lowering of the very estimation in which women are held, since this rests upon their dissimilarity and the fact that their spiritual individuality cannot be replaced by anything else. As already noticed, there is imposed upon them, at the same time, an ideal that is quite distorted and foreign to their nature, and measured by which they necessarily lose in worth and honor. In the Social Evangelical Congress of a few years ago, in a discussion

of the woman question, the point of view adopted by the more intellectual classes in Germany was very aptly formulated: we should regard the sexes, "not as of the same kind, but as of the same worth." Finally, as many historical phenomena show, masculinization of women goes hand in hand with the feminization of men. The obliteration of specific sex characteristics is everywhere a sign of biological decadence; so that some thinkers even believe that these feminine struggles for freedom are a symptom of the degeneration of the race. The groups that exhibit this reaction against the purely mechanical and superficial aspects of the woman movement are now agreed, however, in making at least three demands. The first relates to the economic independence of women. In our new code of civil law, this has been guaranteed, in a very slight degree, as regards the property rights of married women. But that, in addition to this, the possibility of an independent existence should be offered to every woman who is not disposed of in marriage, through the opening to her of educational institutions and professions,—this is a demand that is hardly ever opposed, but unfortunately is as yet only very incompletely realized. With this is connected the second, that the labor of women where it is exactly like that of men should receive precisely the same compensation. As women are less capable of resistance than men, and lack to a great extent organization with a view to the betterment of the conditions of their labor, they are, as a rule,—from the worker in the factory to the music-teacher and the physician,—less well paid than men who perform precisely the same services. Herein lies a monstrous social injustice; and to have called attention to this constitutes one of the greatest merits of the present woman movement in Germany. Finally, it is almost universally admitted, whatever one may think about the value of women's work, that we must at least find out how great the productive power of women is, and that we must accordingly allow them absolutely free play in every field. For, inasmuch as the movement has already proceeded so far, we should not impose arbitrary limits upon it from the outside; but we must

let it find its own natural limits. In general, the principle that social affairs will soon find out their proper course if one only leaves them to themselves, and that freedom in its own development creates its own opposition and the corrective that will restrict it to its proper sphere,—this principle has, in the last few decades, lost almost all credit in Germany; on the one hand, in virtue of the great development of the idea of the State and the extension of the sphere of its powers, and on the other hand, through the influence of the Social Democrats and their critique of liberalism. Yet, as for certain periods of social evolution, this liberal principle has been without doubt most suitable and effective; many persons are convinced that the woman question is at this moment passing through such a period, and that the best policy consists in a simple clearing away of all the obstacles that stand in the path of individual effort.

This alternation between an externalization of the content of life, what we might call its foundation upon a mere criterion of strength, and the antagonistic need of spiritualization makes itself felt also in the domain of religion. The power of the Church, which in the liberal period, up to the seventies, was clearly on the decline, has since then increased in an extraordinary degree. First of all, the quite unique development of German Catholicism during this time has been decisive. The strong state and national consciousness early in the seventies had induced Bismarck to inaugurate the "Kulturkampf"; the matter concerned the limitation through the superiority of the State of the jurisdiction assumed by the Catholic clergy over the government of the Church, over schools, the marriage and family relations, and so on. As regards the success or failure of the struggle, we are here concerned only with the fact that since that time the Ultramontane party has grown to be a strong, sometimes the strongest, party in the German Parliament,—the so-called "Centre," whose platform consists simply in the protection of Catholic interests as such. Their colossal power has been obtained precisely through the fact that they, in regard to all the other questions of the State, are prejudiced by no party programme, and are con-

sequently sought after by all parties, those of the Right as well as those of the Left, and are able to exchange their support of either side for concessions to their special interests. As a result, we have before our eyes the unheard of anomaly, that a party whose centre of interest does not lie in Germany, but in Rome, guides in great measure the fate of Germany. From another point of view, the anomaly appears to be quite as great: our most powerful political party is made up on the basis, not of political, but of religious considerations. This is not, however, so unnatural as it seems, if only we consider the essential character of the Catholic Church. For this Church is not merely a religious association, but a powerful political organization, whose character, truly political in that it seeks to obtain dominion over all the essential things of life, is in nowise altered by the fact that it has no territorial possessions, since, for that very reason, it has no territorial limits. It is the most magnificent creation of history,—a world empire, founded upon the deepest and most supersensuous impulses of the soul, and ruling over the whole of life on the tremendous assumption that there is no province of life, and no interest, that does not draw its ultimate and directing stimulus from these most profoundly and transcendently spiritual strata of the soul. We make a quite unjustifiable demand upon the Catholic Church, if we measure it by the purely moral and inner ideal that is completely indifferent to the things of this world as such,—the ideal that the message of Jesus proclaimed to mankind. This notion of the salvation of the soul, which according to Jesus and the early Christians was attainable, immediately or by the easiest road, through the love of God and one's neighbor, has become for Catholicism merely the point of departure, on which it has erected a system that embraces within itself the entire world,—science and art, material property and marriage, the policy of kings and the school instruction of every subject. Religion as such is only an element, though to be sure the fundamental element, in the structure of Catholicism, which is in essence a systematic regulation of the whole of life. It is true that Catholicism might assert, with regard to all this, that its object

is the transformation of all life into religion. But this assertion would be disproved by its history, which shows that Catholicism either embraced the whole world-life, and was then never mere religion, or that it was only religion, but had in consequence to renounce the world and become monasticism. All this is by no means a depreciation of Catholicism; it constitutes, on the contrary, the highest recognition of its world-historical, fundamental idea and spiritual power, which reach out so far beyond the merely religious interest. At the same time, it is, of course, easily understood from this that in periods in which the Catholic Church, for whatever reason, emphasizes its power over the external reality and fights for it, it must become especially felt as an externalization of the specifically religious, and a confusion of purely spiritual, interests with foreign elements. In the "Centre" of the German Parliament, which has been justly called the "Pope's Bodyguard," has Catholicism's desire for political power attained its frankest and most concentrated expression; and has thereby made good a hundredfold the loss of worldly influence that the Pope experienced when Rome was taken from him. We may admit that all this constitutes only a means to an end, the soul's salvation; yet not only does a means pursued with such intensity become, for so are we men psychologically constituted, an end in itself, but just as inevitably does the importance attached to this means signify that the power of the ecclesiastical organization, the rigidity of obedience exacted in outward matters, the authority of the priesthood, will always become more and more oppressive to the laity. And, since the synthesis of this fact with the inner and personal needs of the religious human being is likely to be attained in only a few cases, these needs and the Church as an institution will depart ever farther from one another; the former will very often suffer at the hands of the latter, with its ceremonies, its "saving works," and its despotism, or else will seek for themselves a place outside of such externalities.

Similar experiences have not been spared to the Evangelical Church, although they were at bottom the result of very different

conditions. All our social institutions display, in the period that I am describing, the tendency toward centralization. On the one hand, this is brought about by the unification of Germany and the extraordinary growth in the power of the State, which has become more complex, and is constantly placing more persons, directly or indirectly, in official positions. It is an old experience that, within any group, the largest, most comprehensive form of combination—in this case, as usual, it is the State—imparts its character to the smaller associations within it. On the other hand, the ideal of a centralization that should unite all elements in absolutely harmonious collaboration has developed a tremendous power of suggestion through the programme of the Socialists, even on the part of those who object to it. Naturally, however, this tendency has been realized only in this way, that individual liberty, the special inclinations and developments of the various elements, are restricted and challenged. The ever increasing endeavors of the Evangelical Church organization, in the different German countries, thoroughly to unite the Church have led thereby to a greater and greater suppression of liberalism within the Church. The tendency aims at a regulation from above of the parish life, at a treading down of all dissenting minorities, and at the expulsion of those clergymen who venture to take any liberties with the orthodox teachings. It is assisted in its working by the peculiar relation in which the Evangelical Church in all essentially Protestant countries stands to the State. Only by association with the State has the Evangelical Church been able to gain that external power and stability of which it had need in order to make head against the great political strength of Catholicism. As a favor in return, the Church preaches vigorously the virtues that subjects should possess, —obedience to superiors, loyalty to the ruling house, quiet, and love of order. The result of this exchange is that in times like the present, when the State, in the intensity and concentration of its centralizing power, is anti-liberal and anti-individualistic, the Evangelical Church must assume the same characteristics. While the State, however, in this way attains its object and is

able to work out its basic idea, the Church is not so fortunate. For the ends pursued by the State are in most instances relatively external, while the externalization that is the inevitable consequence of every attempt at uniformity and the suppression of personal freedom, is opposed, in the highest degree, to the final meaning of the Christian religion. Wherever centralization and uniformity are demanded, the road must lead to externalization ; for only outwardly, not inwardly, can highly differentiated human beings—and it is with such that we have to do—bring to pass uniformity and an unqualified reciprocal adaptation of conduct.

Thus, through the decided emphasis that the State places upon conformity and through the over-strained exercise of ecclesiastical means of control, (for intolerance itself gives rise to disturbances and in every case compels a taking of sides,) there has been brought about a noticeable advance in the outer Church life, which displays itself in church-building, parochial calls, in the rôle played by the clergy in public affairs, and so on. On the other hand, inner and individual religious feeling, so far as it is possible to observe such things, has withdrawn itself from the official Church in a considerable degree. This is so much the more surprising, because the need of religion, in and for itself, does not seem to have lessened at all; it seems, indeed, in the last few years, to have decidedly increased. Now that the two great intellectual currents, the scientific and the social, have lost much of their intoxicating power, and it has come to be recognized that the former can by no means answer all the questions in our minds nor the latter satisfy all the needs of the soul ; now that life's complexity and constant unrest beget ever growing confusions and bewilderments, the longing in many souls for a profounder unification of life, beyond all the oscillations and the fragmentariness of empirical existence, has again attained to clear consciousness, to an irresistible power. With many natures, at the present time, this longing assumes an æsthetic character. They seem to find in the artistic conception of things a release from the fragmentary and painful in real life, a feeling of them that gives us a hint of the connection between them and the fundamental needs

of our souls. Herein, perchance, lies the real reason for the passionate æsthetic interest that such large numbers of persons have suddenly developed; so that one may almost say that it is the devotion to the plastic arts, the conception of them as an indispensable element of life, that distinguishes the younger generation in Germany from the other, whose artistic education and inclinations limited themselves in the main to literature and music. Unless I am deceived, however, this sudden increase in fondness for art will not long endure. The transcendental impulse, disillusioned by a fragmentary science that is silent as to everything final, and by a social-altruistic activity that neglects the inner, self-centred completion of spiritual development, has sought an outlet for itself in the æsthetic; but it will learn that this field also is too limited. As a matter of fact, along with these æsthetic strivings, and even now occasionally taking their place, there are all sorts of struggles, religious or connected with religion, often obscure and full of inconsistency, often having nothing to do with the other life-tendencies of the individual, often assuming most remarkable forms,—but all seeking a reply to the anxious question about the meaning of life and the salvation of the soul. The externalization of the religious life finds in these attempts to form new religious conceptions—whether in societies or in the creeds of individuals—an unmistakable corrective. One of the greatest hopes that can be based upon the present, with all its confusions and superficialities, lies in just such turnings back to the deepest and profoundest things in life, which are thoroughly religious in character, even though they refuse to have anything to do with the Church, on the one hand, and just as little, on the other, with the much extolled conversion of religion into morality; for this, such persons seem to feel, is the formula of a rationalism that is not very profound, a rationalism that, so far as its essence is concerned, still belongs to the shallow traditions of the eighteenth century, and which, however much it may correct the externalizing tendency of the Church, yet is itself a superficial thing in view of the deepest religious yearnings of the soul.

Finally, there has already taken place—as I have frequently suggested—within the purely scientific movements a similar process of evolution, the factors of which, as will be observed, are as often coexisting and interpenetrating as they are consecutive in their unfolding; an extraordinary expansion which is, at the same time, an externalizing process and, in reaction against this, a striving to make more spiritual and more profound the scientific conception of the world. The greater material power, the more vital relations with the practical world, that Germany has enjoyed since 1870, have brought about what one might call a strengthening of the sense of reality. The positivist tendency, which had, to be sure, already manifested itself in the natural sciences, became very general,—the tendency to regard as the proper object of intellectual effort only that which material things display to our senses, with the renouncing of every effort to arrive at the deeper meaning of things through reflection or through still more profound spiritual processes. One may also call this point of view, which appeared, on account of the brilliant practical results of science, to be the only legitimate one, “naturalism.”

Under that title it has held sway during the period I am describing, not only in the natural, but also in the historical sciences, indeed in philosophy and art. It was as though a thirst for reality had suddenly come over men, and as though men thought it impossible to conceive of reality save as in the individual and directly observable phenomenon. Every working-over of these phenomena, whereby something universal, something more than a mere sum of individual cases was obtained, appeared to be draining life of its content, to be a mere abstract speculation,—a lie. In art this fondness for that which was presented immediately to the senses brought about not merely the closest possible reproduction of the accidental phenomenon, the impressionist “fixing” of the momentary effect, but even a worship of the insignificant and ugly as well. For only when the subject was so treated was its reality convincing; a treatment full of charm and significance was accused of being added to and ideal-

ized. Moreover, the ugly in art created a belief in its realistic truth sooner than did the beautiful. Only the fact that it is real can persuade us to represent the ugly, whereas in the case of the beautiful the desire to reproduce may arise from its pleasing content, and by no means merely from the fact of its reality. This naturalism has now, for some years, disappeared in literature as well as in the plastic arts; some of its representatives have even gone over to the symbolist and "mannered" school. For though in their naturalistic stage their mental attitude had not been superficial in the bad sense of the word, yet they recognized, now for the first time, that it was only the superficial, not the deeper, truth of things that was embodied in this exactest possible reproduction of the individual thing. To our spiritual constitution is denied what perhaps may be granted to beings, in some other world, of more highly developed spiritual organs, namely, to experience in the individual phenomenon, with all of its details, the fulness of its reality. To this end, much rather, a certain retreat from the phenomenon is necessary, a transforming of it which renounces the mere reflection of what is given in nature, in order to regain, from a higher point of view, more fully and more deeply its reality.

Now, in science the mere assemblage of facts and the avoidance of higher and more general points of view denote a stage of naturalistic externalization,—that deification of experience, of which it has been justly said that it may be had the more cheaply and safely, inasmuch as there is now no one who does *not* admit that experience is important and indispensable. On this account, internalization and spiritualization, from an opposite point of view, have not proceeded from a negation of experience, but from an insight into the fact that in this body of knowledge, apparently objective, apparently only mirroring with exactness external reality, there are concealed a great number of ideas and assumptions that are in no way derived from the observation of natural phenomena, but have, on the contrary, been introduced into them by the observing mind,—for without such assumptions these phenomena would constitute only a meaningless chaos, a multi-

tude of disconnected sense-impressions. Indeed, Kant recognized this more than a hundred and twenty years ago, and the critical deepening of natural science is founded upon the renewed study of Kant begun in the seventies. Then it was seen that the notions of force, causation, and substance, as well as those of life, evolution, and the connection of body with soul, were of an entirely enigmatical character, were notions that we had formed in order to interpret phenomena but which went far beyond everything concrete and appreciable to the senses. It was seen that the atom and the mechanism of external processes were working hypotheses which assisted us, indeed, in the calculation of phenomena but which could not at all describe or clear up their real nature. This, moreover, is to be added: natural science and in a great degree also philosophy, during the last few decades, have been materialistic; that is to say, they were not only convinced that all material processes must be explained through the assumption of purely material causes, to the total exclusion of all that were spiritual or transcendental, but also that the phenomena of consciousness were, at bottom, nothing more than complicated mechanical processes that took place in the cortex of our brain. This most extreme externalization of that which is most spiritual, however, was finally thoroughly refuted by means of two ideas. First by this, that there was discovered the absolute inconceivability of the notion that a spiritual process should be the result of a material process. If it were that, then it must itself also be a material process; for, by the very assumption of materialism itself, physical processes can beget only physical processes. But to assert that ideas, desires, feelings, are material processes in the brain, that is a way of speaking that can convey a meaning to no one. Secondly, matter, which they regard as the sole-existing and as, in some way or other, generating consciousness, is itself only a product or content of consciousness. The whole world exists for us, however, only in so far as we form images of it, only as phenomena in the image-forming spirit, and what it otherwise may be, in and for itself, is for us nothing at all, since there is no way in which it can

become known to us. Matter itself is only an idea, and hence cannot be the cause or the medium of ideas. These considerations have now, as a matter of fact, reduced materialism to an absurdity, so that of late in the domain of science itself it leads only an unconfessed existence in illogical minds.

Nevertheless, it is to be admitted that the end of this epoch stands very high above its beginning. Its astounding progress in the natural sciences—into the significance of which I shall not enter here, as it is an international, not a specifically German matter—has, despite the energy with which it directed the mind to the observation of external nature, gradually again made visible that twofold boundary. First, it is perceived that the scientific conception of the world itself rests upon a spiritualist and metaphysical basis: it not only mirrors the external, objective existence of material things, but it is a product of the human power to form ideas of things, and is dependent upon the inner laws of this power; it is guided and organized according to the changing demands of thought; it rests everywhere upon assumptions that cannot be proved, that can be only believed; it employs everywhere the enigmatical notions of time, space, matter, effect, feeling, life, and countless others, which are far beyond all calculation, and yet constitute the indispensable union and explanation of our relatively very slight and fragmentary real experiences. And, secondly, even the knowledge of nature accumulated in this way, with the assistance of so much that lies outside of experience, does not afford a satisfactory, complete, and unified picture of being, can tell us nothing of the origin of things in general, nor of the origin of life, nor of the ultimate essence of the mind. Moreover, quite outside of science, and completely out of reach of its computations, stands the question as to the meaning of the existence of the world and of man,—a question we can no more avoid than we can that of the chemical elements or of the planetary motions or of the mechanism of digestion. Far beyond the domain of science rests the whole standard of values, particularly the ethical and the æsthetic, which draw the lines of distinction in our world picture and distribute the emphasis in a way that is thoroughly

incomprehensible on the basis of mere natural law. In consequence of our having come to realize this, the need of great generalizations, uniform points of view, all-embracing philosophical ideas, has in wide scientific circles made itself felt above that of disconnected empirical investigations.

Philosophy has obeyed only half way the demands made upon it by this state of affairs. The premises of experimental sciences, the methods, fundamental ideas, and combinations through which we arrive at experience, but which do not take their rise in it, philosophy has investigated carefully and repeatedly. One may, indeed, say that during this period Germany has been the classic land of the *theory of knowledge*. From the apparently merely empirical and objective observation of material things, the mind has now been led to consider the inner conditions, in the absence of which neither empiricism nor an object can exist at all. To its other duty, however, our philosophy has not shown itself equal; it has not brought into existence, on the basis of modern experimental sciences, a new *theory of life*. The great synthesis that shall unite all the currents of existence as known to us into consistent ideas, that shall convert all external reality into spiritual values, and satisfy all the needs of the spirit with the results of knowledge,—this great synthesis we still await.

Finally, in historical sciences this typical formula that we have adopted for the spiritual movements of our time has attained realization in a special manner. Two motives essentially bound up with each other are at work in it. In the first place, its restriction to a history of external politics and of volcanic events within the State, which has been the rule for so long a time, is done away with. The conditions and lines of development within the historical groups, what is lasting and organic in their existence, have become the centre of interest. As a result, history ceases to be in essence the history of princes and of particular leading persons. It is becoming the history of the masses, of the ever-present class conflicts in their various forms, of the objective content of civilization, and of the group-life in its whole breadth and extent. The biographical interest becomes subordinate to

interest in the totality of social forms and in their evolutions. With this is closely connected the second motive, namely, the increasing emphasis placed upon the economic moment in the life of mankind. For, however far individuals may raise themselves above this economic interest, with a few exceptions this is for the masses the one that turns the scale. The transition from a history of heroes and catastrophes to one that deals with the development of social groups and with their foundation upon industrial methods, with the economic relation of classes to one another, with the kinds and fluctuations of the food-supply and of business,—this indicates, in very general terms, the path taken by our modern science of history. This view of life in its totality, allied as it evidently is to the before-mentioned rise of our economic interests and to the increased importance of the masses, forms also the cause of the tremendously extended pursuit of the science of political economy, which in some of our universities now appears to be considered the leading branch of knowledge and the one that students most eagerly follow. The most extreme form of this tendency of historical study is “historical materialism,”—the theory according to which economic processes constitute the sole foundation of historical life, so that law and morals, art and religion, political constitutions and marriage forms, are only the superstructure built upon them, and receive their character and development from the modes and vicissitudes of the struggle for material existence.

At first sight, this may appear as a marked materializing and externalization of the philosophy of life, and as a matter of fact historical materialism has had such an effect wherever it has attempted to interpret phenomena immediately and from its one-sided point of view. Nevertheless, it is this very historical materialism that has opened the way to a spiritualization of the manner of looking at history, to spiritualization, indeed, that did not need to come to pass at the price of the suppression or neglect of facts, as in the case of earlier ideological constructions. Historical materialism, in other words, is the first attempt to explain history by means of a psychological principle. If hun-

ger did not cause pain, if it were not, besides having its physiological function, a spiritual event, then it would never have set free the effects that we call history.

Historical materialism is surely too narrow an hypothesis, and the endlessly complex interplay of souls, through which the history of the world has come to pass, cannot be reduced to so simple an ultimate formula. That, in general, it supplies to history a purely psychological basis, however, that it seeks energetically for the fundamental emotion from which historical movements arise,—this fact constitutes, despite the essentially material character of the principle, a great step toward the spiritualization of the historical picture, and shows, as in miniature, how completely the externalizing influences of the period of which I speak contain in themselves the corrective whereby they are again made to take the road toward a spiritualization of the conception of the world.

Upon the manifold confirmation of this formula may rest the hope that the many brutal and anti-spiritual phenomena of our times will have a less degree of vitality than the more excellent, more moral, more spiritual phenomena that stand in conflict with them. The coarse and external energies of human life may easily appear to be dominant, because they possess a louder voice and a gaudier coloring than have the more spiritual and ideal energies. But it is of no use to speculate here on the future fate of either; our task was one of retrospection, not of forecast.

THE SEARCH FOR THE TRUE PLATO

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Time has been exceptionally generous to Plato. None of his works are lost, and his fame and influence seem to be undiminished after twenty-three centuries. Such vogue, however, could hardly be maintained, in a world so inconstant as ours, by a philosophy not possessing an extraordinary adaptability and involving a certain vagueness. A severe and explicit system, however true, could hardly have appealed to people of such different mind and calibre as were the Platonists of various ages. Plato had the advantage of presenting a philosophy which in its first principles was practical and rational,—the philosophy of Socrates,—but of presenting it in a brilliant literary form and of escaping from it into eloquent flights of fancy, by which it was relieved of its natural severity and made to appeal to mystical and enthusiastic minds. Platonism is accordingly a many-sided and elusive thing, on which each successive disciple impresses his own stamp and grafts his own intuitions. All sorts of things have passed for Platonism, and passed for it with about equal right,—Pythagorean metaphysics, academic scepticism, Neo-Platonic mysticism, Christian theology, transcendental idealism, and the mere incoherent practice of speculation, whenever it is warm and rhapsodical.

While the philosophers have been content to adopt and adapt Plato in these ways to their own uses, we should naturally expect historical critics in our own day to attempt an impartial reconstruction of Plato's philosophy as it may have existed in his own mind.

Such a reconstruction is rendered exceedingly difficult by the fact, proved both by internal and external evidence, that Plato's works, although all extant, do not adequately cover his philosophy. The authenticity of many of the dialogues is doubtful, and the order in which they were written is a further point which critics feel called upon to settle, although it might seem to be in itself a matter of some indifference; the discussion of it might serve to produce doctors of philosophy at the universities, but might appear to involve no further benefit. Only, in Plato's case, the order of composition acquires a special interest, when we observe that there are notable divergencies among the dialogues in style and in thought, if not absolute contradictions in doctrine. One set is mythological, playful, and humane, another technical, abstruse, and rationalistic. As we give priority to one set of dialogues or to the other, we conceive one of the greatest of philosophers to have moved, as his thought and experience matured (for Plato was one of those philosophers who actually had experience) in one of two opposite directions. The question thus assumes some historic importance and some dramatic interest; it might even be thought to involve an argument from authority in favor of the attitude finally assumed by so illustrious and comprehensive a genius.

While the intrinsic value of the various dialogues remains untouched by such a problem, our notion of their living author is profoundly transformed as we shake our historical kaleidoscope and let those luminous fragments of his mind fall together into one pattern or another. Was Plato a conscientious scholar, did he subject himself to a scholastic discipline, working over abstruse technical problems, in order to rise afterwards, when his apprenticeship was over, to a poetic treatment of real things? Did he shake himself loose from dialectical scruples in his maturity, and proceed to handle the deepest themes with the freedom and irony of a master?

Such is the view that has commonly prevailed. If it has not been insisted upon with more emphasis, the reason is that such a view tends of itself to make people careless about those works which are conceived to be merely preparatory, so that these

works come to be practically ignored. The ordinary practice, even among scholars and philosophers, is not to read the "Laws" or the "Sophist" at all, and to glide over the "Parmenides" as an anomalous and singular performance, possibly not really Plato's. Yet the "Laws" is the longest, one of the latest, and the most earnest and unequivocal of Plato's works. The "Sophist" is one of the most incisive and the "Parmenides" one of the most profound. By losing sight of these dialogues, however, the question of their relation to the rest can be past over in silence, and Plato can be considered as if he were the author only of the more poetic and interesting pieces.

Or, if we take the other view, was Plato by natural inclination a poet, and did he, by the inspiration of his genius, turn at once the ethical doctrine of Socrates into a metaphysical idealism,—the expression of his youthful and enthusiastic intuitions? Did he later analyze and interpret these intuitions in a more critical and sober way? Did he study the problems which they called up and reduce his theories more and more to mere expressions for practical and moral realities, until at last, in the "Laws," all allegory and hypostasis were abandoned in favor of a literal definition of spiritual goods,—the very thing which all that idealistic machinery had from the first been meant to express and to glorify?

Some such view, or at least the chronological theory which might support it, has recommended itself to many detached scholars in recent years. To speak only of those who write in English, Professor Lewis Campbell and Dr. Henry Jackson some time ago made suggestions tending to a reconstruction of Plato's philosophy. Professor Campbell's chronological theory, being buried in the introduction to an edition of the "Sophist" and "Politicus," attracted little attention. Dr. Jackson's papers were more noticed. But the very strong chronological argument they contain, based on a minute analysis of the group of critical dialogues, was prejudiced by a general interpretation of Platonism which was based upon them; and the learned public, generally feeling that interpretation to be unsympathetic and forced, condemned

also the chronology which had been used to introduce it. These English views, uttered by their distinguished authors only, so to speak, in an academic whisper, have recently been trumpeted by Mr. Lutoslawski in his scholarly and readable book on "The Logic of Plato." Here they are supported by a verbal apparatus which, if not calculated to convince the obdurate, serves at least to give the new conception a certain emphasis and to call attention to the more solid grounds which support it, grounds which Mr. Lutoslawski's analysis of the growing Platonic logic brings convincingly before the reader.

The most distinctive feature of his book, however, is the attempt to find a purely linguistic and mechanical method for solving the question of chronology at issue. As not only the style but also the vocabulary differ notably in the various dialogues, it has occurred to Mr. Lutoslawski, as to some of his German forerunners, to make statistics of Platonic language, showing in tables how often every word which seems characteristic of the latest Platonic style, as exemplified by the "Laws," occurs in the other works. Thus, all the dialogues can be arranged in a series according to their linguistic affinity to the "Laws"; and we are to infer that this series will correspond to the order of composition. This method, of course, might be more exhaustively applied, if a greater number of words were counted and compared. The results already attained lead unequivocally to the conclusion that the logical dialogues are later than the poetical, since their language has a much more marked resemblance to that of the "Laws." If further research should confirm this result, we should have, according to Mr. Lutoslawski, a scientific key to the order in which Plato wrote his works.

Such an argument is open to serious objection. Without denying the striking variety of Plato's compositions, it may be doubted whether the change in style is due to a permanent change in the man, and not rather to different and reversible poses in the writer. It is natural to use a different vocabulary in dealing with a different subject. For so imaginative and dramatic a genius as Plato, it is particularly natural to hold various moods

and interests in suspense, and to give utterance to them in turn without being obliged to concentrate, for the convenience of future critics, all the poetry in one period of one's life and all the logic in another. Doubtless verbal tricks and incidental phrases, being comparatively unconscious and instinctive, may serve as indications of certain epochs in a man's literary life. But here, too, much allowance must be made for the power of imagination to carry its own atmosphere with it, so that revulsion to a mood or subject belonging to a buried stratum of the mind may rejuvenate and resurrect a whole vocabulary and gamut of sentiment which had fallen into disuse and been overlaid by other habits. If second childhood can refurbish so many faded ideas, it is because the brain is a miser and hides more treasures than it is often willing to spend. There is no difficulty, therefore, in conceiving that Plato should have tapped his various interests at various times and more or less adapted his expression to each theme he took up.

Critics too often forget that a great writer may have great elasticity, and if any performance seems to them essentially new or at all incongruous with a previous one they take refuge in the easy hypothesis of a forgery. Who knows how many of his works Shakespeare or Goethe, Cervantes or Byron could be suffered to retain under the restriction of never saying anything different in tone from what he had said before! Plato was a great artist, a great observer, a haughty though amiable judge of all opinions. He knew the limitations of art and the often ambiguous complexities of dialectic. What more conceivable, therefore, than that he should have sometimes etched a subject and sometimes filled it in with the richest colors, sometimes followed up the logic of a problem, and sometimes that of a passion? In the "Parmenides," indeed, we have these extreme phases actually juxtaposed,—a singularly picturesque scene, scintillating with brilliant and profound ideas, being followed by a singularly abstruse exercise in dialectic. But both parts are in substance and manner appropriate to their theme and worthy of their author.

Mr. Lutoslawski takes the "Laws" as the starting point of

his verbal investigation. That choice is unobjectionable but not inevitable. We know on as good authority that the "Timæus" is also a late work, and the unfinished "Critias" was actually at Plato's death in process of composition. Now the "Critias" is a humane and highly mythical fragment, written in an excellent style, perfectly congruous with the "Republic" and "Timæus," with which it was intended to form a trilogy. The "Timæus" is the most wildly mythical of all Plato's writings, exceeding in fancifulness and arbitrary complexity even the "Symposium" and the "Phædrus." There is no doubt, therefore, that Plato towards the end of his life was able to write well, and willing to compose myths in which the gods and the ideas appear as metaphysical existences. We should not on that account reverse Mr. Lutoslawski's chronology and revert to the notion that the logical dialogues are all early. Too many details, apart from mere matters of language, forbid that conclusion. If the great mythical trilogy—"Republic," "Timæus," and "Critias"—is unfinished, so is the contrasted logical tetralogy,—"*Theætetus*," "*Sophist*," "*Statesman*," and "*Philosopher*"; the last a dialogue announced in the others but never actually written. Death, which we are told surprised Plato pen in hand, seems to have interrupted both these opposed methods of expressing his philosophy. It would not appear that the two trains of thought were distinctly divided in time nor, to their author's mind, contrary in tendency.

A further circumstance, strangely neglected in these discussions, shows that Plato, towards the end of his life, was driving all his horses abreast. The "*Laws*," admittedly the product of his old age, shows a phase of thought equally distant from the mythical and from the logical, so that whichever of the latter two we place last, it will have to synchronize with something wholly alien to it in character. The "*Laws*" is a monument of didactic formalism, a sort of prolonged catechism, dry, unadorned, and uncritical. It would seem to show a mind disenchanted with poetry, contemptuous of dialectic, careless of eloquence, and bent solely on vindicating antique manners and the antique gods. Had the

other works of Plato's old age been lost to us, what an opportunity there would have been here for the constructive critics, who insist on making every one evolve through a series of successive phases and react like a vegetable on the changing seasons! We should have been told that the Plato who wrote the "Laws" had passed into his dotage, had reverted to the impressions of his earliest years, before he ever knew Socrates, and had become a stern and reactionary bigot. Philosophy and literary lustre had forsaken him altogether and given place to a Spartan severity and Roman-like piety. Since he was always averse to the evident currents of life in his age and country, it would have been argued that he was alienated at last from his own genius, in which he may have discovered too many affinities with a corrupt and vapid civilization. But, as it happens, the author of the "Laws" was simultaneously writing the "Critias," a work of pure and delightful imagination, a mythical echo of the glories of Athens. And if Mr. Lutoslawski and those he represents are not mistaken, he was engaged at about the same time upon a series of analytic discussions which should straighten out the misunderstandings involved in a too poetical rationalism. If such contrasts are admittedly found in the same period, and if the "Parmenides" unites equal contrasts within its own compass, what hope can there be of deciding, with any precision, in what order the other dialogues were composed, or of classing them in water-tight chronological compartments?

The phases of Plato's thought need critical coördination, but little would be accomplished towards that end by arranging the dialogues in a temporal sequence. Even if we accept Mr. Lutoslawski's arrangement of them, we need not infer from it either a change in the author's fundamental views, whatever they may have been, or an improvement in them in case they really developed. Mr. Lutoslawski, like Dr. Jackson, shows that a more acceptable and rational logic is contained in the critical dialogues than in the poetical; but how could it have been otherwise? It was not when Plato gave free rein to his imagination and spoke in parables that his conceptions could bear literal analysis:

what they needed then was imaginative and sympathetic interpretation. But when he undertook to think accurately and incisively, as in the "Parmenides," "Philebus," or "Sophist," we may reasonably take him at his word. The order in which these investigations followed one another, if they were not contemporary, does not alter their intrinsic quality. Not even the philosopher's own preference for one kind of speculation over the other can change their respective functions or prevent their possible harmony. We may ourselves reasonably waver in our preference, and adhere now to the "Phædrus," for instance, for its ideal inspiration, and now to the "Parmenides" for its critical acumen. The only source of contradiction lies in the critic's want of literary judgment and of a reasonable latitude in interpretation, so that he insists on gathering scientific truths from dithyrambics and figs from the cedars of Lebanon.

The merit of Mr. Lutoslawski's classification seems to us to be that, either by accident or by the secret influence of a philosophic idea, he has grouped the dialogues in a way to make clear their internal logical relation to one another. They fall into four groups of which one presents the philosophy of Socrates and the others expand that philosophy in three different ways. The first group consists of the charming little pieces, with the "Apology" at their head, in which Socrates' person is faithfully portrayed, and thoughts are expressed which do not go beyond the characteristic scope and genius of that master. In the second group, which may be best represented by the "Republic," Socrates is still the speaker, and many a lifelike trait puts him now and then visibly before us. But the thought, although Socratic at bottom, is given a great extension both in conception and in expression. It is inconceivable that the philosophy of government, of art, of love, or of immortality which these dialogues contain should ever have been framed by Socrates. Yet in each case Socrates' utilitarian rationalism is the key to the Platonic mysteries which have overlaid it. We shall never understand Plato's idealism, here so eloquently developed, if we forget that his "Ideas" are Socrates' definable moral functions, and his "good," Socrates' principle of

benefit. The mythical and metaphysical expression of these Ideas, however, is carried so far that Plato might well have felt, we should suppose, the impropriety of attributing his ideal constructions to Socrates. But he seems to have been himself more conscious of their Socratic basis than of their non-Socratic extension. These thoughts were after all what Socrates might have arrived at without self-contradiction if he had been a poet and an enthusiast. The import of this ideal philosophy is still exclusively moral and humane; all that the world has since taken for supernatural physics was merely poetic metaphor.

In the last two groups, however, Socrates no longer appears, or appears in a subordinate position, as the object of victorious though respectful criticism. The third group, which contains the critical dialogues we have already mentioned, is devoted to correcting the misunderstandings incidental to metaphysics in general and to the mythical idealism of the second group of dialogues in particular. We are taught to think accurately, to remember what we are thinking about, and to recognize the relativity of all the categories of our thought, especially of the One and the Many, which were then playing so important a part in the controversies of the school. Neither in the "Parmenides" nor in the "Sophist" and "Statesman" are the Ideas abandoned; far from it. But they are explained, and we are warned of the danger they run of becoming irrelevant if they are made absolute.

The fourth group, in other indirect ways, further illustrates the ideal philosophy. Socrates had left nature out of account and declared that physical reality was not an appropriate object for science. Plato fully accepted this doctrine, as he is careful to tell us at the beginning of his pseudo-physical treatise,—the "Timæus." Another great master, Parmenides, for whom Plato had almost as much veneration as for Socrates, had taught him the same lesson and had given him a similar example by beginning his physics with the warning that he was now entering the field of unreality, illusion, and merely verbal play. Nevertheless Plato, like Parmenides himself, was attracted by the legitimate desire to be complete, and not to leave our notions of nature

and the gods, as Socrates had done, to chance and to tradition. He therefore wished to write a philosophy of nature. But instead of composing it, after the manner of the naturalists, out of phenomenal laws and empirical observations, he had the brilliant idea of writing the history of the universe in the inverse order, and from the point of departure of nature's moral functions, of what Emerson would have called nature's commodity. The project was to give an imaginative description of cosmic evolution, each phase showing a stage in the expression or emergence of ideal values, of those very things in which a Socratic philosophy might take a legitimate interest. Utilitarianism, which had led Socrates to renounce natural science, was thus made the principle of a new and inverted natural philosophy. The cosmology of the "*Timæus*" is a vast parable. The creation is described from the point of view of the moral values which it was to generate. These alone could make nature interesting or comprehensible to the moralist. In despair of discovering her causes, he described her justifications. The length of the intestines, for instance, was to be explained not by some hypothetical natural cause, but by its ulterior service to human happiness and virtue. The intestines are long, Plato informs us, to free man from the bestial necessity of spending his whole life in eating, and to give him leisure for philosophy.

This jest, by dint of repetition, soon ceased to seem one, and, together with the similar "*jeux d'esprit*" which fill the "*Timæus*," ended in that prodigious misunderstanding of final causes from which the world has not yet emerged. The study of functions, to see how things might conduce to human life and happiness, led to the habit of explaining the things by the functions they happened to have; and this ideal principle of explanation was then represented as a principle of genesis and growth. Man came at last to the absurd idea that organs can be produced by their own functions and things by their own effects. What had been the glory of Socratic ethics, the study of functions and of the values things have for man, became the disgrace of Aristotle's physics and the bane of all subsequent philosophy.

History was to have been treated by Plato in the same spirit. In the "Critias" he was to furnish a mythical picture of the origin of civilization, obtained by projecting its ideal into past time. The state which in the "Republic" was constructed laboriously and conscientiously, by considering at every point what would be ideally best, was now to be revealed in a fable, feigning to describe the original constitution of Athens. But, at the same time, lest the pictorial elements in such a myth should make us forget the practical and serious kernel of the whole, the "Laws" hastened to provide us with a set of enactments, showing how concrete and rational would be the actual embodiment of that supernal principle of good in whose honor we had all along been philosophizing. For what these speculative dreams circle about is the ideal philosophy itself, that legitimate extension of Socrates' wisdom which fills the second and noblest group of Platonic dialogues. It is morality touched with imagination and applied to all the interests of a liberal life. The fabulous way in which these intuitions are put before us has contributed to their acceptance, but has led at the same time to their misinterpretation. Indeed the misunderstanding was essential to their diffusion, for philosophy never becomes popular until it is believed to offer a logical defence for current prejudices.

The idea of good or of excellence is scientifically defined by Plato as the fulfilment of function; but this fulfilment is illustrated by an elaborate picture of an ideal state,—a Utopia in which much else is conspicuous besides the exemplification of justice. Love, too, is nobly defined as the attraction to the good and beautiful everywhere; but this rational sublimation of the passion seems, in his account, to involve the abandonment of all its real objects in favor of some celestial shibboleth, some absolute focus of incompatible perfections. Immortality is also philosophically conceived as the soul's natural affinity to the eternal, and assimilation with it; but this rational immortality is mythically represented by fables about transmigration in and out of subterranean and celestial abodes. Finally, the preformation of the categories, the native predisposition of the mind to certain forms

of conception, is analytically proved, and the reality of Ideas is inferred from their necessary function as objects of thought; but this transcendental and rational philosophy, too, is compromised by its mythical expression, and we seem to be informed about material existences in the upper heavens, standing about like statues to be admired by passers-by, and inspected by the soul before she descends to this world from that celestial museum.

Now, in each of these cases, Plato's doctrine if taken ideally and morally is profoundly true, but if taken materially is clearly fabulous. He is expressing the values and ideals of real life in mythical form and in the guise of Utopias and of personified abstractions. This situation should have been made clear by the least thought about the original functional character of these Ideas, even if Plato had not composed critical writings in order to warn us that in the others he was speaking in parables. Yet so great is the power of images, that very power against which Plato's rationalism was directed, and so slight the power of reason, that tradition has turned that most intellectual of thinkers into a mystic, and that keenest and mellowest of critics into a blundering mage. There is hardly a piece of sentimentality, theosophy, or mystification that has not sought to cover itself with his name. That is the price Plato has paid for having clothed his speculations in poetry and for having thereby appealed to a public very much less intelligent than himself. Some thinkers, like Spinoza or Fichte, are saved by their severity from a degrading popularity, or if they achieve it for a moment are soon superseded in public estimation by others who, like Hegel, have the art of seeming to be conciliatory and of comforting those public illusions which they secretly despise. Plato's charms were in this way the most serious enemies of his better intuitions. We may even suspect that his condescension to popular weakness was at the same time a sop thrown to his own natural inclinations, and that he allowed himself at moments to be overcome by his own fancy and to yield a half ironical belief to the very myths he was consciously inventing to express a rational philosophy. It is hard, in reading certain passages in the "Phædo" and "Timæus," not to attribute

to them a prophetic intention, as if the author would gladly have been accepted as an inspired oracle whose words had a sacramental value and whose visions revealed supernatural truths. In pagan times it did not seem impossible to touch divinity either through one's dreams or through one's virtues. Only a few years later Alexander could be proclaimed a son of Zeus. It is not inconceivable that in Plato's case, too, pride should have played into the hands of superstition. Such sibylline charlatanism may seem inconsistent with that Socratic candor and enlightenment with which Plato is permeated; yet in this masterful genius much that was un-Socratic both underlay and overlay the Socratic discipline, and we must not be too much alarmed by glints and sparks of mysterious influences and esoteric pretensions. In this soul's career, a winged horse of mythology added itself to the two steeds which reason, the Socratic charioteer, had already to struggle with, and brought the chariot into as great danger of accident as did the refractory, sensual yoke-fellow of virtue. With the joltings and deviations of a course followed under so many conflicting impulses, we can never be quite sure that we have discovered the intended goal, or that any single goal was pursued with absolute constancy.

The exact balance and doctrinal outcome of Plato's philosophy, not being formulated in his writings, must necessarily escape us. In a remarkable passage in the "Phædrus," which no critic of Plato should forget, he disparages the power of writing to communicate the truth. A book, he tells us, can answer no questions, give no explanations, correct no misunderstandings. It cannot enter, as the philosophic guide should, into the learner's mind, to draw from its own depths the implications and potentialities of the argument. A Socratic and conversational method is the only guarantee of genuine comprehension and rational conviction. A book is a dead oracle, reiterating with stupid persistency the same words to every fresh inquiry; a book can never reapply a principle, or reconsider an assumption, and is therefore the most unphilosophical of things.

This idea, put with exquisite dramatic propriety into the mouth

of Socrates, who wrote nothing, is no less characteristic of Plato himself, for all his brilliant and prolix compositions. In every department of his genius and life, there seems to have been a spontaneous rush of imagination curbed and mastered by the iron hand of reason. It is said that in his youth he wrote tragedies and other poems, a pursuit from which he was weaned by the sobering influence of Socrates. The story may be apocryphal, but it well expresses, in an apologue, the inner history, as we may fancy it, of the man's whole soul; the artistic impulse bubbling up, and the dialectic conscience supervening; the pride, the eloquence, the love of beauty, and the sensuous fancies of an Athenian dilettante, all hushed and overawed by the sense of impending social disaster, by logic, by conscience, and by the memory of ancient gods. Such a contrast and conflict is visible, as we have seen, in Plato's writings; but there is every reason to believe that could we see the man as he actually was and compare his discourses and aspect in the Academy with the works we now possess, the conflict and contrast would be much more striking. He was more antique, both in his severities and in his indulgences, than we should like to imagine. Possibly if we could see him as he was in his later years, we should think him a semi-Oriental sage, filled like a new Pythagoras with echoes of sibylline traditions, both Hellenic and barbarian, and like a second Parmenides, absolutely dogmatic and convinced of his supersensible knowledge. At any rate there are sides of his character and conviction which we half see, but can hardly do justice to: for instance, his ancestral religion, his admiration for Sparta and for Egypt, his mathematics, and his apparent surrender to Pythagorean speculation. No one can tell how much these things may have modified in real life the temper and standards of a man who in his writings is generally so urbane, so liberal, and so rationalistic. Much less can we be sure that other influences which escape us altogether were not at work in his mind.

His personality, whatever it may have been, has passed with his country into the irrevocable flux of all that is phenomenal. We should be unworthy of the best lesson that Greece and Plato

can teach us if we regretted their disappearance too much. It is not the idiosyncrasies of that man or nation that should interest us most, but rather the truth, excellence, and beauty, wherever found, which they first clearly envisaged. If it were still in Plato's power to tell us more about himself, it is very doubtful whether he would consent to do so. Could he now re-write or supplement his works, so as to make them perfectly unequivocal; could he affix dates to them and add footnotes and excursuses, we may well believe that he would refuse with scorn to minister in that way to our curiosity and vain erudition. The truth, he might say, cannot enter the mind passively through the eyes, whether they gaze on the sights of the moving world or pore over the pages of a classic. As the body cannot be strengthened by another man's exercise, so the mind can gain understanding only by its own dialectic. The most important questions which a book raises are questions which a man must answer for himself.

THE POETRY OF THE SOUTH

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With the exception of Poe, the Southern poets have not yet received adequate attention at the hands of students and critics of American literature. A brief survey of this considerable group of verse writers may suggest the importance of their work, and its significance in the spiritual history of the country.

It is chiefly as a matter of convenience that the Northern poets may be grouped together ; in temperament, poetic insight, and interpretation of life they are notable for diversity rather than for similarity. The range of interests and the variations of genius which they present are brought into clear view when one places side by side the work of Emerson and of Holmes, of Whitman and of Aldrich. Tennyson and Browning are not farther apart than Emerson and Whitman ; Swinburne and Arnold are not more dissimilar than Whittier and Bayard Taylor. The poets of the South, on the other hand, may be grouped together on the ground of community of temperament.

The student of vital conditions in this country might have anticipated that the deepest and richest poetic movement would take place in the South rather than in the North. History has failed to confirm such a prediction ; but it remains true that in lyrical quality, in sensitiveness, not so much to ideas as to feeling and sentiment, in simplicity and directness of emotional response to the appeals of beauty in nature, in that capacity for pure song which more than anything else reveals the poetic temperament

and which, in the Elizabethan Age, and for thirty years after, enfolded the work of Shakespeare and Milton with a multitude of beguiling, spontaneous songs, so many and so continuous that the path of great constructive poetry seems to run through a world of pure music,—in this lyrical attitude towards nature and life the Southern poets are at one, from the time of Poe to that of Lanier. The product is not great in mass; it is by no means so comprehensively interpretative of the spiritual history of a great community as is the work of the Northern poets; but so far as it goes, it is pure poetry: it is poetry for the love of beauty rather than poetry for the sake of ideas. It is transparently sincere; its spontaneity gives it fidelity to experience and emotion; it is the poetry of feeling rather than of the intellect. It instinctively passes, when it deals with fundamental aspects of life or of nature, out of the realm of thought into that of feeling; and if it fails to enter the region of great literature, it points the way and predicts the artists of deeper passion and of larger poetic capacity.

Before Henry Timrod, no voice of any carrying power was heard in Southern verse: Timrod sounded a new note of penetrating purity and sweetness. He was born in a community in which the sense of local solidarity,—the community-consciousness, so to speak,—which has been at once the charm and the limitation of the South, was so intense as to exercise an educational influence of the most searching kind. In the air of Charleston, the moral fervor of the Huguenot had passed into a passion of loyalty to the tradition and inheritance of a community touched from the beginning with the grace and light of idealism in faith and manners.

Like Goethe and many another boy of poetic temper, Timrod found in his mother a kind of visible Providence of the imagination,—one who recognized the double parentage of her child, and who made him at home in the world of nature, of sentiment, of beauty, and of gladness, where poets are not only born, but made. Paul Hamilton Hayne sat beside him in the school-room and shared his earliest dreams. Timrod was quiet, shy, eager in friendship and in intellectual curiosity; slow of speech, but quick to learn;

delighting in the sports of his fellows, but freest and most completely himself when holidays sent him afield; a sensitive boy, reticent with his fellows, but impetuous and ardent of speech with a friend,—a spirit touched by beauty and vibrating to the breath of nature. His college opportunities were meagre, but access to the best literature was among them, and he fed his spirit on rich pasturage. The Greek drama did not appeal to him, but he early discovered his kinship with Virgil, Horace, and Catullus. Among English poets, Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton, Burns, Wordsworth, and, later, Tennyson, were his teachers, and it is not difficult to discover the lyrical direction of his interest and gift. He made a futile attempt to get into working relations with society by adopting law as a vocation. The inconspicuous sign-board of "William Cullen Bryant, Attorney-at-Law" had been taken down from the long street in Plainfield, Mass., and James Russell Lowell had endeavored vainly to pursue the same vocation. Poets have often tried to become lawyers, but no experiment of this kind has yet succeeded.

There was a small group of men in Charleston who were actively interested in literature, foremost among whom were Paul Hamilton Hayne and W. Gilmore Simms; and there was in the city, as elsewhere throughout the South, a larger group of those who were so familiar with the best in literature that they not only loved it, but recognized it when it appeared in new places, and came from fresh hands. Timrod was born in 1829, and there was but a brief period of time between his days of preparation and the rising of the curtain on the drama of the Civil War,—that "King Lear" among the tragedies of modern history, in its elemental vastness and destructiveness. In the short interval before the storm, Timrod followed the vocation of a teacher, and the avocation of a poet; the first edition of his poems, bearing the imprint of a Boston publishing house, and the date 1860. He found quick recognition at the North, and would doubtless have found there his larger audience, as have all the Southern writers, had not the absorbing passions set free by the war ruthlessly thrust the arts aside for the season. No poet, North

or South, felt the sentiment of the conflict more deeply than Timrod, and none gave it a truer lyrical expression. In "Ethnogenesis," written in February, 1861, while the first Southern Congress was debating the issue for the last time before it passed on to its ultimate appeal, he wrote the prelude to the struggle, as Lowell wrote its epilogue in the "Commemoration Ode"; between the two was fashioned that splendid tradition of heroism which not only is a common inheritance for the whole country, but will become a perennial source of inspiration for the national poetry, which is some day to interpret the life of the nation in the complexity of its vast completeness. The misconceptions of the poem are part of the great misunderstanding of the time; its passionate fire, its lyrical freedom, its pulse of stormy music give it lasting value:—

Nor these alone,
But every stock and stone
Shall help us; but the very soil,
And all the generous wealth it gives to toil,
And all for which we love our noble land,
Shall fight beside and through us; sea and strand,
The heart of woman, and her hand,
Tree, fruit and flower, and every influence,
Gentle, or grave, or grand;
The winds in our defence
Shall seem to blow; to us the hills shall lend
Their firmness and their calm;
And in our stiffened sinews we shall blend
The strength of pine and palm.

The impulsive emotion of the time breaks into still more passionate tones in the long poem on "Carolina," in which, like a far cry, the spirit of Tyrtæus lives again. On the heart of the future, in which the discords of the past will be hushed while its harmonies abide, the lines of this spirited lyric "shall fall like Marion's bugle-blast."

Timrod's inspirations were twofold: the love of his land and people, and the love of nature; and both these springs fed his most notable poem, "The Cotton Boll," which must be ranked

with the real achievements of American poetry. In this fine lyric the intensity of Timrod's localism gives sure footing for a superb movement of imagination; the poem has symphonic breadth of construction, with a succession of delicate and subtle motives continually merging into and bringing into clearness the central theme; the poet holding distinctly before us the concrete reality with which he is dealing, while he suggests all the occult and secret processes out of which nature has fashioned it,—its delicate relationships with the universal blossoming and bearing of the earth, and its passage through human need into human use and association. In its large and free movement of imagination, as in Lanier's "Sunrise" and "Song of the Corn," and Whitman's "Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking," one catches the possible suggestion, in the poetry of the future, of the continental vastness and richness of the New World. Although not without weak lines, and missing at times complete identification of form and thought, this poem has breadth and nobility of conception, and is touched throughout with the tenderness and grace of deep emotion.

Timrod's most ambitious piece of verse, "A Vision of Poesy," is interesting chiefly as it throws light on his conception of the poet's growth and function: the unity between the artist and his work; the sympathy which enables him to divine the hidden experience of his race, and inspires him to speak for and to his fellows; the loyalty to art which makes him a servant of truth in order that he may become a master of the knowledge of life. In his sensitive and impressionable temperament, quickly moved and ardently imaginative, in the directness and simplicity of his attitude and approach to his themes, in the intensity of his patriotic fervor, and in the glow of his tenderness for nature, Timrod represents and interprets the Southern mind and heart more clearly and definitely than does any other poet. It is as a song writer that he will live; and while his range was narrow, and the mass of his work is slight, his place as a lyric poet is secure. He has not yet come to his own, but the wider recognition of his tender and passionate verse is only a question.

of time. Of all that he has written, nothing is more likely to survive than the ode sung on the occasion of decorating the graves of the Confederate dead at Magnolia Cemetery, Charleston, 1867 :—

Sleep sweetly in your humble graves,
Sleep, martyrs of a fallen cause ;
Though yet no marble column craves
The pilgrim here to pause.

In seeds of laurel in the earth
The blossom of your fame is blown,
And somewhere waiting for its birth,
The shaft is in the stone!

Meanwhile, behalf the tardy years,
Which keep in trust your storied tombs,
Behold! your sisters bring their tears,
And these memorial blooms.

Small tributes! but your shades will smile
More proudly on these wreaths today,
Than when some cannon-moulded pile
Shall overlook this bay.

Stoop, angels, hither from the skies !
There is no holier spot of ground
Than where defeated valor lies,
By mourning beauty crowned.

Timrod's verse gains in value as a product of what may be called, in no invidious sense, local conditions, because at its best it shows little trace of the influence of earlier poets or of schools of poetry. It reveals, by its detachment from the poetic movement here and abroad, a distinct flavor of the soil. There is no touch of the world spirit upon it; its quality is native and individual. The isolation of the Old South on the verge of the Civil War seemed to enclose this sensitive poet, and secure for his gift free development upon the lines of least resistance.

The lyrical genius of Paul Hamilton Hayne, his lifelong friend, was less vigorous and concentrated, but more flexible and

free. Hayne's voice has less carrying power than Timrod's, but he sings with more ease, his interests are wider, and his associations with the masters of his craft are far more intimate and potential in their influence. Timrod's work is characterized by solidity and concreteness; Hayne's work by fluency and grace. The Georgia poet does not strike the ear with such freshness and distinctness of tone; he has wider compass of melody; he suggests greater possibilities of tonal resource; he handles his themes with more assurance and ease. Timrod is more distinctly the product of Southern conditions, and the Southern temperament than Hayne; Hayne betrays more thorough and exacting technical training, and the touch of cosmopolitan influence. Timrod's inspiration is drawn directly from the realities of nature and of experience; Hayne, like many of the Northern poets, fed his imagination at many springs, and refines and modulates his native gift with culture.

Circumstances laid a heavy hand on both poets, but Hayne survived the rigors of crushing adversity to live the life of a poet, with as fine a loyalty and as true a dignity as Tennyson, by whose side Fortune stood, not only with the trumpet of Fame at her lips, but with all manner of prosperities in her hands.

Like Timrod, the child of a community peculiarly sensitive to the appeals of sentiment and idealism in manners and conduct, Hayne had gentle influences behind him, and entered by inheritance into the best traditions of character and manners. Upon his work, as upon that of Timrod, Lanier, Lowell, Emerson, and Hawthorne, there rests that touch of distinction which is quite as much a quality of nature as of art; for a delicate sense of fitness, of reticence, and of form is the flowering of a fine spirit: it is not to be plucked by an ambitious hand, however audacious and powerful. A strain of high breeding runs through Hayne's whole life and gives it spiritual dignity.

The Charleston of 1830, like the Boston of the same year, had a Puritan background,—for there were French as well as English Puritans,—a traditional culture, a keen sense of local dignity, and a note of individuality of a very distinct quality.

The intellectual inheritance of the Southern city was, however, very different from that of the Northern city; and love of classical literature was its best possession. College opportunities for Hayne, as for Timrod and Lanier, were meagre, so far as range of studies was concerned; but he felt the influence which makes for culture, even if access to it was inadequate. He was not without companionship in the literary aspirations which early disclosed their predominating hold on his interest, not less than upon his imagination. A little company of aspiring young men kept one another in countenance in their most unworldly dreams and their most audacious hopes; and there was unusual promise of literary productiveness in Charleston when the sky began to darken with ominous clouds. When that strange light which often precedes the tempest falls on the landscape, the birds become silent.

Hayne's connection with journalism was brief, and its most promising incident was his appointment as editor of "Russell's Magazine,"—a periodical which, like the "Southern Literary Messenger," at Richmond, was to glean the wide and then unworked field of literature. In 1855, when he was twenty-five years old, his earliest volume of poems was published in Boston, and the cordiality with which it was received,—a cordiality repeated two years later, and a third time after a second interval of three years,—confirmed his determination to make the writing of poetry a vocation. His marriage cannot be passed in silence, however one may shrink from touching the more intimate relationships, because it was a prime fact in his career as a poet. In her slight figure one saw at a glance the indomitable will, the capacity for renunciation, the heroic idealism which made Mrs. Hayne an equal sharer in the self-denials of a lifelong devotion to poetry. It is doubtful if any man ever achieves greatness alone: it is certain that Hayne was sustained by a calm and patient faith quite on a level with his own.

The war stripped him of all visible links with the past, all tangible ties with his inheritance; his home, his books, his heirlooms of every kind were swept away by the devastating tide.

Out of the universal wreck with which half the continent to the Mississippi was strewn, he stepped courageous and resolute, not to rebuild his shattered fortunes, but to live the life of an artist. Heroism was so general throughout the South in those terrible years after the war, when the epical splendor of action had vanished and left only the bitter realities of loss and misery behind, that Hayne's cheerful acceptance of narrow means was in no way exceptional: there was nothing finer, however, in that universal history of privation heroically borne, than his silent renunciation, his cheerful temper, and his steadfast loyalty. The story of those fifteen years at Copse Hill, overlooking Augusta, and within the circle of the whispering pines, is one of those high traditions of the primacy of the spirit in which American history is exceptionally rich, and which, in the long reach of the centuries, may be seen to be the finest contribution made by the earlier American men of letters to higher civilization on this continent.

The seclusion at Copse Hill bore no such fruit as did the quiet of Dove Cottage, Allan Bank, and Rydal Mount, in the enchanting atmosphere of the English lakes, where clouds and mountains seem to meet and part in mysterious and magical communings, but it was every whit as dignified. In the simple house, embowered in vines, so rudimentary in form and size that Hayne called it his shanty, he nourished his frail body, and found companionship for his brave spirit in the shade and the voices of the pines. He listened with an ear as sensitive as that with which Emerson heard the murmurings of immemorial branches about Walden Pond, and responded with a readier, though a less penetrating music than the Concord poet. He kept the record of the seasons in his memory, for he gave to meditation the time which most men give to toil; he noted every passing phase of life in the woods, every delicate change, and he interpreted the pine in his emotions as Emerson interpreted it in his mind:—

Tall, sombre, grim, against the morning sky
They rise, scarce touched by melancholy airs,
Which stir the fadeless foliage dreamfully,
As if from realms of mystical despairs.

Tall, sombre, grim, they stand, with dusky gleams
 Brightening to gold within the woodland's core,
 Beneath the gracious noontide's tranquil beams—
 But the weird winds of morning sigh no more.

A stillness, strange, divine, ineffable,
 Broods round and o'er them in the wind's surcease,
 And on each tinted copse and shimmering dell
 Rests the mute rapture of deep-hearted peace.

Last sunset comes—the solemn joy and might
 Borne from the West where cloudless day declines—
 Low, flutelike breezes sweep the waves of light,
 And lifting dark green tresses of the pines,

Till every lock is luminous—gently float,
 Fraught with pale odors of the heavens afar;
 To faint where twilight on her virginal throat
 Wears for a gem the tremulous vesper star.

So sings the Southern pine in the ear of a poet whose imagination responds to the vibration of the innumerable needles murmuring or silent, and whose eye misses no aspect, however elusive and evanescent, of the mysterious stir of life in the depths of heart of the trees. In striking contrast is the song of the Northern pine in Emerson's "Wood-Notes":—

Heed the old oracles,
 Ponder my spells;
 Song wakes in my pinnacles
 When the wind swells.
 Soundeth the prophetic wind,
 The shadows shake on the rock behind,
 And the countless leaves of the pine are strings
 Tuned to the lay the wood-god sings.
 Hearken! Hearken!
 If thou wouldst know the mystic song
 Chanted when the sphere was young.
 Aloft, abroad, the pean swells;
 O wise man! hear'st thou half it tells?
 O wise man! hear'st thou the least part!
 'Tis the chronicle of art.

To the open ear it sings
 Sweet the genesis of things,
 Of tendency through endless ages,
 Of star-dust, and star-pilgrimages,
 Of rounded worlds, of space and time,
 Of the old flood's subsiding slime,
 Of chemic matter, force and form,
 Of poles and powers, cold and warm.

* * * *

Come learn with me the fatal song
 Which knits the world in music strong,
 Come lift thine eyes to lofty rhymes,
 Of things with things, of times with times,
 Primal chimes of sun and shade,
 Of sound and echo, man and maid,
 The land reflected in the flood,
 Body with shadow still pursued.
 For Nature beats in perfect tune,
 And rounds with rhyme her every rune,
 Whether she work in land or sea,
 Or hide underground her alchemy.
 Thou canst not wave thy staff in air,
 Or dip thy paddle in the lake,
 But it carves the bow of beauty there,
 And the ripples in rhymes the ear forsake.

In spite of a touch of awkwardness from which Emerson rarely freed himself in verse, these closing lines have a directness and finality to which Hayne never attained; but the two poets must remain the singers of the pine, symbol of detachment from the affairs of life, of seclusion and mystery; with a music which has something of the ocean swell in its volume and its rhythmic rise and fall. To Hayne the pine reveals its beauty, its responsiveness to human moods; to Emerson, it speaks of ancient mystery, of the hidden forces of the world, of the unity which makes every living thing product and fruitage of the universal life, token and symbol of the universal mind. In their common love of the pine, dear to the poets of nature long before Theocritus heard the fall of the cones in Arcadian Sicily, Hayne and Emerson have closely approached one another, as Whittier,

Bryant, Lowell, and Timrod were caught on the tide of the great passion of patriotism, and in the future will be honored together as the chief interpreters in poetry of a national experience of transcendent significance.

Hayne lacked the passion which burned in the heart of Timrod; his lyrical impulse was less powerful and urgent, but he had far more grace and fluency, and was less hampered by provincial influence and sentiment. His natural endowment was not so great as Timrod's, but his poetic training was more thorough, his poetic interests wider. He touched the two themes which lay deepest in his heart, love of nature and love of the personal and social ideals of the Old South, with perfect sincerity, with deep tenderness, and with lyric sweetness. In the ultimate anthology of American poetry the space allotted to him may not be great, but it will be his own. Beyond the value of his work will be the tradition of his life; for he was one of the few American writers who have resolutely lived as men of letters.

William Gilmore Simms belongs to the older group of Southern writers and was, in a sense, the most active and productive man of letters the South has yet produced. He had the vitality of the great novelists without their genius; and the list of his stories suggests the indefatigable industry of Balzac, Dickens, and Thackeray, without, however, recalling their knowledge of life and their dramatic power. He never wholly overcame his lack of early education; he was not recognized or honored in Charleston as he ought to have been; he contended all his life against serious odds; but his courage was indomitable and his energy inexhaustible. He had a vivid imagination, power of invention, and, at his best, a fresh, narrative style; but he was careless, indifferent to details, and lacking in artistic feeling. The interest of the future will fasten upon the man rather than upon his work; for his life covered a dramatic period in the history of his section, and his career brings into clear relief the intellectual and social conditions under which he lived. From the small body of his verse a selection will illustrate his fluency, his pictorial gift, and will suggest the essentially secondary quality of his mind:—

THE BURDEN OF THE DESERT.

The burden of the Desert,
The Desert like the deep,
That from the south in whirlwinds
Comes rushing up the steep ;—
I see the spoiler spoiling,
I hear the strife of blows ;
Up, watchman, to thy heights, and say
How the dread conflict goes !

What hear'st thou from the Desert ?—
“A sound, as if a world
Were from its axle lifted up
And to an ocean hurled ;
The roaring as of waters,
The rushing as of hills,
And lo ! the tempest-smoke and cloud,
That all the Desert fills.”

What seest thou on the Desert ?—
“A chariot comes,” he cried,
“With camels and with horsemen,
That travel by its side ;
And now a lion darteth
From out the cloud, and he
Looks backward ever as he flies,
As fearing still to see !”

What, watchman, of the horsemen ?—
“They come, and as they ride,
Their horses crouch and tremble,
Nor toss their manes in pride ;
The camels wander scattered,
The horsemen heed them naught,
But speed, as if they dreaded still
The foe with whom they fought.”

What foe is this, thou watchman ?—
“Hark ! Hark ! the horsemen come ;
Still looking on the backward path,
As if they feared a doom ;

Their locks are white with terror,
Their very shouts a groan ;
'Babylon,' they cry, 'has fallen,
And all her gods are gone !' "

The South has gone beyond the lyric impulse of Timrod and the lyric temperament of Hayne and given the country a poet whose genius, never quite gaining full spread of wing, was so charged with the elements of which great poetry is made, that it predicts the advent of poetry of the first quality, and shows us what its characteristics must be. It is not easy to speak dispassionately of Sidney Lanier. His life was too short for the ripe maturing of his opulent nature and the fusing into free expression of his many interests and of his various gifts; and the interval since his death has been far too short for the emergence of final and authoritative judgment upon his work. That must be postponed; we must be content to take account of him as he appears in the moment of transition from the literature of sections to the literature of a nation. For Sidney Lanier was distinctively a national poet,—one who felt the stir of the vast movement of coördination which did not begin with the close of the war, but which revealed itself then for the first time, and who expressed in the depth and the largeness of his poetic conception neither the sentiment of New England nor of the South, new or old, but of that America which is to be so much larger, more significant, more influential, richer in appeal to the imagination than the provinces of which it is composed.

It is true, some of the greatest literature has been the work of men of small communities saturated with local feeling, whose deep rootage in the soil gave their work reality, concreteness, and close relation to life; but that which gives the work of the man of a locality authority is not its localism, but its universality. There is a localism which is full of character, individuality, flavor, pungency! And there is a localism which is pure provincialism. The localism which is provincialism dies because it has only a local interest: it means nothing to the world. The localism which reveals character survives because everything which brings

man into the light, even in his eccentricities, is significant and of universal interest. The ultimate judges of literature will care nothing for the admiration of Massachusetts for itself, or for the joy with which Georgia recalls its achievements; but they will care immensely for the *Yankee* and the *Cracker*. Sidney Lanier was neither Massachusetts-minded nor Georgia-minded; he was American-minded. The air of the future was in his singing robes; and it is easier and wiser to try to interpret him in the light of his own conception of the poet's function.

It was in the order of things that he should write the "Centennial Ode,"—so far the only official poetic interpretation of nationality in the history of the country; and the interior and spiritual inevitableness of his appearance on that occasion is made clear in the conception of his poem. It is the hymn of the New World and the new race, in the totality of its experience and achievements, not in antagonism to the Old World, but in fulfillment of the life of the race. His skeleton notes of a single stanza in a letter to Bayard Taylor are significant:—

Cavalier and Puritan

Holland

Huguenot

Wrought, joined hands, welded separate links into one chain.

Lanier had the depth and breadth of imagination equal to the fusing of great ideas: everything he did was on a large scale. He notes in a letter to a friend the timidity of the verse writers of the day; the timidity of the precisian who is more anxious to avoid a blunder than to create a work of art; and he calls attention to the lapses, by no means occasional, of Homer and Shakespeare from perfection of form. From this blighting timidity, which is the reflex influence of a critical age on sensitive rather than original minds, Lanier was delivered by the freedom of great ideas. He was not afraid to blunder in the vast territory which opened before him so long as he could, by bold advance, make himself more and more master of its resources.

The richness of his temperament predicted a great poet if life had given him adequate room. No American has left fuller data

of every sort for a spiritual biography, for a vivid and authentic account of his personality in its various aspects of power, taste, passion, appreciation, love, aspiration, and of the growth of his mind and art. When that material is used, as some day it will be, we shall have a chapter in the psychology of genius of the most fascinating kind, a text-book in poetics for the forming of the poets of the future. When that record of Lanier's spirit is made up it will appear that below his rich temperament, and giving it vividness and perennial freshness, and behind his various powers organizing them into a splendid working force, was his vitality. His strength was always ebbing, his life was always mounting: in that last of weary years, when hope was gone and nothing remained save that supreme faith which preserves all real possessions inviolate, he flung his noble "Sunrise," one of the true revelations of imagination in our poetry, full on the face of death. That poem, like the lines on "Corn," conveys an impression of spaciousness; there is marked unevenness in the workmanship, but there is always a sense of space, as if the mind of the poet had wide horizons and a great reach of territory.

This sense of spaciousness is one of the marks of a great poet, and, alone among the Southern poets, Lanier possessed it,—alone among them his work shows the movement of large ideas, as does the work of Emerson, Lowell, and Whitman; but, unlike the New England poets, Lanier discloses that shaping, fusing, constructing imagination which is the crowning possession of the great poet. His work is full of intellect, but it is not primarily intellectual: no poetry of the first rank is primarily intellectual. Art must be irradiated with ideas, but the possession of ideas does not make an artist; ideas are the stuff which the imagination uses; but this high faculty, with its direct perception, its flashing insight, its organizing force, its vitalizing quality, is the master, not the servant of ideas. A poetry wholly of ideas is passionless, undramatic, colorless; it interests but it does not move; the breath of life has not passed into it. A poetry deficient in ideas lingers in the ear in beguiling cadences, but does not live in the heart. Lanier had both qualities; he had great ideas, and he had

imagination of the vitalizing, constructive kind. He stopped short of the highest achievement because he did not completely fuse his materials and match his conception with perfect form; but he was on the road to greatness, and his work was prophetic of greatness.

Its spaciousness takes him out of the range of Southern poetry and of the great body of New England poetry. There is nothing provincial about him. His occasional stiffness or awkwardness of manner does not come from the limitation of local feeling or culture; it was due either to a too rigid application of his theory of the relations of music and poetry, or to the fact that he had not time to master all the material at his command. It may be suspected that his theory of versification was somewhat responsible for his occasional lapse from musical perfection; that he was so preoccupied with a clear perception of interior musical structure that he forgot the necessity of conveying to the ear the inward harmony. The science of music seemed at times to dull a little his sensitive practice of the art of music; and however definitely the structure of poetry may reveal a science of versification, its form must instantly justify itself. The poet, as poet, is known instantly and ultimately by this natural magic, this final fusion of sound and sense, this power to make ideas sing and to give thought the lift of wings. This supreme felicity, which captivates us when we open Homer or Shakespeare or Heine or Keats, rarely befell Lanier, although he seems always on the very point of overtaking it.

When one recalls what music meant to Lanier, how it seemed to issue out of the depths of his spirit, and give order and sound both to the inner and outer life, it seems disloyal to seek in this extraordinary sensitiveness to harmony the explanation of the limitation of his poetry. "I could play passably well on several instruments before I could write legibly, and since then the very deepest of my life has been filled with music." There was a language, then, that was earlier than speech with him, a language in which he was more at home, which was involved in his earliest divinations and emotions, which was his

most intimate and characteristic expression. The arts are so highly and delicately differentiated that, while the man of genius like Da Vinci or Michael Angelo may master two or three, and speak with authority through them, he cannot carry the method of one art into the practice of another.

It was true, perhaps, that Lanier was misled by the richness of his own endowment. The instinct for the melody of vowels and consonants is something very different from the instinct for melody in notation. Clear perception of the relative values of pitch and tone-color is of high importance, but there is a magic in words which may be explained after it is wrought, but which is brought into being by a miracle. Lanier was striving to expand the resources of poetic speech; he had a great idea; it is a question whether, as has been suggested, he was not dealing with versification too much from the standpoint of the musician. It has been said of him that in music his facility seemed to antedate all training, and that he played as the mocking-bird sings; while in poetry he was compelled to work out a theory of verse.

A touch of emphasis on the word "work" brings into view the limitation in Lanier's work. Ruskin somewhere says that, in the presence of the masterpieces of art we are aware, not of a great effort, but of a great force. Lanier gives us the impression of being a great force, but he sometimes gives us also the impression of effort. There is a suggestion of intention. "Whatever turn I may have for art is purely musical," he wrote in 1873, "poetry being with me a mere tangent into which I shoot sometimes."

To say this of Lanier is to pay him the tribute of judging him by the highest standards,—the standards of universal poetry. It is because he approaches these standards, because there is in his verse, at its best, an air of greatness, that he invites a somewhat rigid examination. The pure, lyrical note is not his as it was Timrod's and Bryant's, Whittier's and Longfellow's; but he has a quality of imagination which is unlike anything in Lowell or Emerson or Bryant; the large, unfolding, irradiating imagination which reveals itself in "The Marshes of Glynn," "Corn,"

"The Song of the Chattahoochee"; the plastic, flowing, penetrating imagination which has left the record of itself in the works of the masters of poetry,—in Æschylus, Dante, Goethe, Shakespeare, Milton, Hugo. The provincialism of thought in Timrod disappears, the thinness of temperament in Emerson, the rigidity of Bryant, the lack of variety of Whittier, the didacticism of Lowell,—all these elements of weakness in American poetry disappear in the large, elemental movement of imagination in "The Marshes of Glynn"; deeper and more inclusive than any movement of thought; a movement which has a touch of tidal depth and reach in it, a hint of cosmical power and meaning. If this movement of imagination had been perfectly free and spontaneous, the product would have been great art; poetry of the quality which could have been placed boldly and without assumption beside the best and greatest in its kind. As it stands, we must be content to recognize the elements of greatness, and to affirm that in this direction the great poet, when he appears, must pass.

Lanier had the constructive imagination, he had adequate ideas, he had the quality, the note, and much of the best material of culture, though time for complete assimilation and full refining was denied him; he had also that final gift of the poet,—temperament. In the long reach of time, if we take into account the richness of the biographic material of many kinds which he has left, it may appear that his greatest service to American poetry was his illustration of the poetic temperament. No man was ever more unworldly in the true sense of the word, more instinctively loyal to the vocation of the spirit, the things of the mind, more sublimely oblivious of material values, more nobly consistent of aim and life, more obedient to his vision, and more constantly inspired to create, to understand, and to enjoy. "So many great ideas for art are born to me each day, I am swept into the land of All-delight by their strenuous sweet whirlwind." By his spirit and his life, not less than by his work, he predicts the art of the future and points the way to it.

A study of the considerable group of minor poets of the South makes it clear that a small body of verse of lasting interest is

yet to be selected from a great number of uncollected songs ; songs with the touch of true feeling and the true singing note in them. These stray and scattered songs are interesting, not only because they are characteristic of the section of country which produced them, but because they are native products of our soil. There are few hints of literary inspiration in them, few traces of a derivative or secondary origin ; whatever their limitations may be, they are the outcries of searching experience, the unhackneyed and unrestrained praise of nature as typified by the palm, or become vocal in the mocking-bird, and the somewhat conventional celebration of the ideal of manners which the South had come to cherish, as something distinctive and exclusive.

The work of Ticknor, Ryan, Cooke, Wilde, O'Hara, Simms, Pike, Hope, Wallis, and Mrs. Preston may be taken as representative of this considerable body of minor poetry, some of which will in time become the possession of the country at large, much of which is significant to the student of American poetry. The lives of many of these poets are part of the spiritual history of the country. John Reuben Thompson, whose portrait hangs in the library of the University of Virginia, belongs to a class of men who, by generosity of aim and superiority of taste, no less than by specific effort, disseminate the spirit of genuine culture, and prepare the way for the production of literature, even when they do not contribute to it. Distinctly successful as editor of the "Southern Literary Messenger," with which Poe's name will always be associated, in securing literary coöperation of high order, and evoking genuine interest alike in readers and writers, Thompson strove by pen and voice to awaken that enthusiasm for the best in literature with which his own soul was consumed. Failing health sent him abroad ; at the close of the war he became the literary editor of the "New York Evening Post," then, as now, a journal of high literary standards. Like Lanier, however, he touched the door of opportunity only to find it the gate of death.

This brief story of struggle, hardship, exile, the shining of the light through obscuring and sometimes obliterating clouds, is typi-

cal; it is, in varying forms of disaster, the history of this group of poets. They were swept from their places of work and opportunity by the relentless storm of war; or they came to maturity in the heartbreaking desolation which followed the struggle. "Perhaps you know," wrote Lanier to Bayard Taylor, "that with us of the younger generation in the South, since the war, pretty much the whole of life has been merely not dying." Their interests were not wide, and they use but one verse form,—the lyric; they were not poets of thought, nor were they masters of the larger resources of versification. They were, however, true singers, with a natural gift for song, moved by genuine feeling, and commanding at times the note of pathos, and the note of passionate feeling.

The searching experience of war drew from them tender or moving expressions of love of their section and their people, as the crisis evoked from the Northern poets hymns to freedom; they were swift to feel and express the dramatic aspects of incident and achievement, and at times, in the turmoil of struggle, the flower of the Mystics bloomed again in their hands. From the small body of verse left by Francis O. Ticknor, a country physician in Georgia, and a devout lover of flowers, a tender and striking lyric may be taken as representative of a class of songs which, despite imperfections of form, have a convincing touch of reality and of pathos which promise long life:—

LITTLE GIFFEN.

Out of the focal and foremost fire—
 Out of the hospital walls as dire—
 Smitten of grapeshot and gangrene—
 Eighteenth battle and he, sixteen—
 Specter, such as you seldom see,
 Little Giffen of Tennessee.

"Take him and welcome," the surgeon said,
 "Not the doctor can help the dead!"
 So we took him and brought him where
 The balm was sweet in our Summer air;

And we laid him down on the wholesome bed ;
Utter Lazarus, heel to head!

And we watched the war with bated breath,
Skeleton boy against skeleton death!—
Months of torture, how many such!
Weary weeks of the stick and crutch,—
And still a glint in the steel-blue eye
Told of a spirit that wouldn't die,

And didn't!—Nay! more! in death's despite
The crippled skeleton learned to write—
“Dear Mother!” at first, of course, and then
“Dear Captain!” enquiring about the men.
—Captain's answer : “Of eighty and five
Giffen and I are left alive.”

“Johnston pressed at the front,” they say ;—
Little Giffen was up and away!
A tear, his first, as he bade good-bye
Dimmed the glint of his steel-blue eye ;—
“I'll write, if spared!” There was news of fight,
But none of Giffen! he did not write!

I sometimes fancy that were I king
Of the courtly Knights of Arthur's ring,
With the voice of the minstrel in mine ear
And the tender legend that trembles here—
I'd give the best on his bended knee—
The whitest soul of my chivalry—
For Little Giffen of Tennessee.

Father Ryan, a Virginian, a priest, chaplain in the Confederate army, editor, and writer of verse full of deep feeling and tinged with mystical sadness, has left in his three volumes one song, among many, of a rare and singular beauty :—

SONG OF THE MYSTIC.

I walk down the Valley of Silence—
Down the dim, voiceless Valley—alone !
And I hear not the fall of a footstep

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Around me, save God's and my own ;
 And the hush of my heart is as holy
 As hovers where angels have flown !

* * * *

Do you ask what I found in the Valley ?
 'Tis my Trysting Place with the Divine.
 And I fell at the feet of the Holy,
 And above me a voice said : " Be mine."
 And there arose from the depths of my spirit
 An echo—" My heart shall be thine."

Do you ask how I live in the Valley ?
 I weep—and I dream—and I pray.
 But my tears are as sweet as the dew-drops
 That fall on the roses in May ;
 And my prayer, like a perfume from Censers,
 Ascendeth to God night and day.

In the hush of the Valley of Silence
 I dream all the songs that I sing ;
 And the music floats down the dim Valley,
 Till each finds a word for a wing,
 That to hearts, like the Dove of the Deluge,
 A message of Peace they may bring.

But far on the deep there are billows
 That never shall break on the beach ;
 And I have heard songs in the Silence
 That never shall float into speech ;
 And I have had dreams in the Valley
 Too lofty for language to reach.

And I have seen Thoughts in the Valley—
 Ah ! me, how my spirit was stirred !
 And they wear holy veils on their faces,
 Their footsteps can scarcely be heard :
 They pass through the Valley like Virgins,
 Too pure for the touch of a word !

Do you ask me the place of the Valley,
 Ye hearts that are harrowed by Care ?
 It lieth afar between mountains,

And God and his angels are there :
And one is the dark mount of Sorrow,
And one the bright mountain of Prayer.

The minor Southern poets share a richness of temperament, a freedom and courage of emotion, denied to the majority of the New England poets. They are natural singers, with a quick ear for melody of the kind which instantly discloses its charm. They are mellifluous; they are, one and all, lovers of nature; but, with the exception of Lanier, they approach her through the feelings and sentiments, and are content to describe her rich and tropical aspects. These inspirations are not deep, nor is their art broad and well-sustained. Their verse lacks fulness and variety of thought, and is often over-sensuous in expression. The verse forms used are few and simple, and there are abundant evidences of lack of artistic training.

That which is real in them is their simplicity of feeling, their naturalness of manner, their command of the singing note. There is often a note of provincialism in their praises of their section and their people, a note of exaggeration, a note, in other words, of that inexperience which had its root in lack of that close contact with other communities which gives a sound and true perspective. The Old South was fatally hampered in its later intellectual development by the fact that there was in its social and industrial system one feature which could not be discussed. That fact created a barrier between a generous people and the rest of the world, developed an abnormal, local sensitiveness, and fostered a tone of exaggeration which is reflected in the minor poets, from which Lanier's largeness entirely preserved him. There is, however, the charm of the Southern temperament even in the most conventional of those singers,—warmth, grace, power of abandon, generosity of spirit; qualities which are winning under any conditions, and which, reinforced by adequate, artistic training and adequate ideas, promise rich fruitage in the poetry of the future.

THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD OF STUDYING ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE

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The function of intelligence is to modify the reactions of animals in such ways as serve to adapt them to their surroundings. Modifications of behavior are the facts from which we infer the presence and degree of intelligence. By a little ingenuity we may devise experiments in which the behavior of an animal is especially illuminating, and is even decisive, on some crucial point of theory. To show some of the ways in which the experimental method has been applied to the study of the mental capacities of different groups of vertebrates is the purpose of this article. We may begin low down in the vertebrate line,—with the fishes.

The common *fundulus*, or mummichog, was found to be quiet and comfortable in the shaded end of an aquarium near the exit of the water, and restless if driven to the opposite and sunny end. In the latter case it would always swim back to the shaded end. If now we drive one to the sunny end and interpose between him and the shaded end a wide-meshed wire screen, with a small opening somewhere in it, we have the means of finding out whether the fish can adapt itself to a novel situation, can, in common language, learn. What happens under such circumstances is this. The fish swims against the screen, then to and fro along it, poking against it, from time to time, in attempts

to reach the shade. In the course of this process it will sooner or later strike the opening and go through. If, in a number of repetitions of the experience of confinement behind the screen, it comes to make fewer and fewer of the random swimming movements, to poke at the screen itself less and less, to go sooner and sooner to the opening, we must credit the animal with the ability to modify its conduct to suit its surroundings. If in this, and in all other cases, we find it doing on the hundredth trial just as it did on the first, failing utterly to make any progressive selection of the impulses that were successful in previous trials, we must deny it that ability.

The *fundulus* does as a fact learn. An individual that on the first trial spent five or ten minutes in random movements will after enough trials go directly to the opening, within a few seconds after it is put behind the screen. What particular mental capacities this learning involves, we may best inquire after noticing the behavior of other groups of animals.

In 1896 I made a great many experiments with young chicks, testing their ability to learn a variety of performances, such as getting out of a box by pecking at a certain spot on a door or by jumping upon a little platform or by pulling down a string with their necks, escaping from a pen by going up a ladder or following an intricate path through a maze, etc., etc. They learn readily to abandon those acts which bring discomfort and to emphasize those which are successful in securing them food, shelter, warmth, and the companionship of their fellows. Their learning, like that of the fishes, is essentially a process of selection. For instance, a chick is confined in a cage from which it can escape only by pecking at a certain spot, and so opening the door. It sees the other chicks and food outside, and reacts to the situation (confinement) according to its inborn organization, by running about, peeping, jumping at the walls, trying to squeeze through any small openings, and pecking at the barriers confining it. The chick feels a score or more of impulses to a score or more of acts. If its reactions include one particular act, namely, a peck at a certain spot, it of course escapes. This one act is followed

by freedom, food, and general comfort. The other acts resulted only in a continuance of the unpleasant solitary confinement. If, after the chick has enjoyed freedom a while, we put it into the cage again, we have a repetition of the first event, except that the chick is likely to run and peep and jump and squeeze less, and to peck at the door sooner. If we continue this process, so that the chick is again and again confronted by the situation,—“confinement in a box of such and such appearance,”—it constantly decreases the useless acts and performs the suitable one sooner and sooner, until finally it pecks at the spot immediately, whenever put into that box. It has learned, we say, to get out of the box by pecking at a certain spot.

This association of a certain act with the sight of the interior of the box is more or less permanent. If we try the chick again, after a week or so, we shall find that it either performs the proper act at once, as it had learned to do, or else relearns it much more quickly than before. This permanence was definitely proved to exist, and was measured in the case of all the animals mentioned in this article. It is characteristic of all animal learning, and I shall say no more about it.

The behavior of both fishes and chicks is surely worthy of the name of intelligent modification of acts to suit circumstances, yet the mental capacities involved are not necessarily comparable to the whole of human intelligence. All that need be and, as we shall see later, all that is implied in the learning of fishes and chicks is the power of selection of one impulse and act from among many, by virtue of the pleasure it brings. The behavior of both exemplifies this process and shows us two great laws of the animal mind. Any impulse and act which in a certain situation felt by the animal brings pleasure tends to become associated with the feeling of that situation, so that when the situation recurs the act will recur also. Any impulse and act which, in a similar case, brings discomfort tends to become dissociated from that situation and to recur less and less frequently. We have here a process of natural selection within the individual comparable to that so fruitful in the race. Just as in the latter case the variations

which are not adapted to the environment fail to survive; so here impulses give rise to varied acts, of which the ones unsuitable to the particular environment in question are eliminated. There is, however, in the individual a positive selecting force, resultant pleasure, which actually weights the dice in favor of the useful acts. We may compare the acts of a single individual to all the animal species, and the situations the individual meets to all the different types of environment, and conclude that just as in the world the whole animal kingdom has come, by the elimination of the species unfitted to various environments, to be a multitude of species, each fitted to a certain environment, so in each individual all the possible acts come, by selection and elimination, to be reduced to a multitude of habits, each of which is fitted to a certain situation.

In 1897 and 1898 I studied the intelligent performances of dogs and cats, and in 1899 and 1900 made similar observations of monkeys. The aim of these researches was to discover how far the simple type of mental life found in the case of the chick was characteristic of these higher animals, and how far, on the other hand, they gave signs of the presence of more complex intellects, of being mentally nearer relatives to man. Thirteen cats and kittens, five dogs, and three monkeys were under observation, in each case for months. Their mental capacities were systematically tested in a number of ways.

The questions at issue were: How far do these animals learn in the same general way as those lower in the scale? do they also reason in the sense of possessing general and abstract ideas and of modifying their conduct in accord with inferences which they make? do they imitate in the sense of learning to do things from seeing their fellows do them?

If we arrange boxes so that their doors can be opened by the manipulation of some simple mechanical devices, and give animals opportunities to obtain food by getting into or out of such boxes, we have a ready means of accurate observation of animal intellect. This general plan of work had been adopted by Sir John Lubbock (now Lord Avebury) in his studies of ants, bees, and

wasps, but had rarely, if ever, been applied to the study of the higher animals, where it is most fruitful. The mechanisms which I used required such acts as pulling down a loop, depressing a thumb-latch, pushing back a bolt, releasing a hook, stepping on a lever, etc., etc. The following is a sample of hundreds of records of animals' learning thus obtained:—

A hungry kitten was put into a cage, the door of which would fall open when a loop of wire that hung in front of the cage was pulled down an inch. The kitten tried to squeeze between the bars, clawed and bit at them, thrust its paws out between the bars, and clawed at various loose objects in the cage. It clawed the loop several times, but not with enough force to pull it down. After 160 seconds of such activity, it happened to claw the loop hard enough, and so escaped. After it had eaten the food outside it was put into the box again. There was a repetition of the same activities, but the successful movement came this time after 30 seconds. On the next trial, general activity for 90 seconds was required before the kitten escaped. With repeated trials the association between the interior of the box and the act of clawing at the loop became fixed, so that finally the kitten would do it in a few seconds, that is, as soon as put into the box. This progress is shown in the times taken in the different trials. They were 160, 30, 90, 60, 15, 28, 20, 30, 22, 11, 15, 20, 12, 10, 14, 10, 8, 8, 5, 10, 8, 6, 6, and 7 seconds.

From the very start, it became apparent that, in general, the dogs and cats learned to operate the mechanisms so as to get out of these boxes in precisely the same way that the fishes and chickens learned their simpler performances. When a dog or cat was put into one of the boxes, it responded by such efforts to get out as its nature and previous education had provided,—such efforts as have just been described in the case of the kitten. If some one of its impulses happened to succeed, that impulse was confirmed, and was more likely to appear in the next trial. The right impulse and act thus, after enough trials, appeared as soon as the animal was put into the box. The selection of successful impulses and their association with the respective situations

which had called them forth, had turned random, general activity into a set of special habits.

Visitors to my laboratory who saw a kitten which was put into a number of boxes, one after another, and which would immediately pull the string or push the bar or depress the thumb-latch, as the case might require, were prone to ask how I had taught the animals so much, and to marvel at the mental powers they displayed. But I had done nothing save furnish situations suitable to call forth varied acts, and a reward in the shape of food for one of these. Nor had any mental power been required on the part of the animals save the mere presence of selection and association by resultant pleasure.

No dog or cat ever showed any signs of deliberate thinking or of any action on the basis of some conclusion formed from the data at hand. Even after they had had a great deal of experience with boxes and doors, they did not, when put into a new box, look it over, apply previous knowledge, and then act. Much less did they think it over. In all cases they seemed simply to feel certain impulses and to act on them. Their learning meant only a change in the number and relative intensity of these impulses,—the useful one superseding all the rest.

The answer to our first question has partly supplied us with an answer to the second in the case of the dogs and cats. In all the experiments with them, and in all their general behavior throughout the months they were under observation, for hours every day, there was not a single instance of conduct that needed general notions, abstract ideas, or inferences to explain it. Moreover, the experiments showed that acts which had been supposed to imply reasoning, did not. The argument in favor of reasoning in animals has always been that some of their acts are incapable of explanation by any lower type of learning. The following quotation from Romanes is a classical example:—

“Thus, for instance, while I have only heard of one solitary case * * * of a dog which, without tuition, divined the use of a thumb-latch so as to open a closed door by jumping on the handle and depressing the thumb-piece, I have received some half-dozen instances of this display of intelli-

gence on the part of cats. These instances are all such precise repetitions of one another that I conclude the fact to be one of tolerably ordinary occurrence among cats, while it is certainly very rare among dogs. I may add that my own coachman once had a cat which, certainly without tuition, learnt thus to open a door that led into the stables from a yard into which looked some of the windows of the house. Standing at these windows when the cat did not see me, I have many times witnessed her *modus operandi*. Walking up to the door with a most matter-of-course kind of air, she used to spring at the half-hoop handle, just below the thumb-latch. Holding on to the bottom of this half-hoop with one fore paw, she then raised the other to the thumb-piece, and while depressing the latter, finally, with her hind legs scratched and pushed the door-posts so as to open the door * * * *.

“Of course in all such cases the cats must have previously observed that the doors are opened by persons placing their hands upon the handles, and, having observed this, the animals act by what may be strictly termed rational imitation. But it should be observed that the process, as a whole, is something more than imitative. For not only would observation alone be scarcely enough (within any limits of thoughtful reflection that it would be reasonable to ascribe to an animal) to enable a cat upon the ground to distinguish that the essential part of the process consists, not in grasping the handle, but in depressing the latch; but the cat certainly never saw any one, after having depressed the latch, pushing the door-posts with his legs; and that this pushing action is due to an originally deliberate intention of opening the door, and not to having accidentally found this action to assist the process, is shown by one of the cases communicated to me; for in this case, my correspondent says, ‘the door was not a loose-fitting one, by any means, and I was surprised that by the force of one hind leg she should have been able to push it open after unlatching it.’ Hence we can only conclude that the cats in such cases have a very definite idea as to the mechanical properties of a door; they know that to make it open, even when unlatched, it requires to be *pushed*,—a very different thing from trying to imitate any particular action which they may see to be performed for the same purpose by man. The whole psychological process, therefore, implied by the fact of a cat opening a door in this way is really most complex. First, the animal must have observed that the door is opened by the hand grasping the handle and moving the latch. Next, she must reason, by ‘the logic of feelings’—‘If a hand can do it, why not a paw?’ Then strongly moved by this idea, she makes the first trial. The steps which follow have not been observed, so we cannot certainly say whether she learns by a succession of trials that depression of the thumb-piece constitutes the essential part of the process, or perhaps more probably, that her initial observations supplied her with the

idea of clicking the thumb-piece. But, however this may be, it is certain that the pushing with the hind feet after depressing the latch must be due to adaptive reasoning unassisted by observation; and only by the concerted action of all her limbs in the performance of a highly complex and most unnatural movement is her final purpose attained.”¹

The whole substance of Romanes' argument in this case vanishes if cats do hit upon such acts by accident in their general impulsive activity, and change accidental success into habitual performance by the process of selection I have emphasized. They do. My cats and dogs learned to get out of boxes by depressing a thumb-latch and simultaneously pushing the door, and one of them hit upon a more adroit and apparently rational method than the cat described by Romanes. It would put one paw between the top of the door and the edge of the box, and so support itself while it pushed down the thumb-piece with the other. The moment it pushed down the thumb-piece, its whole weight acted as a lever pushing against the door, with the short end of the lever (its paw) fastened to the box. So the door was immediately opened. Yet one who had followed the kitten's progress, step by step, from the trials in which twenty minutes of random activity were required before the successful combinations of movements appeared, to the time when the association was perfect and the kitten would invariably escape immediately, in three or four seconds, would have been certain that no ideas “of the mechanical properties of the door,” no “logic of feelings,” no “adaptive reasoning,” and no “rational imitation” were needed. What happens to Romanes' argument in this case happens to all similar arguments that have been tested by systematic experiment. The supposed evidence of reasoning in remarkable acts is not valid, for those acts can be and are learned by simpler mental processes.

It has been a common practice of disbelievers in the reason theory to resort to imitation as an explanation of animals' intelligent performances. This is to leave the frying pan for the fire. It is true that imitation is, in certain senses of the word,

(1) *Animal Intelligence*, pp. 420-422.

a function of the animal mind, but throughout numerous and varied experiments the dogs and cats utterly failed to learn, from observation of their fellows, acts which their own impulsive activities failed to teach them. Nor did they learn acts which they would eventually learn anyhow, any more quickly when they had had the chance to see other animals perform them, with profit, over and over again. My tests involved such simple matters as learning to pull down a string stretched across a box, to pull a loop of wire, to climb up a wire netting at a signal, to depress a thumb-latch, and to jump up on a box and beg. The animals would see one of their fellows go through one of these acts from twenty to a hundred times, and receive food each time, without the slightest influence on their own behavior.

So far I have purposely neglected to discuss the results of experiments with monkeys. These will be much more illuminating after we have gained a new point of view of animal intellect,—the point of view from which my later experiments with dogs and cats, and all the experiments with monkeys were made.

The quarrel over animal psychology has for over a century been about the possession by animals of general and abstract ideas. The distinguishing mark of the human mind had been universally assumed to be the power of thinking in terms of these, and acting in accordance with the fruits of such thinking. Even those most zealous in denying to the animals mental relationship with man have agreed that the higher animals had a large stock of ideas of concrete objects and acts, and learned by means of associations between such.

The systematic observations of animals, so far described, convinced me that in the common meaning of the word animals did not *think* at all, did not have any stock of ideas worthy of note, or form any considerable number of associations between them. Their consciousness seemed to consist in the main simply of vague sensations of their surroundings, sensory emotions, and obscure impulses; their learning seemed rarely to involve more than the association of these impulses with their sensations and emotions.

The ordinary conception of the progress of my kittens would have been that they had gained ideas of the appearance of the different boxes, of the food awaiting them outside, of the acts which had brought them success, and had associated the idea of one act with the idea of one box, etc., etc. The ordinary interpretation of a case where an animal, when put into a box, immediately pushed aside a certain bar and went out, would have been that the sight of the interior of the box called up the idea of the bar, and of having pushed the bar, and that, therefore, the animal was moved to act. The case would have been compared to that of the child who on hearing a certain bell thinks of dinner, calls out "Come to dinner," and runs to the house. The customary view thus compares animal intellect to human intellect, minus abstract and conceptual thinking, and sets as the problem of the evolution of human intellect the question, "How do perception, imagination, and memory give rise to conceptions, judgments, and reasoning?" The view to be defended here compares animal intellect to a much more limited sphere of human intellect and sets as the vital problem in mental evolution, "How do the vague sensations, emotions, and impulses give rise to ideas of any sort?"

Psychology has rather neglected one great field of human learning. The acquisition of skill in making the proper reactions to different stimuli in games, such as tennis or billiards, in making judgments without any conscious reliance upon ideas, in professions like that of the tea-taster or of the expert cook; the major part of what we call *practice*; the whole of the infant's acquisitions up to about nine months,—all the processes covered by these headings go on, to a large extent, independently of ideas. Change, improvement, result here not from deliberation or trains of thought or the growth of ideas, but from the selection of impulses and their association with vaguely felt situations. When, for instance, a boy learns to swim, he does not do so by virtue of any ideas about the water or his body or his movements or by any clear images of how he feels. He simply comes more and more, with repeated trials, to feel the impulses and to perform the acts which keep him afloat, and to neglect the rest. *To this field of*

human learning alone animal learning is strictly comparable. It is, indeed, identical with it in all essential features. Such would be my thesis if put in comparative form.

The hypothesis was verified in the case of the dogs and cats by several lines of evidence. If an animal has ideas of what it sees and does, it should, if it sees and feels itself do a certain thing in a certain situation, and gets food thereby, after enough repetitions, form the association between that situation and the idea of that act, and so do it of itself. If, for instance, you repeatedly put a kitten in a box, take its paw, and pull down a lever with it, so opening the door and letting the kitten out, the kitten should, if it had ideas of what went on, and learned by them, eventually pull down the lever of its own accord. But this, in numerous experiments with all sorts of acts, the dogs and cats universally failed to do. What is lacking is an impulse of their own, and apart from the selection of impulses they did not learn.

Again, suppose that you take one kitten, wait till it happens to go into a certain box, then let it out and feed it. It will, after ten or twenty trials, come to go into the box as soon as it can, for the act of going in has been followed by pleasure. Suppose you take another kitten and yourself put it into the box, then let it out and feed it as before. You may repeat this indefinitely, but the kitten will not be one whit more likely to go in than at first. Experiments of this type with cats and dogs gave uniform results. Now the second kitten had just as good a chance as the first to acquire the idea of being in the box and of associating this state with food. Ideas evidently played no part in the learning.

Further illuminating evidence comes from tests of animals' powers to discriminate, to learn to react differently to two situations to which at first they react alike. For instance, a kitten had learned, whenever I said, "I must feed those cats," to climb up a wire screen in front of its cage, and to wait there for food. It would climb up, however, at any short sentence uttered abruptly. I began to use two signals; I would sometimes say, "I must feed those cats," and at other times would

say, "I will not feed them." Ten seconds after the former signal, I would take a bit of fish to the top of the screen; after the latter signal I would not. The kitten learned in time to react to the former by climbing up, and to the latter by staying still. But its progress in learning showed that it did not learn by getting ideas of the two sounds and associating them, one with the idea and act of climbing up, the other with the idea and act of staying still. If that had been the case it would have changed suddenly from indiscriminate reactions to both signals to clear discrimination. That is, of course, what a human adult would have done. The cat did not. It gradually climbed up, in more and more cases, at the signal that meant food, and stayed down, in more and more cases, at the signal that meant no food. This failure to form ideas of the successful acts, and so to do them directly, is characteristic of the behavior of dogs and cats throughout, and is shown by the gradualness of their learning in all save the simplest performances.

Other lines of evidence we may pass by. It is clear that the mental life of the dogs and cats is homologous only to those aspects of human mentality concerned with learning in infancy, and with the acquisition of habits by a method of trial and success in later life. Here the homology is complete. We can trace back this form of human learning nearly as far as we can the back-bone, perhaps farther.

As we go up in the vertebrate scale from the fishes, of which our *fundulus* was an example, to the mammals represented by our kittens and dogs, we can see a clear evolution of the animal sort of learning. The higher vertebrates can learn more things, a greater variety of things; they can form more delicate and more complex associations; they can retain the associations thus formed longer. This evolution continues through the human species, and the animal method of learning reaches its acme in man. In our trades and games and accomplishments, in speech and song, we form more associations of the purely animal sort than do any of the animals, associations excelling theirs also in delicacy, com-

plexity, and permanence. In addition we possess a life of ideas which is barely hinted at in them.

If man's psychological position in nature is apart from that of the lower animals, in general, in consequence of his ability to have ideas of all sorts and to learn by them, it becomes important to examine his mental kinship to his nearest physical relatives, the monkeys, and to ask, in particular, how far the latter represent an advance from the condition found in dogs, cats, and other mammals toward that found in man. With this aim I undertook the experiments with monkeys already mentioned.

The monkeys were tested in all the ways so far described, and in others as well. Observations were made of their methods of learning to get into and out of boxes of various sorts. Mechanisms were devised which, when a nail was pulled out or a button pressed, etc., etc., threw a bit of food into the cage. An apparatus was used for exposing cards which served as signals to which the monkeys learned to respond by certain acts. Their general behavior in all sorts of ways was closely watched.

From what has been said, it will be clear that the monkeys might represent an advance along either or both of the following lines: (1) the presence, at least to some extent, of a stock of ideas influential in modifying conduct, or (2) the development of the animal method of learning by an increase in the number, delicacy, complexity, and permanence of the associations formed between situations and impulses to action.

There are in the behavior of the monkeys some signs of the first sort of advance, and one cannot feel the certainty in denying them an ideational life which he feels in the case of the dogs and cats. Yet they do not learn by seeing their fellows or human beings do things, nor from being put through the acts, thus failing to manifest two of the chief symptoms of a stock of ideas.

The second sort of advance, however, is shown by the monkeys' behavior in all sorts of ways. No. 1., for instance, learned readily to open doors held by bars, single and double, hooks, single and double, bolts, loops of wire hung over nails,

plugs, levers, etc. It was hard to put together by rough and ready carpentering a mechanism which his varied acts would not sooner or later hit upon. He learned readily the delicate discriminations involved in reacting differently to the letters T and K, to lines an inch and a half-inch long, etc. After trials with three different doors, one held by a hook, one by a bar, and one by a plug, he at once succeeded with a door held by a bar, a hook, and a plug. This triple act was one learned with some difficulty by dogs and cats. When tested after fifty to seventy days interval, in which he had no practice with the boxes, he opened them as well as ever. Moreover, the quickness and suddenness of the formation of habits by the monkeys, although they are not themselves uniform enough to furnish evidence of the existence of ideas, are beyond anything we observe in the case of dogs and cats. Whereas a kitten had over 350 trials with the signal, "I will not feed them," before it learned utterly to disregard it, the monkey just mentioned learned to disregard a diamond shaped surface of black (the other signal being a buff colored surface of identical shape) in less than a hundred trials. If, then, we think of the human mind as a storehouse of ideas, the monkeys must be set apart with the other mammals, but if we think of it as the most complex associative mechanism in the animal kingdom, the mind of the monkeys should be included with it in a common group.

Now the human mind is both. Consequently the extent to which one admits our mental kinship with the lower animals depends upon the degree of emphasis one lays on each of these two aspects. Throughout this article I have emphasized the ideational aspect of human life in order to secure a clear picture of the animal type of mentality. But to the question, "Which aspect is the more fundamental, the more important one in mental evolution?" I should certainly reply, "The increase in the human mind in the number, delicacy, and complexity of associations of the animal sort"; for from that difference we can, I believe, derive the other.

So, though for practical purposes and for common sense, man and the lower animals are mentally far apart, the deeper student may find the human mind to be as close a relative to their minds as is his body to their bodies. And it will seem nearest of all to the mind of the primates,—his nearest physical relatives.

CHRONICLE OF THE MONTH

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The ratification of a new treaty with Great Britain in regard to an isthmian canal is an event of the recent past which transcends all others in importance. It marks the opening of a new chapter in the commercial and diplomatic history of this country, and removes an element of discord that for half a century has chilled the friendly relations of two nations and at times menaced their peace. It opens the way for the construction of an inter-oceanic highway for the commerce of the world, thus carrying into effect an enterprise that has occupied the minds of men for three hundred and fifty years. Within half a century after the discovery of America, the possibility of uniting the Atlantic and the Pacific by piercing the Central American isthmus became a subject of eager controversy. Columbus was seeking a direct route to the Indies when he discovered America, and no sooner had Spain established her colonies on American soil than she again took up the quest. Her engineers, early in the sixteenth century, made surveys at different points on the isthmus, and formulated plans which were laid first before Charles V., and afterwards before Philip II. In 1550, Antonio Galveo, a Portuguese sea captain and navigator, published a monograph on the subject. In the following year, Lopez Gomara, a Spanish historian, appealed to Philip II. to undertake the work, and in doing so discussed the relative merits of three routes,—Nicaragua, Panama, and Tehuantepec. "To a King of Spain," he said,

"with the riches of the Indies at his doorway, where the end to be obtained is the commerce in its products, the barely possible becomes easy."

From that time down to the conclusion of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, in 1850, the project was under almost continuous discussion. That treaty instead of furthering the project proved to be an insuperable bar to it. During the fifty-one years of its existence, nothing was done toward the construction of a canal. It became, almost immediately after ratification, the subject of bitter attack in this country because of its violation of the Monroe Doctrine in allowing England and other European nations to share with us control of a canal, and because of England's alleged failure to comply with its conditions. From time to time, efforts were made to have the treaty denounced, or declared by us void because of England's failure to comply with its requirements, but the American Government refused steadily to take this view, holding that we were bound in honor to abide by the treaty till England should consent to its abrogation. That consent has been given, and is embodied in the new treaty, an achievement for which the American people and the whole civilized world are indebted to the wise statesmanship, trained diplomatic skill, and far-reaching sagacity of John Hay.

The main point in the new treaty is the complete withdrawal of Great Britain from partnership with the United States in the control of any canal that may be constructed. It will be built with American money, and it will be controlled by Americans, and its neutrality maintained by Americans. The United States will have power "to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder," but beyond that no express power is given to fortify it, while the language of the treaty seems to amount to a prohibition in that direction. "The canal," it reads, "shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing the rules prescribed for the preservation of its neutrality, and shall never be blocked, nor shall any right of war be exercised, nor any act of hostility be committed within it." This, taken in

connection with the fact that in ratifying the treaty the Senate rejected by a vote of sixty-two to fifteen an amendment giving power to fortify, seems conclusive against the contention that the United States will have that right. But whether it has it or not, is a matter of no consequence whatever. The best military and scientific authorities are agreed that it would be superfluous and useless. A stick of dynamite exploded at any point in the canal would make it impassible and fortifications would then be entirely to no purpose.

Will a canal be constructed now that the way is opened for one? There is very little doubt that one will be begun within the near future. The question of route must be settled first, and in regard to that we are in somewhat the same position that Philip's engineers were, three hundred and fifty years ago. The commission appointed by President McKinley reported in favor of the Nicaraguan route, but a powerful reason in bringing them to their decision was the conduct of the French owners of the Panama concessions and properties in demanding one hundred and nine million dollars as their price. The commission estimated that forty million dollars would be a fair price, and the French owners have now offered to sell at that figure. It is conceded that this changes the situation, since it removes the most serious obstacle to the choice of the Panama route. Opinion in Congress is divided on the subject, the House favoring the Nicaraguan route, and the Senate inclining toward Panama. Whether the disagreement will result in two bills and a deadlock, or two bills and a compromise, it is impossible to predict at this writing. But whether there is an agreement reached at this season or not, the delay in authorizing the construction of a canal at one point or the other can at most be only a year or two.

* * *

Much confusion has been created in the public mind as to the findings in the Naval Court of Inquiry in the case of Admiral Schley by misuse of the terms majority and minority reports.

As a matter of fact, there was neither a majority nor a minority report, but a unanimous verdict. There could be no other, since the naval regulations provide that the findings of such courts shall be given out as the unanimous opinion of the members. They also provide that no member shall reveal his individual opinion except by permission of the Secretary of the Navy. This provision was violated by Admiral Dewey when, after agreeing with his fellow members in the court's findings, he appended his individual opinion to the effect that Admiral Schley was entitled to the credit of winning the battle of Santiago. He also violated precedent in commenting upon a point which was not mentioned in the precept upon which the trial was conducted, and in relation to which he himself, as president of the court, had excluded all testimony. To call an expression of opinion of this nature a minority report is a perversion of the truth.

The findings of the court were unanimous and, on all points save that of personal courage in the battle of Santiago, they were adverse to Admiral Schley. He was pronounced guilty on all the chief specifications of the precept; failure of duty in command of the Flying Squadron; of conduct in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign, prior to the battle, which was "characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise;" of making official reports in regard to coal supply and coaling facilities of the Flying Squadron that were "inaccurate and misleading;" of "not doing his utmost with the force at his command to capture or destroy the Colon and other vessels of the enemy that he attacked on May 31;" of abandoning the blockade of the enemy's fleet in the face of orders to maintain it; of executing a manœuvre with the Brooklyn—the famous "loop"—at the opening of the battle of Santiago which checked the onslaught of the squadron, and caused the Brooklyn to "lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels," and "caused the Texas to stop and to back her engines to avoid possible collision;" and, finally, of "injustice to Lieut. Com. A. C. Hodgson in publishing only a portion of the correspondence that passed between them." When once his vessel was actually engaged in

the battle of July 3rd, the court found that "his conduct was self-possessed and he encouraged, in his own person, his subordinate officers and men to fight courageously."

It is not surprising that Admiral Schley is dissatisfied with this verdict, though it was given by a court that he had accepted as satisfactory, and before which he appeared in person and was represented by counsel. In approving the findings of the court, the Secretary of the Navy spoke of Admiral Dewey's opinion as an "individual memorandum," and said that the court could not with propriety have concurred in that opinion, since it had excluded evidence on the points involved, and had concurred in the recommendation of the court that "no further proceedings be had in the premises." So far as the Navy Department is concerned the case is closed permanently. Admiral Schley has appealed to the President from the decision of the court and its approval of the Navy Department, and in so doing has violated naval regulations which prescribe that no communication of the kind shall be made except through regular naval channels, this being a matter purely within naval jurisdiction. What action the President will take upon this appeal is not known at this writing, but if he consents to take any at all, it is an entirely safe prediction that it will be in the direction of the action taken by Secretary Long, that is, against further agitation by Admiral Schley. It is no secret that the President thinks the good of the naval service requires that this wearisome scandal be put to rest as speedily as possible.

* * *

The most interesting experiment in municipal government ever attempted in a great city in this country is now under way in the city of New York. Mayor Low, who is in charge of it, said several years ago, in writing upon the question of misrule in American cities, that their charters had been framed as though cities were little States, adding, "Americans are now learning, after many years of bitter experience, that they are not so much little States as large corporations." When he was elected Mayor of New York, Mr. Low began at once the organization of his

government in precisely the way in which the president of a great corporation would have organized its business. He put political considerations entirely aside, or so far into the background that they played an unimportant part in his task of selecting his subordinates. He sought for every post of importance, especially for heads of the great departments of the city service, men with the highest expert qualifications. His success in inducing expert talent to come to his aid was a complete refutation of the excuse so often made for bad appointments to office, namely, that exceptionally fit men cannot be induced to enter political life. For corporation counsel, the legal adviser of the city, he secured the man who by common consent was the most thoroughly equipped person in the community for the place, since as president of a commission that Governor Roosevelt had appointed to revise the city charter, he was familiar with all its provisions and was the highest existing authority on their intent and purpose. In like manner, he selected his department heads for police, fire, tenements, health, charities, docks, parks, streets, and other branches. In no instance did he fail to obtain a man who was not, in greater or less degree, a recognized expert in his particular field, or who had not had special training for the work over which he was to preside.

This trained body, twenty or more in all, will constitute Mayor Low's cabinet. Under the city charter, he has absolute power to remove any one of them at pleasure. They are virtually supreme within their several departments, but he is responsible for the good conduct of all of them. He will sit, in fact, like the president of a corporation, at the head of a board of directors, all of whom owe their positions to him and all of whom depend upon his will for their continuation in office. This is centralized government under a single head, responsible only to the people. In politics the members of this cabinet are divided about equally between the two great parties, but there are few pronounced partisans among them, and not one of them is in office primarily because of his political affiliations. Furthermore, a large number of them have been conspicuous for many years, as has Mayor

Low himself, in various forms of philanthropic and charitable work. All the departments that have charge of matters affecting the lives of the poor and helpless,—tenement house construction and laws, charities and correction,—are in the hands of men who have been for several years at the head of organized charities, and have been the recognized leaders in such work. They come to the task of city government, therefore, not only with full knowledge of the needs of the masses of the people, but with trained experience in dealing with them and with keen but wise sympathy in ministering to their welfare and the amelioration of their condition. In fact, it is not too much to say that jealous care for those portions of the population that are least able to care for themselves, will be a dominating influence in Mayor Low's administration. Of what other municipal administration in any great American city, past or present, can this be said? Brutal indifference to the welfare of the poor, moral, intellectual, and physical, has distinguished every Tammany administration that the city has had, and especially that which immediately preceded Mr. Low's.

In more senses than one Mayor Low intends to be the representative and agent of the whole people in his administration. He has, from the outset, adopted a policy of "Publicity," that is, of taking the people into his full confidence, laying before them all matters which concern their best interests, and asking their coöperation. When rumors reached his ears of attempts to obtain Tammany control of the new Board of Aldermen by means of bribery, he published the facts to the world and defeated the plot. His first message to the Board of Aldermen was unique in the history of the city. It filled less than a column of the newspapers and was confined to a single subject,—that of official blackmail. It stated clearly, and without either exaggeration or mitigation, what everybody knew to be true, that official blackmail under Tammany government had been well-nigh universal throughout the city service, and asked for the aid of the people in exposing all attempts to continue it, promising to use the whole force of his administration "continuously, aggressively, and in every possible

way to prevent and to punish this form of iniquity." His policy of "Publicity" in this field of reform will be of great use, for all offenders know that he will lay before the people the exact facts in every instance that comes within his knowledge.

Surely, government of this sort, under the direction of such a man, and with the aid of such assistants, is a unique experiment in this country. Politics has been defined as "the art of governing men by deceiving them," and the art has been practiced in the highest perfection in our large cities. Mayor Low has reversed the process completely. He has surrounded himself with expert ability, rather than with political ability, and instead of seeking by all methods to deceive the people, he is determined to take them into his confidence, and to conduct the affairs of the city entirely in the open, with no other object than the welfare of the community over which he has been placed as ruler. It is incredible that such an experiment as this should fail, that at the end of two years the people of New York should revert to Tammany rule. The eyes of the whole country are on the city of New York, and if rule of Mayor Low's kind, that is, government by the best intelligence and the morality of the people, becomes permanent there, the moral effect upon municipal government throughout the United States will be incalculable, for other cities will gird up their loins and join New York in ridding this country of the charge that popular government among us is a failure, because of the scandalous misrule of American cities.

THE MILITARY RULE OF OBEDIENCE

CAPT. ALFRED T. MAHAN, *U. S. N.*

The Military Duty of Obedience may be regarded either as a rule or as a principle; for it is both. The rule derives from the principle. It is the principle defined in precise and mandatory terms, as a law is the expression of the general will of the community, formulated by the legislature for the governance and control of individuals. The difficulty of such formulation, however, as that of definition generally, is well known, and has found proverbial recognition in phrases indicating that statutes, even when framed with great care by experienced hands, are very liable to offer loopholes through which the observance of them may be escaped. It is no less difficult to define the military rule of obedience, without, on the one hand, constituting fetters which would neutralize intelligence and palsy individuality in a sphere, and at instants, where both are preëminently needed, or, on the other hand, permitting a license which in practice would degenerate into anarchy. It is not a sufficient solution to so knotty and dangerous a question to damn obedience to orders, as a rugged veteran will occasionally be heard to suggest; while, on the other extreme, the saying of that eminent disciplinarian, Lord St. Vincent, "The whole of discipline is contained in the word 'Obedience,'" though safer in practice, is perhaps too absolute in its assertion.

The matter at stake is too intricate for such Gordian solutions. It is also too important, at once to the individual officer and to

the nation, the conduct of whose armed forces may at critical moments depend upon a correct understanding? In many instances, perhaps in the large majority, the propriety of literal obedience is plainly evident; in a few the inexpedience, folly, or impossibility of such compliance is for obvious reasons equally clear; but there remain, nevertheless, a number of cases, not merely possible, but copiously exemplified by history, which present serious difficulty. In these an officer finds himself confronted with conditions that make a large demand upon his moral courage as well as upon his judgment. His judgment then can be safely guided, and his resolution supported, only by a mastery of principles. No mere rule will here suffice. Military obedience when in subordinate post, and military initiative when in independent command, untrammelled by orders and free to follow the guidance of one's own judgment, are both governed by principles, the appreciation of which is the only sure light to one's footsteps. To them recurrence must be had in doubtful positions, where precise precedent and formal definition are wanting; in short when rules, however good in general use, fail to apply. It does not hence follow that rules, terse and positive embodiments of principles, such as that of obedience, are mostly useless because essentially narrow and unelastic. That all rules have exceptions is proverbial; and military rules are probably more liable to exceptions than most others, because of the emergency that characterizes war and the vast variety of situations to which a rule has to be adapted. No one proposes on these accounts to discard rules utterly. It is evident, however, that an officer who undertakes to violate the fundamental rule of obedience, upon the strict observance of which depends in general the success of combined operations, and who substitutes his own initiative for the directions of his superior, assumes a risk which urgently imposes a comprehension of the principles upon which rest respectively both the rule of obedience and the rules of war.

It may be asserted, as perhaps the most tenable general definition of the principle upon which the rule of obedience rests, that the spirit of obedience, as distinguished from its letter, consists in

faithfully forwarding the general object to which the officer's particular command is contributing. This finds expression in the well-known directive maxim, "March to the sound of the guns." In doubtful cases, however,—and by doubtful I mean cases where action other than that prescribed in the orders seems expedient,—liberty of judgment is conditioned by the officer's acquaintance with the plans of his superior. If his knowledge is imperfect, or altogether lacking, the doing that which at the moment seems wise to himself may be to defeat a much more important object, or to dissolve the bonds of a combined movement to which his coöperation is essential. If, under such circumstances of ignorance, relying only upon his own sagacity or surmises, he errs either in his reading of his commander's general purpose, or in his decision as to his own action, and through such error disobeys, he cannot complain if he receive censure or punishment. He has violated a recognized rule, without adequate reason. The rectitude of his intentions may clear him of moral blame, though not necessarily even this; for the duty of obedience is not merely military, but moral. It is not an arbitrary rule, but one essential and fundamental; the expression of a principle without which military organization would go to pieces, and military success be impossible. Consequently, even where the individual purpose may be demonstrably honest, not wilful, blame adheres and punishment may follow, according to the measure of the delinquency, though that be due to nothing worse than personal incompetency. Does this seem hard measure? It may be replied, In what pursuit is this not so? What is the profession, whether that of physician, lawyer, or Wall Street, in which a transgression of instructions by an inferior, or a departure from recognized methods, when not justified by the conditions, escapes punishment, either at the hand of events or of his employer? Is "I thought so," or "I did my best," accepted there as an excuse for disobedience?

In the question of military obedience there is involved, therefore, both a rule and a principle. In dealing with the matter, I shall have to consider both, but I have advisedly chosen the

Rule for the heading of this article; for, as I have said before, the rule has the force of a law,—a law positive in existing enactment, and a law traditional in the settled practice of the military professions, as well as in numerous precedents established by competent authorities. To go behind a law to the principle underlying it, to recognize a higher law than the law explicit, is a very delicate matter for a man in any position; and it is therefore the rule of obedience, rather than the general principle upon which it rests, that most closely touches an officer in military responsibility. Under what conditions is it permissible to disregard orders, or, even more positively, to act contrary to them? What is the real test of propriety which differentiates one act of disobedience from another of the same apparent character? Is one's own sense of right, one's own good intention, the justifying factor? What judge, however, in such a case is competent to penetrate through the faulty act, if such it be, to the hidden good purpose of the heart? What claim have military men to exemption from the general rule of law, that intention, which cannot be seen, must be inferred from attendant circumstances, which can be seen? If conduct, upon an impartial review of the conditions at the moment of action, is shown to be palpably wrong, by what right can alleged intention, "error of judgment," as it is styled, be invoked to justify an offender? Is there no such thing as malpractice,—professionally guilty, though possibly morally innocent? Is professional incompetence, translated into action and injurious to others, never worse than an error of judgment? Mistakes, doubtless, all men are liable to; the fact is proverbial; but the justification of a decision proved by the event to be mistaken rests not upon the intention of the person making it, but upon a judicial review of the circumstances surrounding the decision, which shall prove that, under the conditions known at the moment, it was correct, or at least the most favored by probabilities. If this be true, as I hold it is, in the case even of a man in independent command, much more is the responsibility weighty when action, intrinsically faulty, is taken in disobedience of orders.

The mere enunciation of the queries in the last paragraph will suggest to most that we have here before us no simple question of yea and nay. In fact, no clear cut absolute reply, no *vade mecum* for pocket use, can be furnished defining just when and how, in all cases, a man is justified in disobedience, nor even when he is justified by blind obedience; although the balance of professional judgment must always incline in favor of the latter alternative. When a doubt arises, as it frequently does, between strict compliance with an order and the disregard of it, in whole or in part, the officer is called upon to decide a question of professional conduct. Personal judgment necessarily enters as a factor, but only one of many; and, to be trusted, it needs to be judgment illuminated by professional knowledge and fortified by reflection. Short of that, it is not a safe counsellor, and has no claim to consideration if cited before a court of final appeal. The officer at the moment should consider himself, as he in fact is, a judge deciding upon a case liable to be called up to a superior court, before which his conclusion has no claim to respect because it is his personal opinion, but only in so far as it is supported by the evidence before him. There is, of course, the necessary reservation that the final judgment upon himself, for his professional conduct as involved in his decision, will be rendered upon the facts accessible to him, and not upon those not then to be known, though afterwards apparent.

Unless qualified by these grave considerations, the phrase "error of judgment," so facilely used, is misleading to the popular understanding. Not only so; it is pregnant with serious consequences to the issues of war, and to individuals influenced by it. It is necessary to realize that some errors of judgment are inexcusable because inconsistent with recognized standards; and that disobedience of orders is on its face a fault, a disregard of a settled standard, of an established rule, of such general application that upon the person who commits it rests the burden of proving that the circumstances commanded his action. The presumption, in the case of disobedience, is not innocence, but guilt. Mere rule though it be, in its narrow construction and rigid framework,

the rule of implicit and entire obedience rests upon reasons so sound that its infringement in action can rarely be condoned, when not thoroughly approved. Nothing can be more disastrous than to trifle with the corner stone upon which rests the structure of coherent, unified action. The admission into the military mind of anything approaching irreverence for the spirit of military obedience, or levity as regards the letter of the rule in which it is embodied, is the begetter of confusion; and that in turn is the forerunner of defeat. To sit loose to this obligation weakens the sense of responsibility, upon the due realization of which rests not merely literal obedience, but intelligent and deserving disobedience, in the occasional circumstances which call for that. The recognition of responsibility by the individual, the consciousness that serious regard to it is governing his determinations, is the best moral equipment that a man can have to enable him to sustain the burden of violating instructions, deliberately undertaken upon his own judgment. It is the *mens conscia recti* in a serious problem of action.

The mental equipment is another matter, but it, as well as the moral, is necessary to full professional competency on such occasions. Upon the hypothesis now before us, the rule, absolute in general, seems not to apply. To meet the difficulty with sound discretion, on which to base the defence of his action whatever its issue may prove, the officer will need an adequate realization of all the conditions before him, and a power of appreciating the military situation, as thus constituted. This power depends in part upon native aptitude; but it requires also a knowledge of the practice of war, a broad and ripened acquaintance with the principles and precedents controlling the conduct of military operations, which is by no means so widely diffused as may perhaps be thought. Without this, disobedience is a hazardous undertaking; but when so equipped, an officer may with considerable confidence permit himself to depart from the letter of his instructions, in order to fulfil their spirit. Confidence, I say deliberately; for in the majority of such instances he will receive intelligent and generous consideration.

In such instances it is not just that the propriety of the act should be judged by the event; and it is not true that it will be, as a cheap sneer would have it. Success undoubtedly often covers mistakes; for human nature is on the whole generous, or at least good-tempered. It is willing to forgive faults which it can afford to forget; but failure does not with any equal certainty entail condemnation, for again mankind is generous, and nowhere more so than in dealing with military men. Even though mishap ensue, where an officer can show preponderant military reasons for departure from orders, he can anticipate from his superiors intelligent comprehension and acquittal, which the public will confirm on their finding; but, while this is so, let none be rash enough to anticipate immunity on the score of error of judgment, when it can be demonstrated that with the data before him a man who knew his business would have decided otherwise.

Actions that fly in the face of ascertainable fact, or of well-settled military principles, are not to be excused as merely errors of judgment. They are something more and worse. A man is just as much responsible for an error of judgment which results from his own neglect to inform himself, or his lack of professional knowledge, as he is for any other misdoing. What is amiss here is not judgment, but conduct. Such errors when they take shape in action, whether of commission or of omission, are misconduct. They have a standing as acts, external to and independent of the persons committing them; just as murder has a standing as a crime quite independent of its association with the individual criminal. As killing is not always murder, but depends for its character upon the attendant circumstances, so a particular unfortunate military movement is not always misconduct. Circumstances may be proved to justify it. In neither case, however, is it the judgment of the person concerned that determines conduct to have been good or bad. It is the circumstances, passed upon by judges other than himself, and referred to recognized standards. Personal defects may be considered in extenuation, or they may not; their title to indulgence is small

where they are due to personal fault or neglect, present or in the past, or to professional incompetency.

If so much as is here claimed be allowed to the military Duty of Obedience, it is desirable to pass in review the considerations from which such weighty obligations are supposed to derive. Tradition and acceptance, in most men irreflective, have built up an imposing fabric of power, cemented by the habit of rigid, and in the last resort of even blind, submission to superior authority, which in exhibition and exercise is directly and immediately personal, though legal in derivation. It will be useful to test the foundations upon which this structure rests, and the necessity, in order to maintain it, of a moral code so foreign to the customary personal independence of the general citizen. Or, if a more vital simile be desired, for an organization so instinct with life and regulated movement as is a well-constituted military body, let us seek the root, the energizing power of which has evolved, developed, and continues to quicken military efficiency in all its ramifications; whether in administrative methods, or in the principles governing the conduct of war in open campaign. What we here possess, we have through tradition. Can it give an account of itself?

The value of tradition to the social body is immense. The veneration for practices or for authority consecrated by long acceptance has a reserve of strength which cannot be speedily obtained by any novel device. Respect for the old customs is planted deep in the hearts, as well as in the intelligence, of all inheritors of English-speaking polity. From the very reason of this profound influence over men, traditions need from time to time to be brought to the touchstone by reference to the principle, in order that we may know whether they are still accordant with the ideas in which their origin is found; or whether, the ideas themselves being already outgrown, the tradition no longer represents a living present, but only a dead past. Is the duty of military obedience in either of these plights? Does the tradition set forth by the rule still embody the essential spirit of the principle once involved? Is the principle itself still alive and applicable as of old?

The question is far from needless, for the contest between the letter and the spirit is constant here, as in many spheres of action. I am inclined to believe that on shore, among soldiers, the letter has tended to have the upper hand, and with seamen the spirit; due probably to the more frequent removal of the latter from the presence of an immediate superior, throwing them thus upon their own initiative. Naval biography and history, and military history as far as my limited reading goes, seem to support this opinion. No man wrestled with the question more vigorously than Nelson; none found greater exasperation than he did in the too often successful opposition of the letter to the demands for coöperation, addressed by his impetuous spirit to men over whom he had not immediate control; none was more generous in his attitude to subordinates who overrode, or overpassed, his own orders, provided he saw in their acts the intelligent and honest will to forward his purposes. Obedience he certainly required, but he recognized that, given a capable and zealous man, better work would usually be had by permitting a certain elasticity of initiative, provided it was accompanied by accurate knowledge of his general wishes. These he was always most careful to impart; in nothing was he more precise or particular. If he allowed large liberty in the letter, he expected close observance of, nay, rather, participation in, the spirit of his ideas. He was not tolerant of incapacity, nor would he for a moment bear wilful disregard of his plans. When considerations of high policy entertained by himself were crossed by Sidney Smith, his language became peremptory. "*As this is in strict opposition to my opinion, which is, never to suffer any one individual Frenchman to quit Egypt, I strictly charge and command you never to give any French ship or man leave to quit Egypt.*" The italics are his own; and he adds again, as though distrustful still, "You are to put my orders in force, not on any pretence to permit a single Frenchman to leave Egypt." The severity of tone sufficiently proves his disposition to enforce the strictest rule, where necessary to control individuals; but a more liberal reliance upon principle, in preference to rule, was his habit. None, it may be

added, illustrated more copiously than he, when a junior, the obedience of the spirit and the disobedience of the letter. His practice was in this consistent in all stages of his career. Unfortunately, the example may tempt smaller men to follow where their heads are not steady enough to keep their feet.

Of course, thinking and feeling thus, he gave frequent expression to his views, and these, coming from a man of his military genius, are often very illuminative. There is one such that is singularly applicable to our present purpose of searching for the underlying principle which governs the duty and observance of obedience, and determines its absolute necessity to all military action. "I find few think as I do, but to obey orders is all perfection. What would my superiors direct, did they know what is passing under my nose? To serve my King and to destroy the French I consider as the great order of all, from which little ones spring, and if one of these little ones militate against it, I go back to obey the great order."

Carefully analyzed, there is much that is instructive in these words. First of all, it will be observed that the obedience commended is that of the spirit, compliant with general, known views. Again, justification of local disobedience also rests upon this compliance with the spirit, applied to the attendant circumstances. This tacitly admits, of course, that the circumstances must be adequate in order to justify disobedience. It is, however, deeply significant and monitory that the particular sentences quoted were elicited by censure from the Admiralty for disobedience, in the only instance, among many similar liberties of action, in which Nelson failed to establish that circumstances did warrant, or rather did require, him to traverse his instructions. Even he, in the very height of his glory, with reputation, capacity, and zeal, all established beyond question, could not trifle with literal obedience, on the strength of his own judgment, where upon a calm review of all the facts the circumstances failed to justify him. He himself, in the exasperation of self-vindication, fell into the facile perversion of thought concerning error of judgment. "I am so confident

of *the uprightness of my intention*, that, with all respect, I submit myself to the judgment of my superiors." "Although a military tribunal may think me criminal, the world will approve my conduct."

What Nelson here meant by "the world" may be doubtful; but it is impossible that the verdict of history today will not affirm the propriety of the Admiralty's rebuke a century ago. The facts, briefly stated, were these. The Commander-in-Chief of the whole Mediterranean had sent orders to Nelson, his subordinate, to detach a certain part of his force from Naples to Minorca, which he considered endangered. Nelson, anticipating the case, had argued, to quote his own words, "Should such an order come, it would be a cause for some consideration whether Minorca is to be risked, or the two kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. I rather think my decision would be to risk the former"; and he deliberately disobeyed, resting on this opinion of his own. His error, however induced, is clear enough. The commander-in-chief was charged with the safety of the whole field,—Naples as well as Minorca, with many other cares needless to specify. It was his business, and his responsibility, to coördinate all in a general plan of offence and defence; in order to carry out which he had need to count upon the certain movement of all parts of his command in immediate obedience to his directions. Refusal in any one part might throw all out of gear. Nelson's particular district was, simply and broadly, Naples and the Eastern Mediterranean. Within these limits he had full discretion, subject to the general orders of his superior, and his information as to his policy; but when he undertook to act upon his own estimate of the relative value of Minorca and Naples, he went outside the trust and the powers committed to him, and invaded the province which belonged to the commander-in-chief alone. His erroneous judgment, or as he styles it, "the uprightness of his intentions," being translated into overt act, became misconduct, and as such was censured by the Admiralty. "Their Lordships do not see sufficient reason to justify your having disobeyed the orders you had received from your commanding officer, or having left

Minorca exposed to the risk of being attacked without having any naval force to protect it."

It is perhaps expedient to observe, as tending to confirm a general truth which cannot be too seriously insisted upon, that this unwarrantable action was something more than a breach of necessary discipline, by a man of too assured position and importance to be summarily treated, and who, therefore, should have been doubly careful of the strict propriety of his course. It was also most unfair to the commander-in-chief, in its possible consequences. In case of mishap, the public, less clear-sighted ordinarily than the administration, because more easily moved by appearances, would have sought the first victim of its displeasure in the superior, who had not the same support of past brilliant achievement to fall back upon that Nelson had. Nor can it, I think, upon a more detailed examination of the circumstances than is here expedient, be doubted that very serious national disaster was possible, though actually no harm resulted from this breach of discipline.

A previous instance of disobedience on the part of a junior admiral, less than three years before, met with very different measure. Lord St. Vincent, then Sir John Jervis, commanded the British fleet in the Mediterranean in 1796. Scarcity of provisions compelled him to order one of his lieutenants, Rear Admiral Mann, to take a half dozen ships of the line to Gibraltar, there to fill up, and to rejoin him in Corsica as soon as possible. On his way down, about October 1, Mann met and was chased by a Spanish fleet of nineteen sail, on their way to Toulon to join the French Navy there; Spain having very lately declared war. He escaped, and reached Gibraltar, but on arrival there called a council of war, and upon its advice determined not to carry out his orders to rejoin Jervis. Instead, dominated by the fear of possible consequences, which governed his judgment, he took his division to England. An error of judgment? Yes, according to the common phrase, which the present writer accepted from unchallenged tradition, until forced by reflection to recognize that "error of judgment" was being invoked

to cover many acts very different in their military character.

Mark the results. Because the junction of the Spanish navy to the French gravely imperiled Jervis with fifteen ships in Corsica, Mann judged it expedient to leave him in the lurch, instead of obeying his orders and taking back the seven he had with him. Jervis, in perplexed uncertainty, hung on to the last moment, diminishing the rations of his men to one-third of the daily allowance, doubting and wondering, unwilling to depart lest he should expose Mann's seven, as Mann was exposing his fifteen. He was, besides, confident that if the junction was effected in Corsica, twenty-two ships, such as he would then have, would make "their way" through the outnumbering Spaniards "in every direction"; that is, "would cut them to pieces." So much for the opportunity lost, as Jervis judged it; in which agreed the opinion of Nelson, who was with him. We have also the sober-measured judgment of Collingwood on the same occasion. "We waited with the utmost impatience for Admiral Mann, whose junction at one time seemed absolutely necessary to our safety." As for Mann, the Admiralty showed their appreciation of his judgment by steps which proved that they considered his conduct at fault. A cutting rebuke was administered. "Their Lordships feel the greatest regret that you should have been induced to return to England with the squadron under your orders, under the circumstances in which you were placed." "The circumstances" which governed his judgment did not justify his conduct. He was deprived at once of his command, and appears never to have been employed afloat again.

Occurring in such high quarters, and being on so large a scale, these instances show more forcibly than usual what the necessity is, what the root, whence spring the principle, the rule, and the duty—all three—of military obedience. Where many wills have to act to one end, unity of effort, effective coöperation, needs not only to exist, but to be guaranteed by the strongest possible sanctions. The many wills need to become one will; the many persons, in many quarters, simply the representatives, in the best sense, of the one person, in whom the united action

of the whole finds source and energy. Lord St. Vincent's maxim, "The whole of discipline is contained in the one word 'Obedience'," may be correctly paraphrased, "The whole of military action is contained in the one word 'Unity.'" Obedience and unity are only different manifestations of the same principle. The one is the principle in will, the other in act. The one characterizes the conduct of persons, the other the conduct of operations. Obedience insures that the members of the military body, often far apart, will obey the one commander with the accuracy and vigor with which the muscles of an athlete obey his will.

In the conduct of war, what is concentration, the necessity of which is universally granted, but essential unity? When, for purposes of the war, concentration yields momentarily to expansion, then all the movements and dispositions of the forces must be governed by reference to easy concentration, to unity of action. The moment this consideration is violated, unity is sacrificed, and conduct has become misconduct; nor does it matter, in justification of a plain violation of principle, that the misconduct is due to an error of judgment. If circumstances knowable at the time justify, judgment has not been at fault; if they do not, the man should have known better. This necessity of keeping unity in view is expressed by one of Napoleon's pithy phrases, "The art of war consists in proper distributions to disseminate in order to exist, and to concentrate in order to fight." Again he says, "War is a business of positions;" and he illustrates the maxim by an example of positions of dissemination, so taken that the scattered bodies can with certainty and in the briefest period unite at a common centre, in case of a threatened attack, or for an intended movement of offence.

There is much in all this, of course, that finds close analogies in civil life, and no doubt much light might be thrown on the rule of military obedience by a comparative examination of other callings. But the peculiarity of war, for which alone the military professions exist, to meet or to avert it, is that men are in the constant presence of power actively and malevolently intent upon

injuring them, by any means of surprise or superiority of force that can be contrived. Therefore the need to have every movement in hand, and upon occasion to exert all the means at one's command to counteract the enemy, to overthrow his designs, to crush him, to do so with the utmost speed and certainty, weighs heavier in war than in more tranquil pursuits. War is face to face continually, not with misfortune only, but with catastrophe, and that not of gradual approach or partial, but sudden and irremediable.

For these weighty reasons, all available resources to forestall such result, and to destroy the enemy upon whom it depends, need to be utilized and put forth in the most effective and in the promptest manner. This means that exertions in all parts must be instant upon the word of command, and in unison; united in movement and united in weight. Velocity and weight are the factors of momentum in armed collision as in any other, and both the rapidity and the force of an intended blow depend upon unity of impulse and simultaneous impact, in bodies of men as well as in projectiles. What else is the conceded value of movement in mass than concentrated movement, the weight of several bodies effectively joined into one? To frame the plan, to initiate and control the movement, to give to it direction, combination, and impulse, to sustain its energy, is the duty of one man, upon whom in the last analysis depends the unity of thought and act which inspires and vivifies the whole; but the transmission of the impulse and energy throughout the mass, so that the oneness of the head is realized in the unity of the whole, is insured by the military rule of obedience, and by that only. Obedience is the cement of the structure; or, more worthily understood in the spirit, apart from which a word is but dead, it is the lifeblood of the organism. In short, the rule of obedience is simply the expression of that one among the military virtues upon which all the others depend, in order that the exertion of their powers may not breed confusion, which is the precursor of disaster, but may accomplish decisive results, approaching perfection in proportion as coöperation has been exact.

GIOSUÈ CARDUCCI

RICHARD GARNETT, *London.*

All are familiar with Horace's regret for the heroes who flourished before Agamemnon, and were no less than he worthy of renown, but who, for want of a Homer, might as well, so far as posterity is concerned, never have existed at all :—

In vain they fought, in vain they bled,
They had no poet, and are dead.

The maxim admits of extension to nations. A period of genuine glory, of liberty received or vindicated, of the awakening of national self-consciousness, or of the accomplishment of national regeneration, is likely to produce a deep impression on the literature of the nation, and especially upon its poetry. If this does not happen, it may be suspected that the movement, however picturesque in appearance, has in reality been sterile, and may not leave a deep mark on the history of the world.

The term "poet," however, must not be interpreted too narrowly, for the methods by which the spirit of poetry finds utterance are various, and sometimes a genuine poetical gift is diverted into other channels by the imperfection of the means of expression. The German language at the period of the Reformation was too unpolished for poetry, though not for rhyme. Yet Luther was a poet, and the epic of his day is written in his innumerable pamphlets. While the English language was struggling to obtain freedom and beauty of expression, the chron-

clers stepped in, and gave in prose what afterwards, in Shakespeare's hands, became the true national epic. For some reason, which it would be interesting to investigate, colonial communities seem incapable of producing poetical literature of much account for some generations after the original settlement. The epic of United States independence, therefore, is to be sought not among the verse writers of the day, but among the orators. If, however, the language is sufficiently cultivated for verse, and the body of the people sufficiently refined to be sensitive to its charm, the nation at certain stages of its development is likely to become its own poet, as in the case of the Spanish ballad-poetry celebrating the expulsion of the Moors. Most modern nations have passed this epoch of development, and progressed, or retrograded, from the period of Homer to the period of Virgil, when "the silent gondolier rows songless," and a single man, the elected representative of his nation, resumes for the time in his own person its pride, its sorrows, and its aspirations. Such was the mission imposed upon Giosuè Carducci, the leading figure among the Italian poets of our own day. There was, indeed, no want of patriotic feeling, corresponding to the deepest emotions of the people, among the poets who immediately preceded him, but such compositions as the satires of Giusti and the great chorus in Manzoni's "Adelchi" express the feelings of an oppressed people, while Carducci is the laureate of a liberated, and, as he would fain hope, a regenerated Italy. His utterances consequently wear a character of dignity and grandeur which cannot, in the nature of things, belong to the poetry of complaint. Were all the other promises attending Italy's deliverance to be blighted, Carducci's songs would remain an imperishable proof of its capacity to inspire a poet.

The figure of Giosuè Carducci is, in every point of view, sympathetic to a degree by no means invariably the case with great writers. It is that of a genial man as well as a man of genius, a man of the people, plain and unaffected, simple, hearty, and sturdy. The circumstances of his birth and bringing-up were fortunate; he had, on the one hand, no aristocratic connections to enfeeble

his popular sympathies, nor, on the other, did he belong to the inferior social strata where a class is so easily mistaken for a nation. Born at Valdicastello in Tuscany on July 27, 1836, he received from his father, a physician, sufficient education to make him a fair Latin and Italian scholar, the indispensable equipment for an Italian poet. Of Greek, which would have been valuable, we do not at this time hear anything; but his subsequent writings evince an extensive acquaintance with the chief foreign literatures of modern Europe, acquired in later years. French was the first conquest, and the student conceived an immense admiration for Victor Hugo and Lamartine. This was highly important, for in dealing with Carducci we must not forget that he is not merely the patriotic exponent of Italy's aspirations, but also the head of the neo-classic school, which aimed at curbing the fatal fluency of her versifiers, and, by stricter form and weightier matter, infusing a robuster and more masculine element into her languid literature. Of this tendency Victor Hugo and Lamartine had given the example, and though still better guides might have been found in English and German, the time had not yet come for Carducci to read, as he has since read, Shelley and Marlowe in the original, and to translate the ballads of Heine.

Every literature, like every individual, must have the defects of its qualities. The chief poetical quality of the Southern languages is their adaptation to poetical purposes by their softness, flexibility, and harmony; their chief defect is the fatal fluency thus engendered. It is not easy for an English poet to pour forth a continuous torrent of beautiful verse without conveying anything in particular; if we may employ, like Topsy, "an or'nary sort o' 'parison," meaning is the penny in the slot, without which the machine remains motionless. Nothing, on the other hand, is easier for the Italian poet than to indite sonorous platitudes, with a wealth of melodious diction which conceals even from himself that he has, after all, left his theme as he found it. The wheels revolve furiously, but the chariot never stirs. In the days of Bembo and the Petrarchists, this inanity had in some measure been compensated by a consummate perfection of form, but in later ages

form and substance were alike lacking. Memorable exceptions, indeed, might be found. Manzoni's lyrics leave little to desire, but Manzoni, in his lyrical aspects an Italian Campbell, wrote little; and Foscolo, like Bryant, seemed to have exhausted himself in a single noble poem. The one man who really wrote both much and well was, unfortunately, in his own person the most flagrant example of fatal fluency, though his form was generally perfect. Hardly any poet of genius has so nearly approached the character of an improvisatore as Vincenzo Monti; and it must be owned that he is an exception to the usual frivolity and inanity of improvisation. It cannot be said of him, "*Il dit tout ce qu'il veut, parce qu'il n'a rien à dire.*" But if he had much to say, he had little worth the saying. A courtier and a time-server, less however from servility than from impressionability, Monti devoted his fine genius to panegyric and invective dictated by the politics of his day. By the time that Carducci and his contemporaries appeared upon the scene, Monti's verse had lost all vitality. The torrent had foamed itself away, and its force could only be judged by the width and depth of its arid channel. A greater but much less productive poet, Leopardi, was disqualified for the office of national standard-bearer by his gloomy pessimism, and to follow Manzoni was to profess allegiance to the Church,—a step impossible for a patriotic Italian after the papacy's conduct towards the cause of national unity.

A new departure, therefore, was imperatively called for, and the circumstances under which it took place illustrate the falsity of extreme views either of the man of genius's dependence upon the spirit of his age, or his independence of it. Carducci could never have arrived at the height he did had he not been carried forward by the needs of his time. But, on the other hand, had there been no Carducci, the inferior though estimable writers whom impatience of the general flabbiness and laxity of Italian literature, and hostility to Christianity as represented by the Church of Rome (few Italians knew any other), must in any case have called into existence, would have attempted to give expression to the neo-classical tendencies of which he is the leading representative.

The distance between him and them was greater than that between Victor Hugo and the champions of the French Romantic school who could be properly accounted his followers,—a limitation which admits Dumas as a dramatist, but excludes him as a novelist.

Released from school, and already author of a little preliminary volume, Carducci found himself, at Florence, the centre of a group of young literary men of talent, all ardent patriots, and all eager to restore to Italian literature the virility of which ages of political and spiritual oppression, aided by the infirmities of the language, had long deprived it. He had scarcely commenced his literary career when his pen was set free by the most auspicious of all possible events, the deliverance of Tuscany by the campaign of 1859. The movement, far outrunning the wishes and designs of its ostensible promoter, Napoleon the Third, speedily gained the provinces of the Romagna, and in the following year Carducci found himself professor of classical literature at Bologna,—where before he would hardly have dared to show his face,—with a good position and salary. The migration was favorable to his genius in every way, the masculine and independent character of the inhabitants of the Emilia being more sympathetic to his robust and energetic temperament than the gentle refinement of his native Tuscany.

It is common for illustrious poets to produce at an early period of their career something which insures celebrity by attracting general, even if unflattering, attention, but which they afterwards more or less regret having published. The youthful Byron assails all the most celebrated poets of his day, thereby compelling them to read him. Shelley writes "*Queen Mab*," Swinburne, "*Poems and Ballads*," Wordsworth carries his innovations to an extreme which enlists even the most friendly critics against him. Whenever the poet has nothing particularly startling to express in verse, he frequently, as in the cases of Victor Hugo and Matthew Arnold, makes amends by prefixing a critical preface decrying the reigning taste and announcing a new dispensation or the recurrence of an old one. It by no means

follows that because these publications had the effect of exciting attention, they were deliberately calculated for that end. Why should not the Muse occasionally do the poet a good turn by inspiring him to write something which would command notice, instead of (her more frequent procedure) something that would not? In any case, Carducci went beyond all recorded examples, and flung the biggest stone that ever plashed into the stagnant waters of criticism by inditing and publishing a "Hymn to Satan,"—a masterpiece of daring, and, as it proved, of worldly wisdom. Had he written an equally fine hymn to the Pope, Garibaldi, Italy, the Virtues, or the Suez Canal, he might have been admired, but would hardly have been read. As it was, every reader in Italy was seized with the curiosity which, Miss Martineau tells us, induced her when a little girl to read "Paradise Lost." She had caught sight of the "arguments" prefixed to the books, and "wanted to know how anybody could argue about Satan." The general curiosity was also no doubt increased by the pseudonym under which the book was published; everybody wished to be able to identify "Enotrio Romano." The sole inconvenience was that Signor Carducci thus acquired the reputation of being the Devil's poet laureate, which he will never entirely lose. It is not an enviable reputation but is still less a merited one. If the Satan of Carducci's verse were the Satan of the Bible, or even the Satan of Milton, his hymn might be poetical, but would certainly be absurd. But this is by no means the case. There is nothing Satanic about the "Ode to Satan" but its name. It would, from the spiritual point of view, have been more appropriately entitled, "Ode to Scarecrow," or from the secular, "Ode to Steam Engine." So far is it from being an apotheosis of the traditional Satan that one of the persons chiefly eulogized in it is his capital adversary, Martin Luther, who threw an inkstand at his head. The Satan of the poet is the classical spirit as opposed to the mediæval, or what, taking the clergy perhaps somewhat too literally at their word, the author chooses to deem such; the spirit of revolt, indispensable to humanity if kept within due bounds, to which we owe the Reformation, the

Renaissance, and many a lesser thing; the spirit of enterprise and invention,—that spirit, in a word, of liberty, which St. Paul says is an inevitable concomitant of the spirit of the Lord.

The "Ode to Satan" was written and published separately in 1865. Its place in the author's collected works is among his "Levia Gravia," the volume immediately succeeding his "Juvenilia," written from 1861 to 1867, and published in their definitive form in 1881. Of these the hymn is the most celebrated, but though it may be equal in poetical merit to any of the rest, there are others in no respect inferior. While, in accordance with the famous "bon mot," the volume unquestionably rises by its gravity, it is far from sinking by its levity. Both departments evince the hand of the master, but as Carducci's bent is naturally to the solemn and austere, and the themes themselves are better adapted for poetical treatment, his most eminent achievements must be sought among the grand and august odes, and there mainly as they are inspired by patriotic devotion to Italy, sympathy for other countries, or zeal for humanity's general struggle for freedom and enlightenment. It is to be regretted that they have not hitherto attracted more attention in Britain and America. Few Italian poems are better adapted for translation, in really able hands, or would constitute a more genuine enrichment of English literature. Their spirit is far more nearly akin to that of the English Muse than is customary in Southern poetry, and their charm does not, as is so frequently the case, consist in evanescent delicacies or untranslatable felicities of diction. It rather resides in those qualities which a countryman of Milton on either side of the Atlantic should be best able to reproduce,—massive sense, noble manner, and pregnancy of thought allied to conciseness of speech. The translator must also be a master of form, since form here is inseparable from substance, and any variation would be fatal. We can attempt no such rendering, but may offer examples of Carducci's lighter ware in the shape of a pair of sonnets:—

PETRARCH.

If ever to my wish accorded were

Retirement by no gloomy thought beset,

Where by a coppice ran a rivulet,
 High in my pure Etrurian native air;
 Nor Mævius nor Zoilus came there
 To vex with idle cavil and vain fret,
 With mind devout an altar would I set
 In the green darkness of that woodland lair.
 By margin of the stream at set of sun,
 Petrarch, thy melodies would I repeat
 To bird, to flower, to water, and to gale:
 Gentler would sigh the breeze, more softly run
 The rill, the bloom diffuse a balmier sweet,
 And the leaf quiver with a nightingale.

The next, a sonnet in defence of the sonnet, may rank with Wordsworth's pair of masterpieces on the same theme:—

Brief strain with much in little rife, whose tone,
 As worlds untrodden rose upon his thought,
 Dante woke lightly; that Petrarca sought,
 Flower amid flowers by gliding waters grown;
 That from trump epical of Tasso blown
 Pealed through his prison; that wert gravely fraught
 With voice austere by him who marble fought
 To free the spirit he divined in stone:—
 To Æschylus new-born by Avon's shore
 Thou camest harbinger of Art, to be
 A hidden shrine for hidden sorrow's store;
 On thee smiled Milton and Camoens, thee,
 His rout of lines unleashing with a roar,
 Bavius blasphemes; the dearer thence to me.

The verse of the next decade has been mainly collected under the title of "Rime Nuove." This volume alone would enthrone Carducci among the supreme lyric poets of his country. It exhibits the happiest adaptation of the strength and purity of the antique style to modern needs. We too often regret in modern Italian, and still more in modern Spanish poets, the general resort to inferior metrical forms, easier to write in, no doubt, but devoid of distinction. Carducci's form is almost invariably noble, while in his hands it is perfectly capable of expressing the nicest shades of modern thought and feeling. He is a popular poet, when themes are frequently suggested by the events of the day,

yet he never appears without his singing robes, nor, on the other hand, can his rhymed lyrics ever be censured as a merely formal revival of the antique. His unrhymed lyrics have been judged variously, but, as yet, we have not to speak of them. Rhymed or unrhymed, Carducci's verse is always that of a lyrist. Two factors are clearly discernible in it,—that of inspiration mastering the poet and that of the poet contending with his inspiration and subjecting it to the severest manipulation, until all the native gold is wrought gold. By instinct, perhaps, Carducci refrains from the blank verse to which, notwithstanding fine examples by Foscolo and Leopardi, it seems as a rule impossible to impart in Italian the majesty of which it is capable in English. His preference for rhyme (excepting, of course, in his experiments in classical metres) is expressed in the charming prologue to the "Rime Nuove," itself a most perfect example of the melody it celebrates. We give the first and the last stanzas in the original:—

Ave, o rima! Con bell 'arte
 Su le carte
 Te persegue il trovadore :
 Ma tu brilli, tu scintilli,
 Tu zampilli,
 Su de' l popolo da' l cuore.

* * *

Cura e onor de' padri miei,
 Tu mi sei
 Come lor sacra e diletta.
 Ave, o rima : e dammi un fiore
 Per l'amore,
 E per l'odio una saetta.

The general character of the volume resembles that of the maturer portion of "Levia Gravia"; even when assailing adversaries and abuses with vivacity, the poet maintains a note of solemnity and grandeur. Although a child of the nineteenth century, for whom mediæval ideals are obsolete, he bows at the shrine of the great mediæval poet whose mission in our age it seems to be to reconcile conflicting creeds in a common admiration:—

Dante, how is it that my vows I bear,
 Submitted at thy shrine to bend and pray,
 To Night alone relinquishing thy lay,
 And with returning sun returning there ?
 Never for me hath Lucy breathed a prayer,
 Matilde with lustral fount washed sin away,
 Or Beatrice on celestial way
 Led up her mortal love by starry stair.
 Thy Holy Empire I abhor, the head
 Of thy great Frederick in Olona's vale
 Most joyfully had cloven, crown and brains.
 Empire and Church in crumbling ruin fail :
 Above, thy ringing song from heaven is sped.
 The Gods depart, the poet's hymn remains.

Carducci's next essay was one for which the readers of his panegyric of Italian song could hardly have been prepared. Still lyrical in form and spirit, it dispensed with rhyme altogether, reproducing the classical metres, especially the Alcaic and Sapphic. The literary controversy which it excited was more tempestuous than the theological controversy aroused by the "Hymn to Satan." In reality, the experiment was not new, but it had previously been attempted with little energy and less success. These "Odi Barbare," as endeavors to restore the most elegant forms of stanza known to antiquity were oddly entitled, were, on the contrary, the work of one who believed firmly in every line he wrote, and spared no effort to naturalize the classical metres in his own tongue. It is difficult to understand why the attempt should have evoked so much hostility. It is surely no crime to enrich a language with a new metrical form, or an old one as good as new. Southey's "Vision of Judgment" was not condemned in England because it was in hexameters, but because it was in bad hexameters. No such charge could be brought against Carducci, whose management of his metres is perfect. In thought and feeling and eloquence the "barbarian" odes are fully equal to their predecessors, or even finer, braced up by the more difficult form. If they are inferior in any degree, it can only be from flaws of expression which none but an Italian can detect, and which in no respect interfere with the enjoyment of the foreign reader. French pur-

ists have discovered numberless linguistic and metrical solecisms in the poems of Victor Hugo, and yet Hugo wrought a great deliverance for French poetry. It is the weak side of Carducci's work in this department of his writings, that it could not lead to large results like Victor Hugo's. So far as Italian poetry needed regeneration, he had himself regenerated it already; the engrafting of classical metres upon it was ornamental, but not vital. His success has enriched his native literature with some poems of extraordinary beauty, and has further raised the standards of severe style and choice expression. It cannot be said to have domesticated the classical metres in Italy as they have long ago been domesticated in Germany. The comparison between him and the great German master of the unrhymed lyric, Platen, is highly interesting. Platen's odes resemble the Greek statues as we behold them now, majestic, pure, and cold. Carducci's, bathed in color and light, resemble them as they originally appeared, tinted by the auxiliary hand of the painter.

The subjects of these pieces are very various, ranging from the highest flights of patriotism and the deepest cogitations on religion and human fate to little gems of landscape and genre painting. The translation of any of them into English in the original metre, apart from which they would be devoid of all savor, is, of course, an undertaking of much difficulty. The following version of one of the finest has appeared in the present writer's short history of Italian literature. The subject is the discovery of an antique statue of Victory at Brescia, which, viewed in connection with the heroic resistance of that city to the Austrians in 1849, was naturally considered by Italian patriots as a most auspicious omen:—

Hast thou, high Virgin, wings of good augury
 Waved o'er the crouching, targeted phalanxes,
 With knee-propt shield and spear protended
 Biding the shock of the hostile onset?
 Or hast thou, soaring in front of the eagles,
 Led surging swarms of Marsian soldiery,
 With blaze of fulgent light the neighing
 Parthian steed and his lord appalling?

Thy pinions folded, thy stern foot haughtily
Pressing the casque of foeman unhelmeted ;—
Whose fair renown for feat triumphant
Art on the orb of thy shield inscribing ?

An archon's name, who boldly in face of Wrong
The freeman's law upheld and immunity ?
A consul's, far and wide the Latin
Limit and glory and awe enlarging ?

Thee throned on Alpine pinnacle loftily,
Radiant mid tempest, heralding might I hear,
Kings and peoples, here stands Italy,
Weaponed to strike for her soil and honor.

Lydia, the while, a garland of flowerets,
By sad October strewn o'er the wreck of Rome,
To deck thee braids, and, gently bending,
Questioneth, as at thy foot she lays it :

“What thoughts, what visions, Victory, came to thee,
Years on years in the humid imprisonment
Of earth immured ? the German horses
Heardest thou stamp o'er thy brow Hellenic ?”

“I heard,” she answers, flashing and fulminant,
“Heard and endured, for glory of Greece am I,
And strength of Rome, in bronze immortal
Sped without flaw through the fleeting ages.

The ages passed like the twelve birds ominous
Descried by gaze of Romulus anciently :
They passed, I rose : thy Gods, proclaiming,
Italy, see ! and thy buried heroes.

Proud of her fortune, Brescia enshrined me,
Brescia the stalwart, Brescia the iron-girt,
Italia's lioness, her vesture
Dyed in the blood of her land's invaders.”

One good effect of the “*Odi Barbare*” is evident, their effect in developing the higher nature of the poet himself. The thought rises to the level of the form, and the constant effort to attain the elevation of his classical models frees him from the few remaining excrescences and impurities of the immature period, which drop away of themselves.

Carducci's prose writings, though displaying nothing of the genius of his poetry, are extensive and not unimportant. As professor at Bologna he has frequently had occasion to discourse on literary subjects; in his early days he conducted a spirited polemic in the ephemeral journals founded by himself and his friends, and his reputation has since brought many invitations to contribute to more securely established periodicals. It was also his duty to deliver the official oration on the millenary anniversary of the University of Bologna, and he has made other public appearances on important occasions. Of his literary essays, the most elaborate are those on the well-worn theme of Dante, but Carducci avoids commonplace by devoting his chief attention to outlying subjects,—Dante's comparatively neglected lyrics, and his various fortune. Other essays treat of interesting persons lying somewhat apart from the common track, such as Marchetti, the translator of Lucretius, and Salvator Rosa. Others treat of private intimacies, as when he revives the gracious memory of Louisa Grace Bartolini, a child of Ireland by birth, of Italy by adoption. There is no extraordinary power or originality in these pieces, but there is a certain distinction from the vigor of the writer's style, almost rugged in comparison with the emasculated garrulity of so much modern Italian prose. The most animated of his prose writings are the "Confessions," mainly replies to the accusations urged against him, at different periods of his literary career of having, like Pope John the Twenty-Second, drunk the Devil's health, and of having contaminated Italian metrical purity by imitating the metres of barbarous writers, such as Horace and Sappho. A frivolous charge is sometimes the occasion of an immortal defence, but Carducci's replies hardly display any higher literary quality than the strong good sense which never deserts him. One passage in his defence of his "Hymn to Satan" is interesting; he admits that his Satan is rather a being of the type of Prometheus, but answers the suggestion that he ought to have made Prometheus his theme by declaring that Prometheus is now exhausted. We know not whether the title of the reprinted newspaper paragraphs,

"Ceneri e faville," is derived from Shelley's prayer to the West Wind to scatter like

"Ashes and sparks, my words among mankind."

In any case, there are more ashes than sparks among them, and the sparks seem devoid of any igniting or illuminating quality. It must not be forgotten that Carducci has rendered much service to the literature of his country as the editor of some of the principal Italian classics. An edition of Petrarch, published in 1899, is especially valuable, though it may be conjectured that the chief burden of the commentary must have fallen upon Carducci's coadjutor, Severino Ferrari.

Of late years Carducci has produced, or at least published, but little poetry; his appearances as a poet have been chiefly confined to odes on occasions of public solemnities, when he has always been worthy of himself. His position is one of singular good fortune both internally and externally. High honor has fallen to his lot; he is a Senator of the Kingdom, yet he lives quietly and unostentatiously at Bologna, the centre of a literary society devoted to him, and the object of universal respect throughout Italy. In the world of thought the fiery youth has come to enact the part of the sage mediator, which hardly any other Italian could perform with equal authority, and for which he is especially qualified by a perfect comprehension of the tendencies he would reconcile,—for he has participated in them all. A Republican in theory, he has the good sense to perceive that monarchy is essential to the weal of Italy, and the throne has no more devoted subject. Opposed as ever to priestcraft and priestly dominion, he is nevertheless a Theist, and his influence, though never ostentatiously exercised, makes wholly for the reverential recognition of a Supreme Power. In ethics Carducci treads the middle path with equal success; his austerity is displayed in his lofty standard of public virtue, not in the Puritanism which condemns natural emotions; while, on the other hand, his joy in life never degenerates into extravagance. In this he is distinguished from his only serious rival, the brilliant D'Annun-

zio, a poet endowed with a more exquisite lyrical faculty than Carducci himself, and more productive and versatile, but never attaining to greatness. We speak merely of D'Annunzio's poems, with all their defects a treasury of beauty and melody. The romances by which he is so much better known want the first condition of a really good novel, the personages are wholly uninteresting and unsympathetic. If they were real they would be detestable, but in fact they are mere puppets. It may almost be laid down that the success of every novelist is in proportion to his power of interesting us in his characters, for the lack of which not all the splendor of even a D'Annunzio's diction can atone.

The main distinction between Carducci and D'Annunzio is that D'Annunzio, partly even in his poems, and wholly in his novels, has stooped to minister to the corrupt tendencies of his public, while the general character of Carducci's work forms a silent protest against whatever is least satisfactory in Italian life and in the national character. Noble passages in recent Italian history prove the conventional notions of Italian effeminacy and frivolity to be greatly exaggerated: yet their prevalence proves that there must be a certain foundation for them. It is, therefore, almost startling to find the national poet the reverse of all that we have been taught to consider national, in his writings as in his physiognomy and manners,—a hearty, jovial, slightly boisterous person, more like a typical Englishman than a typical Italian; with no abnormal endowment of subtlety or insight in the intellectual sphere, but gifted in their stead with a clearness of perception and a vigor of expression worthy of John Bright; in the world of politics, imbued as few continentals are with the English doctrine of equitable compromise; in his tastes a lover of country life and penetrated by its simple and salutary influence. Can there be a greater contrast than that between the Tuscan love of the town so humorously portrayed in Browning's "Up at a Villa—Down in the City," and Carducci's apotheosis of agriculture in the person of its chief minister in Italy, the patient ox, thus admirably rendered by Mr. Sewall?—

"I love thee, pious Ox ; a gentle feeling
 Of vigor and of peace thou giv'st my heart.
 How solemn, like a monument, thou art !
 Over wide fertile fields thy calm gaze stealing !
 Unto the yoke with grave contentment kneeling,
 To man's quick work thou dost thy strength impart :
 He shouts and goads, and, answering thy smart,
 Thou turn'st on him thy patient eyes appealing.
 From thy broad nostrils, black and wet, arise
 Thy breath's soft fumes ; and on the still air swells,
 Like happy hymn, thy lowing's mellow strain.
 In the grave sweetness of thy tranquil eyes
 Of emerald, broad and still reflected, dwells
 All the divine green silence of the plain."

The same feeling for nature appears in Carducci's most elaborate poems ; when fashioning himself after the antique he is no less the poet of the life around him ; and even when evoking the past it is usually for the admonition of the present. It was no doubt his revolutionary ardor that originally made him the popular poet of his day, and it is to the honor of his country to have maintained him at that eminence when his mission has become that of the thinker and artist. His early work will still keep its place in virtue of its poetic quality, and when his work is reviewed as a whole, it will appear, notwithstanding occasional excrescences and aberrations, a work for all sections of his countrymen, the enemies of the national unity alone excepted. These, whether ultramontanes or anarchists, have no part or lot in Carducci. No living writer more distinctly embodies the best and highest thought of his environment ; few poets have gained so high a position simply as lyrists, with so little indication of creative or dramatic power. Any temporary vicissitude in this great reputation would be an evil sign for Italy, but could not permanently affect a fame reared on the impregnable foundations of great thought and great style. It is rather for Italy to show whether she is capable of maintaining the high ideal he has set before her. Carducci will be a great glory to her, or a great reproach.

CONTEMPORARY FRENCH PHILOSOPHY¹

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During the second half of the nineteenth century, France witnessed a remarkable philosophical movement, in which speculations of the loftiest and boldest form concerning the world and life made their appearance, in opposition to the official philosophy, at once timorous and despotic, of Victor Cousin and his school.

The general direction of French philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century may be characterized as the endeavor to harmonize naturalism and idealism,—an endeavor which has terminated in accordance, more or less, with the different mental tendencies of those whom it has attracted. Devotion to facts and devotion to ideas are, moreover, two tendencies henceforth inseparable in the case of every theorist who has at the same time respect for science and a taste for philosophy.

The second half of the nineteenth century presents two distinct periods, one in which naturalism predominates, and, towards 1855, invades literature itself, the other in which idealism finally takes the lead. The year 1851, which was in France the critical year of the century, witnessed the dissolution of all dreams of social and religious reorganization, of liberty, and of universal brotherhood. Force triumphed; there was a retrograde movement; the fact gave the lie to the idea. As a result of the tri-

(1) Translated by Professor H. A. P. Torrey of the University of Vermont.

umph of the positive sciences and of the historical sciences, which were based upon the theory of evolution, it was believed that philosophy would resolve itself into history,—nay, even into philology, into “erudition”! Philosophy was Comtism contracted, and at the same time a decapitated Hegelianism. There was a desire, to use Taine’s expression, to “solder” the moral sciences to the natural sciences;—solder, nothing more appropriate, but to identify and to confound, that was the danger. And the danger was not always avoided. To this period belong the names of Vacherot, of Taine, and of Renan, to whom we should add Littré, if the latter had not limited himself to a positivism devoid of all genuine originality.

It was during the last thirty years of the century that the idealist movement appeared. Already Secrétan and M. Renouvier had published great works that were inspired by spiritualism or criticism, but these works did not receive the attention nor, above all, exert in full the influence due to their merits. It was from the University of France that the impulse was destined mainly to proceed.

The upper Ecole Normale, the competitive examinations in philosophy, the theses for the doctor’s degrees, the examinations of the Academy of moral and political sciences, had their part in the new movement of mind. The official report of M. Ravaisson, in connection with the Universal Exposition of 1868, upon “Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century” was a kind of eloquent manifesto in which the loftiest views were set forth with a magisterial authority. M. Jules Lachelier was already professor at the Ecole Normale, and his thesis upon “Induction” stood at the head, in the Sorbonne, of the long list of theses, which, under diverse titles, were destined to attract attention. To follow the historical order we are obliged to mention the fact that we ourselves were for a short time the colleague of M. Lachelier at the Ecole Normale, that our thesis upon “Liberty and Determinism” followed a year after his own (1873), and was preceded by our memoirs on the “Philosophy of Plato” and the “Philosophy of Socrates” (1869).

From the Ecole Normale next appeared M. Boutroux, whose thesis on the "Contingency of the Laws of Nature" attracted universal attention. The thesis of M. Ribot on "Heredity" excited equal interest, although indicating quite a different direction of thought. M. Ravaisson had become president of the examining board in philosophy; all ideas broached there received his attention, all forms of talent his sympathy, but, above all, metaphysical talent, which he encouraged in a somewhat exclusive manner. To the influence of M. Ravaisson and that of the different masters of the Ecole Normale was soon afterwards added in the university itself, as we shall see further on, that of M. Charles Renouvier, who founded the "Critique philosophique," and that of Secrétan.

Outside the various schools, we shall next take note of the lofty and liberal mind of Guyau, a free and independent spirit, of whom we were much less master than companion in study, and who was destined in his turn to exert an important influence, especially in moral science and in sociology. At the same time, scientific psychology will pursue its onward course, above all, with M. Ribot; sociology, on its part, will also continue to advance; and the labors of M. Espinas, of M. Tarde, of M. Burckheim, will attract attention. The nineteenth century will be seen to close amidst the great activity, free and varied, of a multitude of minds of the most opposite tendencies; it will witness the gradual drawing together in France of the naturalist and idealist schools,—both enlarged until they touch each other at many points.

Philosophy and science are henceforth inseparable, the one from the other, and both are inseparable from theoretical and practical sociology; thought is no longer able to abstract itself from activity, and, particularly, from social activity. Such is the general outline of the movement which we have now to study in a more detailed manner, in its principal representatives, and in its several stages.

I.

Ravaisson, side by side with Secrétan, had followed the lecture courses of Schelling at Munich. He had studied Aris-

totle and had published an admirable work on the metaphysics of that philosopher. In 1840, in the "*Revue des deux Mondes*," he advised French philosophy to seek its inspiration in the work of Maine de Biran. Hence the wrath of Cousin against this independent spirit who appealed to other authorities than that of the grand master of the university. At the Institute the friends of Cousin put Nourrisson in the place of Ravaisson. The latter refrained a long time from publishing philosophical works. In 1865 he was appointed to draw up the official report of the philosophical movement in France. This report impressed every one by the breadth of the views presented, the profundity of the ideas, and the eloquence of the style. Then began the influence of Ravaisson in the university.

The philosophy of Ravaisson appeared at that time to be "an absolute spiritualism." All is spirit, matter has no real existence, it is only a limitation or lower grade of spirit. The only reality that we know, we know in our own consciousness, where it exists as "thought," as "spirit." The true method, according to Ravaisson, is the reflection of consciousness upon itself, which finds, at the bottom of the self, will and effort; hence desire, hence a union, imperfect it is true, with the good, but which is already love. We need only to suppress the human limits of love, and we find ourselves in the presence of infinite and perfect love, of pure spirit, of God himself, who gives himself to us by abasing himself to us. He lends us being by withdrawing unto himself somewhat of his own plenitude, as if he were a vessel to which we ever return without emptying it. Materialism has vanished like an evil dream. Unfortunately, the condition of humanity is quite other than Ravaisson represents it. Pain and evil exist, which prevent us from attaining to that inward assurance of the eternally real love. The reflection of consciousness upon itself ends in effort and in desire, hence in love unsatisfied, not in love satisfied. "We are already united to some good," says Ravaisson. Yes, but we are united also to a great deal of evil, and this evil is sufficient to cast the shadow of a doubt on the infinity of the good, above all, on the

infinity of love, which does not succeed in leaving in the world love only, but which leaves there ignorance, error, suffering, and hatred. The method of internal reflection may, indeed, dissipate the idea of material "substance" and of "thinking stone," to use the expression of Aristotle, but it cannot dissipate the ideal of suffering and of effort; it does not end, therefore, in our recognizing pure spirit as an internal reality. Pure spirit remains an ideal; we experience in ourselves, and we infer in others, an effort to realize it; but it remains always for us to decide whether "in itself" it is ideal or real. No sure intuition of our consciousness will solve this problem; we cannot see God face to face within ourselves as if we were already in full Paradise.

The great stumbling block of absolute spiritualism is therefore the world,—evil, pain, error. How does it come about that we touch God "incompletely"? If "the best is at the start," as Ravaisson asks himself,—if the best is the principle, how are we to understand why it does not remain in its true nature, and in that only? Ravaisson replies, "It is because God is a principle not of movement only, but also 'of repose.'" God being "master of his own existence," of which he is the "cause," may produce therein, if he pleases, a repose, an arrest, which is the world. "Just as it is within our power to suspend at will our own activity, and as this power belongs to all natural agencies, as in sleep and other periods of rest, so, and for a still stronger reason, it belongs to God to dispense with, at least for a time, as the Christian theologian expresses it, something of his plentitude (*se ipsum exanimavit*)."

The world is, then, "a spontaneous abasement of its principle, the unity of which reappears finally in the ultimate character of the whole."

This oriental idea is dear to Ravaisson as it is to Secrétan and to Schelling. Ravaisson returns to it frequently. But we ask ourselves how a metaphor of the void produced by God within God, a metaphor of the sleep of God, can explain the world with its tragic pains and its failures throughout eternity. At this point, it is clear, philosophy sinks into the abyss of mythology. Ravaisson does not ask himself what degree of intelligibility there can

be in the idea of a supreme love that annuls one part of its being (which being has no parts), in order to produce our being; one part of its infinite happiness to produce suffering; one part of its infinite intelligence to produce the darkness of ignorance; one part of its goodness to engender evil. "Separation from God," concludes Ravaisson, "return to God, the closure of the grand cosmic circle, restitution of the universal equilibrium,—such is the history of the world." He has not the slightest misgivings concerning this Alexandrine and oriental philosophy; he even considers it to be a Christian philosophy,—although there would be some difference between the fall of Adam and the voluntary fall of God; and, furthermore, his generous mind refuses to admit eternal damnation, which would prevent the universal return to the bosom of God. The mystic theologian has already in thought and feeling descended so far into the depths of the eternal abyss that he ignores the interrogation points of an age of critical philosophy and of positive science. He has returned to the period before Kant, as Schelling, his principal master, returned there, who teaches analogous doctrines in his second philosophy. The teaching of Ravaisson remains intuitive, it ignores proof, and delivers itself, for the most part, in oracles. Ravaisson is fond of saying, "Aristotle has affirmed, Plato has affirmed," and like them, he affirms. Persuaded that truth is beauty, he freely makes of metaphysics a work of high art. He goes so far as to say with Pascal that "the heart discovers the principles and determines the truths of philosophy." Is there not danger here of confounding not only the desires of the heart with the reality of things, but the heart itself with the imagination, and reasons with visions? Disdain of all method, properly so-called, which proceeds by reasonings logically bound together, has finally brought Ravaisson to a constructive philosophy of an æsthetic and theological type, which is the *credo* of a lofty soul. Where Renan doubts and smiles at his own thought, Ravaisson affirms with the most unbounded confidence and with the most earnest faith. The "voluntary sleep of God" in the world is at bottom much more intelligible than the final consciousness of the world, which,

according to Renan, will realize God. We are far from proscribing hypotheses, or even dreams, but while we are not to fall into the scepticism of Renan, it is no less necessary to avoid the dogmatism which Ravaisson conceals beneath an exterior of the most sincere thought.

The philosophy of Ravaisson, despite its advance upon eclecticism, which would push scientific ignorance to its extreme limits, does not appear to have made any great contribution to knowledge, except in the declaration of principles that are not followed by application. Moreover, Ravaisson favored, above all, speculative metaphysics of the most abstract type,—very near to ontology. Everything, either of “criticism” of the Kantian sort or of “science,” with methodical deduction and induction, is almost banished from his works. The fact that his influence has not been felt abroad, or even in France outside the university, and the complete silence to his claims on the part of Germany, of England, of the United States, proceed from the character, so eminently personal and in fact too arbitrary, of this too comprehensive dogmatism, which is one with the most comprehensive traditionalism. There is in our days an access of the scientific and logical spirit which makes us distrustful of metaphysics by intuitions, by illuminations, and by views of the distant heights. We desire to know by what path the philosopher has reached the top of the mountain, even the bosom of the clouds; we desire to know by what laws the lightning comes from the cloud.

The influence of Ravaisson, by favoring the return to the speculations of great individual philosophers, has unfortunately encouraged also, among a certain number of young people, a very subtle kind of metaphysical dilettantism. The admirable “Report upon Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century” began as the liberator of mind, and shattered at a blow the intolerable yoke of Cousinism, but at length a yoke of a new sort, that of an authority quite persuasive and charming, though very firm and scarcely flexible at all, makes itself felt in the university where Ravaisson presided over the competitive examinations, and imparted to the studies a somewhat too uniform direction. It is

evident that we must now seek a new philosophy, more methodical, more critical, and more scientific, more in touch with experience, and by that very fact better suited to the needs of the new century. We cannot deny the existence, in the second half of the last century, of a certain excess of metaphysical inebriation,—however noble this inebriation,—from which the earlier positivism had desired to debar the mind. Perhaps it is time to return to a wisdom that is more removed from extremes, that is equally distant from strict science and from philosophical poetry.

II.

M. Jules Lachelier, by his profound treatise upon "Induction," in which the Kantian inspiration was dominant, and, above all, by his prolonged instruction at the *Ecole Normale*, exerted a powerful influence over the young lecturers of the university. His philosophy offers three superimposed parts, or rather, three orders analogous to those of Pascal,—universal "mechanism," universal "finality," and, lastly, the realm of "liberty" and of grace. According to M. Lachelier, being presents itself to us at first under the form of a series of movements connected in time and in space; it is under this form that being becomes the object of "knowledge," or of intellection, properly so-called: there mechanism reigns as absolute sovereign. In the second place, or rather at the same time, being presents itself to us under the form of a harmony, of which organization offers to us the most perfect type; and under this title it is for us an object of "feeling," that is to say, at once of pleasure and of desire,—the realm of "finality." Lastly, we recognize, although quite imperfectly in this life, and only in beings like ourselves, an absolute unity which is no longer that of the physical individual, but that of the moral personality, and which is on our part the subject of the one truly free act, that is to say, the act of love. And these three things are not three species of being, but three inseparable aspects, at least in our present condition, of the same being; every one of us is, without the least contradiction,

indivisibly brute matter, living soul, and moral person,—necessity, finality, and freedom. It is a sort of internal trinity. This lofty doctrine, like that of Ravaisson, had strong affinities with Descartes and with Leibnitz, but with the addition of Kant. Further, while M. Ravaisson admitted with Plato, Aristotle, and Schelling, a sort of intellectual intuition, in which the spirit apprehends the divine, M. Lachelier, at this epoch, had been led, both by his Christian education and by the study of Kant, to believe that the principle of things is concealed from our view in an impenetrable night, and that if we are able to attain to it, it is not by an intellectual intuition, like that of Schelling and of Ravaisson, but solely by “beliefs” founded upon “duties.” Criticism, the most daring and the most independent, might thus, according to M. Lachelier, end in the act of moral and religious faith. And in this conclusion he represented a state of mind quite prevalent at the time; he satisfied the double demand of doubt and of faith. In his treatise upon “Induction” (1871), M. Lachelier had obliged himself to establish induction upon the principle of finality and to demonstrate in this principle a constitutive element of thought, while, for Kant, finality was not necessary to thought itself and to consciousness. According to M. Lachelier, we cannot have self-consciousness without apprehending ourselves as a system of means and ends; and we cannot conceive the world itself except as a “system,” which involves in its turn the idea of a bond of reciprocal finality, without which there would be nothing stable and ordered in the universe. This lofty doctrine excited, at the time, a lively interest, but did not appear to be sufficiently demonstrated. Unquestionably we recognize in ourselves immanent finality under the form of desire, and when we wish to frame a philosophical idea of external things such as they are in themselves, we are led to attribute to them also an interior activity analogous to desire, to tendency, to effort; but this is merely an hypothesis which is not at all necessary to thinking the universe systematically. A system of causes and effects is sufficient to introduce into the world the determinism necessary to science without there being any need of conceiving

the world, at the same time, as an assemblage of "ends" represented at the start in an ordering and creative intelligence. Induction, as we believe, has no need of finality, it needs only causality and the determinism resulting from it.

III.

Charles Renouvier¹ gives to his philosophy the name of criticism, in order to connect it with the doctrine of Kant. It is certain that M. Renouvier is dependent upon Kant; he obliges himself, as Kant did, to render knowledge compatible with faith, and for that reason to limit the domain of knowledge in the interests of morality or of religion. But the Kantism of M. Renouvier has undergone changes so profound that it is rather a mixture of phenomenalism of the style of Hume and of monadology of the style of Leibnitz, though with no admission of the actual infinite. The method of M. Renouvier takes for its chief instrument the principle of contradiction, and would make use of it to prove that phenomena are finite, subject to number, contingent, affording room for absolute beginnings. Renouvier accordingly rejects the affirmation of the absolute unity of being, of its infinity, of its continuity, of its identity with a universal truth, which would develop its consequences with necessity. He breaks up being, he disperses it in discrete individualities, he admits discontinuity, multiplicity, the radical finite, he admits the "absolute" primary beginning of the world, of other primary beginnings in the series of our voluntary actions that constitute acts of free will, judgments, and decisions,—the expression at once of our reason for acting and of our power to act.

In the questions of first philosophy which concern the nature and the value of life, the object, according to M. Ravaisson, remains inaccessible to all experience, to all analysis, to all

(1) See chiefly, *Essais de critique générale* (1854-64), *la Science de la morale* (1859), *la Critique philosophique* (1868 and following years), *l'Année philosophique* (1872 and following years), *la Philosophie analytique de l'Histoire* (1896), *la Nouvelle Monadologie* (1899), *les Eléments de la métaphysique pure* (1900).

reasoning that proceeds from abstract premises. Hence it follows that there remains no other process than that of "moral induction," in which "the judgment of the true and the false proceeds from that of the good and the evil." We judge, then, freely and decide freely to act in accordance with such or such judgment: moral faith is the basis of philosophy. There are judgments which thrust themselves upon us ethically in the name of duty, such as the affirmation of the existence of God conceived as personality, and that of personal immortality in the form of individual consciousness. The philosophy of M. Renouvier ends in religion, in the form of an extremely liberal Protestantism.

In this world M. Renouvier believes that we are not to look forward to the coming of a happy social state, either from the mechanism of nature, or from the discoveries of science. We can expect it only from our own free will, if this will decides in favor of the moral good. Starting from Kantism, the ideas of M. Renouvier traverse Leibnitzism, to end anew, practically, in a Kantian morality, where, indeed, the imperative is far from being purely formal, for it involves the idea of happiness as end, and where free will replaces determinism.

M. Renouvier has exercised a great influence,¹ but the fundamental propositions of his system have appeared to be in opposition to the whole movement of modern philosophy, which admits as a principle the universality of reasons and of causes.

M. Renouvier believes that universal determinism—that is to say, substantially, the universality of causality according to laws, the universality of sufficient reasons—can be established neither by experience, which is not sufficient for a universal conclusion, nor by means of logical demonstration, which would involve, according to him, "a begging of the question." But one may reply to him that the principle of universal causality is established, if not by logical demonstration, at least by "critical" demonstration, in the sense that criticism of knowledge finds in

(1) In France he has had for a faithful disciple, M. Pilon; in America, Mr. William James has adopted several of his views.

causality the condition itself of the exercise of thought. And since, on the other hand, experience confirms everywhere, and more and more, the existence of causes, we have a sufficient demonstration, not a begging of the question, unless one claims that every principle is a "petitio principii." But our "petitio" bears solely upon the principle of "identity" and that of "sufficient reason"; if these two principles are not granted there is no longer any way of judging or of reasoning; all that is left to us is to hold our peace.

M. Renouvier does not so understand it. Availing himself of the fact that the principle of causality, or of universal reason, is neither empirical nor logically demonstrable, he contends that exceptions are possible to this principle,—exceptions which would constitute indeterminateness, contingency, spontaneity, and finally free will.

M. Renouvier does not seem to have conceived the true idea of liberty. He very properly rejects the liberty of indifference; he declares that the will never decides in a state of indifference without motor power, or impulse, and without motives; every decision of the will is a judgment, and consequently includes a reason which explains it. Very well, but M. Renouvier adds that we are masters of our judgments and even of our feelings, of our motives and of our motive powers, that we are able to introduce into the series new motives and motor powers. Is not this to bring back the liberty of indifference into the domain which is most hostile to it, that of the judgment? To judge *ad libitum*, is not that still more of the nature of a miracle than to will *ad libitum*? Indifference in the judgment is more repugnant to thought than indifference in the will. And it is not more moral, for how can a stroke of chance or of unreason in the reasons of my choice, and in my choice, itself be moral? What has been gained by transporting arbitrariness into the judgment itself and by establishing it in the midst of intelligence? It is as if injustice were installed in a court of justice. M. Renouvier would have us allow "exceptions to laws" and to causes; but, we reply, one single exception to causality is utter ruin, just as a

single exception to the principle of contradiction would bring the whole principle to nothingness.

M. Renouvier concludes by calling on the free will itself to decide by a free act that there are exceptions to laws, and his proof is that the will affirms it freely. "Freedom, a principle which affirms itself,—and by that very fact, the principle of its fundamental determinations and of the judgments upon the truth or error of those principles which science cannot attain to,—freedom reveals itself virtually at this point of view as the 'principle of knowledge,' as Jules Lequier was the first to proclaim, in his fragments concerning the 'Search after a first Truth.'" For our part, we cannot thus suspend knowledge upon belief, belief upon the option of the will, at a first beginning of a series which would posit its acts in positing its own judgments. Moreover, we do not comprehend how such acts in their indeterminism could have moral quality and be morally determined. The philosophy of the finite and of first beginnings appears to us to be insufficient and unintelligible without the philosophy of the infinite. Moral and religious faith ought to be before all things reasonable and rational, *rationabile obsequium*. Let us not sacrifice the rights of thought, which are also those of reasonable action, to religion or to morality, that is to say, to a certain form of moral theory which we would make the only possible one, when, in fact, humanity has long ago passed beyond it. Where do you find among the Greeks free will, such as the indeterminists understand it? Where do you find among the Greeks the categorical imperative of Kant? Where do you find the idea of absolute responsibility? Where the idea of sin, and of sin against God himself, of sin entailing as the expiation the inexpiable, that is to say, eternal damnation and eternal exclusion from the vision of God? Were all these ideas, many of which are so astonishing, indispensable to the Hellenic morality? Were they so to the Buddhist morality? How then shall we make the moral theory of Saint Augustine and of Kant the standard of philosophical truth? It would amount to the subjection of *perennis philosophia* and of *perennis scientia* to the requirements of a special moral

theory conceived under the influence of a particular social order and of a particular religious belief. Such a method has always seemed to us to be the abandonment of philosophy and of science; it is also the abandonment of true practical morality, which cannot be thus immobilized in a system, and which should be as progressive as the theory itself.

IV.

Is scientific determinism truly incompatible with the moral freedom of man rightly understood? That is the great question which was more than ever claiming attention at the time we were publishing our treatise upon "Freedom and Determinism" (1872). The main ideas of that book were already contained in the conclusion of our "Philosophy of Plato" published in 1869, and in that of our "Philosophy of Socrates." As professor of philosophy along with M. Lachelier, in the Ecole Normale, we undertook to contribute to what appeared to us, and still appears to us, to be the principal need of the time,—the conciliation of science with morality. We should not be an accurate historian of the movement of thought in France, if we neglected to determine precisely the place which we ourselves have endeavored, rightly or wrongly, to take in this movement.

Science, let us remind ourselves, presupposes at this epoch universal determinism; on the other hand, morality presupposes a certain independence of the rational being, a certain power of acting upon himself which has been called freedom, and which has almost always been represented under the form of a free will, in formal contradiction to determinism. As to this free will, the attempt has, indeed, been made to distinguish it from the liberty of "indifference"; but the distinction is vain. If, granted the character of a man, with the motives and with the circumstances in which he is to determine himself, it is possible for that man, in one and the same moment, with the same motives and in the same circumstances, to determine himself *ad libitum* for a thing or for its contrary, there is really in his will a power of determining himself apart from the motives, the character, and the circum-

stances,—a power of indetermination which excludes all explanatory reason, and which it is impossible to distinguish from the *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*. It seemed to us that this power was in formal contradiction to the determinism that originated from the principle of causality upon which science is based. On the other hand, that free will of indifference appeared to us no less opposed to true morality, for what moral character can pertain to an action which is nothing but internal chance, an unintelligible “clinamen” of the will? Hence we concluded that it was necessary to seek true freedom in the domain of causal determination, but by rectifying and enlarging this determinism. This rectification was the object of our book on “Freedom and Determinism.” We called attention to an important oversight on the part of psychologists and moralists in neglecting to propose to themselves these questions: Does not the idea itself, and the desire of moral independence or of liberty, in a rational being, enter as an element into the explanatory reasons for his voluntary determinations? What is the action of this idea of freedom? Is it not a liberating influence which renders us capable of opposing to the divers motives and impulses the idea of our independence and of changing an inflexible determinism into a flexible auto-determinism?

Convinced, for our part, that complete harmony exists, we endeavored, from the first, to seek the greatest harmony possible on the basis of facts, of science, and of consciousness, between determinism and moral freedom, between the mechanism of nature and the aspirations of the mind, between the truth which science demands and the good which ethics seeks. We essayed to place ourselves, successively, at the point of view of every one of the great doctrines and to discover, accordingly, either mean terms to intercalate, or synthetic ideas, wherein the differing conceptions might find their principle of unity.

Moreover, to the method of conciliation we proposed to add a “doctrine of idea-forces,” which is an application of it in the domain of experience. Instead of rejecting the idea of “evolution,” we contended that this should first be rectified and then

subordinated to a higher idea in which it will harmonize with different conceptions. That is why we put the evolution of idea-forces in opposition to the exclusively mechanical evolution of Spencer. While fully admitting the law of gradual transformation of existences, we aimed to restore to ideas the efficient influence of which brute naturalism had despoiled them. We maintained, accordingly, that we cannot, as Spencer ends in doing, translate all activity and all reality even, into movements, so as to leave to consciousness merely the rôle of reflecting these movements under the guise of enjoyment and of suffering, or under that of appetition and effort. We endeavored to show that pleasure and pain, in particular, cannot be simply "signs" or "indices," but that they are immediate affections and profound states of the will, not to be reduced to mere objective representations. We have always maintained both the reality and the specific originality of the fact of consciousness.¹

Consciousness, according to Maudsley and Huxley, according to Taine himself in certain passages, and, finally, according to Ribot, would be a mere "representation" of the material object and of movement: but a representation, pure and simple, is, by the definition, always passive; it cannot be interposed in any legitimate manner in the succession of mechanical and physical phenomena; it is a phenomenon in excess, an "epiphenomenon." This notion of a phenomenon in excess appeared to us contradictory in the universe even of science, for a phenomenon is defined scientifically only by its properties, that is to say, by its action upon other phenomena, an action without which it would not manifest itself; consciousness is, then, not a mere "epiphenomenon"; its forms and ideas cannot be conceived as mere representations which act no more upon facts than a mirror acts upon a star. We contend, further, that that which gives to consciousness its true character and its originality, that which makes it irreducible to the physical and to the external, is not solely, as

(1) See our *Psychologie des idées-forces*, (1891), our *Evolutionisme des idées-forces* (1890).

the Kantians and the criticists, such as M. Renouvier, maintain, the "representative" and the formal; it is sensation, in so far as it is of a specific and indecomposable nature. Sensation itself cannot be understood, as it is understood by the empiricists after the manner of Taine and of M. Ribot, in the sense of an inert state which can receive an impulse only from without; the base, the root of sensation is activity, it is appetition. Here we have what, in our view, makes an integral psychology possible. Is it a question, for example, concerning memory? We have tried to show that with its different moments, "conservation, association, recognition," memory cannot be explained without admitting, in the case of the being, an appetition or conscious power, as the basis of it. From this point of view, we have shown how ideas, so-called abstract and contemplative, act and live,—are idea-forces. By ideas we mean, then, as Spinoza does, all mental states more or less conscious of themselves and of their objects. As to the "force" of ideas, we have always taken this in a triple sense. From the psychological point of view, the idea-force is the active or appetitive element which every state of consciousness includes, in addition to its representative element, and which makes it tend to realize its object: every idea of a good of any sort, especially, tends to realize itself. From the physiological point of view, the force of ideas consists, not in an influence which they would exert mechanically, but in the law which unites every conscious state to an appropriate movement, which, if not hindered, realizes the idea externally. Lastly, from the point of view of philosophy, in general, the force of ideas consists in this,—that the mental, instead of being a mere accessory reflection of the universal evolution, is one of its primordial factors; it is even, in our view, the sole factor or true spring, of which the mechanism is only the symbol; for the mechanism expresses the reciprocal relations and the laws of realities, which in themselves are mental, that is to say, endowed with feeling and appetition. These are the three relations under which we have set forth the idea-forces as opposed to the idea-reflec-

tions of Spencer.¹ Developing this theory under its diverse aspects, we have made it the centre of a constructive system which embraces psychology, morals, sociology, and cosmology.

In psychology and in morals, the synthesis of determinism with indeterminism may be brought about, within the domain of facts, by means of the "idea of freedom," which includes the "love of freedom." Determinists and indeterminists have equally the idea of freedom, that is to say, of the "maximum of independence possible for the intelligent and loving self." It is this independence which forms the basis of the different conceptions of liberty, some of which, like the liberty of indifference, being chimerical, are unrealizable other than by substitutes. We have never maintained, as we have been made to say, that liberty is a pure "illusion," but that nevertheless we realize that illusion in conceiving it. There are, according to us, in the idea of liberty, true and realizable elements, notably the independent power of conceiving the future and the power of coöperating in the determination of the future. This idea, by conceiving itself and desiring itself, attains to the realization of itself by a progressive approximation, and to the production in conduct of a relative liberty in the moral order. By showing the influence thus exerted by the idea of our power upon ourselves, we have rectified at once determinism and indeterminism; we have filled a gap, we have intercalated a mean term, we have brought about a higher synthesis; to the very bosom of determinism we have restored the element whereby it modifies itself, and imparts to itself an indefinite flexibility, by recognizing the idea of intelligent "auto-determination," which is at the foundation of what is called liberty!

"For a long time," as Taine has said, "men endure as a yoke the necessities which they ought to embrace as laws." But, we reply, Taine forgets that the very knowledge of necessities and of laws permits us, instead of "embracing" them, to release

(1) See our *Psychologie des idées-forces* (1893) and our *Evolutionisme des idées-forces* (1890).

ourselves, at least partially, from their yoke. If there are beneficent necessities, if there are maleficent ones, why require that we consent to the second as to the first, so long as determinism by becoming conscious may of itself change its own direction in accordance with a higher idea and a higher desire? Like the idea of liberty, the moral ideas of the good, of responsibility, of disinterestedness, of universal love, of the universal society of minds become progressively realizable by the very tendency to realize themselves which they include. To conceive and to desire the ideal, that is the beginning of its realization.¹ On the other hand, that immanent realization of the ideal is not at all in opposition to the laws and the very essence of nature. Mechanism is, in reality, only the mode of our representing the relations of things in space and in time. To that which appears to us as movement and figure corresponds, in the very depth itself of real existences, something analogous to our sensitive and appetitive life. It is the mental, not the physical, which is the source of everything, to mental states belong everywhere, with veritable reality, veritable forces. Accordingly the entire world is, in our view, what we have called a vast society in process of formation, in which minds can more and more free themselves from individual limitations, in order to know themselves and to unite with one another.² Thus, without falling into the unfathomable mysteries of a contingency real and absolute, we have refuted the fatalism, no less absolute, of which traces are visible still in the writings of Taine, and which ends in dissolving morality and immorality in a necessity that is always optimistic, and which terminates in universal satisfaction in view of the whole.³

The great rock on which geometric naturalism goes to pieces, is the possibility of something new. If logical and

(1) See the *Idée du droit en France, en Angleterre et en Allemagne* (1878), the *Science sociale contemporaine* (1880), the *Propriété sociale et la démocratie* (1884).

(2) See the *Mouvement idéaliste et la réaction contre la science* (1896) and the *Mouvement positiviste* (1896).

(3) See our *Critique des systèmes de morale contemporaine*.

mathematical necessity, as Taine contends, buries in the heart of things "its iron fangs," one may indeed, conceive, that the world functions as a vast mechanism and presents, now one, now another, of its different sides,—hence its diverse aspects. But beneath this variety there must be concealed, at bottom, an eternal monotony. Hence it will be possible, it will even be logical, to suppose, as did the physiologers of ancient Greece, that the combinations of things are "exhaustible," being those of elements ruled by necessity, and that consequently the same things must at last end in reproducing themselves in the same order, when once the "great year" has run its course, and brings back all the combinations to their point of departure. This theory which Heinrich Heine, Nägeli, and Blanqui have outlined, which Guyau in his "Verses of a Philosopher" had a glimpse of, which the physician Le Bon admitted, and which Nietzsche celebrated as a new gospel, is that of the eternal recurrence, in time and in space, of the same beings and the same events,—counterparts innumerable which reproduce themselves interminably: *eadem sunt omnia semper*. This strange conclusion might cast a suspicion upon those systems in which geometrical necessity alone is placed at the heart of things.

Evolution, by purely mechanical factors, imprisons within fixed limits the influence of the moral element, even if it does not deny it altogether; it closes the door to hope as an incentive to a moral progress in the world. This is what impressed us at the time we were writing our thesis on "Liberty and Determinism." By the doctrine of idea-forces we attempted to lay hold of the fact and to establish within its laws the practical power of the ideal, consequently the possibility of a progress perhaps unlimited. That is why we proposed a "philosophy of hope."¹ Beyond that we made it appear that the metaphysical conditions which make reality, instead of being in radical opposition to the ideal, on the contrary include the possibility of its realization. These conditions of possibility must be founded on some condition of

(1) *L'Evolutionisme des idées-forces*, 1890.

reality. Thus the ultimate problem of metaphysics reappears, with the various modes of representing it which may be given to that immanent principle of the world which makes the world capable of thought, of consciousness, of will, and of love.¹

(1) See the conclusion of our *Philosophie de Platon*, and of *La Liberté et le Déterminisme*.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

DECAY OF THE BELIEF IN THE DEVIL

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There is a marked tendency in cultivated religious circles to eliminate from Christian teaching the belief in a personal Devil; and it is at least a quarter of a century since any overt action was taken in his behalf by any member of the Anglican clergy. I refer to an incident which took place at Clifton. A beneficed clergyman refused the sacrament to one of his congregation who had publicly expressed his disbelief in the Devil. Public opinion in orthodox circles inclined, on the whole, to the side of the parishioner; and even religious reactionaries condemned the clergyman for raising an awkward point and unnecessarily disturbing the peace and unity of the flock.

Certainly, for half a century, English mothers of the upper class have carefully abstained from bringing up their little ones in the belief that a hideous enemy, as a rule invisible, and for that very reason the more terrible, is lying in wait and dogging their infant steps, ever ready to do them harm, and inspired by pure and unsleeping malignity towards all that are innocent and good. In my own memory, I can go back forty years to the Sundays when I was learning the English Church catechism at my mother's knee; and I remember how scrupulously careful she was, both on those days and during the week, when, every morning, my brothers and sisters and myself gathered round the table to read the Bible and prayer-book, to explain to us that the name Satan or Devil, was not the name of a real person, but a manner of signifying an impersonal evil principle.

Doubtless this teaching was a compromise, and a philosophical explanation which meant little to us; but I am certain that her scruples against the crude, old-fashioned teaching of a personal Devil were based on the most delicate perception of the highest needs of her own, as of all, little children,—who have too often in their surroundings, and, if they are not very robust, in their very digestive systems, more than enough to make them timid and nervous. It is unspeakably cruel to frighten children with supernatural bogies; for their own little souls are apt to call up only too many terrors of the dark without being intimidated by older people who should know better. Love of and trust in man and nature, rather than dread of an unseen, malignant foe, are the proper sentiments in which to rear a child; and those who in childhood are nursed on supernatural terrors grow up to be cruel, superstitious, fanatical, and false.

Sixty years ago the author of the "*Lyra Apostolica*," filled with forebodings of a decay of dogmatic belief, wrote of "*Liberalism*" thus:—

"O new-ventured art
Of the ancient Foe!—but what, if it extends
O'er our own camp, and rules amid our friends?"

But in respect of the belief we are discussing, as in respect of many others, Newman himself lived to witness a great change steal over the best religious minds of his age. Let us take so representative a writer as Dean Farrar of Canterbury, and ask how he treats of the episode of the temptation of Jesus Christ by the Devil in the ninth chapter of his "*Life of Christ*,"—the best known and most popular of his many works. It is true that he begins his paragraph with the words, "The struggle was, as is evident, no mere allegoric semblance." And at the top of the page as a headline we read this, "*The Temptation Real*." Nevertheless the following note lurks at the foot of the same page:—

"Very few writers in the present day will regard the story of the temptation as a narrative of objective facts. Even Lange gives the story a natural turn, and supposes that the tempter may have acted through the intervention

of human agency. Not only Hase and Weisse, but even Olshausen, Neander, Ullmann, and many orthodox commentators, make the narrative entirely symbolical, and treat it as a profound and eternally significant parable."

In his text also, Dean Farrar repudiates any wish to examine "the exact external nature of the temptation." To do so would, in his opinion, be "at once superfluous and irreverent." And after a little he adds that "from Origen down to Schleiermacher, some have regarded it as a vision or allegory,—the symbolic description of a purely inward struggle." And he says in conclusion, "On this point, which is a matter of mere exegesis, each must hold the view which seems to him most in accordance with the truth."

The reader who is not hypnotized by the fragrancy of Dean Farrar's rhetoric, might pause here and ask how was the temptation *real*, if the story of it be not a "narrative of objective facts." How real, if it was but a parable, however profound and eternally significant? How can he reconcile the statement in the text that "the struggle was no mere allegoric semblance" with that in the note that the narrative may be "entirely symbolical."

It is evident that a certain scepticism has eaten its way deep into the mind of Dean Farrar, as into the minds of the cultivated Anglican clergy of which he is one of the brightest ornaments. He is far from the robust faith in the particulars of Holy Writ which characterized a former age. In our old illustrated family Bibles, so far from being voted merely symbolical, the narrative of the temptation was held to be capable of pictorial representation, and many are the old prints in which the Devil advances towards Jesus, looking half-goat and half-dancing-master. In the Middle Ages he was popularly supposed to have transformed himself for the occasion into a friar; and any ecclesiastic who embarked, like Dean Farrar, on a discussion of "the objective or subjective reality of the entire event," and displayed so clear a leaning to the "subjective" interpretation, would have been sent straight to the stake by any court of inquisitors.

Dean Farrar's "Life of Christ" is so popular a book that it is small wonder if it finds imitators. Accordingly, in the most

recent work of the same kind, "The Life of the Master" by John Watson, D. D. ("Ian Maclaren"),¹ we meet with the following passage :—

"It is a reasonable question whether the circumstances of the temptation were actual or figurative. Did the Evil One appear in bodily shape to Jesus? Was Jesus actually placed on a pinnacle of the Temple? Were the kingdoms of the world shown to him as in a magical mirror? Or did Jesus, in relating this experience to his friends afterwards, clothe spiritual events in physical dress, to convey by a picture what had happened in his soul? The essential truth of the narrative and the reality of the incident are the same either way, and each person will conceive it as best suits his own mind; but the spiritual interpretation has advantages."

Like Dean Farrar, Dr. Watson pretends to preserve the reality of the incident at the same time that he explains it away as something that happened "in the soul" of Jesus. With equal facility the story of the miraculous birth of Christ as related in the first chapter of Matthew might be explained away as a little drama that took place in the souls of the parents, and quite compatible with the physical fatherhood of Joseph, which, indeed, is alleged by the most ancient Syriac, and some old Greek, texts that end the genealogy of Christ with the express words, "Joseph begat Jesus."

Mr. Gore, now bishop of Worcester, is the most intellectual writer of which the advanced or High party in the English Church can boast. He has wielded by pen and personal magic a wide and deep influence over the younger clergy. He has founded among them what is really a monastic order; and first as chief librarian of the Pusey House in Oxford, and later as a canon of Westminster, he has been able, so to speak, to form a school of religious thought all of his own. It is of interest, therefore, to inquire how he looks at a problem, in attempted solution of which so highly trained a divine as Dean Farrar feels himself constrained to give way to such ambiguous utterances.

Bishop Gore, then, in his volume of "Dissertations on the Incarnation" is inclined to discuss the Devil and his phalanx of evil

(1) Published by Hodder & Stoughton: London, 1902.

spirits under the same rubric with the angels of the Old and New Testaments. He declares "the question of diabolic agency and temptation" to be one "which really concerns the permanent spiritual struggle of mankind." He repudiates the suggestion that "our Lord, without emphasizing the existence of 'spirits,' connived in regard to it at popular belief and language"; and he avers that in the contemporary controversy about the existence of angels and spirits between the Pharisees and Sadducees the Lord must have taken sides with the former:—

"Our Lord's language certainly reaches the level of positive teaching about good, and still more about bad, spirits * * * * He must have related his own temptation to his disciples, in which the personal agency of Satan is vividly presented. He speaks with great simplicity of the Devil, as disseminating evil and hindering good (Mat. xiii. 39; Luke viii. 12). He warns Peter of an explicit demand made by him upon the souls of the apostles (Luke xxii. 31). He deals with demons with unmistakable seriousness, emphasis, and frequency. He sees Satan behind moral and physical evil (Luke xiii. 16; John viii. 44)."

These remarks are entirely just; and there is no use to try to disguise the fact that in the mind of Jesus, as revealed in the Synoptic Gospels, Satan and his legions occupied just as important a place and played as prominent a rôle as in the mental outlook of other Jews of that age, and of believers in every age precedent to our own. That many devout persons today, as Mr. Gore remarks, "find a scandal in angelic appearances" and much more in diabolic ones, is a striking proof of the religious metamorphosis which has begun and must yet go on indefinitely; although the conviction will have to accompany it that Jesus, in all his doings and sayings with regard to evil spirits, was merely a son of his age, laboring under the same human ignorance and delusions as the Jews around him. Mr. Gore, indeed, alleges that "the teaching and method of Jesus Christ with regard to Satan and the 'demons,' when compared with current Jewish lore, exhibit a marked independence and originality owing to their entire freedom from elements of superstition." And he explains his meaning by adding that in "exorcising" demons, he did "by

simple moral authority what the Jewish exorcists did by incantations and charms." Mr. Gore, it is clear, admits,—what the New Testament indeed alleges,—that the power of Jewish exorcists over demons was as real as was our Lord's, only taking effect by more cumbrous means than did his. And to exemplify what he understands by incantations and charms, he quotes in a foot-note the recovered Chaldee text of Tobit, which relates (Ch. vi. 16, 17) how a demon that was infesting a woman fled when the heart of a fish was taken and smoked underneath her garments. But, after all, which is the more wonderful in itself and the greater miracle, that an evil spirit should flee from a bit of toasted fish or from the presence and reproach of the Son of God? Surely the former. If the Jewish incantations and exorcisms, though less direct as a method than Christ's verbal commands, were nevertheless equally effective in attaining the desired end, namely, the expulsion of the evil spirits, why in contrast with his methods should they be considered by Mr. Gore either as superstitious or lacking originality? Jesus agreed, at any rate, with the exorcists of his own and of other ages in what was, after all, the essence and focus of their superstition, namely, in the ascription of physical disease and of bad weather to evil and unclean spirits.

If we found it related in any hagiology that Satan or one of his servants raised a tempest on the sea, and that a particular saint, fearing that his bark would be submerged by the angry waves, stood upon the poop and rebuked the wind and waves, and that there at once followed a calm, it is probable that Mr. Gore would immediately reject the narrative as superstitious and wanting in originality. He would almost certainly repudiate the idea that there are special storm-demons lashing the waves to fury with their breath.

Yet this is precisely the narrative related in the oldest stratum of the Gospels (Mark iv. 35-41; Mat. viii. 23-27; Luke viii. 22-25). Jesus, we read, awoke and *rebuked* the wind, and said unto the sea, *Be thou silent, be thou muzzled*. And the wind wearied,

and there was a great calm. * * * And they feared exceedingly, and said one to the other, who then is this, that even the wind and the sea *obey* him?

Observe how the leading phrases here are the characteristic ones of demonological belief. "He *rebuked*"; in the Greek *ἐπετίμησεν*. So in Mark ix. 25, "he *rebuked*" the dumb and deaf spirit, saying, I command thee, come out. So in Luke iv. 39, "he *rebuked*" the fever, and in iv. 41 "he *rebuked*" the devils that recognized him as the Son of God and *suffered them not to speak*.

"Be silent, be muzzled;" here a slipshod English version has concealed from its readers the demonological stamp of the original Greek, *σιώπα, πεφίμωσο*. A little before, in Mark i. 25, he uses this very formula to the unclean spirit which possessed a man in the synagogue and which recognized him as the Holy One of God. Jesus, we read, *rebuked* this spirit (*ἐπετίμησεν*), and said, Be thou muzzled (*φιμώθητι*) and come out of him. And the same phrase recurs in Luke iv. 35.

"The wind and sea *obey* him" (*ὑπακούουσιν*): so in Mark i. 27, we read of how the people in the synagogue who had witnessed the expulsion of the unclean spirit by use of the same formula as he used to wind and waves, "were all amazed, inso-much that they questioned among themselves, saying, what is this? A new teaching? With authority he commandeth even the unclean spirits and they *obey* him" (*ὑπακούουσιν*).

The wind and waves, therefore, were, for the evangelists, vehicles of Satan and evil spirits; and this is the interpretation which the Fathers, S. Ephrem for example, put upon the narrative. Christian artists as late as the Renaissance did the same. In another passage of the Gospels, Luke iv. 39, Jesus took his stand over against Simon's wife's mother who was "holden" with fever; he *rebuked* (*ἐπετίμησεν*) the fever, and it left her. There was, therefore, a fever-demon as well as a storm-demon. Obviously the writer of the Gospel, and Christ also, if it is credible, moved in that stage of intellectual development in which not only mental disease, but all forms of physical disease, are attributed to

special classes of demons. We still find such beliefs dominant in the East, and in an ancient city altars were commonly raised to the god *Puretos*, or Fever.

There are writers, like Dean Farrar, who, though explaining all cases of so-called demoniacal possession outside the Gospels by natural causes, are yet "not prepared to deny that in the dark and desperate age which saw the Redeemer's advent there *may* have been forms of madness which owed their more immediate manifestation to evil powers."¹ As if the demons of the New Testament had been created *ad hoc*, in order that the Saviour might have them to expel. Such a theory, remarks Professor E. B. Tylor, in the article, "Demonology," in the ninth edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, p. 61, "seems too like a discussion whether the earth was really flat in the ages when it was believed to be so, but became round since astronomers provided a different explanation of the same phenomena."

It is not a little characteristic of our age that this subject should have been assigned for treatment by the editors of the Encyclopædia, not to a theologian, but to the leading anthropologist and student of the mind and manners of the prehistoric or savage races of mankind.

It is in no carping spirit that I have written what precedes. But it is surely right to protest against the make-believe of popular divines like Drs. Farrar and Watson that everything remains just as it was before, after they have allegorized away the plain and direct meaning of crucial passages. Bishop Gore says very justly that, "On the whole, it is impossible to treat His (i. e. Jesus') language about spirits as 'economical' without giving profound unreality to His teaching as a whole."

I think so too, and *not* "on the whole," but absolutely. And when the bishop introduces this qualification in a sentence intended to sum up his conclusions, may it not be that he is conscious of a certain internal revolt from his own standards of literalness? Even he is touched with the modern spirit, other-

(1) *Life of Christ*, Chap. 23.

wise he would scarcely seek to illustrate and elucidate the story of the temptation from "the phenomena of temptation, as experienced by ourselves." For what are these phenomena, which he suggests to be analogous to the experiences of Christ so vividly depicted in the Gospels. They are merely "evil thoughts" which "come to us," though they "are alien from all our convictions and all our sympathies." They are "doubts which we have deliberately confronted, examined, and concluded to be absolutely destitute of force,—doubts about the very existence of God, or about the authority of Christ, or about the reality of our own redemption. Sometimes the assaults take another form. Evil fires which we thought we had quenched are suddenly rekindled by unseen hands" * * *

These lines which Bishop Gore cites from Dr. Dale's "Lectures on the Ephesians" have a truth of their own, and a very profound one. In all moral conflicts the individual conscience is the one and only battlefield of contending wills, or, if we prefer it, spirits of right and wrong. I am the arena in which the spiritual hosts contend. I am both sinner and sinned against. I alone in this mortal affray am guide and general, and the claim of another human being to direct my conscience is as idle as his claim to be able to forgive me. I forgive myself, I that am at once accuser and accused, righteous judge and quailing criminal, tempter and tempted.

But when Bishop Gore dimly hints that the above is "the substantial truth of these evangelical narratives," and when Dean Farrar and Ian Maclaren boldly assert that they were meant as allegories of an inner moral conflict, it is impossible to go with them. If Jesus Christ as the Son of Man was "the spiritual teacher of mankind, having a perfect insight into the spiritual condition of our human life," to use Mr. Gore's words, is it conceivable that he would have left us the narrative of the temptation, when all the time he intended only to convey to us what had happened in his soul?

And how, again, are fever-demons and storm-demons and demons of rheumatism explicable as "evil thoughts" or "doubts"? These

divines whose elucidations we have set ourselves to examine, because they are typical of so much modern exegesis of the Gospels, are pouring new wine into old bottles; and their explanations have only to be set side by side with those which the earliest and the latest Fathers of the Church provide on every page, to realize how completely modern ecclesiastics have themselves drifted away from the moorings of old-time orthodoxy.

How different an atmosphere we breathe when we open the books of Christian writers and apologists of the first ages! Take Justin Martyr for example, who lived and wrote only one hundred years after the crucifixion, and listen to his explanation of the words of the dying Christ, "Father, into thy hands I commit my soul." This petition, he says, was offered because the lower air is full of Satanic angels and powers, as shameless as they are evil; and Christ feared that at his decease his soul might be caught and mastered by them. These evil spirits, he assures us, are the children of the wicked angels, whose leader Satan was seen by Jesus to fall like a star from heaven. They haunt the earth and delude pagans into offering them sacrifices and food and drink, persuading them that they are gods. They manifest themselves to our eyes in bodily shape. They deflower maidens, and, masquerading as gods, they were the true agents and perpetrators of all the crimes and abominable sins narrated in the *chronique scandaleuse* of the pagan Olympus. They are lastly the authors of heresies among Christian believers, and inspire the heathen governors of the world to persecute the faith. The name of Jesus Christ is above all other names in respect of the terror with which it fills them. Armed with that name the believer is safe from their worst assaults; not but what other names, for example that of Abraham's God, are also efficacious against them, if used in adjurations to go forth from those of whom they have taken possession. It is specially the restless spirits of the dead that enter into the living and drive them mad.

And the writings of Origen, who lived early in the third century, and is reputed the most philosophical of the Christian fathers, are a veritable storehouse of information about the Satanic hosts. He

tells us how they have shapes which admit of being engraved upon gems; how their bodies are formed of a spiritual material, subtle and thin as air. How they charge themselves with the heavy vapors of earth and so render themselves incapable of soaring into the higher heavens. How it is to their agency that are due plagues and famines and the storms in which mariners perish. They snuff up the reek of the animal sacrifices offered to them by their pagan votaries, and batten on the blood which is the soul or vital principle of the victims. Thus they are fattened and fortified for their malignant campaign against the Christians, who by refusing to make offerings to them can starve them out and reduce them to inanition and impotence. Hence the urgent necessity of repudiating the sacrifices of the heathen. Hence the peculiar spite of the outraged gods and goddesses against the followers of Christ. These demons, according to Origen, have their own special languages and dialects, which they understand and in which the workers of magic—no mean art in Origen's opinion—must address them, if they would be heard and helped. Some demons talk Greek, others Latin, others Persian, Chaldee, Scythian, or Egyptian. Some have a language of their own, familiar to and spoken by demoniacs. The Greek papyri dug up today in Egypt are full of the gibberish of demons. They enter not into human beings alone, but into the brutes as well. It was one of the peculiar gifts of the Holy Ghost in the Early Church to be able to exorcise and drive out these pests.

According to Tertullian the rivers are full of demons, who are on the watch to seize the unwary passer-by, to drag him down under the waters and drown him. The very ancient liturgies still used all over the East to commemorate the baptism of Jesus, relate that the old dragon himself was lurking in the waters of the Jordan when the Saviour approached and slew him, so hallowing and purifying for future baptismal uses the element of water. Tertullian believed as naïvely as any Teutonic heathen in the reality of water-sprites and river gods, and in his treatise on baptism, written about 200 A. D., he argues from the cer-

tainty of their dwelling in the waters to the possibility of the Holy Spirit being introduced and made immanent in the same waters through Christian invocations.

Even the Christian churches were not free from demons, who, according to Justin Martyr, had listened at the cracks of door and window, and learned by heart the Christian mysteries, especially the Eucharist, in order to betray them to the worshipers of Mithras. They even infested the inside of the churches, and Tertullian insists on St. Paul's injunction that women should veil their heads in church, because, if they did not, the fallen angels, who were wicked demons, were likely to enter them through their ears and impregnate them. They were forever hovering about, like ghouls, in the air, not far from the earth; and Athanasius, the great champion of orthodoxy in the fourth century, assures us that the reason why the Saviour was lifted up on a cross, instead of being beheaded or dying by some other death, was that he might reach the demons in their own peculiar region and there vanquish them.

Nor is it in Christian writers that we find the closest analogues to the demonological narratives of the Gospels, but in Josephus and in the "Life of Apollonius of Tyana" written by Philostratus with the help of the memorials handed down by a Syro-Greek disciple of the sage named Damis. Josephus relates how God allowed Solomon to acquire all the lore of controlling demons for the succor and healing of mankind, and how Solomon composed and left to posterity incantations which charm away disease, and formulas of exorcism by which one can bind the demons and chase them out of men, so that they will never return. He had himself seen a demon drawn out of a man through his nose by a fellow Jew named Eleazar in the presence of the Emperor Vespasian. It was done by giving the demoniac a ring to smell, in which was fixed a root revealed by Solomon. The evil spirit threw the man down as it left him, and as it passed from him tipped over a basin of water which Eleazar had put in its way, in order to convince the Emperor that the demon had really left the man.

So the sage Appollonius, about 70-100 A. D., would fix his gaze on a person possessed, and the wraith within would utter cries of fear and rage, as of persons who are being burned and tortured, and swear that he would leave the individual possessed and never again fall upon any one.¹ On one occasion the sage commanded a demon to go forth from a youth and throw down a statue as he went out, in proof that he was gone. And the statue first shook a little and then fell prone on the ground.

The time-spirit has filched away from the minds of the most intelligent believers of today the belief in an evil being, prince, or ruler of the visible world, forever troubling men, especially the righteous, with corporeal apparitions of himself. Instead of exorcising the mad, we send them into an asylum, where they are properly looked after. In Great Britain, except in remote corners of Cornwall, of Ireland, and of the Scotch Highlands, and among Celts, one never hears of magical cures and incantations which will alleviate sickness and arrest bleeding. Two hundred years ago a drug or remedy signified for most people a charm which operated by occult and supernatural power and of which the efficacy had no relation, chemically or physiologically, to the diseased or wounded tissues it was supposed to heal. It was usually some herb, plucked from the grave of a malefactor at full moon, like Solomon's root used with such effect by Eleazar. The cures of Jesus excited so much surprise among his contemporaries because they were effected by his word and look alone, and needed no adventitious aid of magical drugs; though even he would send on his patients to the priests to be finally purified by magical ablutions from the unclean spirit's visitation. In the age of the Gospels, every one from the beggar in the streets to the Emperor on the throne believed in the existence of demons infesting men and animals, haunting trees and rivers, even inhabiting statues as their tenements. It was only a question of which name was most potent in exorcism, and in Acts xviii. 16, Gallio drave from the judgment-seat the Jews, who were rioting about

(1) Cf. Acts ix. 16.

mere words and names ; that is to say, were assailing Paul for invoking the name of Jesus Christ as a defence against the invisible powers of evil rather than the names of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. In that age, as in the ages that followed, there was thus a background of demonological belief into which fitted the stories which are a stumbling-block to modern divines like Farrar and Ian Maclaren. In the age of the Reformation, this background of belief in evil spirits causing madness and sickness and bad weather was still intact, and entered as a factor into men's lives and conduct to a degree which only those can realize who will consult the literature of that age. Even Luther, who burst so many bonds of superstition, never questioned the reality of the visits which the Devil paid him. Witness such a passage from his diary as this : " Early this morning, when I awoke, the fiend came and began disputing with me. ' Thou art a great sinner,' said he. I replied, ' Canst thou not tell me something new, Satan ? ' "

With the disappearance from the minds of the cultivated of the belief in Satan and his angels, a great part of the narrative of the New Testament has been left hanging in the air, and without any points of attachment in the minds of believers. On the one hand, our divines are bound by a traditional reverence for the letter of the Bible not to question openly any of its narratives. On the other hand, their views of man, of the universe, of Providence, and of the general course of history, of what is possible and probable, have undergone such a revolution that narratives like the temptation, the swine of Gadara, even the angelic apparitions are mere stumbling-blocks. In the English Church, moreover, their ordination vows and in the Non-Conformist congregations the chapel deeds, commit them to an outworn belief ; and there is always a minority of obscurantists ready to hurl at them hard words like " sceptic," " rationalist," " backslider," and " atheist," if they venture to speak out. Most of them, therefore, feel the ice so thin that they carefully avoid a discussion of miracles or of evil spirits. If they cannot avoid it,

they mechanically restate standpoints which they have really overcome, repeating parrot-like the formulæ of another age. Their position is lamentable. They ought to lead their flock on in the march of intellectual progress. Instead of doing so, they must affect to lag behind. "They are to execute, without power; they are to be responsible, without discretion; they are to deliberate, without choice." Small wonder that the English clergy are given up to petty quarrels about lights and incense, when they may not boldly grapple with the great issues of belief, which yet are in everybody's mind. The result is that an ever increasing number of laymen dispense with their ministrations, and leave a blank too often filled by weak women who want a priest assuming miraculous attributes to direct their consciences.

Nor is it in Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic communities alone that there has set in a decay of those demonological beliefs, which, after it has gone a certain way, cannot but give an air of strangeness, unreality, and isolation to much of the New Testament. At Venice I was recently loitering in the lovely garden of the island-Convent of San Lazzaro with some of the brethren, who are in communion with the Latin Church, and I mentioned that the rest of my party had gone that day to visit Chioggia. "What charm," asked one of my monkish friends, "has Chioggia? The people there are so sunk ('abbrutiti') in superstition." "What do you mean?" I answered. "Oh," he said, "they all believe whenever they are sick or insane, that they have devils inside them plaguing them. We in this convent know it to be so, for they come every week to us asking us to expel their demons with our exorcisms." "And you do so?" I asked. "Yes, at least we take them into church to read the prayers of our *Mashdotz*¹ over them, and they say they are the better for it." "But you do not believe in their evil spirits?" "No, we only consent to

(1) The *Mashdotz* or Armenian euchologion is a book of prayers for various occasions. The prayers in it, to be said over the sick and over lunatics, go back to the fifth century, and of course envisage all physical and moral evil as due to the direct inworking and indwelling of Satan and his evil spirits.

do it, because our founder, the saintly Mekhitar, two hundred years ago used to exorcise them, and we follow the tradition he has left us."

It is not, of course, to be denied that even in England the belief in possession lurks still among the uneducated! A few years ago old nurses were wont to say of turbulent children that they were behaving "as if they were possessed." This phrase was, however, a mere survival from a former age. But I lately had a reminder that in the class from which domestics are drawn a belief in the possibility of personal assault by the Evil One lingers a little under the surface. A maid-servant, belonging to one of the women's colleges, had been out with her lover without leave from her mistress and was returning late along my road, at the top of which lived the lamented Professor Nettleship. Now the latter had a large yellow dog that took the usual canine delight in seeing cats scatter and flee, and, the better to pounce on them when they were stealthily crossing the street, he would perch himself on the top of the professor's garden wall, surrounded and half hidden in foliage. As the truant maid-servant passed beneath him, he caught sight of a cat in the middle of the road, and making a spring at it collided with her and knocked her down. She picked herself up and ran screaming home, almost mad with terror, because, as she said, the Devil had jumped on her back and thrown her down.

Today we only smile at such an incident, but our forefathers would have gravely discussed her story and believed it, and the same influence of modern enlightenment pervades even those circles in which planchette and the gazing crystal, the waltzing table and the medium, work their wondrous feats. The people who have a penchant for such diversions are not so much afraid of being put down as dupes as of being reckoned to be superstitious by their neighbors. Accordingly, they subscribe to psychological research societies, whose function is to examine critically, to sift statements, if possible to weigh and measure the manifestations of the hidden spirits. All the terms and categories of mathematical and physical science are invoked by these

investigators, with whom one cannot mix even a little without perceiving that nervous diseases have passed forever from the domain of the exorcist and inquisitor into that of the *soi-disant* researcher, who even if he falls short of his professions, nevertheless does not want to burn you, and even if he be superstitious, is so in ways that are humane and harmless, and not grim, gloomy, and atrocious.

FAIRY LORE AND PRIMITIVE RELIGION

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In two ways the modern reader is brought into contact with conceptions of early faith: to Greek divinities belongs a diminishing measure of symbolic authority, and through tales familiar to the nursery every child acquires some acquaintance with the motives and scenes of fairydom, the artistic transformation of which he afterwards enjoys in "Midsummer Night's Dream" and "The Tempest." It will be the object of these pages to indicate the manner in which fairy mythology, apparently light and fantastic, nevertheless represents the serious belief and worship of early religious life.

First may be shown the illuminating history contained in the word. Only from Elizabethan time has the term *fairy*, properly descriptive of qualities and character, come to be applied as a class designation. The older name, *fay*, is a modification of the French feminine *fee*, through a vulgar Latin *fada* descended from *fata*, a form maintained in Italian speech. Rare is the corresponding masculine *fè* from *fadus*, *fatus*; in occasional application to males the English word has preserved a token that such spirits originally belonged to either sex. The Latin designations are themselves variants of an older neuter *fatum*; such evolution supplies a second example of a qualitative transformed to an appellative.

Fatum, our *fate*, signifies that which is spoken,—destiny conceived as the declaration of a god. In Roman thought, there-

fore, *fatum* or *speech* has played a part analogous to that taken by the *logos* or *word* in Christian theology. The metaphor may have been dependent on oracular usage. Long before the rise of great cities, it had been the custom of the Latins to forecast the future by the consultation of deities who usually resided in localities likely to inspire awe, in the secluded cave of a mountain or in the shadow of a sacred grove. The inquiry was answered through the lips of a medium, a priest, or more commonly a priestess, whose reply was rendered in sentences pronounced under the inspiration of the deity. Such utterance would be the god's *fatum*, which, as declaring the will of a being able to carry into effect his purpose, would constitute a rule of life. For a while the prediction would possess a validity dependent only on the power of the particular divine being. In process of time, an early theologian desirous to integrate and concord the variety of local customs, would be able to make a bold generalization; he would infer that if consulted in a ritual manner, all shrines stood on an equal footing, that the response of one god must of necessity agree with that of another. He ventured to designate this prophetic ability under a common, impersonal name, and by so doing eliminated the element of caprice, and made a long stride in the direction of monotheism. His theory would be subject to the usual course of elevated conceptions; the multitude who had been educated in older notions would appropriate the new language, but bestow on it a connotation adapted to coördinate it with ancient beliefs. The abstract term was personified, and the personal quality expressed by a termination which recognized gender; in the time of Nero, Petronius uses a masculine *fatus*, alternating with the original neuter.

Latin religion, however, was not left free to complete an independent career. When the time came at which in the order of nature it should have blossomed into art and literature, it encountered a kindred faith in which piety had received a form so incomparable as to supersede the necessity of further effort. Hellenic belief, imported into Rome, brought about a recast of Italian ideas. In Greece, also, the doctrine of foreordination had

obtained acceptance, but with the usual variation of kindred tongues, had received expression by the aid of a different metaphor. The portion of happiness or misery assigned to each individual had come to be called his *moira* or share; the original reference was probably to the public banquet, in which the allowance of food bestowed on each guest would have depended on his rank. With the usual change of quality to appellation, the word became personal; Moira, as a feminine deity, took her place in the pantheon, where she was conceived in fashions varying according to the degree of ethical sentiment,—now as the agent of a ruler of life, now as a power behind the throne of all divinities. As a female, the goddess would occupy herself with the ordinary tasks of women, would ply the spindle and twine the yarn. Such employment lent itself to metaphorical application; a poet imagined the fragile thread to typify the uncertain life of man. Seeing that existence has beginning and end, the name received a plural; the Allotter was added to the Weaver, and one of the triads favored by Greek myth was created by the addition of the Unalterable. The poetic idea, already appearing in Hesiod, found favor, determined artistic presentation, and eventually descended to the folk. As the Moirai are three on monuments, so even to the present day in Greek folk-lore they appear as a trio. Together with other Hellenic deities, the Sharers were welcomed to Rome; in seeking a translation, the word *fatum* seemed to present an equivalent; the Fata were, therefore, regarded as trinal and feminine. It was natural to bestow on the name a feminine desinence; Latin epigraphy shows that under the Empire the givers of destiny were worshiped through the Roman world under the title of Fata, as in older euphemistic address they had been entitled Parcæ or Sparers.

That the appellation received currency in all Romance tongues, and that the Fates superseded other luck-bringing powers, requires a further explanation; this, I think, is to be found in their association with a particular birth rite, itself of Greek origin and a relatively late importation.

The ends of early religion are practical. If an oracle be

consulted, it is with the view of obtaining guidance in action. Let philosophers affirm as they please the unchangeableness of fate, common sense holds that any perils which can be foreseen may also be avoided. On the other hand, with accustomed inconsistency, worshipers argue that if a prophecy is certainly to be effectual, it is all-important to make sure that it shall be favorable; to secure a prosperous future it is necessary to obtain a satisfactory weird; accordingly, it becomes a problem of ritual procedure to bribe, coax, or compel the rulers of life into the bestowal of an agreeable promise. The disposition engendered by dining is known to be kindly; it is not easy to be hard on one's host, if his food and wine have been found acceptable. In order to procure from the Sharers a favorable forecast, it will be proper to provide them with a cheerful banquet. At what period ought such precaution to be taken? Obviously, it will be wise to begin with the beginning; the time to ensure the babe's future is before its budding life is blighted by a frost, against which precautions might have been taken, if the peril had been foreseen. The Moirai, therefore, were invited to be present after the birth, in order that they might partake of the proffered repast, enter into relations of hospitality, and favorably weird the infant. On vases and on marbles of the Roman period, they figure in birth scenes, in company with the divinity whose office it is to usher in the newcomer. Corresponding with this is their mention in literature. As far back as the fifth century before our era can be traced the myth that on the seventh day after the birth of Meleager, the Moirai appeared and foretold his career. They affirmed, says the abbreviated report, that the child would survive only until the consumption of the brand then burning on the hearth; Althæa, inspired by an ingenious prudence, seized the stick, and deposited it in her coffer; the hero survived to the day on which the giver of his being, animated by ancient ideas of the duty of blood vengeance, saw fit to avenge on her son the death of her brothers, who had perished at his hands.

It is natural to suppose that the Greek story must have had a ritual origin; and the correctness of such a conjecture is placed

beyond doubt by the continuance on Hellenic soil of the ceremonial act with which the tale was associated. This is the fating of the babe, still supposed to be accomplished by the Moirai, who are summoned to a feast at which kindred are present, on a day variously fixed as the third, fifth, or seventh after nativity. At Kassus on the Ægean, these spirits are presumed to appear after the lapse of seven days. The nurse, after suspending and incensing the infant, utters an appeal to the "Moirai of the Moirai," "asking them to arrive and bestow a happy weird; after such invocation, the child is dressed in the best garments of the father or mother, and a table is set, on which are placed three rolls of bread, and in the centre a basin of honey, with three newly made candles on the rim. In the presence of relatives and friends, the candles are lighted; one is named after Christ, a second after the Virgin, and the third after the Baptist; amid deep silence, broken only by the cries of the babe, the creed is recited, and the saint whose candle is first consumed is hailed as patron of the newcomer. The Moirai are then supposed to appear, to fate the child, and to accept something from the table."¹

One feature of this ceremony, the taking of omens from the duration of the lights and the consequent choice of a patron, furnishes an extraordinary example of the persistence of religious usage. In his commentary on the First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, Chrysostom mentions the practice in his own day of naming several candles, and of bestowing on the infant the appellation belonging to that which lasted longest; it is clear that the rite belonged to the name-day of the child, while the fating formed part of the same series of observances. The modern custom illustrates the object of the usage noticed by the Greek Father; this had been a pagan observance designed to obtain for the newly born a spiritual protector after whom the babe was named. The principal distinction of the Christian survival is, that instead of one of the ancestral spirits of the family a great personage of the faith is preferred as guardian. Again, the existing observance (as

(1) N. G. Polites, *Μελέτη ἐπὶ τοῦ βίου τῶν νεωτέρων Ἑλλήνων*. Athens, 1871, p. 212.

has not been observed) is explanatory of the ancient classic myth; the brand saved by Althæa must have been one from a number of named torches, which by outlasting the others indicated the divine protector, and bestowed on Meleager his name; being in this manner associated with his life, the preservation of the charred fragment would be no more than a reasonable act of precaution.

In some Greek localities the fating of the child has been connected with the christening; but in Sikinos the usage has been postponed to the first birthday. A table is spread with lights, cake, and wine; the infant is undressed and laid on the table, after which the Moirai are supposed to enter and to make their predictions, the nature of which is inferred from objects placed within the infant's reach, his destiny being indicated by that first touched. In other localities the Moirai are imagined to write on the brow certain marks, which the nurses profess to understand, and which constitute an inscription declaring the weird.

This rite became diffused throughout the entire Roman world; a mention of Tertullian shows that in his time the *Fata Scribunda* (Writing Fates; the title may be explained by the belief last noted) were summoned on the ninth day. A variety of evidence makes it plain that in Western Europe the custom became general, and so continued during the Middle Ages. In the eleventh century Burchardus of Worms complains of the popular superstition which assigned to the deities called *Parcæ* the power of bestowing on a child any fate they might choose to award. He states that on certain days a table, with three knives, was spread for the *fatales deæ*, to the end that they might be refreshed and bless the habitation. It is evident that these divinities would be summoned also at a birth, although that is not recorded. As late as the fifteenth century, Alfonsus de Spina could affirm of the Fates that they were women who shed spiritual influence on creatures newly born. Absence of mention of a superstitious custom is no proof of its non-existence; during the millenniums of Greek usage, neither history nor letters furnish a notice. It is the more gratifying that testimony to the mediæval practice is found in French romances. The poem of Guillaume au Cort Nez (late twelfth or

early thirteenth century) informs us that in Provence and other kingdoms it had formerly been usual to spread a table, on which were set three loaves, three pots of wine, and as many cups. The babe was laid on the table, and friends of the family invited. In the tale, three fays appear; one unwraps the child, one lights up the fire, and warms it, and a third once more apparels the infant; they take their seats and eat, after which they endow the object of their care with all fortunate gifts. This account might serve for a description of the rite as now performed in Greece; the introduction of Provence belongs to the scenery of the romance, while the mention is founded on reminiscence or observation of French practice.

Modern fairy tales abound in allusions to the ceremony. Perrault represents fairies as invited to the christening of a heroine on whom they bestow their several gifts; that in such mention he follows the example of older romances is shown by the tale of Huon of Bordeaux, where fays attend a merrymaking at the nativity of Auberon; one, displeased with her reception, sentences him to be a dwarf, but as an atonement for harshness endows him with beauty. The title of *marraine* or godmother, bestowed on the fairies of nursery tales, itself exhibits the combination of pagan and Christian ceremonies on which the representation depends.

The custom of fating the babe was not confined to the limits of the Roman world. In old Norse literature, Norns are substituted for Fates, as in the lay of Helgi in the poetic Edda, where these spirits appear to weird the infant; that the trait has been borrowed from classic or romantic sources is shown by adherence to the metaphor of the thread. Saxo Grammaticus relates that Fridleif, desirous to obtain a favorable weird for his son Olaf, goes to the house of the gods, where he sees three maids sitting in the cell; these recite the boy's destiny, two giving beauty and generosity, but the third a malignant disposition. Here the ceremony takes place in the temple, and perhaps there were variants of the ritual performance in which this was the case. In the romance of Brun de la Montaigne, the fating hap-

pens at a fairy well, whither the father carries the child. In the saga of Nornagest occurs a parallel to the myth of Meleager; the weirding is done by Völur (spae-women), who utter predictions over the cradle above which burn two candles; the youngest Norn, incensed by neglect and rudeness, declares that the boy shall live no longer than one of the lights; the oldest sister takes the indicated candle, which she commends to the charge of the mother. The narrative may be imitated from the classic myth; but even in this case the additional features with which the reciter has invested the incident display a knowledge of the custom as otherwise known.

It will not be doubted that the mediæval mentions refer to the birth ceremony as anciently recorded; the only question can be whether these references may be explained as reminiscences of an extinct custom, or whether the rite was practiced in Europe as late as the twelfth century. To my mind the evidence is sufficient to establish the latter alternative; there is reason to believe that at the period noted, the practice of weirding the babe and inviting the Fates occupied in France and Anglo-Norman England a place answering to that which it still holds in modern Greece. It is evident that the observance belonged to folk-lore in the full sense of that word; was familiar, that is to say, in every class of society. The superstitions connected with the name-day, therefore, were remarkably persistent, and outlived by a thousand years their denunciation by Tertullian. The lights of the Church, who in later years would have denounced the folly of mothers and nurses, may themselves have received a consecration to the heathen goddesses of destiny before their devotion to the service of Christ. Nor was such dedication merely a form maintained from habit, and with no distinct idea of the original intent; on the contrary, as with Christian baptism, the rite was felt to be sacramental. When put under the protection of the fays, the infant was assigned a supernatural guardian whose favor was supposed to extend through life, and whom he was expected to regard with a respect and devotion comparable with that rendered to the patron saint secured by the ecclesiastical ceremony.

Strange as such an assertion may appear, its correctness will be exhibited by an examination of the part assigned to the Fates in directing the important periods of existence.

At the time of death, especially, these deities were regarded as active. According to primitive notions, mortality consists in the ravishing of the soul by an external power; our daily speech contains traces of the belief, as when we speak of a person as "taken away" in the bloom of life. That the Roman Fatae were supposed to exercise such authority is shown by the funeral inscriptions in which they are said to assign the limit of existence; hence, indeed, our word "fatal." It is at such time that the *dame blanche* or *banshee* (*ban*, white, *shee*, fairy), makes her apparition, to summon away and receive the person who is weirded to depart. In this activity fays succeeded to the office of ancient nymphs, who also had duties as guides of souls,—to use the technical expression, psychopompic. In a letter, Pliny relates that to Curtius Rufus, in Africa, while walking at eve on the piazza, appeared a lady larger and more beautiful than mortals, who predicted that he would rise to honor in Rome, but return and die in the province; she named herself Africa (as though a *genius loci*). The prophecy was fulfilled; Curtius did attain distinction, returned to Africa (we may suppose in poor health), but on his arrival encountered the same being, on which he abandoned hope and rapidly sank. The lady, obviously, was a Fata, even although not yet so named, and the notice shows the prevalence in Rome of ideas analogous to those of Western Europe during the Middle Ages.

Fays often act in the capacity of nurses; so the departed Melusina returns to tend her children. In this respect they agree with the Greek Moirai, who are termed *kourotrophoi* or child-nourishers. Thus one of the fairies who weirds Brun offers herself as his nurse. The desire which these beings have for offspring induces jealousy of the mortal mother, and stealing of the babe. So a fairy carries away the little Lancelot, and bears him to her castle, whither she carries his cousins also, in transformed shapes preserved from impending danger; at a later time she

escorts the youth to the court of Arthur, in order that her charge may receive the honor of knighthood, insisting on herself supplying the arms, which, in virtue of her quality as *dame blanche*, are pure white.

It is not only at birth and at death that mediæval fays are active; through the whole course of life, they are attendant on their chosen heroes. The fairy mistress waits on the necessities of her knight, supplies means and weapons, and is at all times ready to respond to his call, appearing in a closed chamber. Such favors must be kept secret, incautious revelation being followed by abandonment and ruin. The primitive idea which has given rise to similar representations is the belief that the protector of any person or family may not be shared with others, and will prove available only so long as kept strictly a private possession. Acting as a guardian spirit, the fairy appears as *dea ex machina*, ready to solve any difficult situation. That such quality was by no means a creation of imaginative letters, but a very serious and general belief, is indicated by the language. Any one who possessed extraordinary qualities, or had a distinguished career, was considered as fated (*faé, fatatus*), that is to say, a favorite of fays and inspired by them. The phraseology indicates that the fairy is conceived as a spirit attached to an individual, whom she protects or injures, blesses or curses; the theory of a patron saint is no more than the christianized form of the same idea. The evidence of speech, therefore, shows that during the ages which are called those of faith, the pagan conception continued to be as vital as the Christian.

If mediæval thought agreed with that of the ancient world in regard to the essence of the idea, notions respecting the aspect and manner of life of these beings were equally accordant.

As to the external appearance of the powers of destiny, representations varied, according to the predominance of respect for superior wisdom or admiration of superhuman form. The Greek Moirai were popularly conceived after the manner of wise women or midwives, and supposed to be ancient and withered. Such has remained the usual opinion among the people, as indi-

cated by fairy tales. On the other hand, Hellenic art transformed the Sharers into lovely young women. A parallel course has been followed by romance literature, and appears sporadically in modern popular belief.

The Fates belonged to a class of deities who were supposed to exist apart from men, and to inhabit inaccessible deserts. So in modern Greece the Moirai are supposed to dwell, and similarly to French fays, were assigned fountains in the wilderness. In such residence fairies agree with the Muses of Helicon, who indeed are only cousins that have received a differentiation of function. In abode and aspect, therefore, mediæval fays prolonged, without much change, the life which in the Roman period had been assigned to Fataë.

The importance of the part played by the Roman Fataë, as birth goddesses and familiar spirits, is sufficient to explain why this name, and no other, was chosen to designate the supernatural neighbors of mankind, including beings of different origin and character, but equally designated by the name of fairies. The Fataë known in connection with the birth rite, appear as divine patronesses, living out of relation with males of their own order, and having existence and history chiefly with regard to the individual mortals with whom they were associated as guardians. West European folk-lore, however, presents us with communities of fays, maintaining in the vicinity of man a life in all respects similar to his own.

The fairies of this second class are imagined to inhabit especially hillocks among cultivated fields, with galleries conducting to subterranean palaces, where the dwellers pursue activities answering to those of farmers and artisans. To them belong the best horses, cattle, and hounds, the finest arms, utensils, and stuffs,—treasures which may come into the possession of men either by way of gift or capture. They are endowed with a high degree of wisdom and magical art, can travel through air without restraint of distance and time, and are able at pleasure to take various forms. They are commonly invisible, but may be seen at certain times, and at any time by individuals endowed with

the faculty of perceiving spirits. They belong especially to the twilight and darkness, and at such hours pursue their dances after the manner of human festivals. They wage war and do harm, by their destructive breath blight crops and cattle, and shoot arrows which carry disease and death. In their relations to mankind they are dangerous, and sometimes hostile; they must be conciliated by respectful mention, and occasional observances and presents. They are capricious in their likings, and choose favorites on whom they bestow prosperity.

Both males and females are of amorous disposition, unrestrained in their passions, and likely to seize and carry off the objects of their sexual desire. The organization of their society answers to that of the mediæval world. In size they are usually represented as having a stature lower than the ordinary; the males are often withered and ugly, the youthful females beautiful and attractive.

The inclusiveness of the English word, as applicable to both orders of spiritual existences, is paralleled in other tongues. From the Anglo-Saxon we have in the term *elf* a complete synonym. According to old Norse poetry, the *Alfar* form a divine race containing deities of the highest rank; in the sagas, however, the same designation is applied to a Hidden Folk, of dwarfish character, and answering to fairies of the second species. Nowhere have early beliefs been better preserved than in Ireland, but the Irish name *sidhe* is applied equally to island-dwelling nymphs answering to the Greek Hesperides, and to the tiny inhabitants of a petty rath. Breton speech includes both classes under the appellation *korrigan*, a diminutive of *korr*, short (akin to Latin *curtus*). The breadth of significance belonging to these words may in a measure be explained as a result of later confusion, in which came to be blended conceptions formerly distinct; but it may also be that the use of a common name implies the original absence of any clear dividing line between the kinds of beings designated.

Indeed, an examination of properties assigned to the dwarfish *fays* shows that these are not very distinctive. The temper and sentiments assigned to supernatural powers in reality consti-

tute a reflection of primitive human nature, and are, therefore, as applicable to one family of spirits as to another. All demons, gods, and dwarfs would be represented as jealous and severe, averse to intruders on their territory, uncertain with respect to favor and dislike, disposed to gratify their passions and revenges with small regard to altruistic considerations, because these imaginary lives only furnish mirrors for the portrayal of men who possessed these characteristics. Leaving out of view moral divergencies, as secondary and accidental, for means of discrimination there remain only stature and sex.

The inferior height of fays has been explained on ethnological principles. Western Europe, it is said, was occupied by dwarfish predecessors of existing races, who inhabited chambered mounds, such as might well furnish the idea of subterranean palaces. These early occupants were regarded with aversion by their successors, who entertained toward them feelings similar to those now felt for Lapps, to whom also magical powers are assigned; hence the origin of fairies, based on the reminiscence of such a population. Admitting that the explanation has a certain plausibility, it may be objected that it can be applied only with restrictions. If appropriate to dwellers of hills, it can hardly relate to inhabitants of rivers, lakes, or forests, which also fairies are supposed to occupy. Again, fays are conceived as possessing dimensions much more attenuated than can be accounted for by supposing them the reflection of any actual existences. Readers of Elizabethan poetry are familiar with fairies who fashion coats from a bat's wing, fans from those of butterflies, coverlets from the skin of snakes, wage war with spiders, and make expeditions on the back of flies. Writers have commonly assumed that such minuteness was the product of poetic fancy, which reduced these spirits to a size much below that admitted by popular belief, but this is an error; folk-lore supplies us with abundant examples of fairies who can carry no more than a single straw, who emerge from a mole-hill, and make a thread bridge in order to traverse a keyhole. Concordant is the testimony of language, as when the foxglove passes for being a fairy cap. If

a size so reduced cannot allow historical interpretation, still less does ethnology explain the qualities of these fays, who in power do not differ from their larger cousins. Queen Mab, no larger than the jewel of a ring, is yet charged with the functions of a birth goddess. The least fairy can steal a bride or a baby; tenuity is of less consequence, since any tiny sprite can at will assume gigantic proportions. The fairies who in one canton are represented as dwarfish, in the next may be described as gigantic. The contrast, which cannot be accounted for as arising from historical memories, may be easily explained by the early modes of conceiving nature. In prehistoric conception a mountain might pass for a large man, a river for a tall one, while the inmates of petty hillocks would naturally be imagined as possessing a form corresponding to the narrow limits of their habitations.

There remains the sexual difference; the Destinies were supposed to be feminine. But this determination was by no means absolute; in Latin we find *Fati* as well as *Fatæ*, and both in French and Italian the masculine is represented. Nor is the method of life assigned to the female fays such as to distinguish them; if they are sometimes considered as belonging to a country inhabited only by women, at other times they are described as residing in palaces where they are surrounded by troops of male attendants. Like any earthly sovereign, the fairy queen rides with her train of knights. Such fays are depicted after the pattern of chatelaines of castles, or orphaned queens who are bereft of male protectors, and are ready to be "counselled" by the adventurous hero. With such mode of portrayal necessities of romance have more to do than peculiarities of belief. Fairies are especially associated with fountains, and these are often imagined as female; the Heliconian spring supplies a kindred example; in Roman legend we find a supernatural patron in the nymph *Egeria*. Yet spirits of wells were by no means exclusively of this sex, as is sufficiently shown by the masculine gender of the Latin *fons*; an inscription of Spain, contained in the *Corpus*, dedicates a shrine to *Fontanus* and *Fontana*. There are good reasons for believing that in early religion the protectors of life

and authors of fate were quite as often male as female. It would seem, therefore, that no reason can be given, arising from the nature of the case, why such beings should be chiefly feminine; the conclusion is, that this characteristic must be regarded as secondary, and a result of the historical evolution already explained, in which the chief place was taken by the deities of a peculiar birth rite, who in virtue of their function were of necessity women. We must, therefore, resign the attempt to establish any boundary between different orders of the beings we call fairies, whose essential character may be further elucidated by remarks concerning their kinship with gods, animals, and mankind.

Writers agree that fairies represent the survival of ancient divine powers, but they add that it is especially that of the minor deities, to the continuance of whose worship they correspond. If, for instance, we find that in Provence of the thirteenth century women offered sacrifices for fecundity on a fairy stone which had been a Celtic dolmen, to a fay named Esterelle, we have a case in which the reverence paid to a local deity of the canton, and the rites connected with such worship, may have survived with nothing more than a change of name. The fays of the Middle Ages, accordingly, answer to innumerable local genii, while the great gods of the Celtic pantheon (if, as is probable, there were such), disappeared before the Roman influence, or were absorbed into deities known to classic literature. The spirits of each district, supposed to inhabit forest, brook, and stone, continued to exercise their sway, retained rural sacrifice and honor, and came to be classed under the inclusive title of fairies. According to the account which has been offered, it is clear that such a statement, while in a measure correct, is not the entire truth. When Roman civilization subdued the West, the change that took place in ethnic religious usages was more than nominal; the new tongue had a tendency to unify cantonal rituals as it did cantonal language. We have seen that a single birth ceremonial of Hellenic origin became diffused in the West, imposed itself upon Celts and Norsemen, and supplanted the various provincial observances,

which may antecedently have possessed a purpose and character more or less similar. The Fataë who took the place of Dusii and Sulevæ inherited from the Fata, who are to be classed among the greater divine beings, both in regard to their essential authority, and to the manner in which in birth rites they had assumed the function of the most important Roman goddesses,—of Juno and Lucina. The worship of Roman Gaul, even in rural districts, must have presented an aspect much more simple and uniform than that of the same villages in the old Celtic time. After Christianity achieved a second conquest of Western Europe, a similar result followed, save that the contrast of faiths was greater, and the combination less easy. If the ecclesiastical authorities could have had their way, the transition would have been simple; doctors of the Church would fain have followed a general rule, and have degraded the gods of the vanquished faith to a parity with the demons of the victorious religion. In this manner the far-shooter Diana was represented as leader of the malignant spirits against whom her shafts had been esteemed a protection. Such an orthodox manner of conception affected earlier French literature, where we continually find fays assimilated to devils. This, however, on the whole, was a learned manner of thinking which did not pervade the ideas of the unlettered. We have seen that in popular belief the Fates continued to maintain their ancient divinity, that they even received ethical respect, and were treated as on a par with saints and angels. This estimate, usual with the folk, came to the surface in the work of mediæval romancers, who were able to perceive the beauty of ancient ideas for the very reason that they reached a stage of culture which made them sensible of their unreality. In this way a literary tradition grew up which took the place of transmitted belief; English Elizabethan poetry exhibits in full force such æsthetic interest, in great measure dissociated from direct contact with current superstition.

If fays were originally divine, so also they are often animal. Modern experience has learned to place divinity and beasthood at the opposite poles of mentality; but for primitive fancy no such gulf

existed; the brute creature was supposed to think, plan, and will from motives identical with those of a human being, and with equal judgment and foresight. In the opinion of the savage, the difference is merely external, consists in the presence of a fleshly envelope, which may be slipped off and on as easily as altering the costume. This equation is not altogether degrading, does not so much lower human life as elevate animal nature; though gods are made to appear in bestial form, the worship rendered to them is not to brute as brute. Rather the beast is assumed to possess also a human shape which he can adopt at will, and which in the retirement of domestic life he usually does put on. Whether the divinity be represented as having purely animal form or semi-animal, or as a man retaining certain animal tokens, is more an affair of artistic ability than of essential spirituality. According to primitive ideas, ancestors of their own tribe, and of surrounding clans, were themselves animal, but animals who had the virtues and abilities, and even the forms, of men; there was felt to be no difficulty in the common belief that each human family and some one horde of wild creatures possess the same forefathers, and ought to live on terms of blood kinship. This manner of conception being so universal, one would expect to find it manifested in fairy lore, and this is abundantly the case. To set forth such relations with fulness would require an extended treatise; it will here be sufficient to furnish a few examples.

Shakespeare describes Puck as having a preference for equine form:—

“When I a fat and bean-fed horse beguile,
Neighing in likeness of a filly foal.”

The shape is given as one among many transformations, yet there are reasons for supposing this aspect to be affected by some fairies. In Hampshire a colt pixy is said to be the title of a spirit which misleads other horses, and attracts them into bogs. Gervase of Tilbury relates a curious tale, which illustrates the superstition of the thirteenth century. A knight of Arragon, named Giraldus, owned a remarkable horse, which had the accomplishment of dancing to music, and which was called Bonus Amicus.

Whenever he had to decide any difficult matter, the knight resorted to his favorite, from whom he obtained advice which always turned out to be prudent. At last Giraldus, at a time when he chanced to be using another steed, was assassinated by his squire, and the horse dashed out his brains for grief. People generally took the animal to be a fairy, but Gervase has his doubts. If the beast was a *fadus*, why did he eat like any other horse? If not, how did he come to have prophetic knowledge?

The beauty of the swan's plumage seems to make that shape appropriate for the earthly manifestation of a daughter of heaven; hence, perhaps, the part played by swan maidens, whose appearances may be found described in the "Science of Fairy Tales" of Mr. E. Sidney Hartland. The most common of these legends relates the manner in which a celestial nymph uses this form for her descent, takes human shape in order to bathe in a lake, is robbed of the feather robe which alone enables her to soar, and comes into the power of a lover whom she eventually escapes. Such is the theme of a celebrated hymn of the Rig-Veda, where the heroine, Urvaçi, is a mythological being, an *apsaras* or water-goer, a goddess of fertility whose permanent abode is on high. In the course of historical development, a tale of this class came to include, not merely a loss, but also a quest and recovery of the bride; the romanticized *Märchen*, starting from the recast of some one narrator,—it may be from the Hindostan of centuries anterior to our era,—has made the circle of the habitable globe, become the parent of innumerable variants, and attained popularity in traditional English fairy lore. If it be to its beauty that is due the part played by the swan, such is not the ultimate reason for the adoption of bird form; we find the same idea, for instance, in the common European belief that fairies possess the feet of geese, and leave tracks of corresponding character. The shape furnishes an explanation of their mysterious arrivals and vanishings, and of their usual invisibility. We must not accept too crude an explanation; the thought underlying the superstition is, not that all geese are fairies, but that for purposes of conceal-

ment and locomotion anserine form may be one of the many transformations of fays.

No animal could be more unlike a swan than a toad, yet the latter also has a prominent place in folk-lore. Perhaps such honor is primarily due to the very ugliness of the creature, just as it has been affirmed that next to personal beauty a reverse aspect may find favor with the fair sex; the main point being to impress the memory. At any rate, we find the toad distinguished in popular tradition, and that in its most permanent province, in local worship and belief. The survival is so strange in itself, and so well fitted to illustrate the primitive character of fairy mythology, that it may be accorded particular attention. According to the statements of Dr. G. Pitrè, contained in his excellent account of Sicilian tradition, the faith of that island still recognizes supernatural beings known as *Donne di Fuora*, Ladies from Abroad, also entitled Patronesses of the House, who have attributes in common with the fairies of England. Like the latter, during the night-time they enter houses, where they expect to find everything in order; among mortals they have their favorites and enemies; fortune is considered to result from their kindness, sickness and poverty from their persecution. It is a peculiar feature of their habits that they visit the domicile not on any evening indifferently, but only on Thursday, making their entrance by the keyhole or by cracks of doors. If day surprises them before they leave the cottage, they change into toads, and in this state remain until the following eve, when they are once more at liberty to resume their proper shape of beautiful women. During the interval the toad is sacred, because it is impossible to be sure that any particular one may not in reality be the Lady of the House. Legends abound in which are related the reward or punishment consequent upon the good or ill treatment of a Friday toad; on this day, therefore, the usually unpopular animal is safe from abuse and secure of attention, more especially if it chance to belong to a species possessing a particular arrangement of the cuticle reminiscent of a lady's head of hair. Any person who occupies himself with folk-lore becomes accustomed to remarkable survivals;

yet it does excite astonishment to find so perfect an illustration of prehistoric thought in central Europe of the twentieth century.

If fairies are both divine and animal, it will not be considered wonderful that their nature should also be essentially identical with that of man, to whom they are regarded as genealogically related. So in the thirteenth century Jean d'Arras (or his source) derived the house of Lusignan from a fay named Mélusine; the object of the minstrel was to exalt the honor of the race, just as Virgil, in order to glorify Rome, makes Æneas descend from Venus. Similar claims were not rare; on the contrary, during the Middle Ages many a great family had its *dame blanche*, its fairy ancestress, still actively interested in the welfare of the children. Walter Scott has presented such a guardian in the White Lady of Avenel. In general, however, the romancers take another side of the situation, and describe the relation of the fairy to her chosen knight as purely personal, an amour confined to the hero himself, calculated to bring into relief his attractions, and furnish interesting or pathetic passages, but not extending to a clan. In such cases it is often plain that the legend which furnished the suggestion depended on racial interest, and was meant to justify the pretensions of a particular house by alleging its divine origin.

If an important family was of supernatural extraction, all individuals of that stock would have a strain of divine blood; it would then be only natural that certain descendants of the celestial mother should be born as fairies rather than mortals, and even in life should assume superhuman character. Old Norse legend, which describes *Valkyriur* as daughters of mortal kings, may in such mention correspond to early belief. The notion of original identity is naïvely expressed in the world-wide opinion that difference between god and man results from the food which each partakes; feeding with ambrosia bestows immortality on Achilles, while Adam would have secured divine privileges had he eaten of the fruit from the Tree of Life. On the other hand, for a celestial spirit to assimilate human viands would in itself be a sentence of corruption and death. It is, therefore, natural that nurslings adopted into fairy homes receive fairy nature, and that visitors to

their mansions find time elapse according to the rule of that higher sphere, where (as Scripture affirms) a thousand years are as one day.

If a living man may become identical with fairies, so may a departed spirit. The wanderers who meet in a mist the train of the fairy queen, or in the gloaming happen on a company of fays dancing in a meadow, perceive among the troop former companions, who have recently deserted the present world. As ancient nymphs, so mediæval and modern fairies have a soul-guiding function; they act as allurers, inviting mortals to seek their paradise; sickness and death are results of wistfulness induced in this manner. Whether such seducers were conceived as residing in remote isles, or rather in neighboring hills, depended on variations of local scenery.

From such association, what inference may we draw? Must we conclude that these spirits, and the older divinities whom they represent, were originally the ghosts of particular men? The question cannot here be discussed, in so far as it involves examination of savage belief; but in so far as the fairy lore of Western Europe is concerned, it may be affirmed that accessible information does not justify such opinion. It seems natural that vanishing members of the clan should resort to the mothers of the race, whose arms will always be open to welcome their offspring; but so far as we can see, these maternal ancestors were not identical with real parents; rather in the first instance they were powerful beings having an independent life, who were assumed as authors of the tribe to the end that it might enjoy a powerful protectress. Thus Melusina seems to be the appellation which is modernized as Millicent; but there were no ladies of this name in the family of Lusignan; alike the personality and the legend were borrowed and transferred for purposes of racial pride and convenience. If it is possible to justify the hypothesis which finds in ghosts the origin of ethnic deities, the proof must be accomplished by means of information obtained from peoples in the most primitive condition, and not from the survivals of modern folk-lore.

To my mind it appears that the evidence points toward a more

general conclusion, namely, the fundamental identity of spirits of every sort. To all souls, as such, according to the doctrine of early faith, belong energy, emotion, will, magical art, and the power of transformation; whether these souls happen to occupy human bodies, or are temporarily resident in water, wood, or stone, or are unattached agencies devoid of a tabernacle, and wandering in quest of a tenement, does not affect their essential nature. Each may become the object of attention and flattery, receive homage and worship, vanish from memory or be retained in permanent regard, rise to a central deity or sink into a hated foe, come to occupy one or another degree of the religious scale, according to chances and changes so various as to be incapable of reduction to any general rule. In thus populating all nature, and also the empty spaces outside of corporeal existence, primitive man followed that irresistible impulse which recent anthropologists have elected to call animism, and which some metaphysicians of a former generation believed to be included in the law of causality. Modern man is sensible of the same tendency, but suffers his fancy to undergo the restraint summed up in the voice of the understanding,—“the spirit that forever denies.” The personifying passion which he is unable to outgrow he generalizes, and extends to the totality of the universe.

NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURE: ITS INDEPENDENT EVOLUTION.¹

A. H. KEANE, *London.*

It is not my present purpose to give a detailed notice, or indeed a special notice at all, of the works quoted below. They are here brought together mainly for convenience of reference, which will in all cases be made to their respective Roman numerals. They will at the same time help to show the extent to which the long standing questions connected with native American culture origins have been revived in recent years. The discussion, which had been "in the air" ever since the Discovery, first acquired concrete form about the beginning of the nineteenth century, when A. von Humboldt threw the immense weight of his authority into the wrong side of the balance by the assumption of direct Asiatic influences on the growth of the various local civilizations from Peru to Mexico. But there were protests, or at least mutterings of dissent, from the first, and appeal was made to that shrewd observer of men and things, W. Bartram. He, after a careful survey of a wide field in the Northern Continent, had come to the conclusion that none of the monuments and associated objects seen by him "discover the least signs of the arts, sciences, or architecture of the Europeans, or other inhabitants of the Old World."²

Thus were founded what may be called the rival Asiatic and

(1) The list of printed sources is given at the end of this essay.

(2) *Travels*, 1792, p. 522.

American schools, whose disputations, at first largely academical, threatened at one time to become interminable. But in scientific theories, as in the biological world, there is a survival of the fittest, and the fittest is reached when mere speculation yields to accurately observed facts. I propose here to show that this stage of the question has already been reached, and that the American view should now be frankly accepted, and regarded as a safe landmark in the further inquiry into the origins, migrations, and inter-cultural relations of the American aborigines. My position, although clearly formulated some two decades ago in the article "Indians" contributed to the ninth edition of the "Encyclopædia Britannica," and later more fully developed both in my "Ethnology" and "Man Past and Present," has been so often misrepresented, that I find it necessary here to re-state it in the plainest possible language. I hold, then, that America was reached and peopled from Alaska to Fuegia during the Stone Ages by at least two streams of migration,—one from Northwest Europe, the other from Northeast Asia,—mainly by land connections which have since disappeared. Owing to this subsidence, which converted the New World into an ethnical as well as a geographical island, and also for other reasons elsewhere fully specified, all serious migratory movement from the Old World ceased absolutely after the general settlement; and the "Amerinds,"¹ as they are now frequently called, were thus left to continue their normal racial and cultural development in their new homes, unaffected by foreign influence of any kind till the arrival of the Norsemen and the Spaniards. Hence what they have in common with the peoples of the Eastern Hemisphere is just what they brought away with them during the migration period, and that amounts to very little,—the forms of the stone implements found amongst all primitive races; perhaps the fire-drill, with the associated cup markings; the germs of articulate speech; the family group inherited from

(1) This term, proposed by the Washington Anthropological Society, is a contraction of American Indian and thus, although convenient, unfortunately perpetuates the initial blunder of Columbus, who on first making land thought he had already reached the East Indies.

the higher anthropoids; a few crude religious ideas leading in the direction of Shamanism; possibly some early symbols, such as the cross and swastika, and the rude beginnings of the simpler arts. But even much of this may very well have been evolved on the spot; and when we recall the common psychic nature of man, it seems a "work of supererogation" to run up and down the world in quest of motives and inspirations to explain simple growths which may spring up spontaneously in any soil.

All the rest, all the higher arts, all the monuments, from the Ohio mounds and the "casas grandes" of the Arizona pueblos to the Mexican and Central American pyramids, temples, and palaces, the Peruvian huacas, aqueducts, and highways, the stupendous monoliths of Tiahuanaco, the advanced social institutions, political organizations, philosophies, calendric systems, pictorial and perhaps phonetic scripts, must be credited unreservedly to the natives themselves. In other words, American culture properly so-called was locally evolved, and owed absolutely nothing to extraneous influences. I hold, further, that this view has passed from the stage of *a priori* reasoning and hypothesis to the domain of acquired knowledge, and is therefore to be taken as established, in the same sense as, for instance, evolutionary teachings are now generally regarded as established once for all.

It may be taken as axiomatic that the view which harmonizes best with the known conditions, which explains most satisfactorily the largest number of factors in a given problem, must hold the field against all rival theories. Now I think it can be shown that the American view stands in this position in a preëminent degree, that it alone accounts for all the phenomena, while the Asiatic accounts for nothing at all, and leaves innumerable facts utterly unexplained. On the Asiatic assumption, there are not even analogies where identities should be expected, and all the so-called resemblances when brought to the test are found to break down completely.

Perhaps the most important factor in the problem is speech, and it may be stated at once that, despite the assertions of uncritical etymologists, and even of some sound thinkers, no comparison

is possible between the American linguistic systems and those of the rest of the world. Articulate speech is grouped in four now well-established morphological orders, which differ from one another as profoundly as do the orders, or even the classes, of the animal and vegetable kingdoms. Of these orders, three—the agglutinating, isolating, and inflecting—range over the Eastern Hemisphere, while the fourth, the polysynthetic, is in exclusive occupation of the Western. Attempts have been made to show that polysynthesis is not a distinct order, differing little from agglutination, and consequently that the American tongues have structural affinity with Mongolo-Turki, Basque, and the other more highly developed agglutinating families of the Old World. But the difference is radical, and consists in the tendency of polysynthesis to embody, not merely the pronominal, but also the nominal and qualifying elements of the sentences in a single verbal or participial form, a so-called “bunch-word,” often of prodigious length. Thus the verbal paradigm becomes endless, and in the Tarascan of Mexico, for instance, such combinations as *hopocuni*, to wash the hands, *hopodini*, to wash the ears, etc. are conjugated in all their moods and tenses, in their positive, negative, causal, and other forms. This extraordinary morphological structure, of which not a single instance occurs elsewhere, ranges with scarcely any real exception, from the Eskimauan of Greenland to the Araucanian of Chile, and can be explained only on the assumption that the proto-Amerinds possessed a common form of speech which was everywhere developed on polysynthetic lines during an immense period of complete isolation from extraneous influences.

The native vocabularies are equally independent, and all the essays at lexical comparisons with Chinese, Japanese, Malay, Polynesian, Basque, Irish, Welsh, and other Old World tongues, have ended in absolute failure. Here is a typical case, which may serve as a warning against accepting the *ipse dixit* even of the highest authorities when there is a question of etymologies. In VI., p. 262, Mr. Cyrus Thomas tells us that “the Zapotec name *ape*, which according to Dr. Brinton may properly be trans-

lated by *lightning*, is much like the name for *fire* which prevails throughout Oceanica (Malay *api*, Samoan *afi*, etc.). In the Zapotec words *laari-api-niza* * * * we find precisely the original form of the Oceanic word for *fire*." But in Zapotec the word for *fire* is not *api* or *ape*, which means "to come down," but *laa* or *laha*, as shown by Dr. Seler (IV., pp. 8 and 15), where *fire* stands as the sign of the second of the twenty days of the Zapotec calendar. These days were first published by Seler, and borrowed, as he complains, without acknowledgment, by Brinton for his "Native Calendar of Central America and Mexico," who in the borrowing blundered over the words *api* and *laa*, and thus led Thomas astray.

Similarly Mrs. Nuttall (III. *passim*) proposes a number of impossible etymologies, such as the Mexican city of *Chalco* with the Greek *Chalcis*, and the old Aztec capital *Temistitan* with the Byzantine philosopher *Themistius* (fourth century A. D.); the suggestion being that, having failed to reorganize the Byzantine Empire on a proper footing, this prefect of Constantinople or a band of his faithful adherents took refuge in "the hidden land of the West," and there developed the perfected scheme, "where it was preserved intact until the time of the Spanish Conquest. * * * Can it be that the name *Temistitan* means 'the land of established law, order, and Justice' dedicated to the Greek Themis, just as New Rome was dedicated to Sophia,—Wisdom? Or did some sort of connection exist between the name of the Mexican capital, the system on which it was established, and the philosopher Themistius?"¹ These are not the ravings of an etymological lunatic, but the serious suggestions of a learned writer who has done really good work in other departments of American archæology, but who is unfortunately compelled by her thesis to find connections at all costs between the two hemispheres. Meanwhile, against such connections stands the impassable barrier of the linguistic systems, which, when duly considered, will be accepted as conclusive.

But the industrial arts, basketry, spinning, weaving, pottery?

No one has handled this side of the question more thoroughly than the Swedish expert, Dr. Stolpe, who speaks at first hand, and, after long observation of the processes and results, declares that wherever the raw material has been available, all native American art development can be shown to have been indigenous. Dr. Stolpe criticises unsparingly those recent writers who, like Dr. Hamy, Schurz, and others, still persist in looking for analogies or contacts with the Old World, and repeats that he has not found a trace of such cultural connections between the Old World and ancient American handicrafts. But his book¹ is not generally accessible, and the inquirer is therefore referred to Mr. Dellenbaugh's work (I.), which covers the whole ground, and is also written by a careful observer. This work has, further, the great merit of tracing the industrial methods from their rude beginnings, through all the transitions, up to the highest standards of excellence reached by the Amerinds in pre-Columbian times. Mr. Dellenbaugh arrives independently at the same general conclusion as Dr. Stolpe, and like him deals trenchantly with the futile attempts that are constantly made to account for the local processes "by importing different peoples from different parts of the world and their recent culture with them. But the more the Amerinds are studied, the more homogeneous do we find them, and the more isolated from Old World influences. * * * * Thus the more the matter is investigated, the more closely are we confined to the Western Hemisphere for the origin of the Amerind people *as we know them.*"²

A great point has been made of the assumed resemblance between the games and pastimes of both hemispheres, and Professor Tylor, the most distinguished and consistent advocate of the Asiatic view, has devoted a special treatise (V.) to one aspect of this interesting question. He lays great stress on certain common features of the Mexican *patolli* and the Hindu *pachisi*, and thinks them sufficiently close and numerous to make independent inven-

(1) *Studies in American Ornamentation*, Stockholm, 1897.

(2) I., p. 430.

tion highly improbable. Hence the general inference that "the relation of the *pachisi-patolli* groups of games in the Old and New World must be accounted for by intercourse before the Spanish Conquest. If communication across the Atlantic fails, the alternative is communication across the Pacific from Eastern Asia."¹

But after a searching inquiry, competent observers, such as Mr. Culin and Mr. Frank Cushing, have rejected the Asiatic origin of *patolli*, which they declare to be "thoroughly American in origin." No doubt games are good anthropological evidence, where continuity and contact are possible, otherwise even startling resemblances are worthless. Thus Mr. A. R. Wallace found that the Papuans of Malaysia could carry on the "cats' cradle" farther than he could himself, and he also tells us that the same Papuans have a game at football played with "the arm shoulder, knee, or thigh" just like the Mexican and Central American game, in which the ball "was to be pitched, not with the hands, but with the shoulders or the hips."² Nobody, however, will conclude from all this that the Britons, the Aztecs, and the Mayas borrowed their sports from the Papuans, or were themselves originally Papuans. Brooding over these futile attempts to bring everything from abroad, Dr. Brinton, one of the foremost champions of the American view, writes pathetically: "When I see volumes of this character, many involving prolonged and arduous research, I am affected by a sense of deep commiseration for able men who expend their efforts in pursuit of such will-o'-the-wisps of science, panting along roads which lead nowhere, inattentive to the guideposts which alone can direct them to solid ground."

Much has been made of certain rock carvings assumed to be of Asiatic origin, and attributed to Chinese, Japanese, or other immigrants, or perhaps to the Buddhist pilgrims who discovered the mythical Fu-sang in America. Let me say at once that the

(1) V., p. 14.

(2) Seler, IV., p. 109.

Fu-sang legend has been exploded by M. Henry Cordier, who shows that the identification of this nebulous region with America is impossible, and with this M. R. Verneau also agrees.¹ The same fate has overtaken all the "inscriptions" that have been critically examined. I do not refer to one or two possibly genuine runes, any more than to the traces of Norse dwellings which Miss C. Horsford thinks have been discovered at Cambridge, Mass. None of these data, if established, can affect our argument, since the discovery of North America by the Northmen is not questioned. It would be otherwise with the supposed early Asiatic rock carving,—the Japanese "document," for instance, which Mr. O. H. Howorth came upon in Sinaloa (Mexico), and thought "likely to furnish an important link in the problem of the prehistoric colonization of Central America." But in the audience at the meeting of the London Anthropological Institute, where he produced this "link," was a Japanese scholar, Mr. Daigoro Goh, who promptly disposed of the evidence by showing that the Sinaloa "script" betrayed not the faintest resemblance to the prehistoric Japanese characters with which it had been compared.²

After this it will be needless to deal with the "Davenport" and other inscribed tablets which are written on some eclectic system in various Old World scripts, and from time to time extracted from the Mississippi Valley mounds by their "authors." The Amerinds had writing systems of their own, which not only betray no foreign influences, but are of such a nature as clearly to show that they must have been locally developed. In fact, America is one of the few regions where the evolution of the art of writing can be intelligently studied through all the transitions, from the modest pictorial beginnings up to the rebus stage, verging on a true phonetic system.

From the incised and painted petroglyphs, which have an immense range from the Laurentian basin to Argentina, and

(1) *L'Anthrop.*, 1896, p. 605.

(2) *Four. Anthrop. Inst.*, Feb., 1894.

many of which were certainly pictorial records, the passage is clear enough to the "winter counts" of the Prairie Indians, while the heraldic and totemic devices on the posts fronting the houses of the Thlinkits and Haidas of the northwest coast are obviously symbolic, if not otherwise significative. As these often present a certain resemblance to the *tiki* or carved pillars decorating the graves of Maori chiefs, they have always been appealed to in proof of Polynesian influences on the natives of British Columbia and adjacent lands. But Mr. A. P. Niblack, who has made a special study of this subject, dwells on the futilities of such clues in tracing the origin and affinities of widely separated peoples,—their social institutions and general culture. After pointing out several coincidences in the political organization of the tribes, their land tenure, laws of vendetta, tattoo markings, ornamentation of canoes, paddles, house-fronts, etc., etc., Mr. Niblack continues: "The carved wooden mortuary columns erected in front of the Maori houses are also suggestive; but it is safe to say that while all this is not in one sense accidental, yet the resemblances and similarities are as likely to have arisen from the like tendencies of the human mind under the same external conditions, or environment, to develop along parallel lines as through contact of these tribes or through a common origin."¹

A similar remark had already been made by Theodore Waitz, who is most instructive, especially on the comparative psychology of different racial groups. Referring to the analogies existing between Asiatic and American peoples which have been collated by Delafield in "American Antiquities" and elsewhere, he declares that "most of these peculiarities prove nothing, as they concern things which are frequently met with among uncivilized nations of the most remote regions. * * * The same mode of procuring fire by whirling a thin piece of wood in the hole of a larger piece, prevails in Australia, North and South America, among the Kaffirs and Bushmen, also in the Carolines and Aleutes, etc."²

(1) *The Coast Indians.*

(2) *Anthropology*, p. 257.

An equally wide range, both in time and space, is ascribed to the fire-dance and the couvade, probably the two most extraordinary social customs of which there is any record. The fire-dance was already practiced by the Sabines of Mount Soracte before the foundation of Rome, and although generally supposed to be unknown in the New World, I have been able to show, on the authority of an eye-witness, that it was a popular institution amongst the now extinct Catawbas of North Carolina. "These miserable wretches," writes quaint old Lederer, "are strangely infatuated with illness of the devil; it caused no small horror in me to see one of them wrythe his neck all on one side, foam at the mouth, stand barefoot upon burning coal for near an hour, and then recovering his senses, leap out of the fire without hurt or sign of any."¹ When we are further told that there is a fire-walking clan in the Society Islands, like that of the Hirpi of Mount Soracte, and that the rite is or has been practiced in New Zealand, Fiji, Japan, Southern India, Bulgaria, and elsewhere (Andrew Lang) we begin to realize the absurdity of building theories of affinities and contacts on such foundations. We see also how self-destructive are all such theories, since the parallel instances of fire-walking, the couvade, and the like, if they prove anything, would tend to prove that the Siouan Catawbas, for instance, had close intercourse simultaneously with the Japanese, the Polyynesians, the Ugrian Bulgars, and the ancient Sabines. The *quod nimis probat nihil probat* would at once rise up in protest against such an inference.

Recently Mr. N. W. Thomas has drawn attention to some American parallels to European agricultural customs, as affording a striking proof that such coincidences, "are not necessarily due to transmission."² Thus the Papagos of Arizona performed a rain dance round a pole to which was fixed a deer's head with the flesh underneath; the Pawnees danced, sang, and

(1) *Man Past and Present*, p. 394, where the reference is given from J. Mooney's *Siouan Tribes of the East*, p. 71.

(2) *Jour. Anthropol. Inst.*, Jan.—June, 1901, pp. 155-6.

prayed before a bird stuffed with all kinds of roots and herbs; the Finnish Woguls, after eating a reindeer, left the skin and horns as an offering, sometimes filling them with rice; and the old Prussian Slavs, when sowing their winter corn, killed and ate a goat, hung its skin upon a high pole, and at the following harvest suspended a bunch of corn and herbs above it, then joined hands and danced round this Lithuanian "maypole." Volumes could be filled with such instances, but only to prove the common psychic unity of the human family and thus to strengthen the monogenist view of its origin as against the still current polygenist theories.

We come now to the monuments,—the vague comparisons that have been drawn between the Tiahuanaco and Stonehenge uprights; the palace of Mitla and the Parthenon; Uxmal, Palenque, and Chichen-Itza, and the Hindu temples of Java and Camboja, may all be summarily dismissed as untenable. Without entering into details, here impossible, we may ask, why are the Javanese Boro-Bodo and the Cambojan Ankor-Vat instantly and unmistakably recognized as Hindu inspirations, whereas the Eastern analogies of the Yucatan structures are still the subject of subtle archæological speculation? Obviously because the former were raised under the guiding hand of Buddhist and Brahman master-builders, while the latter are the independent products of Central American culture. In Indo-China and Malaysia we have legible Sanskrit and Pali inscriptions; in Mayaland we have also monuments covered with written records, but in a native script which has not yet been deciphered. The American monuments, therefore, stand out as silent witnesses to the independent local evolution of Amerind civilization.

But the Asiatic school trusts mainly to the pyramids,—pyramids in Memphis, pyramids in Mexico; therefore, etc., etc. But the American structures were not, strictly speaking, pyramids at all, but square mounds terminating in a broad platform crowned by a temple, hence called in Aztec *teocalli*, "God's House," and in Maya *humal*, "temple mound." They were usually raised in receding terraces, with long flights of steps giving access to the altars where human sacrifices were offered, and Mr. Maudslay now shows

that all, without exception, were of this type (IX., *passim*). What have these in common with those of the Nile Valley, which are assumed to be their prototypes, but were royal tombs terminating in an apex and made as inaccessible as possible to the outer world? It should be further noted that the Egyptians ceased to be pyramid builders some two thousand years before the new era, whereas Papantla, Teotihuacan, and Cholula, the very oldest in the New World, are not supposed to date much further back than about 800 A. D. "If, therefore, the *teocalli* are to be attributed to the early Egyptians, it will be asked, Why did they delay all that time before erecting them? If to the later (post-dynastic) Egyptians, how came they to revive a style of architecture forgotten for over two millenniums?"¹ Thus the pyramids, the sheet-anchor of the Asiatics, prove, when tested, to be but a broken reed.

Besides the sanguinary deities of their native pantheons, the Aztecs amongst others were credited with some sublime ideas regarding a supreme being, creator and controller of the universe, and Eastern influences were again introduced to account for this assumption. To this supreme Lord, Tonacatecutli, no offerings were made because he needed none, or because he loathed the ceaseless flow of blood required to appease Tezcatlipoca and the other national divinities. But without going abroad for the source of such lofty concepts, Seler more plausibly suggests that "Tonacatecutli did not emanate from the living cult, from those influences on the supernatural powers which are regarded as necessary to obtain their help in distress, or for any other material purpose. His ideal was the outcome of philosophic speculation, of the need of a principle of causality, such, for instance, as the God of our modern theosophistic systems, so that the monks were nearer the truth when they described this divinity as the true and only God of the ancient Mexicans" (IV., pp. 38-9).

Another explanation, less flattering to the Amerind intelligence,

(1) *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1901, p. 183.

must be given of the Algonquian *Manitu*, and of the Dakotan *Wakanda*, whose claim to be regarded as supreme beings emanated, not from the native philosophies, but from the Christian missionaries and the other modern students of aboriginal thought. Thus, Mr. W. J. McGee shows plainly that the current conception of wakanda or the "Great Spirit," the Creator, and so on, is a delusion, wakanda being rather a quality than an entity, and in any case only a material substance or being, and in no sense a spirit. Thus, among many tribes "the sun is wakanda, not *the* wakanda or *a* wakanda, but simply wakanda; and among the same tribes the moon is wakanda, and so are thunder, lightning, the stars, the winds, the cedar; even a man, especially a Shaman, might be wakanda or a wakanda. In addition, the term was applied to mythic monsters of the earth, air, and waters. So, too, the fetishes and the ceremonial objects and decorations * * * various animals, the horse among the prairie tribes, many natural objects and places of striking character, though it is easy to understand how the superficial inquirer, dominated by definite spiritual concepts, perhaps deceived by crafty native informants, came to adopt and perpetuate the erroneous interpretation." ¹ In fact, the counterpart of the Dakotan *Wakanda* is neither the Hebrew Jehovah nor the Christian Godhead, but rather the Polynesian *Mana*, which is so difficult to understand, but of which a luminous explanation will be found in the Rev. R. H. Codrington's "Melanesians." ²

A last refuge was sought in the Aztec-Maya calendric system, which was found to be so perfect that Old World influences were at once assumed, and indeed taken for granted. The impression was confirmed when Humboldt found not merely analogies, but what he considered identities between the Central American and some Asiatic month names and zodiacal signs. Thus, of the Mongol signs, four—hare (rabbit), snake, ape, and dog—correspond, and the leopard might answer to the ocelot

(1) *Fifteenth An. Report, Washington Bureau of Ethnology*, 1897.

(2) Oxford, 1891.

(jaguar); but the remaining seven differ. This was not much to build upon; yet it is about all that there is in common. The chronologies—time divisions, number of days, weeks, or months, year cycles, etc.—differ *toto cælo*, and now that the whole question has been thoroughly sifted, the local evolution of the Amerind systems has been placed beyond all doubt. We know, for instance, that both the Aztec and Maya year comprised eighteen months (which Seler prefers to call weeks) of twenty days each, with five epacts, or 365 days altogether, but with no bissextile (leap-year) or other corrective to harmonize with the true solar reckoning, and also that there were at least two cycles of four and fifty-two years respectively. So much is certain, and has been firmly established, especially by the investigations of Mr. Cyrus Thomas (VI., pp. 205, *sq.*). It is here shown that the twenty day signs of the Maya codices were largely phonetic, that is, rebuses, which could be interpreted only in the Maya language, and were consequently of Maya origin.

The eighteen Aztec months (weeks) of twenty days each are also clearly denoted by the corresponding signs on the famous Calendar Stone, which was made by one of Montezuma's predecessors, King Axayacatl, in 1479, and is now preserved in the Mexican National Museum. This document has been searchingly studied by A. Chavers, who unhesitatingly ascribes the astronomic system here perpetuated to the unaided efforts of the American aborigines. No other conclusion is possible, since this calendar, with its time divisions as above described, differs profoundly from the Babylonian, the Egyptian, the Greek, as reformed by Meton of Athens in 432 B. C., the Julian, and all other Old World systems. The whole subject will be found very fully and learnedly treated by Mr. Payne (II., Vol. II.), where Leon y Gama's mystifications and the other traditional misconceptions that have crystallized around the Amerind astronomic reckonings are cleared up.

A sort of mathematical certainty is thus acquired for the independent evolution of the highest efforts of the Amerind intellect, and as the greater contains the less, there can be no further

difficulty in crediting the natives with all the other arts, industries, political and social institutions for which prototypes have needlessly been sought on the remotest confines of the globe. Here I may be permitted to refer to a striking but little known historic contrast. The ancient Himyarites of South Arabia, who possessed the oldest known chronological methods in common with the Babylonians, introduced these time divisions into Madagascar thousands of years ago, certainly prior to the time of Solomon, as I have elsewhere shown.¹ The result is that the Malagasy people have still a pure Semitic calendric system, in which the seven week days are, not in the later (post-Koranic) Arabic, but in the far more archaic Himyaritic Arabic of the Sabæan and Minæan rock inscriptions. Moreover, their month names are not those of the Moslem Arabs, but those of the twelve Babylonian zodiacal constellations in the very Semitic forms introduced by the pagan Himyarites. It is, therefore, past dispute that the Malayo-Polynesian inhabitants of Madagascar received their chronology from the South Arabians in exceedingly remote pre-Mohammedan times. And here comes in the contrast, for it must now be equally self-evident that contrariwise the inhabitants of Central America did not derive their calendric system from the Arabo-Babylonian, which is the source of the Greek, Indian, Chinese, and other calendars prevalent throughout most of the Eastern Hemisphere. If they had done so, the fact would be as palpable as it is in the case of Madagascar.

We come now to a series of considerations which, if possible, are still more conclusive. That Amerind culture as a whole is of local growth appears from the fact that, like special branches, such as weaving and pottery, it may be studied on the spot in all its upward developments, from its roots in the Brazilian and Fuegian shell-mounds to the Peruvian and Aztec-Maya efflorescences. From the American standpoint this presents no difficulty, and is only what should be expected. But on the Asiatic

(1) *The Gold of Ophir, Whence Brought and by Whom*, a series of papers contributed to *Rhodesia* for August and September, 1901.

assumption it is inexplicable, and indeed impossible. Let us for a moment suppose that these developments begin, as from a *tabula rasa*, with full-fledged Eurasian or African peoples,—Malays, Indo-Chinese, Japanese, Mrs. Nuttall's Byzantine Greeks, Basques, Egyptians, Babylonians, or others,—each and all equipped with their own characteristic cultural appliances. How in that case account for the sambaqui and other kitchen middens, which fringe the seaboard in many places, and some of which are known to be of vast antiquity? How explain the exceedingly rude stone, bone, and wooden implements of many groups, the debased social condition of the Mexican Seri and Brazilian Botocudos, the utter savagery and pronounced cannibalism of many Amazonian tribes? Did the Babylonian astronomers, the Egyptian pyramid and temple builders, the Greek and Hindu philosophers, forget all their arts and sciences, and make a fresh start, as it were, from this *tabula rasa* upwards? If they did not, the shell-heaps, the palæoliths, the neoliths, the blowpipes, and other primitive elements are left unexplained. If they did, then they did not act like rational beings, like modern immigrants, for instance, who bring their advanced cultural appliances with them, and continue in their new homes the civilization of the metropolis.

In any case all these cultural appliances of the East are non-existent in the West. Where are the stout seaworthy craft, the Malay praus, the junks, the triremes, without which they could not have arrived at all? Did they, Cæsar-like, burn their ships behind them, and revert to the Algonquian birch-bark canoe, the rudderless Peruvian rafts, the paddle-impelled Carib boats? For nothing else was found by the Conquistadores in the New World, where navigation was in a rudimentary state, where many South American tribes had never launched so much as a float on the magnificent streams winding sluggishly through the Amazonian woodlands. When Gonzalo Pizarro reached the Napo from Quito in 1540, he had to build "a small vessel," which was a wonder to the river-side populations, in order to descend that tributary of the Amazon. And when Orellana deserted him, he had to do likewise, in order to follow the great river to its

estuary. So, also, the sails hoisted by Cortes on the Mexican lagoons were a surprise and a terror even to the civilized Aztec subjects of Montezuma.

This universal ignorance of navigation, beyond the canoe or cayak, in a region possessing the finest navigable waterways in the world, should alone satisfy the most obdurate that these waterways were never reached by the seafaring Malays and Phœnicians of the East. Yet, apparently without any sense of humor, Mrs. Nuttall can seriously write (III., p. 531) that "the events which took place in Egypt between A. D. 379 and 451, must unquestionably have been deeply felt by the descendants of the ancient Phœnician, Carthaginian, and Greek exiles, fugitives, and mercenaries. * * * Migrations from these regions (the Mediterranean coast-lands) would doubtless have resulted in the remarkable combination of archaic star, fire-drill, and socket worship found in Yucatan and Mexico, existing alongside of a highly developed and perfected philosophical scheme of social organization, identical, in principle, with that which in the Old World contributed an ideal which was the result of centuries of experience and active intellectual life. * * * Investigation seems to reveal that influences emanating from the most ancient centres of Old World civilization reached sundered regions of America at different times, and that they could have been carried there by a seafaring and building race such as the Minyans, the Magas, the Phœnicians or their descendants."

Well, if these later Phœnicians could have forgotten their galleys and triremes,—an unthinkable assumption,—they must surely have preserved their lamps, these being even more indispensable to an "active intellectual life." But when we look around we cannot find them anywhere in the New World, except only amongst the Hyperborean Eskimauans, and these at any rate are not claimed to be "Phœnicians or their descendants." Apart from them, Professor E. B. Tylor admits, against his own views, that "no lamps at all were known to the indigenes of America, not even to the comparatively cultured Mexicans and Peruvians."

The idea that these Amerinds should have received their culture from the East, and not have retained the useful lamp, even in its simplest form, is too grotesque to be entertained for a moment by any sane thinker. By the Eskimauans it may have either been borrowed from the Norsemen, or, more probably, invented by themselves, seeing that it is a necessity of their very existence, and has accompanied them in all their migrations from Alaska round the Frozen Ocean to Greenland and Labrador. Dr. Walter Hough, our best authority on the subject, inclines to this view, remarking that "since the Eskimo is dependent upon his lamp for his very existence, it seems safe to bring forward as a corollary that his migration into his present home was subsequent to the invention of the lamp. Further, the lamp seems to have determined the distribution of the Eskimo."¹ An Asiatic origin is also excluded, since "lamps administered so differently seem to have no genetic relationship."²

Passing now to the other essential accompaniments of Old World cultures, we again look in vain for their presence in the New World. Here it may be asked, if, on the arrival of the Phœnicians, Egyptians, Malays, and the other Eastern intruders, the New World was not a *tabula rasa*, but already inhabited by the Amerinds, did these aborigines learn nothing from their foreign friends or foes? And if anything, what has become of it? Was everything forgotten like the junk and the lamp? Where were the tea, the coffee, the silks, the cereals, such as rice, wheat, rye, barley, oats, which could scarcely help running wild in many places, but not a grain of which had germinated before the Discovery? To realize the full force of this argument, we have but to recall the present magnificent crops of California wheat and of Carolina rice. Nor will its cogency be lost when applied to the domestic animals of the Eastern Hemisphere,—sheep, goat, horse, ox, pig, poultry,—which once introduced must have thriven in

(1) *The American Anthropologist*, April, 1898. See also his illustrated monograph *On the Lamp of the Eskimo*, Washington, 1898.

(2) *Ibid.*

pre- as well as in post-Columbian times. And, once more, where are the languages, the letters, the chronologies, the hieroglyphs, the cuneiforms, the alphabets of these cultured Oriental peoples? Surely it is much easier to say that they never arrived than that, having arrived, they all perished in such congenial homes, in such entirely suitable environments.

After this rapid survey of the whole field, I believe myself justified in concluding with Mr. J. W. Powell (VIII., *passim*) that "the aboriginal peoples of America cannot be allied preferentially to any one branch of the human race in the Old World"; that "there is no evidence that any of the arts of the American Indians were borrowed from the Orient"; that "the industrial arts of America were born in America"; that America, at the time of the beginning of industrial arts, was inhabited by tribes that left the Old World before they had learned to make knives, spear and arrow heads, or at least when they knew the art only in its crudest state; that primitive man has thus been here ever since the invention of the stone knife and the stone hammer; that the American Indian did not derive his forms of government, his industrial or decorative arts, his languages or his mythological opinions from the "Old World, but developed them in the New"; and, finally, that in "the democratic characteristics of the American Indians, all that is common to tribes of the Orient is universal, all that distinguishes one group of tribes from another in America distinguishes them from all other tribes of the world."

It may be added that these views appear to be rapidly gaining ground amongst leading American anthropologists, such as Mr. Dellenbaugh (I.) and Professor E. S. Morse, who opened a discussion on the subject at the meeting of the American Association, Detroit, 1897, and dwelt upon the essential unity of the Americans, both in their physical characters and cultural developments.

- I. *The North Americans of Yesterday.* By Frederick S. Dellenbaugh, 1901.
- II. *History of the New World called America.* By E. J. Payne, Vol. ii., 1899.
- III. *The Fundamental Principles of Old and New World Civilizations.*
By Zelia Nuttall, 1901.

- IV. *The Tonalamatl of the Aubin Collection*: Dr. E. Seler's German Explanatory Text. Englished by A. H. Keane, 1901.
- V. *On American Lot-Games as Evidence of Asiatic Intercourse before the Time of Columbus*. By E. B. Tylor, 1896.
- VI. *Day Symbols of the Maya Year*, in *Sixteenth Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology*. By Cyrus Thomas, 1897.
- VII. *On Various Supposed Relations between the American and Asian Races*. By G. Brinton, 1893.
- VIII. *Whence Came the American Indians?* By J. W. Powell, *Forum*, Feb., 1898.
- IX. *A Glimpse at Guatemala and Some Notes on the Ancient Monuments of Central America*. By Anne C. Maudslay and Alfred P. Maudslay.

OUR WORK IN THE PHILIPPINES

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The work that has been undertaken by Governor Taft and his associates in the Philippine Islands is a great and arduous one; but it is being carried out with a zest and energy that astonish foreign observers as well as Spaniards and natives. It is the kind of work, in some respects, that has enlisted American enterprise in the organizing and building up of the new territories of the West, and it promises some of the same brilliant results. In many respects, however, it is more difficult and will require the exercise of more tact by the governors and more patience on the part of the American people.

It is more the ethical than the strictly political and commercial side of this mission which at first most strongly impresses the visitor to Manila. It is most gratifying to see the American flag streaming over one of the most important and picturesque of Oriental cities, and to see the white hulls of our armored cruisers lying majestically upon the placid bosom of the Bay of Cavite, and casting their lengthening shadows in the Eastern sunset over the rusting frames of the sunken Spanish cruisers and gunboats. That the United States has become an important Oriental power is evident not only at Manila, but at Hongkong as well, where Englishmen are looking to their laurels as regards the control of the trade of the East, and at Nagasaki and Yokohama, where the frequent appearance of American transports and cruisers has made the name of the Americans as common as that

of the English, and where American money has come to have the same standing, as the equivalent of gold, that the pound sterling of Great Britain has. These influences are paving the way for the extension of American trade in the Philippines that will promptly follow complete pacification and the repeal of the restrictions upon the creation of corporations which were imposed by the last Congress. Social order, the sanctity of contracts, and the supremacy of law are the necessary factors, however, in making the way clear for commercial development. It is the inauguration of these preliminary factors which has been the work of Judge Taft and his associates of the Philippine Commission during the year and a half in which they have acted as a legislative body in the Philippine Islands, and the scant half-year during which the civil power has been predominant in the pacified provinces under Judge Taft as Civil Governor.

Much misconception prevails in the United States regarding the military conditions in the Philippine Islands. The occasional robberies by provincial brigands, of which we hear so much, and the murderous attacks upon American troops by irresponsible bands of savages are, when they have any political significance whatever, but the last lashings of the storm. Brigandage and friction with the savage tribes are likely to persist in sporadic forms for many years to come. These conditions, however, have little to do with the security of the civilized portions of the Islands or with their future development. As President Roosevelt pointed out, in his annual message to Congress, the existence of local banditti was a survival in very recent times even in civilized European countries, and friction with the savage tribes is no more than the United States encountered for many years with the Indians of the Western plains. Outside of two provinces of the Island of Luzon, the opposition which exists to the United States is without any other political significance than the resistance that would be made by robbers and savages to any civilized government.

The progress that has been made in the Philippines is imperfectly understood in the United States. If stamping out

the insurrection by military force against the sullen opposition of the people were the sole reliance of the Americans, the problem would still be an arduous one. The bands of brigands, which are able to scatter when attacked by organized troops, and to gather again as by magic when a supply train is to be raided, would always find a safe refuge in the mountains and forests, if they still had the support of the mass of their fellow countrymen. The most important work with which Governor Taft and his associates of the Philippine Commission have supplemented the systematic and daring work of our soldiers in the field, has as yet received little "advertisement" at home because of its peaceful character. The story is perhaps best told in concrete form in the history of the Federal party of the Philippines. This organization is headed by two men who have since been appointed members of the Philippine Commission and whose advice is proving suggestive and useful to their American associates. Their work was carried on, however, long before they were given office by the Americans, and its foundations were laid while they were members of the cabinet of Aguinaldo. Dr. Pardo de Tavera and Don Benito Legarda joined the Aguinaldo Government when they believed that there was a prospect of coöperation with the United States for the creation of a liberal government at home under American sovereignty. Both resigned from Aguinaldo's cabinet in the autumn of 1898, several months before swords were crossed in the suburbs of Manila; but not until they had already learned that it was the fixed purpose of the revolutionary leaders to provoke bloodshed.

The mission on which Judge Taft and his associates were sent to the Philippines was, first of all, to convince the Filipino leaders that the United States was sincere in its promises of local self-government and the orderly development of the Islands. It was the mission of the Federal party, or the "Americanistas," as its members were called, to aid the Americans in carrying the conviction of sincerity in their purposes to the masses of the people. Beginning their work soon after the elections in the United States had put an end to the prospect of a change of policy at

Washington, the Federal party organized native committees all over the Islands, especially in Luzon, until by May 31, 1900, 285 such committees had been formed. The month of January, 1901, saw the formation of 63 committees; February brought 122, March 86, and April and May 14, by which time the principal towns of the pacified provinces were thoroughly organized.

One of the chief purposes of these committees was to communicate, as only natives could do, with the insurgents in the field, and to convince them that the Americans meant well for the future of the Islands and that their promises would be kept. Remarkable success attended these efforts. Bands of insurgents began to surrender, with their rifles, at the suggestion of the Federal committees, until the number thus brought in ran up into the hundreds and thousands. With a modest beginning in January, there were half a dozen surrenders in February, followed by surrenders almost daily in March, and sometimes several in a single day. The record for April was of like character. The number of surrenders then began to decrease because nearly all the insurgents in the civilized provinces had submitted. The American military officers accustomed to sudden attacks, ambushes, and barren victories which left much of their work to be done over again, were astonished as band after band voluntarily laid down its rifles, and took the oath of allegiance to the new sovereign.

The work of the Federal party, which already numbered 150,000 adherents by the middle of May, prepared the way for the tours of the Civil Commission, which gave definite assurances to the Filipino people that the Americans meant to carry out their promises. Judge Taft, accompanied by his four associates of the Commission, and by Mr. Arthur W. Fergusson, the Secretary of the Commission, whose capacity for sympathetic translation from both Spanish and English was so vitally useful, visited more than thirty provincial capitals and met the Filipino leaders face to face. In every province a provincial government act was proposed and the native leaders were asked for their suggestions as to its provisions. These suggestions were frankly discussed

and in many cases adopted. Before July 4, 1901, twenty-seven provincial governments were organized, in which the Filipino leaders shared with the Americans the responsibility of administration. Only a few provinces were left under military control, and the work of organizing civil government went steadily on in other provinces after July 4, when Judge Taft was sworn in as Civil Governor of the Philippine Archipelago, and in that capacity supplanted the general of the army in the control of the "Ayuntamiento," or public official building at Manila, and in the possession of the old residence of the Spanish Governors-General in the suburbs of the city.

The primary lesson which the Americans had to teach in the Philippines,—that their promises were made to be kept, instead of to be lightly broken,—was one of the greatest difficulty, because of the experience of the people under the former régime. Among the savage tribes the lesson has perhaps been easier to teach than in the civilized provinces, because of the greater open-mindedness of the natives and the practical demonstration which it has been possible to give them of the kindly feeling of the Americans. The story is familiar in the Orient, how Piang, the half-Chinese chieftain of an important group of Southern tribes, was influenced by the humanity of Dr. Ralph Porter of the Thirty-first Infantry, who brought one of his relatives through a severe attack of typhoid fever. Piang appreciated the service, wondered at the medical skill of the new governors of the East, and swore steadfast friendship for the Americans. Equally interesting was the experience of Dr. C. C. Snyder of the Marine Corps, who successfully treated an ulcer for a relative of one of the local "dattos" in Mindanao, and presently found an improvised free hospital on his hands; all the halt, lame, and sick of the tribe came to be treated. None of these things was done by the Spaniards, and the natives are beginning to discover the differences between their new rulers and the old.

An interesting illustration of the ease with which the natives are influenced when kindly used, is afforded by the expedition which was made by a party of three Americans into the country

of the Igorrotes in the summer of 1900. The party consisted of Hunt,—a hospital steward,—and two former soldiers. They went out in search of gold, without any guard or other protection than their revolvers. The natives, who were head-hunters and constantly at war with each other, were much surprised at the audacity of such a small band in thus penetrating their country. Hunt and his associates made it clear to them, however, that it was not their purpose to do them any injury unless they were themselves injured. They communicated with the natives through the few words of their tongue which they could command and through the usual language of signs. Thus matters drifted along for some time in a state of armed neutrality. At length one of the natives broke his leg. It was the savage custom to kill such persons at once, in order to put an end to their misery. Hunt indicated to the natives that he could save the injured man. They permitted him, with some misgivings, to undertake it. The leg was set, and within a month the man was walking about as usual. This miracle of superhuman power on the part of the white men strongly impressed the natives. Other injured men were brought to Hunt and his associates and were treated to the best of their ability. The natives became so well pleased with their white friends that they complied with all their wishes, and finally determined to send a delegation to Manila to offer their allegiance to the United States. The delegation was well received by the Government and was entertained in the grounds of Professor Worcester, whose long experience among the Filipino tribes taught him the most effective ways of reaching them. Thus, without the firing of a gun, a whole tribe of man-hunting natives was brought under the authority of the United States through the intelligent kindness of three Americans.

Many important improvements, which will benefit the country by opening roads to markets and by affording employment for labor, are being planned by Governor Taft and his associates of the Philippine Commission. Many of these improvements, however, cannot be made at once, and there has not yet been time enough to carry them out. The work of education is already fortunately

well under way, thanks to the enthusiastic leadership of the young superintendent of education, Dr. F. W. Atkinson. About 100,000 pupils had been enrolled in the schools as early as last summer, and the new American and the old Filipino teachers are working shoulder to shoulder in spreading the knowledge of English. It is not intended that Americans shall supersede the Filipino teachers. This has been made as plain as possible to them, and the opening of the normal school for giving them lessons in English has afforded practical proof of the sincerity of these assurances. The annual report of the Philippine Commission says regarding the Manila schools:—

“Already they (Filipino teachers) have so mastered the English language that they are able to make use of it in teaching, and it is gradually coming to be the language of the schools. Efforts are being made to show them the necessity of breaking away from the mechanical and the routine methods which they have hitherto followed. The interested efforts of Filipino teachers to teach English to children after they themselves have had merely a year of instruction in that language are noteworthy, and their zeal and their success in this form of instruction will contribute greatly to the spread of the English language here, and to the success of popular education.”

Eight night schools are already in operation in the city of Manila, and three more are in process of organization. The attendance in September last averaged about 1,800, under 68 teachers, and hundreds of applicants were turned away for lack of sufficient accommodations. The instruction in the night schools was recently increased from three to six nights in the week, and in some of them advanced classes have been organized for typewriting and stenography and for preparing students for civil service examinations. Industrial and manual work is being added to the curriculum of the schools in Manila and other provinces, and agricultural colleges will soon be established under the supervision of the Department of Agriculture at Washington. The industrial work will include the teaching of such trades as carpentry, harness making, plumbing, and also the mechanical arts employed in building and every-day life, for which there is so great a demand and so deficient a supply under the

existing conditions in the Philippines. General Greely has presented to the Civil Commission a plan for the education of young Filipinos as telegraph operators, and for the gradual transfer of the telegraph and signal service by provinces from the military to the civil authorities.

The eagerness with which the natives are seeking to learn the language of their rulers is no doubt inspired in some degree by self-interest; but it is a natural result of the policy adopted by the War Department and by Governor Taft in educating the people up to their responsibilities. The ability to read English or Spanish is required before any part may be taken in municipal elections, unless the elector possesses one of these three qualifications,—he must be a holder of property worth \$250 in gold; he must pay annual taxes of \$15 in gold, or he must have held one of the municipal offices under the Spanish régime. These municipal offices, like that of acting mayor of a small town or of membership in the Municipal Council, were numerous, and this provision of the electoral law admits many men of some standing and force of character who have not acquired a knowledge of English or Spanish. Some of them read and write Tagalog, the native dialect of Luzon, which the Spanish friars were willing to teach them because it did not give them access to the literature of civilization.

It has been ascertained that the number of qualified electors in the organized municipalities of the Philippines is about ten per cent of the number of males who would be entitled to vote under the more liberal of American suffrage laws. Reports called for by Professor Worcester in October last showed that in 390 municipalities, containing a population estimated by the local authorities at 2,695,801, there were qualified electors to the number of 49,532. This showed an average of 18.37 for each 1,000 inhabitants. The usual average in the United States, in those States where no educational test is imposed, is about one qualified male voter to every five inhabitants, or 200 voters for every 1,000 people. The percentage ascertained in the towns from which there are reports is a little less, therefore, than ten per

cent of the number that would qualify under universal manhood suffrage without any test of educational fitness. It is stated by those familiar with conditions in the Philippines that in nearly every town there has been great eagerness among those who possess the qualifications to register as electors, and many towns show a much larger percentage of registered voters than the general average for all the towns. In the peaceful islands of Masbate the number of registered electors runs as high as 45 to 1,000.

The knowledge of the Spanish tongue, sedulously kept by the friars from the masses of the people, will soon become almost extinct under the conditions which prevail in the Philippines. English is the language chiefly employed in the public offices, and will become the exclusive official language of the courts as soon as a few years have been allowed for the native attorneys to adapt themselves to the new conditions. In the civil service Filipinos are already employed to a large extent in the clerical positions. They will be promoted to the higher positions as fast as they show competence, but Caucasian leadership will be necessary for some time to come in positions that require inventive skill and the capacity for combination and organization. The extent to which the Filipinos have been admitted to the civil service is illustrated by the fact that the whole number of employees in all branches of the Insular Government, on October 1, 1901, was 4,606, and of this number 2,562 were Filipinos. The salaries drawn by the 2,044 Americans were necessarily larger than those of the Filipinos, because the latter fill all the subordinate positions of laborers and watchmen, in addition to other differences in the distribution of employment. The total amount paid for salaries was \$3,086,989, of which the American officials received \$2,280,044 per year and the Filipinos \$806,945.

Changes in these proportions, both of employees and salaries paid, will come with the progress of time and with the extension of the Civil Government over all the provinces. It is to be remembered that in many branches of the service,—indeed in nearly all,—the Civil Government has but recently assumed authority, and

has found much of the work being done by officers and details of soldiers. Many of these, upon the breaking up of the volunteer regiments, were glad to continue their services under the Civil Government. There is still a great scarcity of efficient clerical and official service in Manila and in other parts of the Philippines. If the salaries paid to Americans in some cases appear to be large, this is chiefly for two reasons. First, Secretary Root and Governor Taft believe that the best economy is to secure the highest type of men for the responsible administrative positions. A man of fair capacity who would accept perhaps \$2,500 or \$3,000 in a responsible official place in the United States is not easily persuaded to break off all his old relations at home for the same salary in a distant land. The man who is willing to go to the Philippines for the corresponding salary is, in many cases, likely to be one who has failed at home. This is the very type of man who is not desired by the Government of the Philippine Islands.

The second reason for paying liberal salaries in the Philippines is the high cost of living under the present conditions. The influx of Americans into the sleepy, mediæval city of Manila raised the cost of everything, partly from the sudden excess of demand over supply in food, houses, and services; partly from the lavishness and the high standard of living which astonish even Europeans in their dealings with Americans. Trade in Manila is still largely in the hands of a few English houses, which make large profits by a practical monopoly both of supplies and of the means of transportation. When American competition reduces freight rates and forces merchants to accept moderate profits, the cost of living will be reduced, and it will be possible to obtain efficient men for a more modest compensation than under the present conditions.

Whatever expenses are incurred by the Government of the Philippine Islands are paid entirely from the revenues of the Islands, and impose no burden upon the Treasury of the United States. It is perhaps important that this fact should be emphasized, since much misinformation seems to prevail on the subject

in the United States. The Philippine Treasury has been kept entirely separate from that of the Union, and it is proposed to pay from its revenues for all public improvements. This will cover river and harbor improvements, the lighthouse service, the marine hospital service, and the collection of customs,—all of which are charged within the limits of the States to the Treasury of the Federal Government. Notwithstanding this arrangement, the Insular Treasury had a balance in gold on September 30, 1901, of \$7,460,175, and had a balance over and above previous appropriations of \$5,106,518. The customs receipts at Manila exceed those of San Francisco or New Orleans, and the imports of the Archipelago were valued for the fiscal year 1901, at \$69,469,600, and the exports at \$65,345,052. The expenses of the United States Army are borne in the main by the Federal Treasury, but down to a recent date many of the incidents of military occupation were paid from the revenues of the Islands, including the free use by the army and navy of the public buildings of the Spanish Government, which belong in reality to the civil branches of the service. It is not surprising, in view of these conditions, that Governor Taft and his associates have been enabled to make so favorable a report to Secretary Root regarding the finances of the Islands:—

“It is only a reasonable and conservative statement to say that under any proper management of the finances of the Islands, the revenue will be at all times sufficient to meet all ordinary expenses of good administration and to make considerable appropriations for large general improvements and the erection of public works. * * * * There is no reason why the Government of the United States should ever be called upon to contribute towards the support of the Insular Government, and within a comparatively few years after the complete restoration of good order, it is entirely reasonable to anticipate that the revenues of the Islands will be sufficient to pay all expenses incurred for troops, native or American, and Insular Police sufficient to maintain good order throughout the whole Archipelago.”

What the Americans have found to do in the Philippines, and what they are doing, has thus far been partially set forth. But these measures are chiefly for the benefit of the natives and the

people of the Islands rather than of the Government or of the people of the United States. They are a part of the "white man's burden," which has been so bravely taken up by the Caucasian, and especially by the Anglo-Saxon race, in the undeveloped countries of the tropics and the Orient. The question is often asked, What profit is the United States to derive from this great responsibility? The answer is easily found when one investigates the vast natural and mineral resources of the Philippines. It is not the purpose of this article to enter in detail upon this subject. It is enough to say that great areas rich in gutta percha, rubber, and elastic simply await intelligent control, not only to supply the world for many years to come, but to afford under proper culture a permanent and enduring source of wealth. Veins of coal are frequent in Mindanao and other islands. Gold thrusts its shining head through the rifts of the rocks, and rich deposits of copper have already been located by capitalists eager to begin mining when Congress shall pass the proper laws. Great areas of rich soil are poorly cultivated, or not at all, which are capable of affording the sugar supply, the tobacco crop, and the hemp stock of the world. The forests are rich in hard woods, which are so common in the Philippines that the humblest home, where there is a floor at all, usually has one of dark solid boards, so wide and evenly veined that they would excite the envy of the piano-builder or cabinet-maker in America.

Many opportunities for the profitable investment of capital are afforded by the development of these great natural resources. An electric line from Manila through the various suburbs would probably pay richly from the beginning, and estimates have been prepared for the Civil Commission for a thousand miles of railway in Luzon at a cost of \$35,000,000, and for 500 miles of railway in Mindanao. Great syndicates are fixing eager eyes upon the untouched riches of the Islands, and bankers and engineers are planning to make locations as soon as the prohibition put by Congress upon the grant of franchises is properly modified. All these opportunities for investment mean that American capital will earn a larger return, that its owners will compete

less severely with capital at home, and that the larger purchasing power of both will increase the demand for labor, for machinery, and for goods from the United States.

The fact that the Civil Government of the Philippines is self-supporting has already been set forth. There will be a necessity for garrisons in the Islands for many years to come, just as garrisons were necessary on the frontier posts of the West, until they were thoroughly conquered by civilization. The Filipinos are not exactly of the same nature as the Indians, and are more likely to become civilized enough to settle down as agriculturists and to give up the resistance which in the case of the Indians invited extermination. Garrisons will always be required, however, in certain districts, not merely for the purposes of local police, but to enable the United States to play the great part which it is likely to be called upon to play in defending its interests in China, and in the trade of the Orient. It is obvious that garrisons and ships kept for this purpose at Manila and Subig Bay cannot be properly charged to the budget of the Philippines. They are a part of the cost of preserving national dignity and of defending national interests. It is fortunate that the country possesses in the Philippines a base so capable of defense and embracing in itself such great riches and such opportunities for Americans.

The experience thus far with native troops has been eminently satisfactory. They were the chief reliance, under their American officers, in the capture of Aguinaldo, where a single treacherous word or hint would have betrayed Funston and his brave associates into the hands of the enemy. There is no reason why in the course of time these loyal little natives should not form many regiments of the American army, and win as much praise as was won by the Japanese, whom they much resemble, by their soldierly bearing in China. To convince them that the cause of orderly progress in the Philippines lies in loyalty to their new sovereign is the instruction which was given by President McKinley to Governor Taft and his associates, and it is the goal towards which they have faithfully and successfully directed their efforts.

CHRONICLE OF THE MONTH

JOSEPH B. BISHOP, *New York City.*

The visit of Prince Henry, only brother of the German Emperor, is an international event of the highest importance. Its beneficent influence will not be confined merely to this country and to Germany, for cordial friendship between these two great nations means a union for peace and for the development of the arts of peace which will advance the cause of civilization throughout the world. The first effect, as was pointed out by the "National-Zeitung" of Berlin, when the visit was announced, was "to dissipate all the foolish and malicious assertions of political antagonism between Germany and the United States and of German plans of conquest in the American sphere of influence, and instead thereof, to strengthen and establish feelings of mutual recognition and equality of standing." The origin of these "foolish and malicious assertions" has been something of a mystery. Just what was the cause of them it would be difficult to say, but they were persistent in both countries, and were kept alive by the reckless course of the more irresponsible and sensational newspapers in both countries in exaggerating every trifling difference of opinion, and in magnifying every petty disagreement in the hope of coaxing it into an international complication. One distinct cause was the conduct of the German admiral at Manila after Dewey's great victory, and this, but for the consummate tact and ability which Dewey developed in the emergency, might have led to serious trouble. The irritation created

by that incident was very slow in subsiding; in fact it may be said to have rather increased during the past year or two. It was kept alive by the industrial rivalry of the two nations which leads each to watch with jealous alarm every effort which the other makes to increase its share of the world's trade. One heard constantly such expressions as, "Sooner or later we shall have a war with Germany"; or "Germany will never let us alone till we give her a whipping"; or "I am afraid that we are drifting into a war with Germany." Talk of this kind was especially prevalent when, after McKinley's death, Theodore Roosevelt came into the presidency. It was a quite common saying then, by those of his critics who dwelt unceasingly upon his impulsive qualities and his supposititious fondness for war, that he would surely get us into a war with Germany before his term expired.

All this cloud of unfounded and even silly suspicion was dispelled by the manner in which the Prince's visit was arranged by the Emperor and the President. Nothing could have been more cordial and graceful than the Emperor's request to have the President's daughter perform the ceremony of naming the private yacht which he was having constructed in an American shipyard. The President's response was in the same spirit, and when the Emperor announced that his brother would cross the Atlantic to be his personal representative at the ceremony, the whole people expressed their hearty pleasure in anticipation of the visit, and began at once the preparation of a series of hospitable demonstrations which gave indubitable evidence that the alleged national animosity toward Germany had no tangible basis of existence. President Roosevelt, by his quick comprehension of the vast possibilities of this visit as a means for promoting international amity, and by the hearty enthusiasm with which he inspired others to improve this opportunity to the utmost, has done the nation and the world a service of inestimable value. He has also given one more demonstration that instead of being the impulsive and reckless person that his critics had made many people believe him to be, he is really one of the most conservative Presidents we have ever had, and one of the most wise and

useful, because he combines with his conservatism that quality of sagacity which enables a true statesman to reap the full benefit of every opportunity for national advantage which presents itself.

There is no European nation, except England, with which this country has stronger reasons for maintaining friendly relations than it has with Germany. No element of our vast population that has come to us from Europe has been more serviceable in our national development than has the German. 'Wherever the German immigrant goes, he becomes a good citizen. He is a home builder and a home owner. Even in our cities, where the least desirable of all the immigrants that come to us are apt to settle, the Germans can be counted upon invariably to uphold honest government. Throughout the Western and Northwestern States, the German votes have stood invariably against all schemes for worthless or depreciated money, against all assaults upon the stability and preservation of property, and inflexibly in favor of law and order. It is a truism, almost, that the naturalized German-American is as patriotic and loyal an American citizen as is the most intense American himself. Serious trouble between the United States and a nation that sends us such valuable citizens as these, would be both unnatural and mutually disastrous. It was said at the time of the visit of the Prince of Wales, in 1860, that it extinguished the last smouldering flames of the animosity toward England that had grown out of the war of 1812. There can be no doubt, in view of the overwhelming manifestations of popular esteem and genuine friendship that have greeted Prince Henry, from all parts of the land, that the last lingering trace of national suspicion of Germany has been swept away,—let us hope, forever.

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President Roosevelt put the whole question of tariff concessions to Cuba into a single strong sentence in his first message to Congress when he said, "We are bound by every consideration of honor and expediency to pass commercial measures in the interest of her material well-being." That a reduction in the

duty levied under the Dingley law on sugar is in the interest of the material well-being of Cuba, nobody has denied or can deny. That duty is nearly one hundred per cent upon the price which the planter gets for his crop. Owing to the overproduction which has been brought about by bounties paid in continental Europe, the prices of sugar are lower than ever before known. It costs the Cuban planter today as much to get his crop to market as he can get for it after he has paid the duty on it. He is, therefore, compelled to sell without any profit whatever, and even at a loss unless he takes every precaution to keep all expenses of production down to their minimum.

Under the Platt amendment, or law, Cuba is virtually prohibited from making trade treaties with other countries, and she is consequently completely at the mercy of the United States. Great Britain and the United States are the two most important sugar consuming countries in the world, but Cuba is shut out of the former by the low price of German sugars which is fully half a cent a pound less than the cost of production, owing to the enormous crop which Germany, under the stimulus of bounties, is producing. She is producing the largest sugar crop of all countries in the world,—about two million tons annually, or nearly three times the amount of her home consumption. A syndicate of manufacturers and refiners has been in operation for some years for the purpose of maintaining the prices of home consumption at as high a point as the import duty on sugars will allow, in order to permit of the export of sugar at prices which would otherwise be below the cost of production. In addition to this, the German manufacturers have the aid of a government export bounty, so that between these two artificial aids they are able to sell sugar abroad at fully half a cent a pound below the cost of production. About 400,000 tons of German raw beet sugar came into this country last year, where it entered the market against the Cuban product, which had to come in against a one hundred per cent duty and without the aid of bounties of any kind.

It is clearly not generous or just to Cuba to continue this

system of oppression toward her in regard to her chief product. We drove Spain out of the island in order to rid its people of intolerable oppression. We went there as her friend, pledged to give her people every possible aid in becoming a peaceful, prosperous, and independent nation. We deprived her of the means of helping herself toward material prosperity by inducing her to consent to a compact not to make trade treaties with other nations. To turn about now and to refuse to make such trade treaties with her as are absolutely necessary, not for her prosperity, but for her escape from want and even starvation, would be an act of national bad faith and positive brutality which would put us on a par with her Spanish oppressors.

But the moral obligation is not the only one. The argument of expediency is scarcely less strong. We are pledged to give the island independence, yet if we were to withdraw our troops and protection and to leave the Cubans to set up their own government, while virtually barring their products out of our markets, we should be doing our utmost to make this experiment in self-government a failure at the start. If, on the other hand, we were to open our markets generously to their products, we should advance our own interests by securing all the trade of the islands. Prosperity and development in Cuba mean an enormous increase in her value to us as a market for our products. When the duty was taken off sugar in 1891, under the McKinley act, nearly the entire trade of Cuba was transferred to the United States, and the island enjoyed the highest degree of prosperity in its history. At present about \$30,000,000 of its trade goes to Europe, all of which would come to us under lower tariff duties. We have a growing export trade in cotton goods and shoes, and yet Cuba's purchases from us in these lines are far less than her purchases from Europe. The prices of manufactured goods are generally lower in Europe than in this country, which accounts for Cuba's buying there. A discrimination in our favor in the Cuban tariff would divert this trade from Europe to the United States. The general impression is that we are already supplying the greater part of Cuba's needs of food, but this is not the case. Cuba buys

the greater part of her beef, cattle, and fish from other countries than ours. Concessions on Cuban sugar and tobacco would be an unspeakable boon to Cuba, but they would be a very low price for the United States to pay for a large increase in foreign trade.

There is not a word to be said, either on the side of morals or of expediency, in support of a refusal to grant reasonable concessions. All opposition to them comes from selfishness and greed, and it will not be allowed to prevail. If the Republican majority in the House persists in its refusal, or rather if its Ways and Means Committee continues to stand in the way of concessions, which is doubtful at this writing, there is no doubt about the course which the Senate and the President will take. The concessions will be made in the form of a reciprocity treaty, and will be generous enough to save the island from disaster and to save the American name from dishonor. It would be a great pity to stop at a twenty-five per cent reduction, for thirty-three per cent, according to Governor-General Wood, is the least which can be depended upon to give substantial relief. A great deal of harm has been done already by delay, for relief should have come in December, when the harvesting of the sugar crop began.

So far as the Philippines are concerned, tariff concessions are less vital to the welfare of the islands, but the same considerations prompt them also. Governor Taft recommends a reduction of seventy-five per cent on sugar and tobacco, as the lowest that should be granted. He says it would be valuable more as an evidence of friendliness and good faith than as a benefit to the producers or as a stimulus to trade. A discrimination by Congress in favor of the islands would be an assurance to their inhabitants that the United States government is interested in their welfare and eager to help them. There are no trade consequences of much advantage either way, for the sugar and tobacco crops of the Philippines are not large, and hemp, which is the chief crop, can find an eager market under any terms, for the demand exceeds the supply.

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The purchase of the Danish West Indies by the United States,

which has been arranged in a treaty whose ratification by the Senate is assured, is an acquisition of great strategic value to this country. For more than thirty years the American government has been seeking to annex these islands, but until now it has failed. In 1867 an offer of \$7,500,000 was made for them by Secretary Seward, but Denmark refused to sell for less than \$15,000,000. Subsequently the Secretary agreed to pay \$7,500,000 for the islands of St. Thomas and St. John, but complications arose which prevented the bargain from being completed. Denmark insisted that the people of the islands should be allowed to vote on the question, and they did so, the result showing only twenty-three votes against annexation in a total of more than 1,200. The sale was arranged in a treaty which failed of ratification in the Senate in 1870. Since that time the islands have been in the market for any nation that might choose to pay \$5,000,000 for them, and this has been more or less of a menace to the United States. So long as this country is at peace with the world, the islands are of no military or naval importance to us; but if we were to become involved in a war with Germany or France, and Germany or France should at the time be in possession of these islands, it would be a very serious matter for us. It is this view of the case that has compelled the purchase under the strong advice of all our military authorities, including the Naval Board of Strategy. The islands, together with Porto Rico, occupy the northeastern portion of the Caribbean Sea. St. Thomas, the largest of them, is the natural point of call for all European trade bound to the West Indies, Central America, and the northern part of South America. With Porto Rico they lie directly in the pathway between the Atlantic Ocean through the Caribbean Sea to the entrance of an isthmian canal, and are of great importance to us in connection with the commerce of the canal. As the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations says:—

“They are of first importance in connection with our relations to the region of the Orinoco and the Amazon, and with our control of the Windward Passage. In view of the Isthmian Canal and European settlements in South America, every additional acquisition by the United States is of value.

Porto Rico is densely populated. Its roads are poor. It has a long coast line without ports for large vessels. It is consequently very difficult of defense. San Juan is the only harbor capable of fortifications and this is only suitable for vessels of light draught."

This defect is completely supplied by the harbor of St. Thomas, which is very large and safe, entrance to it being through a narrow passage, and it has an abundance of water. The island itself is admirably adapted by nature for a naval station. There is a high ridge running through its centre which can be fortified so as to command approach from all directions, furnishing absolute protection for the harbor, and making of the island itself a veritable Gibraltar in the pathway of commerce to and from an isthmian canal. The United States may never need such a fortress for the protection of its commerce and property, but it would be very shortsighted policy to allow some other nation to erect it when all danger of the kind can be removed by the outlay of so small a sum as \$5,000,000.

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The action of the Isthmian Canal Commission in reversing their first report and writing a new one favoring the Panama route as the "most practical and feasible," in view of the action of the owners of the Panama concessions and property in reducing their price from \$109,000,000 to \$40,000,000, has served to bring out more clearly than heretofore the relative merits of the two routes under consideration. The reduction of nearly \$70,000,000 in the price demanded by the French company destroyed completely the one advantage which the Nicaraguan route possessed over that of Panama,—that of being cheaper, so far as cost of construction is concerned. In every other important respect the Panama route had been pronounced by the Commission superior. It is only one fourth as long; the time of passage for a vessel through it is estimated about one third that estimated for Nicaragua; the cost of its construction is estimated at \$35,000,000 less, and the cost of operation and maintenance at \$1,350,000 less each year. In addition to these superior

qualities, there are natural harbors at both ends of the Panama route and no harbors whatever at the ends of the Nicaraguan route. The one advantage that the latter has is that it enters the Caribbean or the Pacific 500 miles nearer to San Francisco than the Panama route does; but nearly all the time thus gained is lost in the additional time consumed in transit through the canal. The water supply at high level, for use in locks, is virtually unlimited on both routes, but the controlling or regulating works would be of much simpler construction and more easily operated and maintained on the Panama line. The estimated time of construction is about the same for both routes,—eight to ten years.

The dominating merit of the Panama route is its shortness. A vessel arriving at Panama on the Pacific side, or at Colon on the Atlantic, would naturally wait a few hours, either to be cleaned, or to take on coal or provisions, or for some other cause. She might thus lie in the harbor till daylight on the following morning, and by nightfall she would have passed through the canal. There would be no delay in the canal, whereas by the Nicaraguan route she would be for one night at least in the canal, and subject to more or less delay. Furthermore, the curves which would be necessary by the way of Nicaragua would be much sharper than by Panama, and there would be danger of delay in rounding these in case of very large vessels. It should be borne in mind that there has been an enormous increase in the size of ocean-going ships since the Nicaraguan route was first taken up by American capitalists as a more desirable line. The great ocean liners of today have a displacement of more than 40,000 tons, and for vessels of those dimensions a canal with a navigable depth of thirty-five feet and a bottom width of 150 feet must be constructed. Its locks must be 740 feet in length and eighty-four feet in width. This is a very different kind of canal from what was contemplated when the Nicaraguan route was highest in favor, and to construct one by that route now would be a quite different enterprise from the one first contemplated. It would need to be much longer because of the impracticability of short

radius curves, and as a consequence some of the natural streams which were proposed for use originally would be unavailable now, and additional excavation would be necessary. When one considers that a work of this magnitude by way of Nicaragua would have a length of nearly 184 miles, and that by way of Panama only forty-nine miles, with natural advantages so strongly in favor of the latter that fewer locks would be required, that far less curvature would be necessary, and that the time of transit would be only one third as long, it is easy to understand why the Commission has reported unanimously in favor of Panama.

The harbor question is a very important one. There exists at Panama on the Pacific side a natural harbor, or more properly, roadstead, which would answer all needs of vessels entering or leaving the canal. On the other side of the isthmus, at Colon in the Caribbean Sea, there is a harbor which is perfectly safe for vessels 360 days in the year. On the remaining five days nothing is safe in the harbor because of the peculiar winds which blow into it. This objection, it is suggested by members of the Commission, could be met by enlarging the mouth of the canal so as to make a harbor of that. On the Pacific side of the Nicaraguan route there is nothing but a sandy coast. "A harbor would have to be excavated back of the shore line in the sand," says Professor W. H. Burr, of the Canal Commission, in an extremely lucid and interesting article on this whole canal subject in "Scribner's Magazine" for February, "and made of sufficient dimensions to give all the harbor facilities desired." On the other side, at Greytown in the Caribbean Sea, there was formerly a good natural harbor, with a navigable depth of thirty feet, but "at the present time, and for many years past, the movement of sand northwesterly along the coast into the bay which in early days formed the harbor of Greytown has partially filled the latter and closed the entrance to it, forming a closed lagoon completely unavailable for other purposes." It would be necessary both to excavate a harbor, and to maintain it by annual dredging,—that is, to enter upon a perpetual warfare against one of the irresistible forces of nature and one of the most insidious.

THE MODERN SOLDIER AND MILITARY LESSONS OF RECENT WARS

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Both as a political and military episode, the Boer War has made some notable demonstrations. Politically, it has shown the nature and degree of British imperialism; it has decided the question of Anglo-Saxon domination in South Africa and incidentally developed the ulterior ambition of the Boer republics; it has brought about an intense recrudescence of continental detestation of Great Britain and weakened her Oriental supremacy at a critical period; it has thrown her decisively towards an American alliance in sympathy and policy; it has shaken her political self-complacency and modified her aggressiveness, and it has indicated that her political zenith was already reached during the Victorian era.

From the military standpoint it has demonstrated both strength and weakness. As an exhibition of resource,—of organization, equipment, transportation,—the campaign has been a marvel of achievement. It is beyond question that no other power on earth could have placed a fully equipped army of two hundred thousand men upon another continent at a distance of ten thousand miles with such celerity and completeness and with so few casualties in the transit. When the nature of the field of action and the enormous local difficulties encountered are considered, the achievement becomes still more admirable as an operation of movement. Nor does the meed of praise stop here, whatever the mistakes and shortcomings developed by the abnormal conditions of this struggle. Tommy Atkins has done credit to his traditions and to the indomitable tenacity of the British soldier, and his sturdy combination

of pluck and patience seems to have suffered little diminution. It is extremely doubtful if the best troops the Continent could put in the field would have made as good a showing, in the heart of Africa, against such a foe, and under such heartbreaking conditions. And, for the matter of that, what warrior on the globe can show a like record of endurance and glory in foreign climes as the British grenadier, who, from equator to pole, has marched and bled and conquered, founded empires, overthrown despotisms, and made ready the ground for an imposing structure of equity, order, sound finance, and peace? But beyond this, the aspect is far from roseate. The British officer has not modified, to any appreciable extent, that combination of qualities which had become characteristic in Frederick's time and which Carlyle has described in an epigrammatic phrase. "Without knowledge of war, without fear of death" seems as fair a summary of him today as ever. "Up guards and at them," however, is no longer the equivalent of technical knowledge, neither do gallant dandies in uniform hurry from the ballrooms of "Belgium's capital" to epoch-making Waterloos. The grim genius of the Boer War has scratched a plain, if somewhat ragged, line between the centuries, and marked the limit of romantic war,—the boundary of the kingdom of the iridescent Mars and of picturesque slaughter. Feathers and paint as attributes of the soldier are the stage properties of the centuries behind us, and are becoming as absurd as the gongs and hobgoblins of the Chinese military establishment, for they were, together with the appetite for war, our inheritance from the savage, and while we have not altogether outgrown the latter, we are beginning to appreciate the grotesqueness of war paint and spangles as its livery. Alas for the cuirassier, the uhlan, the hussar, the grenadier of red, of white, and of blue, with incredible head-gear! their splendor has set with the sun of romance, and the glory of them will depart with the day of absolutism. Their passing began with the development of the American soldier of the frontier, was hastened by our Civil War, and is now being consummated by the alert, practical Yankee as he appeared at Santiago and in the Orient, and the uncouth, mobile, sharp-shooting Boer of the Veldt.

War is sombre, bitter, outrageous, even when unavoidable, and surely the effort to clothe its sinister body in feathers and tinsel, in rainbow hues and extravagant garments, is a grim irony never so absurd as in a day when the citizen covers himself with raiment of black and dun, and shies at color as if it bore the germs of the bubonic plague.

But the evolution of military clothes is largely a psychic question and their morphology ought to be written by a man of scientific mind with a sufficient sense of humor. If their prismatic development is incongruous in our day, it has, nevertheless, always been in harmony with the institutions and conceptions of absolutism, and it is the professional ruler of the twentieth century who is deeply concerned in the silver plated radiance of the cuirassier and the general "mise en scène" of his military establishment. It is perfectly certain that the gorgeousness of Tempelhof and St. Petersburg must disappear on the modern battle-field. What then is its worth? Much every way to the dynasties. First, then, the sight is thrilling,—intoxicating. It is a show that sends delightful shivers down the spinal column and stimulates a desire to get up and yell and wave the arms. It has an element of historic excitement, too, as a pageant connected with the nation's wars and victories, and stirs the patriot's blood with the glories of past slaughter as well as with the hopes of future victorious carnage, while it goes far towards reconciling the private to the conscription and the loss of his individuality. When his Kaiser preaches to him the doctrine of imperial ownership, there must be a *quid pro quo* in the clothes and the military idea they represent, and he gets it in the adoration of the sex and the privilege of elbowing the citizen off the sidewalk. Again, what we term military glory is made incarnate in the glitter and magnificence of the dress, and it is urged that the pride of the soldier in his profession is stimulated while his "esprit de corps" is vitalized by effective clothes. As a matter of fact, is it not an appeal to personal vanity, pure and simple, and on a level with the war paint and feathers of the Indian? The court of a monarch is made showy and impressive, the personal element in his relation to the military arms that sustain his

throne and the importance of rank are put in evidence, and all the subtle allurements that intoxicate the senses and befog political issues are powerfully enhanced by gold and glitter and color. We have seen the great master actor and imperial artist in "coups de théâtre" play upon the vanity of an emotional people and move them to unheard of sacrifices very largely through the mechanism of clothes and ribbons, and so long as her votaries were splendid to look upon, the sham goddess "La Gloire," whose high priest he was, was sure of a crowded temple, and her altars never lacked devoted victims.

But, together with fine clothes, passes also the wooden soldier, the masterpiece of the great Frederick and his father, and the military type par excellence up to recent years. This automatus perversion of man without mind or emotion,—a marching, trigger-pulling, and saluting mechanism,—has been marched and countermarched on European battle-fields for the better part of two centuries; a patient ox led to the slaughter, coaxed and bullied to needless victories and unnecessary defeats, by heroic swells in fine raiment, to serve the miserable intrigues of hereditary rulers. This passive being was developed by a suppression of everything but mechanical impulse communicated by word of command. Individuality was obliterated. A certain association of human beings constituted a military animal known as a company whose cerebellum was the captain. They were deprived of reason and of natural movement, and ranged as they were in compact ranks were compelled to walk like wooden images actuated by springs. And what incredible burdens of grotesque clothes they were compelled to bear! The ingenuity of man must have been taxed to its limit to conceive of head-gear and coats so well calculated to render them as unlike human beings as possible. The dress hats of Frederick's grenadiers were fifteen inches high. Some of the Prussian infantry in 1815 wore hats which, with plume, were over two feet in height, and these same in 1836 wore huge coffee-pots nearly twelve inches across the crown, eight inches high and proportionally heavy. To describe the variety of French head-gear from Louis XIV. to President Loubet, including the bear-skin of the grenadiers, would take a volume and show hardly a

single one really serviceable and comfortable. The helmets and hats of cuirassiers and hussars are still worse, while the jackets, body coats, and attachments of every sort are beyond all limits of absurdity as clothes for fighting men in the field. And yet these oppressive and grotesque liveries were "toted" all over Europe in every season, as if war were a harlequinade, and men were proud to die in them on the snow-drifts of the Beresina and the burning sands of the Pyramids.

But the wooden soldier was well fitted to a development of the firearm as primitive as himself and a method of warfare as formal and automatic as its personnel. Although Bonaparte smashed into bits the ligneous strategy of his day with a result so unsettling to the military nervous system of Europe that twenty years of disaster were required for the assimilation of this lesson, the individual type of the rank and file was very little modified. The crude weapons of the past brought bodies of combatants into close range, and the delivery of fire at point blank distances demanded nothing of the private but mechanical action. The man stood where he was bid, was shot or marched off to another place with no idea of why or whither, and found himself victorious or defeated, as the case might be, with no more notion of the logic of the situation than of the reason why he was fighting at all. He was a part of the blind herd of cattle in circus clothes driven from one slaughter pen to another at the caprice of cabinets of cynical Talleyrands and Metternichs; and after a lifetime of such performances he knew nothing more than when he began.

With the improvement of firearms and the mechanism of war, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, there came somewhat of a change in the conception of the function of the human unit. The people of detail and organization did an immense amount of military thinking, and before the Pallas that emerged full-armed from that German brain there went down with a crash another lot of decrepit military traditions. The fall of Paris was the triumph of organization. But, although so much of reform was accomplished, there still survived a great deal of the automatic idea in the construction of the soldier. He was an improved and highly perfected machine, but still a machine, and wholly the

instrument of his officer. In the meanwhile on our own continent, under a different social and political sky, and breathing an atmosphere that filled his being with self-reliance as the first element of existence, was developing a totally different type of fighting man. The school of his profession has been on the frontier in nomadic combats where sharpshooting and unconventionality are the prime factors of existence, and in that hard school of the survival of the fittest he has learned to value the essentials of success, and to dispense with most of its luxuries and adornments, so that, when we came to the settlement of our own family quarrel in 1861, we went at it with a business-like directness that reduced war to its lowest terms, and kept it there until the job was done.

When the American soldier made a sudden *début* in the arena of the world in 1898, he was an enigma which the Old World could not readily understand. He was altogether too individual and full of character to be adjusted to foreign standards. His fighting had too much spontaneity and intelligence to conform to the automatic ideal; his uniform according to them was unspeakable, and his results, being wholly unacademic, could not be fully approved by the military faculty. In China the same dissonance in type begat astonishment and criticism. It was the child of the Western Republic cheek by jowl with the offspring of the feudal and Oriental systems. And yet the American type is the forerunner,—the soldier of the future,—and from certain similarity in conditions, which are mainly those of environment, the Boer is in some respects his transcript. The Boer is a modern strain partly reverted to a nomadic state. The frontiersman is the same, and our soldiers developed in contact with that social reversion. The Boer has absorbed, also, the independence of thought and action which is a part of our national temperament. He is a frontiersman, but differs from his American brother in not being adventurous. Obstinate, domestic, and averse to crowds, he became a herder, and was a mighty hunter so long as game lasted. When game grew scarcer, he remained fond of his rifle, but still fonder of isolation. Merged with his nomadic tastes was an intense religiosity,—practical and puritanical in a

certain way, but not incompatible with a Dutch eye for the main chance—as a whole the most unsoldierly type imaginable, without the least touch of romance or the picturesque, and habits which are described as the reverse of cleanly. As to discipline and organization, the rudiments are hateful and unimaginable to him. Of all these qualities, a description of which may be gathered from many sources, not one is characteristic of the regular soldier of the conventional type, and some of them are of a nature even to imperil the integrity of an army and to invite disaster. Two important qualities, however, he has which are supreme,—the capacity to subsist indefinitely upon a small ration which can be carried by the individual, and the ability to shoot straight. Add to these a horse for every man, an environment ideal in its adaptability to defense, and the principal sources of the Boer successes are stated.

There is an element of epic dignity and pathos in the Boer struggle, even when everything is admitted that has been urged against them as obstructionists, slave owners, unclean fanatics, degenerates. They may, perhaps, be more or less all of these things. Their history on the Dark Continent has not been without stain in its relation to the aborigines. Our own, in a similar connection, is not wholly celestial. It may be admitted that their ambition to dominate the destinies of South Africa is a menace to its civilization, and neither could nor should be permitted to prevail against the progress of Anglo-Saxon supremacy. There yet remains a stern, patriarchal majesty in the fight, underlying their uncouthness and dirt; a singleness of purpose and a simplicity of faith Judaic in their grandeur; a tenacity of despair which is a fine echo of the spirit that freed their mother country from the bloody grip of Philip. These grave, bearded, heavy-eyed, gothic men in plain clothes and slouch hats, cross-belted with a couple of hundred death-bolts and hugging a repeating rifle, are to my mind more dignified and impressive as an impersonation of war than all the cuirassiers, uhlans, hussars, grenadiers, and field marshals that ever bespangled a battle-field. These men hate war as did never the Puritans, and a siege of Drogheda would be unthinkable to them. Their psalms are not

sung through the nose, and they burn neither witches nor non-conformists with prayer and thanksgiving, and yet they sing psalms and pray and fight with devotion, and they have given to war a quality something different from its tradition. Fathers and grandfathers, sons and grandsons, have lain down and died together in homespun, and their blood has been just as red as though it stained a scarlet coat, a cuirass, or khaki. Their homes are desolate; their women and children in pens; their beloved Veldt invaded; their nationality obliterated; themselves a ragged handful, and yet they keep two hundred and fifty thousand modern Anglo-Saxon soldiers on the jump, and every now and then release a few hundred of them minus their guns and shoes, but with a blessing and an impressive experience. The pity of it, that two brave peoples are fertilizing the "civilization" of a new empire with blood and hatred, disease and death! The pity of it, that our own mission in the Orient is sown in the same soil, and that the road of modern progress lies over the bodies of invaded and invaders!

It is a curious fact that with all the acumen brought to bear in recent years upon military affairs the one point which has escaped serious consideration is the essential feature of the soldier's reason for being, that is, the shooting of a gun. For long everything else was deemed paramount to the matter of straight shooting. There has, of course, been a certain proportion of target practice and firing drill in the training of continental armies, but of limited amount and perfunctory in kind, and not insisted upon as a vital matter until very recent years. The conception of military operations on the field of battle still remains a mass conception in which the action of the individual unit is practically ignored. Although the size of the fighting unit has steadily decreased from regiment to battalion, and from battalion to company, it had fallen no lower in the estimate of continental theorists than the company. The logic of recent military operations and of the existing situation in military mechanics is that *the future fighting unit will be the individual*. The rationale of this conclusion is the irresistible logic of an accurate, long range firearm in the hands of a marksman, and it is immensely to the credit of the American army and the

personal efforts of a few officers,—notably Lieut.-Col. W. R. Livermore of the Engineers, Major Stanhope E. Blunt of the Ordinance Corps, and Major H. G. Litchfield of the Artillery,—that marksmanship has been emphasized and fairly enforced in the training of our troops. The introduction of this feature was more natural and easy from our contact with frontier conditions and also on account of the small size of our army, but target practice is expensive, and large military establishments shrink from it on that account, yet if modern nations will read the handwriting on the Boer wall, they will shrink from it no longer, or it will be borne in upon them by the bitter experiences of disaster. It will not do to decry the results of the South African struggle as proving nothing because of the smallness of the Boer armies and guerilla nature of the operations. In the early phases of the war the Boer forces, although relatively small, were yet armies acting both on the offensive and defensive. The converging movements that shut up White in Ladysmith were both strategical and tactical; the operations against Buller were on a large scale and along an extended front; Methuen's frontal attack on the Modder River was an open field assault with artillery, and in every instance the infantry fire of the Boers withered and dispersed superior forces bravely led. Never before have pitched battles been fought with armies of sharpshooters operating against armies of modern troops trained in the old school of infantry fire and automatic movement. It has been here conclusively proved that in the future it will not be enough to possess the best weapons,—it will be necessary to know how to shoot them straight. Thin lines of more or less reluctant boys, middle aged and old men—dirty, ununiformed, unorganized, undisciplined, extended in rude, unmilitary trenches, and with very little control from their officers—demoralized and destroyed by the corrosion of their fire the best and bravest troops England could hurl against them. The English soldier fought as he had been taught,—as the best continental troops would have done had they been in his place. They “deployed” and “rushed” after the fashion of the modern academic attack, and they pegged away with their own rifles in the indiscriminate method of the school of the soldier and infan-

try marksmanship, but to their amazement they "got left"—many of them in their tracks—by these uncouth boys and bearded ranchmen of the Veldt. The British officer all the while was a pathetic spectacle. From all accounts he stood up in the fine old Fontenoy manner, heroic and absurd, and called for a dose of cold British steel. But alas! it did not "arrive," and before long it became evident that unless something was done the British officer would disappear from the face of the earth. Unfortunately, besides his magnificent pluck he had very little to fall back upon. Encased in the privilege of class; saturated with the prejudice of caste; despising the technique of scientific warfare; luxurious in habit; the British officer is an anachronism in the modern military world. As a trained expert, resourceful and alert, he is, as a class, entirely deficient, because he had been taught to "leave all that to the sergeant." Had he possessed the thorough training in reconnaissance and "terrain-lehre" of the continental soldier, that alone would have saved his face and the situation on many an occasion, but unfortunately this also had been "left to the sergeant." Cool, tenacious, intrepid, reticent, generous,—a gentleman,—he is, nevertheless, a failure as an officer in the modern sense, and it will go hard with him before he can be made to see the error of his military ways and learn the drudgery of his profession.

If further illustration of the extent to which marksmanship is a determining factor in action is needed, we have but to turn to our campaign in the Philippines. Here it is almost a *reductio ad absurdum*. Our slippery adversaries make no pretence at aiming even, to say nothing of marksmanship. It is usually a volley or two from the hip, and then a "devil take the hindmost." On our own side our men deploy, deliver a well-aimed skirmish fire, and then charge with a yell to reach only a deserted trench full of dead bodies.

The Filipino guns have been for the most part as good as our own,—at the outset even better than our Springfields,—but the men behind the guns were of different quality and skill. Had the Filipinos been clever marksmen, at home with the rifle, and trained in even the elements of defensive fighting, our record of

success might have been far from uninterrupted, and would certainly have been sanguinary to a frightful degree.

Probably the next most important novelty among the demonstrations in the private war academy of the Veldt is the strategic value of mounted infantry. The extreme mobility of the small Boer armies enabled them to cover an immense front, to deceive the enemy as to the number and position of their forces, to choose time and point of attack as well as to refuse battle at will. It enabled the Boer to become bold and aggressive, to imperil and cut the British lines of communication, to bewilder and demoralize his initiative, and when defeated, it often made barren his enemy's victory and in almost every case ensured a safe retreat from overwhelming odds. They are the guerillas of the Forrest and Moseby type *plus* an accurate, long range, repeating arm, and increased in numbers to the size of an army corps.

Large masses of mounted infantry should figure conspicuously in future wars, or rather, the tendency of cavalry will be to assume that character, and the function of the horse will become purely vehicular,—to get the man to the point of attack with a full-sized gun in his hand, and, if necessary, to get him away again. For battering purposes the horse will be about as useful as a baby carriage or a bicycle. The commander who shall drive a mass of cavalry against rapid-fire guns and modern small arms will deserve the fate in store for his victims.

As an adjunct to mobility, the immense value of a highly condensed, portable ration is made conspicuous. With good grazing and the equivalent of biltong, a large body of mounted infantry can for a considerable time dispense with trains and defy every species of troops with less levity than itself. An infantry column, no matter of what size, is almost at the mercy of such a body which has, even when greatly reduced, forced the British to mount all their forces for which horses can be procured. It is to be observed also that accuracy of fire and extreme mobility tend to prolong the defence very greatly and to develop ambuscade, night attack, and the Parthian warfare of harassment. Long lines of communication become very difficult

to maintain, and the problem of supply vastly more serious.

The lesson for artillery is to be found at the Tugela and Modder Rivers. No position within fair range of infantry fire is tenable without cover and not oversafe with it, provided the infantry can shoot straight. Santiago showed that even under indifferent marksmanship it is becoming for artillery to be very respectful in attitude, and it follows, then, that, as a very long range arm, good marksmanship is rather more imperative for it than for infantry. It is in defense that artillery showed up strongest, and the heavy gun appears to have done the best work. As a battering agent, it seems to have been a failure everywhere. The ridiculous showing of our navy practice on the Santiago batteries is paralleled by the ineffectiveness of the Boer guns in their siege operations, such as they were.

To summarize, it appears that determinative factors in future wars will be :—

(1.) The development of individuality and self-reliance in the soldier.

(2.) Expert marksmanship in infantry fire. Every man a sharpshooter.

(3.) Expert marksmanship in artillery fire.

(4.) Mobility in large bodies of troops of the nature of mounted infantry, and incident thereto, a highly condensed ration.

(5.) The abandonment of nearly all close formations and manœuvres on the tactical field, as well as all drill and parade exercises of the old wooden order tending to automatic habits and ideas. The new soldier should be made intelligent, active, skilful with his weapon, and self-reliant, as above stated, and all manœuvre formations for garrison or marching purposes should be elastic and natural. The manual of arms to be reduced to a few simple movements and the work of military exercises directed to perfecting the intelligence and marksmanship of the individual.

Drill regulations to be greatly simplified. Nearly all the complex details relating to formal movements both of the individual and the manœuvres are unnecessary,—embarrassing to the man and without use in the field. Battalion drill with precise

alignments, closed rank formations, and involved movements, is archaic, and has no function in any operations of warfare. It may be pretty to look at and delightful to the fair sex, but it is time wasted, and should be relegated to the ballet in light opera. Ranks to be always open with perfect freedom of movement and ample space for the rear files. Ceremonial formations should be few and need not be stiff in order to be dignified. The time spent in marching and countermarching, in perfecting an elaborate manual of arms and constrained mechanical movements is even worse than wasted, since it tends to make stiff, unthinking, blind, and dull soldiers, and takes valuable time needed for instruction in their active duties as fighting and human beings.

(6.) A field uniform designed solely with reference to service, and a peace uniform, simple, neat, and comfortable, extravagant neither in color nor insignia, which shall designate rank and service corps distinctly, without clothing a soldier in a style of raiment which in this land should be confined to the circus.

(7.) If practicable, some form of individual protection from infantry fire would be an important adjunct to the offensive in assault.

It is inconsistent with civic freedom and the modern spirit that soldiers should be reduced to the slavish level of an Oriental despotism, and that their training should in any way tend to lower their intelligence to that of cattle, nor does a proper discipline demand the operation of such methods. An intelligent man serving his country in a military capacity will subordinate himself to the hierarchy of command, because this is an absolute essential to successful military operations and also because obedience to law whether civil or military is the duty of the citizen to the State. Thousands of men of education and position during the Civil War carried muskets with a subordination never excelled in any army and yet the relations of officers and men were such as to preserve the self-respect of both. In developing a self-reliant, intelligent, unconstrained type of fighting man there need be no relaxation of the essential discipline, which is not fostered in its highest form by enforcing a sense of degradation.

The time is past for recruiting soldiers from state prisons and the less the mechanism of his training tends to give him the status of driven cattle the more effective will a man become as a fighting unit.

The profession of the soldier is honorable only as it is followed with a serious conviction of its deplorable necessity under existing social conditions ; with a profound realization that its operations should be effective to the extent imposed by its necessary purpose and no further, and ameliorated so far as possible by an enlightened humanity. The glory in war for war's sake or for personal advancement is a barbarous and murderous appetite which degrades the soldier to the level of the pirate.

War is the symptom of social and political disease and inevitable until a time of spiritual health shall make it possible for all the world to beat the sword into the plowshare. The soldier who recognizes that his profession is, in a way, that of a political surgeon will study it as a serious and honorable science whose virtues are self-devotion, self-control, unselfishness, moral and physical courage, efficiency, discipline, respect for law, integrity. In this catalogue there is no place for the ambition whose motive is personal glorification and power, which looks upon fighting as a means to the acquisition of rank and the furthering of private interests, and it would seem that the finest military character should shrink from the show and finery of a semi-barbarous feudalism. The American soldier is always a citizen and a volunteer ; always a thinking, independent, fearless, self-respecting man who fights for his country and his rights, and by him the tradition of the military cockatoo must ever be viewed with aversion. His discipline is higher than that of the continental automaton because it is not the discipline of fear and conscription. No more subordinate, cheerful, and honestly respectful soldier is to be found in the world than he ; devoted to his officer, frank and fearless,—the very traits which shocked the harsh formalists of the foreign powers in Asia are the elements which make him the foremost soldier of the new century and the highest type of the profession of arms.

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSE

A DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS OF MODERN SCIENCE
WHICH RELATE TO THE EXTENT AND
STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSE.

SIMON NEWCOMB, *Washington.*

The questions of the extent of the universe in space and of its duration in time, especially of its possible infinity in either space or time, are of the highest interest both in philosophy and science. The traditional philosophy had no means of attacking these questions except considerations suggested by pure reason, analogy, and that general fitness of things which was supposed to mark the order of nature. With modern science the questions belong to the realm of fact, and can be decided only by the results of observation and a study of the laws to which these results may lead.

From the philosophic standpoint, a discussion of this subject which is of such weight that in the history of thought it must be assigned a place above all others, is that of Kant in his "*Kritik*." Here we find two opposing propositions,—the thesis that the universe occupies only a finite space, and is of finite duration; the antithesis that it is infinite both as regards extent in space and duration in time. Both of these opposing propositions are shown to admit of demonstration with equal force, not directly, but by the method of *reductio ad absurdum*. The difficulty, discussed by Kant, was more tersely expressed by Hamilton in pointing out that we could neither conceive of infinite space nor of space as bounded.

The methods and conclusions of modern astronomy are, however, in no way at variance with Kant's reasoning, so far as it extends. The fact is that the problem with which the philosopher of Königsberg vainly grappled is one which our science cannot solve any more than could his logic. We may hope to gain complete information as to everything which lies within the range of the telescope, and to trace to its beginning every process which we can now see going on in space. But before questions of the absolute beginning of things, or of the boundary beyond which nothing exists, our means of inquiry are quite powerless.

Another example of the ancient method is found in the great work of Copernicus. It is remarkable how completely the first expounder of the system of the world was dominated by the philosophy of his predecessors. This is seen not only in the general course of thought through the opening chapters of his work, but among his introductory propositions. The first of these is that the universe,—*mundus*,—as well as the earth, is spherical in form. His arguments for the sphericity of the earth, as derived from observation, are little more than a repetition of those of Ptolemy, and therefore not of special interest. His proposition that the universe is spherical is, however, not based on observation, but on considerations of the perfection of the spherical form, the general tendency of bodies, a drop of water for example, to assume this form, and the sphericity of the sun and moon. The idea retained its place in his mind, although the fundamental conception of his system did away with the idea of the universe having any well-defined form.

The question as attacked by modern astronomy is this: we see scattered through space in every direction many millions of stars of various orders of brightness and at distances so great as to defy exact measurement, except in the case of a few of the nearest. Has this collection of stars any well-defined boundary, or is what we see merely that part of an infinite mass which chances to lie within the range of our telescopes? If we were transported to the most distant star of which we have knowledge, should we there find ourselves still surrounded by stars on all sides,

or would the space beyond be void? . Granting that, in any or every direction, there is a limit to the universe, and that the space beyond is therefore void, what is the form of the whole system and the distance of its boundaries? Preliminary in some sort to these questions are the more approachable ones: Of what sort of matter is the universe formed? and into what sort of bodies is this matter collected?

To the ancients the celestial sphere was a reality, instead of a mere effect of perspective, as we regard it. The stars were set on its surface, or at least at no great distance within its crystalline mass. Outside of it imagination placed the empyrean. When and how these conceptions vanished from the mind of man, it would be as hard to say as when and how Santa Claus gets transformed in the mind of the child. They are not treated as realities by any astronomical writer from Ptolemy down; yet, the impressions and forms of thought to which they gave rise are well-marked in Copernicus, and faintly evident in Kepler. The latter was perhaps the first to suggest that the sun might be one of the stars, yet, from defective knowledge of the relative brightness of the latter, he was led to the conclusion that their distances from each other were less than the distance which separated them from the sun. The latter he supposed to stand in the centre of a vast vacant region, within the system of stars.

For us the great collection of millions of stars which are made known to us by the telescope, together with all the invisible bodies which may be contained within the limits of the system, form the universe. Here the term "universe" is perhaps objectionable because there may be other systems than the one with which we are acquainted. The term stellar system is, therefore, a better one by which to designate the collection of stars in question.

It is remarkable that the first known propounder of that theory of the form and arrangement of the system which has been most generally accepted, seems to have been a writer otherwise unknown in science,—Thomas Wright of Durham, England. He is said to have published a book on the theory of the universe,

about 1750. It does not appear that this work was of a very scientific character, and it was, perhaps, too much in the nature of a speculation to excite notice in scientific circles. One of the curious features of the history is that it was Kant who first cited Wright's theory, pointed out its accordance with the appearance of the Milky Way, and showed its general reasonableness. But, at the time in question, the work of the philosopher of Königsberg seems to have excited no more notice among his scientific contemporaries than that of Wright.

Kant's fame as a speculative philosopher has so eclipsed his scientific work that the latter has but recently been appraised at its true value. He was the originator of views which, though defective in detail, embodied a remarkable number of the results of recent research on the structure and form of the universe, and the changes taking place in it. The most curious illustration of the way in which he arrived at a correct conclusion by defective reasoning is found in his anticipation of the modern theory of a constant retardation of the velocity with which the earth revolves on its axis. He conceived that this effect must result from the force exerted by the tidal wave, as moving toward the west it strikes the eastern coasts of Asia and America. An opposite conclusion was reached by Laplace, who showed that the effect of this force was neutralized by forces producing the wave, and acting in the opposite direction. And yet, nearly a century later, it was shown that while Laplace was quite correct as regards the general principles involved, the friction of the moving water must prevent the complete neutralization of the two opposing forces, and leave a small residual force acting toward the west, and retarding the rotation. Kant's conclusion was established, but by an action different from that which he supposed.

The theory of Wright and Kant, which was still further developed by Herschel, was that our stellar system has somewhat the form of a flattened cylinder, or perhaps that which the earth would assume if, in consequence of more rapid rotation, the bulging out at its equator and the flattening at its poles were carried to an extreme limit. This form has been correctly though

satirically compared to that of a grindstone. It rests to a certain extent, but not entirely, on the idea that the stars are scattered through space with equal thickness in every direction, and that the appearance of the Milky Way is due to the fact that we, situated in the centre of this flattened system, see more stars in the direction of the circumference of the system than in that of its poles. The argument on which the view in question rests may be made clear in the following way.

Let us choose for our observations that hour of the night at which the Milky Way skirts our horizon. This is nearly the case in the evenings of May and June, though the coincidence with the horizon can never be exact except to observers stationed near the tropics. Using the figure of the grindstone, we, at its centre, will then have its circumference around our horizon, while the axis will be nearly vertical. The points in which the latter intersects the celestial sphere are called the galactic poles. There will be two of these poles, the one at the hour in question near the zenith, the other in our nadir, and therefore invisible to us, though seen by our antipodes. Our horizon corresponds, as it were, to the central circle of the Milky Way, which now surrounds us on all sides in a horizontal direction, while the galactic poles are 90° distant from every part of it, as every point of the horizon is 90° from the zenith.

Let us next count the number of stars visible in a powerful telescope in the region of the heavens around the galactic pole, now our zenith, and find the average number per square degree. This will be the richness of the region in stars. Then we take regions nearer the horizontal Milky Way; say that contained between 10° and 20° from the zenith, and, by a similar count, find its richness in stars. We do the same for other regions, nearer and nearer to the horizon, till we reach the galaxy itself. The result of all the counts will be that the richness of the sky in stars is least around the galactic pole, and increases in every direction toward the Milky Way.

Without such counts of the stars we might imagine our stellar system to be a globular collection of stars around which the

object in question passed as a girdle; and we might take a globe with a chain passing around it as representative of the possible figure of the stellar system. But the actual increase in star-thickness which we have pointed out shows us that this view is incorrect. The nature and validity of the conclusions to be drawn can be best appreciated by a statement of some features of this tendency of the stars to crowd toward the galactic circle.

Most remarkable is the fact that the tendency is seen even among the brighter stars. Without either telescope or technical knowledge, the careful observer of the stars will notice that the most brilliant constellations show this tendency. The glorious Orion, Canis Major containing the brightest star in the heavens, Cassiopeia, Perseus, Cygnus, and Lyra with its bright blue Vega, not to mention such constellations as the Southern Cross,—all lie in or near the Milky Way. Schiaparelli has extended the investigation to all the stars visible to the naked eye. He laid down on planispheres the number of such stars in each region of the heavens of 5° square. Each region was then shaded with a tint that was darker as the region was richer in stars. The very existence of the Milky Way was ignored in this work, though his most darkly shaded regions lie along the course of this belt. By drawing a band around the sky so as to follow or cover his darkest regions, we shall rediscover the course of the Milky Way without any reference to the actual object. It is hardly necessary to add that this result would be reached with yet greater precision, if we included the telescopic stars to any degree of magnitude,—plotting them on a chart and shading the chart in the same way. What we learn from this is that the stellar system is not an irregular chaos; and that notwithstanding all its minor irregularities, it may be considered as built up with special reference to the Milky Way as a foundation.

Another feature of the tendency in question is that it is more and more marked as we include fainter stars in our count. The galactic region is perhaps twice as rich in stars visible to the naked eye as the rest of the heavens. In telescopic stars to the ninth magnitude it is three or four times as rich. In the stars

found on the photographs of the sky made at the Harvard and other observatories, and in the star gauges of the Herschels, it is from five to ten times as rich.

Another feature showing the unity of the system is the symmetry of the heavens on the two sides of the galactic belt. Let us return to our supposition of such a position of the celestial sphere, with respect to the horizon, that the latter coincides with the central line of this belt; one galactic pole being near our zenith. The celestial hemisphere which, being above our horizon, is visible to us, is the one to which we have hitherto directed our attention in describing the distribution of the stars. But below our horizon is another hemisphere, that of our antipodes, which is the counterpart of ours. The stars which it contains are in a different part of the universe from those which we see, and without unity of plan, would not be subject to the same law. But the most accurate counts of stars that have been made fail to show any difference in their general arrangement in the two hemispheres. They are just as thick around the south galactic pole as around the north one. They show the same tendency to crowd toward the Milky Way in the hemisphere invisible to us as in the hemisphere which we see. Slight differences and irregularities are, indeed, found in the enumeration, but they are no greater than must necessarily arise from the difficulty of stopping our count at a perfectly fixed magnitude. The aim of star-counts is not to estimate the total number of stars, for this is beyond our power, but the number visible with a given telescope. In such work different observers have explored different parts of the sky, and in a count of the same region by two observers we shall find that, although they attempt to stop at the same magnitude, each will include a great number of stars which the other omits. There is, therefore, room for considerable difference in the numbers of stars recorded, without there being any actual inequality between the two hemispheres.

A corresponding similarity is found in the physical constitution of the stars, as brought out by the spectroscope. The Milky Way is extremely rich in bluish stars, which make up a consid-

erable majority of the cloudlike masses there seen. But when we recede from the galaxy on one side, we find the blue stars becoming thinner, while those having a yellow tinge become relatively more numerous. This difference of color also is the same on the two sides of the galactic plane. Nor can any systematic difference be detected between the proper motions of the stars in these two hemispheres. If the largest known proper motion is found in the one, the second largest is in the other. Counting all the known stars that have proper motions exceeding a given limit, we find about as many in one hemisphere as in the other. In this respect, also, the universe appears to be alike through its whole extent. It is the uniformity thus prevailing through the visible universe, as far as we can see, in two opposite directions, which inspires us with confidence in the possibility of ultimately reaching some well-founded conclusion as to the extent and structure of the system.

All these facts concur in supporting the view of Wright, Kant, and Herschel as to the form of the universe. The farther out the stars extend in any direction, the more stars we may see in that direction. In the direction of the axis of the cylinder, the distances of the boundary are least, so that we see fewer stars. The farther we direct our attention toward the equatorial regions of the system, the greater the distance from us to the boundary, and hence the more stars we see. The fact that the increase in the number of stars seen toward the equatorial region of the system is greater, the smaller the stars, is the natural consequence of the fact that distant stars come within our view in greater numbers toward the equatorial than toward the polar regions.

Objections have been raised to the Herschelien view on the ground that it assumes an approximately uniform distribution of the stars in space. It has been claimed that the fact of our seeing more stars in one direction than in another may not arise merely from our looking through a deeper stratum, as Herschel supposed, but may as well be due to the stars being more thinly scattered in the direction of the axis of the system than in that of its equatorial region. The great inequalities in the richness of

neighboring regions in the Milky Way show that the hypothesis of uniform distribution does not apply to the equatorial region. The claim has therefore been made that there is no proof of the system extending out any farther in the equatorial than in the polar direction.

The consideration of this objection requires a closer inquiry as to what we are to understand by the form of our system. We have already pointed out the impossibility of assigning any boundary beyond which we can say that nothing exists. And even as regards a boundary of our stellar system, it is impossible for us to assign any exact limit beyond which no star is visible to us. The analogy of collections of stars seen in various parts of the heavens leads us to suppose that there may be no well-defined form to our system, but that, as we go out farther and farther, we shall see occasional scattered stars to, possibly, an indefinite distance. The truth probably is that, as in ascending a mountain, we find the trees, which may be very dense at its base, thin out gradually as we approach the summit, where there may be few or none, so we might find the stars to thin out could we fly to the distant regions of space. The practical question is whether, in such a flight, we should find this sooner by going in the direction of the axis of our system, than by directing our course toward the Milky Way. If a point is at length reached beyond which there are but few scattered stars, such a point would, for us, mark the boundary of our system. From this point of view the answer does not seem to admit of doubt. If, going in every direction, we mark the point, if any, at which the great mass of the stars are seen behind us, the totality of all these points will lie on a surface of the general form that Herschel supposed.

There is still another direct indication of the finitude of our stellar system upon which we have not touched. If this system extended out without limit in any direction whatever, it is shown by a geometric process which it is not necessary to explain in the present connection, but which is of the character of mathematical demonstration, that the heavens would, in every direction where this was true, blaze with the light of the noonday sun.

This would be very different from the blue-black sky which we actually see on a clear night, and which, with a reservation that we shall consider hereafter, shows that, how far so ever our stellar system may extend, it is not infinite. Beyond this negative conclusion the fact does not teach us much. Vast, indeed, is the distance to which the system might extend without the sky appearing much brighter than it is, and we must have recourse to other considerations in seeking for indications of a boundary, or even of a well-marked thinning out, of stars.

If, as was formerly supposed, the stars did not greatly differ in the amount of light emitted by each, and if their diversity of apparent magnitude were due principally to the greater distance of the fainter stars, then the brightness of a star would enable us to form a more or less approximate idea of its distance. But the accumulated researches of the past seventy years show that the stars differ so enormously in their actual luminosity that the apparent brightness of a star affords us only a very imperfect indication of its distance. While, in the general average, the brighter stars must be nearer to us than the fainter ones, it by no means follows that a very bright star, even of the first magnitude, is among the nearer to our system. Two stars are worthy of especial mention in this connection, Canopus and Rigel. The first is, with the single exception of Sirius, the brightest star in the heavens. The other is a star of the first magnitude in the southwest corner of Orion. The most long continued and complete measures of parallax yet made are those carried on by Gill, at the Cape of Good Hope, on these two and some other bright stars. The results, published in 1901, show that neither of these bodies has any parallax that can be measured by the most refined instrumental means known to astronomy. In other words, the distance of these stars is immeasurably great. The actual amount of light emitted by each is certainly thousands and probably tens of thousands of times that of the sun.

Notwithstanding the difficulties that surround the subject, we can at least say something of the distance of a considerable number of the stars. Two methods are available for our estimate,—

measures of parallax, and determination of proper motions.

The problem of stellar parallax, simple though it is in its conception, is the most delicate and difficult of all which the practical astronomer has to encounter. An idea of it may be gained by supposing a minute object on a mountain top, we know not how many miles away, to be visible through a telescope. The observer is allowed to change the position of his instrument by two inches, but no more. He is required to determine the change in the direction of the object produced by this minute displacement with accuracy enough to determine the distance of the mountain. This is quite analogous to the determination of the change in the direction in which we see a star, as the earth, moving through its vast circuit, passes from one extremity of its orbit to the other. Representing this motion on such a scale that the distance of our planet from the sun shall be one inch, we find that the nearest star, on the same scale, will be more than four miles away, and scarcely one out of a million will be at a less distance than ten miles. It is only by the most wonderful perfection both in the heliometer, the instrument principally used for these measures, and in methods of observation, that any displacement at all can be seen even among the nearest stars. The parallaxes of perhaps a hundred stars have been determined, with greater or less precision, and a few hundred more may be near enough for measurement. All the others are immeasurably distant; and it is only by statistical methods based on their proper motions and their probable near approach to equality in distribution that any idea can be gained of their distances.

To form a conception of the stellar system, we must have a unit of measure not only exceeding any terrestrial standard, but even any distance in the solar system. For purely astronomical purposes the most convenient unit is the distance corresponding to a parallax of $1''$, which is a little more than 200,000 times the sun's distance. But for the purposes of all but the professional astronomer the most convenient unit will be the light-year; that is, the distance through which light would travel in one year. This is equal to the product of 186,000 miles, the distance traveled

in one second, by 31,558,000, the number of seconds in a year. The reader who chooses to do so may perform the multiplication for himself. The product will amount to about 63,000 times the distance of the sun.

The nearest star whose distance we know, Alpha Centauri, is distant from us more than four light-years. In all likelihood this is really the nearest star, and it is not at all probable that any other star lies within six light-years. Moreover, if we were transported to this star the probability seems to be that the sun would now be the nearest star to us. Flying to any other of the stars whose parallax has been measured, we should probably find that the average of the six or eight nearest stars around us ranges somewhere between five and seven light-years. We may, in a certain sense, call eight light-years a star-distance, meaning by this term the average of the nearest distances from one star to the surrounding ones.

To put the result of measures of parallax into another form, let us suppose, described around our sun as a centre, a system of concentric spheres each of whose surfaces is at the distance of six light-years outside the sphere next within it. The inner is at the distance of six light-years around the sun. The surface of the second sphere will be twelve light-years away, that of the third eighteen, etc. The volumes of space within each of these spheres will be as the cubes of the diameters. The most likely conclusion we can draw from measures of parallax is that the first sphere will contain, beside the sun at its centre, only Alpha Centauri. The second, twelve light-years away, will probably contain, besides these two, six other stars, making eight in all. The third may contain twenty-one more, making twenty-seven stars within the third sphere, which is the cube of three. Within the fourth would probably be found sixty-four stars, this being the cube of four, and so on.

Beyond this no measures of parallax yet made will give us much assistance. We can only infer that probably the same law holds for a large number of spheres, though it is quite certain that it does not hold indefinitely. For more light on the subject

we must have recourse to the proper motions. The latest words of astronomy on this subject may be briefly summarized. As a rule, no star is at rest. Each is moving through space with a speed which differs greatly with different stars, but is nearly always swift indeed when measured by any standard to which we are accustomed. Slow and halting indeed is that star which does not make more than a mile a second. With two or three exceptions, where the attraction of a companion comes in, the motion of every star, so far as yet determined, takes place in a straight line. In its onward motion the flying body deviates neither to the right nor left. It is safe to say that, if any deviation is to take place, thousands of years will be required for our terrestrial observers to recognize it.

Rapid as the course of these objects is, the distances which we have described are such that, in the great majority of cases, all the observations yet made on the positions of the stars fail to show any well-established motion. It is only in the case of the nearer of these objects that we can expect any motion to be perceptible during the period, in no case exceeding one hundred and fifty years, through which accurate observations extend. The efforts of all the observatories which engage in such work are, up to the present time, unequal to the task of grappling with the motions of all the stars that can be seen with the instruments, and reaching a decision as to the proper motion in each particular case. As the question now stands, the aim of the astronomer is to determine what stars have proper motions large enough to be well established. To make our statement on this subject clear, it must be understood that by this term the astronomer does not mean the speed of a star in space, but its angular motion as he observes it on the celestial sphere. A star moving forward with a given speed will have a greater proper motion according as it is nearer to us. To avoid all ambiguity, we shall use the term "speed" to express the velocity in miles per second with which such a body moves through space, and the term "proper motion" to express the apparent angular motion which the astronomer measures upon the celestial sphere.

Up to the present time, two stars have been found whose proper motions are so large that, if continued, the bodies would make a complete circuit of the heavens in less than 200,000 years. One of these would require about 160,000; the other about 180,000 years for the circuit. Of other stars having a rapid motion only about one hundred would complete their course in less than a million of years.

Quite recently a system of observations upon stars to the ninth magnitude has been nearly carried through by an international combination of observatories. The most important conclusion from these observations relates to the distribution of the stars with reference to the Milky Way, which we have already described. We have shown that stars of every magnitude, bright and faint, show a tendency to crowd toward this belt. It is, therefore, remarkable that no such tendency is seen in the case of those stars which have proper motions large enough to be accurately determined. So far as yet appears, such stars are equally scattered over the heavens, without reference to the course of the Milky Way. The conclusion is obvious. These stars are all inside the girdle of the Milky Way, and within the sphere which contains them the distribution in space is approximately uniform. At least there is no well-marked condensation in the direction of the galaxy nor any marked thinning out toward its poles. What can we say as to the extent of this sphere?

To answer this question, we have to consider whether there is any average or ordinary speed that a star has in space. A great number of motions in the line of sight, that is to say, in the direction of the line from us to the star, have been measured with great precision by Campbell at the Lick Observatory, and by other astronomers. The statistical investigations of Kaptoyn also throw much light on the subject. The results of these investigators agree well in showing an average speed in space,—a straight-ahead motion we may call it,—of twenty-one miles per second. Some stars may move more slowly than this to any extent; others more rapidly. In two or three cases the speed exceeds one hundred miles per second, but these are quite

exceptional. By taking several thousand stars having a given proper motion, we may form a general idea of their average distance, though a great number of them will exceed this average to a considerable extent. The conclusion drawn in this way would be that the stars having an apparent proper motion of $10''$ per century or more are mostly contained within, or lie not far outside of a sphere whose surface is at a distance from us of 200 light-years. Granting the volume of space which we have shown that nature seems to allow to each star, this sphere should contain 27,000 stars in all. There are about 10,000 stars known to have so large a proper motion as $10''$. But there is no actual discordance between these results, because not only are there, in all probability, great numbers of stars of which the proper motion is not yet recognized, but there are within the sphere a great number of stars whose motion is less than the average. On the other hand, it is probable that a considerable number of the 10,000 stars lie at a distance at least one half greater than that of the radius of the sphere.

On the whole, it seems likely that, out to a distance of 300 or even 400 light-years, there is no marked inequality in star distribution. If we should explore the heavens to this distance, we should neither find the beginning of the Milky Way in one direction, nor a very marked thinning out in the other. This conclusion is quite accordant with the probabilities of the case. If all the stars which form the groundwork of the Milky Way should be blotted out, we should probably find one hundred millions, perhaps even more, remaining. Assigning to each star the space already shown to be its quota, we should require a sphere of about 3,000 light-years radius to contain such a number of stars. At some such distance as this, we might find a thinning out of the stars in the direction of the galactic poles, or the commencement of the Milky Way in the direction of this stream.

Even if this were not found at the distance which we have supposed, it is quite certain that, at some greater distance, we should at least find that the region of the Milky Way is richer in stars than the region near the galactic poles. There is strong

reason, based on the appearance of the stars of the Milky Way, their physical constitution, and their magnitudes as seen in the telescope, to believe that, were we placed on one of these stars, we should find the stars around us to be more thickly strewn than they are around our system. In other words, the quota of space filled by each star is probably less in the region of the Milky Way than it is near the centre where we seem to be situated.

We are, therefore, presented with what seems to be the most extraordinary spectacle that the universe can offer, a ring of stars spanning it, and including within its limits by far the great majority of the stars within our system. We have in this spectacle another example of the unity which seems to pervade the system. We might imagine the latter so arranged as to show diversity to any extent. We might have agglomerations of stars like those of the Milky Way situated in some corner of the system, or at its centre, or scattered through it here and there in every direction. But such is not the case. There are, indeed, a few star-clusters scattered here and there through the system; but they are essentially different from the clusters of the Milky Way, and cannot be regarded as forming an important part of the general plan. In the case of the galaxy we have no such scattering, but find the stars built, as it were, into this enormous ring, having similar characteristics throughout nearly its whole extent, and having within it a nearly uniform scattering of stars, with here and there some collected into clusters. Such, to our limited vision, now appears the universe as a whole.

We have already alluded to the conclusion that an absolutely infinite system of stars would cause the entire heavens to be filled with a blaze of light as bright as the sun. It is also true that the attractive force within such a universe would be infinitely great in some direction or another. But neither of these considerations enables us to set a limit to the extent of our system. In two remarkable papers by Lord Kelvin which have recently appeared, the one being an address before the British Association at its Glasgow meeting, in 1901, are given the results of some

numerical computations pertaining to this subject. Granting that the stars are scattered promiscuously through space with some approach to uniformity in thickness, and are of a known degree of brilliancy, it is easy to compute how far out the system must extend in order that, looking up at the sky, we shall see a certain amount of light coming from the invisible stars. Granting that in the general average, each star is as bright as the sun, and that their thickness is such that, within a sphere of 3,300 light-years, there are 1,000,000,000 stars,—if we inquire how far out such a system must be continued in order that the sky shall shine with even four per cent of the light of the sun, we shall find the distance of its boundary so great that millions of millions of years would be required for the light of the outer stars to reach the centre of the system. In view of the fact that this duration in time far exceeds what seems to be the possible life duration of a star, so far as our knowledge of it can extend, the mere fact that the sky does not glow with any such brightness proves little or nothing as to the extent of the system.

We may, however, replace these purely negative considerations by inquiring how much light we actually get from the invisible stars of our system. Here we can make a definite statement. Mark out a small circle in the sky 1° in diameter. The quantity of light which we receive on a cloudless and moonless night from the sky within this circle admits of actual determination. From the measures so far available it would seem that, in the general average, this quantity of light is not very different from that of a star of the fifth magnitude. This is something very different from a blaze of light. A star of the fifth magnitude is scarcely more than plainly visible to ordinary vision. The area of the whole sky is, in round numbers, about 50,000 times that of the circle we have described. It follows that the total quantity of light which we receive from all the stars is about equal to that of 50,000 stars of the fifth magnitude,—somewhat more than 1,000 of the first magnitude. This whole amount of light would have to be multiplied by 90,000,000 to make a light equal to that of the sun. It is, therefore, not at all

necessary to consider how far the system must extend in order that the heavens should blaze like the sun. Adopting Lord Kelvin's hypothesis, we shall find that, in order that we may receive from the stars the amount of light we have designated, this system need not extend beyond some 5,000 light-years. But this hypothesis probably overestimates the thickness of the stars in space. It does not seem probable that there are as many as 1,000,000,000 stars within the sphere of 3,300 light-years. Nor is it at all certain that the light of the average star is equal to that of the sun. It is impossible, in the present state of our knowledge, to assign any definite value to this average. To do so is a problem similar to that of assigning an average weight to each component of the animal creation, from the microscopic insects which destroy our plants up to the elephant. What we can say with a fair approximation to confidence is that, if we could fly out in any direction to a distance of 20,000, perhaps even of 10,000, light-years, we should find that we had left a large fraction of our system behind us. We should see its boundary in the direction in which we had traveled much more certainly than we see it from our standpoint.

We should not dismiss this branch of the subject without saying that considerations are frequently adduced by eminent authorities which tend to impair our confidence in almost any conclusion as to the limits of the stellar system. The main argument is based on the possibility that light is extinguished in its passage through space; that beyond a certain distance we cannot see a star, however bright, because its light is entirely lost before reaching us. That there could be any loss of light in passing through an absolute vacuum of any extent cannot be admitted by the physicist of today without impairing what he considers the fundamental principles of the vibration of light. But the possibility that the celestial spaces are pervaded by matter which might obstruct the passage of light is to be considered. We know that minute meteoric particles are flying through our system in such numbers that the earth encounters several millions of them every day, which appear to us in the familiar phenomena of shooting stars.

If such particles are scattered through all space, they must ultimately obstruct the passage of light. We know little of the size of these bodies, but, from the amount of energy contained in their light as they are consumed in the passage through our atmosphere, it does not seem at all likely that they are larger than grains of sand or, perhaps, minute pebbles. They are probably vastly more numerous in the vicinity of the sun than in the interstellar spaces, since they would naturally tend to be collected by the sun's attraction. In fact there are some reasons for believing that most of these bodies are the *débris* of comets; and the latter are now known to belong to the solar system, and not to the universe at large.

But whatever view we take of these possibilities, they cannot invalidate our conclusion as to the general structure of the stellar system as we know it. Were meteors so numerous as to cut off a large fraction of the light from the more distant stars, we should see no Milky Way, but the apparent thickness of the stars in every direction would be nearly the same. The fact that so many more of these objects are seen around the galactic belt than in the direction of its poles shows that, whatever extinction light may suffer in going through the greatest distances, we see nearly all that comes from stars not more distant than the Milky Way itself.

Intimately connected with the subject we have discussed is the question of the age of our system, if age it can be said to have. In considering this question, the simplest hypothesis to suggest itself is that the universe has existed forever in some such form as we now see it; that it is a self-sustaining system, able to go on forever with only such cycles of transformation as may repeat themselves indefinitely, and may, therefore, have repeated themselves indefinitely in the past. Ordinary observation does not make anything known to us which would seem to invalidate this hypothesis. In looking upon the operations of the universe, we may liken ourselves to a visitor to the earth from another sphere who has to draw conclusions about the life of an individual man from observations extending through a few days. During that

time, he would see no reason why the life of the man should have either a beginning or an end. He sees a daily round of change, activity and rest, nutrition and waste; but, at the end of the round, the individual is seemingly restored to his state of the day before. Why may not this round have been going on forever, and continue in the future without end? It would take a profounder course of observation and a longer time to show that, notwithstanding this seeming restoration, an imperceptible residual of vital energy, necessary to the continuance of life, has not been restored, and that the loss of this residuum day by day, must finally result in death.

The case is much the same with the great bodies of the universe. Although, to superficial observation, it might seem that they could radiate their light forever, the modern generalizations of physics show that such cannot be the case. The radiation of light necessarily involves a corresponding loss of heat and with it the expenditure of some form of energy. The amount of energy within any body is necessarily limited. The supply must be exhausted unless the energy of the light sent out into infinite space is, in some way, restored to the body which expended it. The possibility of such a restoration completely transcends our science. How can the little vibration which strikes our eye from some distant star, and which has been perhaps thousands of years in reaching us, find its way back to its origin? The light emitted by the sun 10,000 years ago is today pursuing its way in a sphere whose surface is 10,000 light-years distant on all sides. Science has nothing even to suggest the possibility of its restoration, and the most delicate observations fail to show any return from the unfathomable abyss.

The most careful investigations of all conceivable sources of supply have shown only one which can possibly be of long duration. This is the contraction which is produced in the great incandescent bodies of the universe from the loss of heat which they radiate. The amount of this supply admits of fairly accurate computation. It can be said, with the confidence of demonstration, that the energy generated by the sun's contraction

could not have kept up its present supply of heat for much more than twenty or thirty millions of years.

At this point the astronomer meets the geologist in a discussion which has been going on for a generation and still seems no nearer a decision than it was when it began. It is impossible in the present article to set forth the geological evidence in detail. It will suffice to say, in a general way, that the study of earth and ocean shows evidence of the action of a series of causes which must have been going on for hundreds of millions, quite probably for thousands of millions, of years.

The antagonism between the two conclusions is even more marked than would appear from this statement. The period of the sun's heat set by the astronomical physicist is that during which our luminary could possibly have existed in its present form. The period set by the geologist is not merely that of the sun's existence, but that during which the causes effecting geological changes have not undergone any complete revolution. If, at any time, the sun radiated much less than its present amount of heat, no water would have existed on the earth's surface except in the form of ice; there would have been scarcely any evaporation, and the geological changes due to erosion could not have taken place. Moreover, the commencement of the geological operations of which we speak is by no means the commencement of the earth's existence. The theories of both parties agree that, for untold æons before the geological changes now visible commenced, our planet was a molten mass, perhaps even an incandescent globe like the sun. During all those æons the sun must have been in existence as a vast nebulous mass, first reaching as far as the earth's orbit, and slowly contracting its dimensions. And these æons are to be included in the physicist's estimate of twenty or thirty millions of years.

The doctrine of cosmic evolution,—the theory which in former times was generally known as the nebular hypothesis,—that the heavenly bodies were formed by the slow contraction of heated nebulous masses, is indicated by so many facts that it seems scarcely possible to doubt it except on the theory that the

laws of nature were, at some former time, different from those which we now see in operation. Granting the evolutionary hypothesis, every star has its lifetime. We can even lay down the law by which it passes from infancy to old age. All stars do not have the same length of life; the rule is that the larger the star, or the greater the mass of matter which composes it, the longer will it endure. Up to the present time, science can do nothing more than point out these indications of a beginning, and their inevitable consequence, that there is to be an end to the light and heat of every heavenly body. But no cautious thinker can treat such a subject with the ease of ordinary demonstration. The investigator may even be excused if he stands dumb with awe before the creation of his own intellect. Our accurate records of the operations of nature extend through only two or three centuries, and do not reach a satisfactory standard until within a single century. The experience of the individual is limited to a few years, and beyond this period he must depend upon the records of his ancestors. All his knowledge of the laws of nature is derived from this very limited experience. How can he essay to describe what may have been going on hundreds of millions of years in the past? Can he dare to say that nature was the same then as now?

It is a fundamental principle of the theory of evolution, as developed by its greatest contemporary expounder, that matter itself is eternal, and that all the changes which have taken place in the universe, so far as made up of matter, are in the nature of transformations of this eternal substance. But we doubt whether any physical philosopher of the present day would be satisfied to accept any demonstration of the eternity of matter. All he would admit is that, so far as his observation goes, no change in the quantity of matter can be produced by the action of any cause whatever. It seems to be equally uncreatable and indestructible. But he would, at the same time, admit that his experience no more sufficed to settle the question than the observation of an animal for a single day would settle the question of the duration of its life, or prove that it had neither beginning nor

end. He would probably admit that even matter itself may be a product of evolution. The astronomer finds it difficult to conceive that the great nebulous masses which he sees in the celestial spaces,—millions of times larger than the whole solar system, yet so tenuous that they offer not the slightest obstruction to the passage of a ray of light through their whole length,—situated in what seems to be a region of eternal cold, below anything that we can produce on the earth's surface, yet radiating light, and with it heat, like an incandescent body,—can be made up of the same kind of substance that we have around us on the earth's surface. Who knows but that the radiant property that Becquerel has found in certain forms of matter may be a residuum of some original form of energy which is inherent in great cosmical masses, and has fed our sun during all the ages required by the geologist for the structure of the earth's crusts? It may be that in this phenomenon we have the key to the great riddle of the universe, with which profounder secrets of matter than any we have penetrated will be opened to the eyes of our successors.

CONTEMPORARY FRENCH PHILOSOPHY¹

ALFRED FOUILLÉE, *Menton, France.*

(Concluded from the March number.)

V.

The determinist philosophy and the indeterminist philosophy continued to develop side by side in France. We have witnessed the former ending, in the case of Guyau, in an idealistic naturalism wherein, indeed, the diverse elements have found an harmonious synthesis. Guyau (Jean-Marie, 1854, died at thirty-three years of age, in 1888,)² would have philosophy, without abandoning at all its loftier speculations, return to its practical and social function, by drawing forth from scientific data and metaphysical discussions the solution of the problems of our time. No one had more than he the perception of these problems, no one reflected

(1) Translated by Professor H. A. P. Torrey of the University of Vermont.

(2) *Morale d'Epicure* (1878), *Morale anglaise contemporaine* (1879), *Vers d'un philosophe* (1881), *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction* (1885), *les Problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine* (1884), *L'Irréligion de l'avenir* (1887), *L'Art au point de vue sociologique* (1889), *Education et l'hérédité* (1889), *Génèse de l'idée des temps* (1890). Concerning Guyau, of whom we were the only master, and whose second father we became, see our book entitled *La Morale, l'Art et la Religion selon Guyau* (1888). In the collection of *Pages choisies des grands écrivains*, published by A. Colin, are found the *Pages choisies de Guyau*. The life and works of this young man who died at thirty-three years of age, and was already widely celebrated, are a great and noble example for the youth of all countries.

more than this poet-philosopher, no one expressed with more sincerity, penetration, faith, and eloquence, the aspirations, the doubts, the hopes, the negations, and the beliefs of the society of the present day. He thought, moreover, that the social and the sociological interest would assume control of all studies, and was destined to rejuvenate them all; he treated morality, religion, and art from the sociological point of view. The idea of individual "life," and, above all, the idea of social life, are the fundamental conceptions of his great doctrine, in which naturalism is crowned with a broad and noble idealism. To put in relief the social side of the human individual, to view living being in general in the same way,—this, as he conceives it, ought to be the task of philosophy, thus completing and correcting, at the close of the nineteenth century, the too exclusive individualism of the eighteenth. Hence the supreme interest of sociology and the unique place it holds today at the centre of human sciences. By studying the social aspect of the individual life, Guyau wished to reestablish, upon one and the same foundation, henceforth a solid one, morality, art, and religion. All his studies served to anticipate that "sociological era" on the path to which, according to him, modern science has entered. He did not doubt that the approaching century would end "with discoveries in the moral world as important perhaps as those of Newton and of Laplace in the sidereal world,—those of the attraction of the sensibilities and of wills, of the solidarity of intelligence, of the penetrability of conscious minds." All philosophical problems have become rejuvenated by the single circumstance of their statement in social terms. The moral problem, in particular, insoluble while the individual is considered by himself alone, becomes much clearer when he regards himself as a "living" part of a "living" whole, as a member of a body of which "solidarity" is the law, and harmony the sovereign good.

One of the original points of the doctrine of Guyau is the important objection which he urges against the view of the English school. This school conceives morality to be a simple social instinct, just as migration is an instinct for the swallow.

But, replies Guyau, it is a law that reflexion shall exert a solvent influence upon instinct; if, then, morality is nothing but an instinct by which the individual is turned to the profit of society in general, the reflective knowledge of this fact will make it possible for the individual not to allow himself to be made a tool and a dupe of; he will diminish by degrees his altruistic instinct for the benefit of his egoistic instincts. There must be discovered, therefore, a system more profound than the utilitarian, or even than the evolutionism of Darwin and of Spencer.¹

The generative thought of the system of Guyau is this,—that life envelops in its individual “intensity” a principle of “expansion,” of fecundity, of generosity,—in a word, of sociability. “Normal” life thus reconciles within itself the individual point of view and the collective point of view, the opposition of which could not be removed by the utilitarian schools. Reflexion, here, but confirms nature. “Life has two modes of expression: viewed in one aspect, it is nutrition and assimilation, in the other, it is production and fecundity.” Guyau affirms, even in the life of the blind cellule, a principle of expansion, which makes it impossible for the individual to be sufficient unto himself. “The richest life is found to be also the one most prone to lavish itself, in a certain measure to sacrifice itself, to impart itself to others.” Hence it follows that “the most perfect organism will be the most social, and that the ideal of the individual life is the life in common.” Thus there is “deposited in the very depth of the being the source of all the instincts of sympathy and of sociability.” These instincts are not products of an exterior mechanism, but of the immanent expansion of life itself. And the more fully life knows itself and comprehends itself, the more it justifies in its own eyes its altruism. Guyau finds one of the most striking refutations of universal and exclusive egoism in the universal law of “labor.” Labor, this exertion of will and of “energy,” far from isolating him (as Nietzsche will have it) ends in uniting the individual man with other

(1) See Guyau, *La morale anglaise contemporaine*.

men. "To labor," says Guyau, "is to produce, and to produce is to be useful at the same time to one's self and to others." In the world of society, labor is useful to the individual himself only upon the condition that it is so to others, without which it would bring him in nothing at all. The law of labor, then, is an essentially moral law, through that expansion of the self upon others which it entails. The moral instinct and reflective thought are everywhere in accord; the more the individual will reflect upon himself, the more he will find within himself society entire, the more fully he will recognize the fact that his true life is not that which shuts itself up within the self, but that which radiates upon others. "Pure egoism is an impossibility, a Utopian dream."

Guyau concludes, therefore, that life of itself creates its obligations for itself, not by virtue of a mysterious imperative, but by the very consciousness of its power of personal and social activity, of its individual and collective fruitfulness. "I can, therefore I must." It becomes thus its own sanction by its very activity, for in acting it rejoices in itself, mounts or descends to the point of view of "value" and of "happiness" as one whole.¹

"Education" has for its end the development in the child of this moral and social fruitfulness and the gradual establishment of it in the race by heredity.² Art also elevates the individual to the true self. That which constitutes beauty is the "expansive life" which manifests itself in things, and with which our own life is in sympathy; "artistic" beauty is the intense and sympathetic expression of life. "Genius" is a mysterious power of "sociability" in which is concentrated the life of humanity and of all nature. According to this profound and new theory, by which Tolstoi was very soon to profit, art is sociological, not only in its aim and in its results, as Villemain and Taine have shown, but in its very "essence" and its "law," which is to radiate sympathy by being inspired with it and by inspiring it.

(1) *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction.*

(2) *Education et l'hérédité.* Translated into English by Greenstreet.

For Guyau, the idea of a "social bond" between man and the universe (not merely, as for Taine and Renan, of a law of geometrical or physical necessity) is at the bottom of all religious conceptions, and it is this which constitutes their unity. "Religion" is "universal society," its sources are, first of all, sociological. Particular religions, founded upon dogmas, myths, and rites, are destined to disappear; it is in this sense that, according to him, there will be in the future "irreligion"; religion, in the true sense of the word, being more or less dogmatic, mythical, and ritual, as otherwise it passes over into philosophy and morals.

In his second masterpiece, "The Irreligion of the Future," Guyau sets forth in outline the great systems among which minds will be divided, and he closes with visions of an extraordinary amplitude of the future of humanity, of the way in which the sage is to look upon death, of the kind of higher immortality for which it is permitted him to hope.

Guyau had shown in his "Outline of a Moral System" and in his "Verses of a Philosopher" that the great scandal of thought is the moral indifference of nature, as well as its monotonous uniformity. Well known are the pages of the "Outline of a Moral System without Obligation or Sanction," in which he discusses his theory of the indifference of nature. "Nature in its totality is not necessarily fruitful; it is the great equilibrium of life and death. Perhaps its highest poetry springs from its supersterility. A field of wheat is not worth the ocean. The ocean does not labor, does not produce; it heaves, it does not give life, it contains life, or rather, it gives and withdraws life with the same indifference." This is the doctrine of eternal equilibrium and of eternal reversion, to which Nietzsche was very soon to give his enthusiastic support. In this doctrine Guyau would see, rather, the great temptation to despair. One day as he was meditating at Biarritz by the shore of the sea, he thought he perceived in the ocean the image of a nature aimless and ceaselessly repeating itself,—“a grand equilibrium of life and death,” an eternal rocking to and fro of the cradle of being. "The more I reflected,

the more the ocean seemed to rise around me, to invade everything, to bear everything away; it seemed as if I myself were nothing more than one of its waves, a drop of water in its waves, as if the earth disappeared, as if man disappeared, and there remained nothing more than nature, with its ceaseless undulations, its flux and reflux; and concealed beneath its perpetually changing surface, was its profound and monotonous uniformity.”¹ But Guyau, in his “Irreligion of the Future,” rises to a higher point of view, from which progress appears possible in the very heart of nature itself, through the action of thinking beings. One eternity *a parte ante* has run itself out, another *a parte post* remains to us. The world has, then, at least one chance out of two of succeeding in the great moral work to be accomplished. According to Guyau, no fixed limits can be assigned to the movement of life, or to its transformations; the eternity past, which has “ended only in this world” known to us, may bring into existence worlds infinitely superior, of which human society affords us already a distant and vague anticipation. Why, indeed, may there not be already in the immensity of space forms of humanity superior to our own, which, in comparison with ourselves, are even divine? “Our testimony,” says Guyau, “when it is a question concerning the existence of such beings has no more value than that of a snowflower from the Polar regions, of a moss from the Himalayas, or of an alga from the depths of the Pacific Ocean, which should declare the earth to be void of truly intelligent beings because it had never been plucked by a human hand.” Sociological laws, which are at bottom psychical and physical laws, include more than we are able to conceive, and it is this thought of a universal work, of a universal society, which should sustain the dying sage.

Guyau died at Mentone, March 31, 1888. Upon his tomb we had engraved these words from his last book, which are, as it were, the very voice from his tomb,—his voice retaining the accent of immortal thoughts: “That which has once truly

(1) *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction.*

lived shall live again, that which seems to die does so only to prepare to be reborn. To conceive of and to will the better, to attempt to realize the noble work of the ideal, that is, to desire it, is to attract to it all generations that shall come after us. Our highest aspirations, which seem precisely the most vain, are like waves, which, having had the power to reach us, will go on beyond us, and perhaps by uniting and gaining amplitude will shake the world. I am quite sure that what I have within me of the better will survive me. No, not one of my dreams, it may be, shall come to nought; others will take them up, they will dream them after me, until they shall come to pass some day. It is by the force of dying waves that the sea succeeds in fashioning its strand, in shaping the immeasurable bed wherein it moves." ¹

Thanks to the accent of touching sincerity which makes one feel the man within the writer, the works of Guyau, in which the form is worthy of the thought, have had a remarkable influence, not only in France, but abroad; his principal books have been translated into German and into English, his complete works into Russian. Several of his ideas have reappeared, more or less altered and perverted into sophistry, in the case of Nietzsche, who has exaggerated "being without law" (*l'anomie*) into "immorality."

VI.

In opposition to a determinist philosophy, enlarged and animated throughout with the spirit of universal conciliation, we have witnessed the development, up to these last years, of the philosophy of contingency, which has also become enlarged and refined.

Profoundly versed in German philosophy and acquainted with the whole progress of the sciences, M. Boutroux,² professor at

(1) *L'Irréligion de l'avenir.*

(2) Besides his principal work, M. Emile Boutroux published also a book upon the *Idée de loi naturelle*, important inquiries concerning Socrates, Jacob Boehme, Leibnitz, some very remarkable articles upon Aristotle and upon Kant in the *Grande Encyclopédie*, the translation of the *History of Philosophy Among the Greeks*, by Zeller, with an introduction; next some studies on morals and pedagogy, such as *Questions de morale et d'éducation*, and, lastly, a beautiful work on *Pascal*.

the Sorbonne, has set himself the task of breaking through the meshes of necessity, in order to make room for a spontaneity which might assure "the contingency of the laws of nature."

According to him, the necessity of natural laws is only relative, and each group of laws leaves outside itself a residue which it does not explain. Mathematical laws do not explain mechanical force, mechanical laws do not explain life, biological laws do not explain consciousness. M. Boutroux opposes to determinism the possibility of a matter which may not adapt itself entirely to the forms and laws of logic. Suppose that things in themselves were contradictory essences, not exclusive of a mean between the affirmative and the negative; logic, with its principles of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle,—logic, that type of perfect intelligibility, would then be no longer applicable to things in themselves,—their nature being at bottom illogical. Hence M. Boutroux concludes that experience alone can enable us to know in what measure logic is a legitimate method for the interpretation of nature. It is the unknowable, therefore, which the partisans of contingency oppose, no longer solely to causal determinism, but even to logical determinism founded upon the principle of contradiction. And, in fact, thought may conceive, or believe that it conceives, realities that escape its laws, and are, therefore, absolutely uncertain, indeterminate, and indeterminable. But we shall demand in what these realities are "contingent." To apply to them the logical categories of the possible and the impossible, which the idea of contingency implies, is not this, as we have shown elsewhere,¹ to contradict the very hypothesis from which one starts, to make use of a concept which does not allow of any use, to introduce the unthinkable among the realities which we think, in order to make it afterwards play the part of liberty?

Granting that our concepts are incomplete, they are not, therefore, doubtful; but what follows from it is simply this; that conclusions logically drawn from these concepts are themselves

(1) *Le mouvement idéaliste*, p. 182.

incompletely true and do not exhaust the whole of reality ; it does not follow that this whole, in the part which lies beyond the range of our experience and of our concepts, is contrary to logic, or even above the realm of logic. We do not know "all" the properties of the ellipse ; it does not follow from this that the properties still unknown are supralogical. The hypothesis of an unintelligible depth is, therefore, gratuitous ; from the fact that our intelligence is not equal to all that is intelligible, it does not follow that the intelligible which lies beyond it is unintelligible. If we may dream of an illogical and antimathematical world, with still stronger reason may we imagine one in which mechanical principles would be inapplicable. M. Boutroux has shown that the more one gives his attention to the concrete sciences, the more he is obliged to appeal to experience in order to establish certain data, which serve as points of departure. Abstract mechanics is reducible to mathematical laws, but concrete mechanics is obliged to accept, as a fact not yet explained, the relation discovered by Newton between attraction, mass, and distance. Hence M. Boutroux concludes that "the law of attraction may well be contingent." But the necessity we are under of constant appeal to experience, instead of deducing everything from the data posited in the first place "by ourselves," proves, indeed, that our data are incomplete, our senses insufficient, our experience partial ; it does not prove that the empire of logic, of reasons, and of causes ceases whenever new data enter into the account in our experience and in our science.

The direction followed by M. Boutroux is also that taken by a young and brilliant metaphysician, at present professor in the College of France, M. Bergson. The latter has published an extremely subtle treatise upon the "Immediate Data of Consciousness." He endeavors to show that being lives, not in space, but in "pure duration," which is more profound than "time," as it is conceived and imaged in memory. For M. Bergson, life is a perpetual "novelty," of which scientific laws are only inexact formulæ.

We agree with M. Boutroux and with M. Bergson that there

must be admitted in the world, and above all in consciousness, something "new," something "singular," and certain "primordial differences." The sensation of green is "singular," the sensation of sound is "new" for the deaf man whose hearing is restored, but things new and singular are not necessarily "free from law," they develop and manifest themselves according to causal conditions. The new and the different are conceived by the intelligence only as being subject to conditions, and difference itself, far from being the negation of causality, calls for its application. It is, therefore, science in its constitutive and vital principle which contingency attacks; it is knowledge that it annihilates or brings into suspicion, in favor of the unknowable, escaping, by hypothesis, the control of law. And this unknowable, which is represented to us as "spirit," being an irrational spirit, unintelligible and unintelligent, is at bottom only the old matter of the ancients, the old unfathomable substance.

VII.

The close of the century saw psychology become a science. The elimination of metaphysical controversies and the application of the positive method to this science, which tends more and more to assume an importance of its own and to acquire an autonomy, has brought about here, as in other sciences, a rapid progress.

M. Ribot is in France the principal representative of scientific psychology, by reason of his original and solid works on psychological heredity, on diseases of the memory, of personality, of attention, which confirm the importance attributed by Taine to the study of diseased and anomalous cases. More recently, M. Ribot has given us the "Psychology of the Feelings," a masterly work, wherein the depth of his philosophic thought appears to more advantage than elsewhere.

M. Ribot aims to employ a truly exact method. Like Taine, he seeks facts and the laws of facts, without wishing to follow Taine in considerations that bear upon the ultimate constitution of the universe. Like Taine, he ends in admitting a double

aspect of phenomena, the one physical, the other mental, but he seems to give the advantage to the physical side, and with Maudsley and with Huxley, he would appear to reduce the mental to a phenomenon in excess. He himself freely admits, again and again, that consciousness is an illumination, while, at the same time, he grants that this illumination itself constitutes a part of the totality of phenomena, and that without this the phenomena would no longer be the same. M. Ribot has striven to restore in all things the "motor" element. He considers this much more vital than "thought," which, for him, is superadded and superficial. Thought is among the qualities recently acquired by living being, it is also much more variable and feeble than the rest, for example, than "sensation," and, above all, than "tendency" with its motor elements. For ourselves, we admit with M. Ribot that the base of the affective life is to be sought in the appetites,—consequently the will, but we find that M. Ribot passes outside the limits of psychological experience, when he identifies appetite with "movements or arrest of movements"; this is to pass from the internal point of view to the external point of view; we believe that movements are only the manifestation and exterior form of appetites. We admit, indeed, that, in its root, the affective life is "tendency, act, in either the nascent or complete stage," but we should not dare to add that it is "independent of intelligence, which," says M. Ribot, "has no part in it, and may even not exist." We believe that an intellectual element, although very rudimentary, is mingled with all the facts of the mental life; this element is simply that which the English call "discrimination," or the discernment of a difference, of a change of state, without which no consciousness would be possible, and which occurs without doubt even in the lowest animals. Intelligence, in our view, is not, then, "superadded," grafted upon an absolutely alien stock, for from what would the scion be taken? It is a development and an expansion which presupposes already present the consciousness of internal change and the perception, more or less vague, of some sort of relation. M. Ribot ends by making intelligence a sort of epiphenomenon coming no one

knows whence, no one knows why, to add itself to a mechanism capable of functioning without it. All that is needed, we believe, is to push the unification further, to make apparent the omnipresence of the mental element, which, in our view, is indivisibly appetitive and sensitive, or to speak the language of what may be called adult life, voluntary and intellectual.

VIII.

In short, the whole movement of contemporary philosophy in France is an endeavor to harmonize the claims of the real with the claims of the ideal. The century which has just closed was, taken as a whole, one great reaction against the ideal of human justice, of liberty, of equality, of fraternity, which France has had the merit of proclaiming without being able or knowing how to apply it. In the century now beginning, we look for a renaissance of the ideal, but under a form which makes it compatible with reality, that is to say, progressively realizable in consciousness, not only in the consciousness of individuals, but also in that of societies. The ideal can no longer be mystical, it must be, before all things, social; it must descend from heaven to the earth, and, above all, into the heart of humanity; it must be justice for all and complete solidarity.

But the human and social character under which French philosophy figures to itself the ideal, does not exclude metaphysical and religious speculations upon the question whether the ideal has not, beyond the visible world, its own proper reality. Every philosopher in France, including Renan and Taine, has come to recognize that the ideal must be founded, even in the heart of reality itself, upon something which makes it possible, and which makes it possible for us to attain to it. This "real" condition of the possibility of the "ideal" is, for us, as for Renan and Guyau, an immanent aspiration of the world itself, an obscure consciousness which tends towards perfect clearness. For others, like Ravaisson, Lachelier, and Boutroux, it is that and more,—a supreme thought, or a supreme love, present in the world, without exhausting itself therein. These two assertions, in our view, are

not irreconcilable, since the desire immanent in the world may be founded upon some reality superior to the desire itself,—a reality of which man can evidently form only an inadequate and more or less anthropomorphic conception.

What is certain is that a harmonization of the real and the ideal is possible, within the world itself, by means of a conception of reality which finds, beneath movement, appetite, and in appetite, the more or less conscious idea. It is necessary, then, if we are not mistaken, to introduce everywhere the immanent mean term of idea-force, which gives room for all speculations regarding the transcendent. Such an idealism excludes nothing save systematic negations, it is open on all sides, it grows by all that is added to it, it would be broad enough to reject nothing; an imperfect attempt at synthesis, it aspires to become a synthesis always more comprehensive and more complete.

Philosophers! let us never cease to make war upon war, to exclude exclusions, to deny mere negations, to remind ourselves how restricted are individual minds, how much the "monads" need to have "windows on the outside," or rather to be on all sides open to the sunlight of intelligence. All sincere thought has something in it for the philosopher to learn and to remember; individual dogmatism is the arrogance of thought; dilettantism is the indifference of it; the spirit of conciliation is, in our view, the spirit of fraternity and of liberty.

MAETERLINCK'S ESSAY ON THE LIFE OF BEES¹

EDOUARD ROD, *Paris*.

At the outset I must warn the readers of this magazine that I cannot speak impartially of Mr. Maurice Maeterlinck, as critics are recommended to do, because he is of all contemporary writers the one whom I most enjoy reading, and because I am most grateful to him. I fell in love with his first works, to which attention was directed, immediately on their appearance, by an enthusiastic article of Octave Mirbeau. I loved him at once, and I have gone on loving him from volume to volume. As a poet, he delights me by the deep grace and the eternal meaning of his creations; as a moralist, he abounds in truths on the soul and life that strike me as new, and that I listen to with profound reverence. Present day literature has produced a large number of writers of talent, whose qualities and powers are extremely varied, but not one of them is more "human" (every one knows the meaning of this vast and magnificent expression, which ennobles the literary works to which it is applied); not one better deserves the epithet "modern," so often grossly misused, for no one has better succeeded in adapting his art to the conditions of present day life, by creating moulds and forms for himself.

I have never met Mr. Maeterlinck; I know only by hearsay that he is not afflicted with neurasthenia or neuropathy, that he is not even a spinner of niceties after the manner of "des Esseintes," but a tall, robust, healthy individual, fond of every

(1) Translated by Professor F. C. de Sumichrast of Harvard University.

form of sport, with no perverse tastes, no "gamy" ideas, and who seeks sensations only where these may be found by every one. He recently published, in "The Figaro," an article on automobiles, and it may be that it impressed rather unfavorably some of his female admirers, whose worship is always tinged with a certain proportion of snobbishness and preciosity: it is because they praise without understanding. Our author, who accepts the latest comforts without sacrificing aught of the poetry of which he is full, is busy giving the lie to Alfred de Vigny's sad and splendid prophecy,—repeated so often by others since he uttered it. I refer, of course, to the memorable description of the world, transformed by scientists, by steam, and by machinery, which is to be found in "The Shepherd's Home":—

"Jamais la rêverie amoureuse et paisible
N'y verra sans horreur son pied blanc attaché,
Car il faut que ses yeux, sur chaque objet visible,
Versent un long regard comme un fleuve épanché,
Qu'elle interroge tout avec inquiétude,
Et, des secrets divins se faisant une étude,
Marche, s'arrête et marche avec le col penché." 1

It seems as though Mr. Maeterlinck had undertaken to prove, by his own example, that the poet was mistaken, and that poetry is to be found in all things, or, at least, that when it dwells in a man's heart or mind, he can cause it to spring from everything. In spite of the feverish activity that surrounds him, and which he does not affect to ignore, in spite of the hundredfold greater rapidity of our means of transportation, of the noise of iron works, the smoke of blast furnaces, and the cries of anguish of the troubled nations, he "interrogates everything restlessly," though there is nothing troublous or sickly in his unrest. His

(1) "Never shall reverie, amorous and tranquil, see her white foot fixed to it without a feeling of repulsion; for her eyes must cast, upon each object visible, a long glance like to an outpoured stream; she must restlessly question each thing, and studying deep her divine secrets, with bended neck walk on, stop, and again proceed."

steadfast glance sees through appearances, and penetrates into the very soul where he collects the "divine secrets." And in order to make these manifest, he has made for himself a language which is subtle without being obscure, personal without being affected, novel without being the fruit of vain refinement. He thus belongs to no school, to no set, to no group. He stands in "splendid isolation." I do not think he has any imitators even; no one, so far as I am aware, has attempted to rewrite "The Princess Maleine" or "Pelléas and Mélisande," or to moralize as he has done in "The Treasury of the Humble," while I am convinced that no one will attempt to produce "The Life of Bees" under another form.

When "The Flowers of Evil" appeared, Victor Hugo told Baudelaire that he had invented a "new shiver." When one reads Mr. Maeterlinck's dramas, that is the expression one instinctively thinks of in connection with them, so new is the emotion they excite. Then, when one examines his other works, it becomes plain that "shiver" is too sensual and too fugitive a word to suit them. For, indeed, Mr. Maeterlinck is not satisfied with making a fleeting, superficial impression upon us; he creates an abundance of sentiments, sensations, and ideas, not by inventing them, doubtless, for in that line nothing is ever invented, but by expressing them, by revealing them in speech. And his last work, which treats of bees, a subject already discussed by many before him, is fully as personal and novel as are his former books.

To begin with, he introduces an almost new method of observing animals.

In all ages this kind of observation has furnished poets and moralists often with the happiest themes. It is enough to recall the great satirical epic that expresses all the irony and all the suffering of the Middle Ages, as if it were intended to form a sarcastic companion picture to the poems of chivalry, to say nothing of the "Animals painted by themselves,"—the fables of Æsop, La Fontaine, Lessing, Florian, Gellert, and so many more. Taine, in his first work, endeavored to analyze and define the

nature of the pleasure we derive from these excursions of poets into the animal world:—

“The main charm of fables is that the characters are animals. We gladly put aside for a moment our serious business and our unhappy passions, for they touch us still too closely when poetry represents them to us in men. The reaction of the emotions they awaken is so violent that it hurts us. We are less touched when it is animals that are involved, because they are less like ourselves and their feelings are more infantile. The mind runs lightly through the whole fable without becoming so deeply interested as to suffer; pity, joy, anger, every passion touches it, but none penetrates it; the mind glides over numbers of fugitive, half-formed emotions that gently lead it to a facile and delicate enjoyment.”

All this is well observed, though perhaps marked by a tendency to arbitrary generalization that imparts to it a somewhat too dogmatic character. I fancy that in reality the literary observation of animals, as I shall call it, has a simpler and more spontaneous origin. It springs, like all poetry, not from calculation and reflection, but from instinct and the unconscious. It is wholly different from the proposed research of the scientist, of the “naturalist.” It is simply a gift which the Eternal Mystery has bestowed upon some and withheld from others. Descartes, whose influence ruled French thinkers in the days of La Fontaine, would have been utterly unable to observe in that way, for, as Taine has not failed to remind us, that great devotee of the abstract persistently looked upon animals as mere machines. Many nowadays consider them to be nothing more than animals,—tease, hunt, fish, exploit, and eat them, without caring whether they think, feel, or suffer. But does any one suppose that any fabulist ever reasoned in the way indicated by Taine? Does any one imagine that a single one of these ingenious or profound observers of the ways of animals and of the corresponding faults of mankind ever said to himself: “I shall try to entertain men, who do not care to delve deep, by presenting to them a sketchy and, as it were, attenuated image of what they are, by incarnating their passions, their feelings, their vices, and their oddities in animals great and small, which shall thus become men, since they

will take their ways and their speech, but which shall nevertheless remain animals, since I shall continue to call them tigers, rabbits, lions, or crows"?

If ever any fabulist did do this, before deliberately carrying out his purpose, it is quite certain that he was not one of those who stand in the front rank. Florian may have done so, or Lachambaudie, or Viennet; but La Fontaine did not take so much trouble; he simply obeyed the "good, natural law" that he appreciated so well, and the candid observance of which forms the best part of his genius. It is to be remembered that in his day natural history scarcely existed, so that he had the good fortune not to be hampered by books, to be ignorant of many things that would have been rather in his way, to be able to observe unfettered,—following his fancy rather than a method,—and, without being troubled by preconceived ideas, to write in accordance with the natural bent of his genius. Like his contemporaries, he was interested above all in human affairs, and it is, indeed, a picture of the manners of his times that he has given us in his fables, in which Taine very properly recognized the absolute King, Louis XIV. in person, under the features of the lion, the courtier under the aspect of the fox, the smaller fry of the middle classes in hares or ants, and so on. But he possessed this advantage over most of the poets of his day that he had an innate feeling for nature; and this is why his animals retain their own character, and are true, which is not the case with nearly all those of other fabulists. Besides, among poets who have selected animals as a poetic theme, La Fontaine is one of the very few who have applied themselves to observe them with a fair amount of attention. Every one knows that he quite forgot an engagement one day while following an ant's funeral. The Chevalier Florian would never have done that. To most literary students of animals these are but symbols; they care little what their real habits, manners, and character may be, provided the animal can be made to represent, more or less closely, a certain class of human beings or be employed in support of a moral thesis.

It is thus that the ass, so well understood by La Fontaine, who

seems to have penetrated into the inmost recesses of its somewhat complex soul, becomes, in the fables of most later writers, no more than a mere imbecile, an insolent fool, or a presumptuous ninny. The case is the same with the cock, the rabbit, and with almost all those animals whose traditional character has not been fixed by usage, as is the case, for instance, with the fox and the lion. It happens even that all thought of observation is superseded by the preoccupation of the idea. I do not suppose, for example, that Lessing ever observed the ostrich very closely; yet that did not prevent his making use of it when he desired to describe the impotence of the poet who lacks genius. Similarly, Goethe was concerned merely with the expression of a feeling personal to himself when he wrote "The Eagle and the Dove." When Baudelaire describes the fall of an albatross upon a ship's deck, he does so for the sake of the image he can draw from it, and without being particularly interested in the giant bird hampered by the great spread of its wings:—

* * * "Le poète est semblable au prince des nuées,
Les ailes de géant l'empêchent de marcher."¹

And when Leconte de Lisle relates the death of the captive lion, it is again because the picture he paints illustrates in striking fashion the feeling he wishes to render:—

"O cœur toujours en proie à la rébellion,
Qui tournes, haletant dans la cage du monde,
Lâche, que ne fais-tu ce qu'a fait ce lion?"²

In point of fact, these poets do not pretend to be acquainted with animals. They occasionally borrow a poetic theme from these inferior and despised lives, but leave the task of observing them

(1) "A poet is like the lord of the clouds: his mighty wings impede his flight."

(2) "O heart, to revolt ever a prey, that paces up and down, breathless, in the cage we call the world, O coward heart, why doest thou not what that lion did?"

with scientific accuracy to naturalists. These, indeed, do examine, study, and classify animals, and compare their organisms; they go back to the origins of their species, but, on the other hand, rarely seek to deduce from their observations, truths or maxims that may be turned to account in the knowledge or guidance of our moral life. They are scientists, that is, specialists, and they rarely go outside of their specialty. I need not here recall all we owe them, or the marvelous development of their activity during the last century; but, admirable as is the work they do, it is work of another sort. There is no connection between them and the fancies of our fabulists and poets. They confine themselves to the animal kingdom, which, for the matter of that, provides them with a sufficiently wide field; they even abstain from philosophizing too much about their researches. They do not take much pains to bring the realms of science and poetry together, and when, by chance, the line of demarcation disappears, it is due to the fact that there is in the "ensemble" of things a unity that at times compels this sort of drawing together. Writers that are not scientists have vastly different methods; let the reader peruse "The Bird," by Michelet, to whom, one day, "the whole of natural history" exhibited itself "as a branch of politics," and he will understand my meaning.

Now it so happens that Mr. Maurice Maeterlinck, who is first and foremost a poet and a moralist, is at the same time a naturalist, as was before him Toussenel, the original author of "The World of Birds." The bibliography of Mr. Maeterlinck's work shows that he began by studying his subject through the medium of previous research which presupposes a sound scientific training. Further, as the work itself proves, he has added to the results of the investigations of others very personal investigations of his own; he has observed for himself, he has invented, as he found the need, new experiments; he has carried them out, has succeeded with them, has drawn conclusions from them as skilfully as a professional naturalist. He has in his drawing-room a glazed hive, which he has constantly watched for a number of years, so that the incessant study of these small winged insects, that form a

very complex society, mingles in his mind with his poetic creations and his moral reflections. It is possible, also, that this double process takes place sometimes simultaneously in the mysterious cells of the brain where ideas are elaborated; it may be that the sight of the complete little world he has ever under his eyes has suggested to him many a thought that applies to our own world, or may be (who can tell?) it has furnished him with certain subjects. Does it not seem, for instance, as though the tragic death of the little Prince Tintagille recalls the sombre dramas that take place in the hive when the queen bee rids herself of those that might become her rivals? and is there not in those splendid deadly loves he tells of so admirably a distant resemblance, as it were, to the "nuptial flight" that costs the life of the lover brought into the world for a single act of love? I do not propose to attempt to make precise certain analogies, the full uncertainty of which I am well aware of. In order to do so, I should have to penetrate into the most secret recesses of the imagination, to trace back to the first of its invisible links the evasive chain of the connection of ideas,—a task that no critic can reasonably undertake. It is none the less true that the perusal of "The Life of Bees" has enabled me to understand better the personal style that constitutes the irresistible charm of "Aglavaine and Sélysette" and of "Pelléas and Mélisande." Under the clear-sighted glance that observes them from above, love, walk, live, weep, and die "poor little mysterious beings, like every one in the world"; and these strange and symbolical little beings, although their smallest movements are capable of being easily noted, contain an immense portion of the Unknown, and represent far more truths, ideas, and presentiments than are expressed by the actions they perform or the words they utter. I have better grasped, also, the philosophy of his other works,—a philosophy that rests upon so complex and so accurate an understanding of social contingencies, and denotes so deep and so sure a knowledge of the relation between cause and effect in the march of human events, when they so often escape the most sagacious.

Mr. Maurice Maeterlinck, as he watches his bees, often returns

to a thought that is very characteristic of his method: he supposes our activity, which appears to us so well calculated, observed by an inhabitant of another planet, or by a being that bears the same relation to us that we bear to honey bees, that is, capable of changing the conditions of our life at his will. What would be such an observer's idea of our laws, our organization, our inner and collective life? How much could he understand of it all? And we ourselves, in what measure could we understand the perturbations of all sorts that he would cause in our world? What sort of knowledge of him could we acquire?

This analogy, the deep and simple truth of which is patent to every one, furnishes our author, even before he has expressed it, possibly, the method of thought and observation that constitutes his originality. At one time he applies himself to ascertaining the unknown point of view of this supposititious being, and at another to divining its probable action in the incoherences of our fate, so that one can find in his works many a passage that corresponds in a very striking and singular fashion to his investigations as a naturalist.

I must be permitted to quote one instance of such correspondences. I read, in "*La Vie des Abeilles*," with reference to the swarming of bees:—

"Whether we speak of bees or of ourselves, we call fatality whatever we do not as yet understand. But the hive has now yielded up two or three of its material secrets, and it has been established that this exodus is neither instinctive nor inevitable. It is no blind emigration, but an apparently deliberate sacrifice on the part of the present generation in favor of the future one. All the beekeeper has to do is to destroy the still inert young queens in their cells, and at the same time, if the larvæ and the nymphæ are numerous, to increase the warehouses and dormitories in the hive; straightway the unproductive riot subsides like golden drops of obedient rain, the customary work on flowers is resumed, and the old queen, having become indispensable, neither expecting nor dreading a successor, reassured with regard to the future of the active ones about to be brought forth, makes up her mind not to see again the light of the sun that season. She quietly resumes in the darkness her maternal task, which consists in laying, along a methodical spiral,—passing from cell to cell, without omitting a single one,—two or three thousand eggs each day.

"What is there of fatality in this, save the love the generation of today bears to the generation of tomorrow? A similar fatality is evident in the human race, but it is of less extent and power. It never produces such unanimous and complete great sacrifices. What foreseeing fatality do we obey in place of this one? We know not, nor do we know the being that looks upon us as we look upon the bees."

And in "Wisdom and Fate" I read:—

"If you mistrust imaginary tragedies, go to the heart of one or another of the great dramas told of in authentic history, and you will find that fate and man bear the same relations to each other, have the same habits, are equally impatient, equally submissive, and revolt in the same way. You will see that there also the most active part of that which we call 'fatality' is a force created by man. It is tremendous, that is true, but it is seldom invincible. It does not suddenly emerge from an inexorable abyss, but is the result of the thoughts, the sufferings, the passions of our fellow men, and we ought to be acquainted with these passions, since we share them. Even in the strangest moments, when the most mysterious and most unexpected misfortunes befall us, it is almost never an invisible or totally unknown foe that we have to contend with. Let us not gratuitously extend the realm of the irresistible. Truly strong men are well aware that they do not know all the forces that stand in the way of their projects, but they contend with those they do know as courageously as though there were no others, and they often conquer. The day that our ignorance and our indolence shall cease to call fatality everything that our energy and our intelligence ought to have called human and natural, that day we shall have assured our security, our peace, and our happiness to a remarkable degree."

Do not similarities like this, observations of the same sort in such different realms, almost identical conclusions, to say nothing of the resemblances in tone, reveal perfect unity of method,—no matter the field wherein the writer is laboring? It is plain that in Mr. Maeterlinck the moralist and the beekeeper, the entomologist and the thinker, the naturalist and the philosopher mingle happily one in the other, interchange the results of their very diverse investigations, compare them, are surprised to find themselves so close to each other, and march on to conquer truths that are not so far apart as might be thought at the first glance.

It is the very character of these truths that gives to Mr. Maeterlinck's work such a lofty meaning, whether the work be

a drama, a poem, a treatise on morals, or the book which has suggested these thoughts. He is of those who endeavor to consider things, not in their contingent reality or in passing details, but from the point of view of eternity. His main effort is to penetrate below the surface, down to the mysterious soul that his eye perceives, that his art enables him to feel, and throbbing glimpses of which he excels in giving us. No one has ranged farther within the Unknown. He has read deeply the mystic writers of the Middle Ages, among others the old Flemish master, so near a relative of John Tauler, Meister Eckhart, and Heinrich Suso, Ruysbroeck, the Admirable, whose singular and absorbing treatise, "The Ornament of the Spiritual Marriage," he has translated. He owes much, it may be, to his intercourse with these strange and powerful, familiar and sublime minds. In any case he has learned from them to look upon the Infinite even through the smallest things, to seek in the sensible world for reflections of the Unknowable, and to note the secret connections that link the chorus of beings and things in the universal harmony.

And surely these are just the traits that make the charm of "The Life of Bees," and that have won for that book with so specialized a title almost the popular success of a novel of adventure or of love. It is certainly not through interest in the bees alone that the majority of readers have perused this work with as much delighted curiosity as they read "The Treasury of the Humble," for if, on the one hand, there is no one now that believes with Descartes that animals are mere machines, there are, on the other hand, many people who insist on considering them unworthy of their attention. But every one is interested in the problems of human life, in the infinitely complex problems it suggests, in the rules that may improve it, make it more beautiful or more healthy. Since men began to reflect, they have asked themselves what should be their manner of life, and the writers who most move them are those who take up again and renew this everlasting question. And is it not this question that stirs within the little fables I spoke of but now? Almost all, no matter what may have been said to the contrary, contain a lesson,—the

misadventure of the cricket teaches in prosaic fashion the need of foresight; that of the crow puts us on our guard against foolish conceit, that of the lion and the rat shows us that we must not disdain the friendship of the lowly, that of the torn butterfly exhibits the advantages of a quiet and humble life,—and so on. The case is exactly the same with “The Life of Bees,” which may be considered a long fable in prose (and full of poetry into the bargain), or a treatise on morals in exactly the same way, or nearly so at least, as “The Treasury of the Humble” and “Wisdom and Fate;” for on every page it is plain that when Mr. Maeterlinck is watching his hive through the glass that enables him to observe its secrets, it is human society and the hearts of men that he is studying.

Now the hive at once, one might almost say at the first glance, reveals to the observer the great secret of its existence,—a secret that Mr. Maeterlinck appears inclined to offer us as the answer to the questions that cause most division amongst us. The hive, indeed, appears to be the last term of a development prepared and continued through the inferior species of honey bees, in the form of a collective organism apparently in its final shape; the principle that secures its preservation being the complete sacrifice of the individual in favor of the species, of the present in favor of the future. None of the actions performed in common by the inhabitants of the hive tend to benefit the present; they are all performed by a conscious “ensemble” of which the individual is but the “winged organ.” The latter is “completely absorbed by the commonwealth,” which, “in its turn, is regularly sacrificed to the abstract and immortal city of the future.” And this organization strikes Mr. Maeterlinck as the supreme and desirable termination of the metamorphoses and progress of the species of honey bees of which the bee is the most perfect. I may be mistaken, but I incline to the belief that he would be disposed, up to a certain point, to recommend it to mankind, which, for the matter of that, would, in its present state of development, be ready enough to accept it. Of course it is not his intention to draw from the facts he states “conclusions applicable to

man," for, as he rightly says, "man enjoys the faculty of not submitting to the laws of nature, and the most serious and at the same time the most enigmatical point in his system of morals, is to know whether he ought or ought not to make use of that faculty."

Scarcely has he made this very prudent reservation than he adds: "In proportion as society becomes organized and rises, the individual life of each of its members becomes more and more circumscribed. As soon as there is progress anywhere, the result is a sacrifice of the particular to the general interest that becomes more and more complete." Then he goes into ecstasies, no longer over the thorough sociology of the hive, but over the distant ends it appears to be striving after, the work it carries out, the lessons it teaches us.

"Is it not amazing that the hive we see confusedly, from the height of another world, should answer us, at the first glance, so accurately and wisely? Is it not matter for wonder that its buildings marked by certainty, its usages and laws, its economic and political organization, its virtues and its cruelties even, should at once reveal to us the thought or the god that the bees serve, and a god not the least legitimate or the least reasonable that may be conceived, although it is possibly the only one we have not seriously worshipped—I mean the Future? We endeavor at times, in our human history, to estimate the force or the moral grandeur of a people or of a race, and we can find no other standard than the persistency and the extent of the ideal it has pursued, and the self-sacrifice it has exhibited in striving after it. Have we often encountered an ideal more comformable to the designs of the universe, more firm, august, disinterested, manifest, and a more complete and heroic abnegation of self?"

Mr. Maeterlinck admires these virtues the more in that while they are preparing the future, they bear fruit in the present in the shape of the marvelous work of the honeycomb, which he praises in enthusiastic language, as if it were the most perfect product of creation. And it strikes me that here he indulges rather much the beekeeper's fancy. A comb of honey is a pretty and agreeable thing, and no one will deny it; it is golden as the light and scented like the flowers; it is deliciously sweet,

and appears all the more attractive because we know its poetic story. Its cells make our architects dream ; they humbly declare that with all their mathematical skill they are unable to devise more perfect, more accurate, and better balanced proportions. But the comb of honey is ever the same. Let us grant that it has received in the course of ages slow improvements too subtle for our gross senses to perceive on account of their minuteness, yet it remains uniform and monotonous in its composition, purpose, and "*raison d'être.*" It has been constructed in order to serve as lodging and granary for an extremely laborious diminutive race, and it happens especially to tickle the palate of the men and the bears that steal it. I do not want to depreciate it, but at the risk of saddening Mr. Maeterlinck, I cannot help telling him that I prefer to it the smallest piece of man's work that has about it something unexpected, fanciful, and personal. And it would make me shudder to see men moulding their lives and their work after the pattern of the bees, for I imagine that ere long, due regard being had to proportions, their work would become just as monotonous. When the individual is absorbed in the species, when the entire species gives itself up with all its force to the prosecution of the same piece of work, what possible interest can that work present? Further, of what value is existence? What is it worth, to each "winged organ" of the living cluster that is the swarm, to each working bee that is only a nameless wheel performing unchanging functions? And that "future" even, to which the individual is sacrificed, to what does it amount? To the endless making of combs of honey, the shape of which will vary only as varies the form of the hives imposed upon the bees by men, to a sort of mechanical work in which our imagination alone finds some poetry because honey is of a beautiful golden color and is drawn from the juices of flowers. But if you suppress flowers what charm is left the bees? They have not even the handsome colors of the wicked wasp, their work does not differ sensibly from that of the ant,—the traditional type of the avaricious middle class, and Mr. Maeterlinck would not then dream of having a glazed hive in his drawing-room. The truth

is that it is we who ennoble the bees, because they serve and amuse us. "Man is the measure of all things," as some ancient philosopher said.

Mr. Maeterlinck knows all this; he even says it in other words:—

"When we discover outside of our race a token of genuine intelligence, we experience something of the emotion Robinson Crusoe felt on discovering the print of a human foot on the beach of his island. It seems to us that we are less alone than we believe ourselves to be. When we try to understand the intelligence of bees, it is after all the best of ourselves that we study in them; it is an atom of that extraordinary matter that, light where it may, has the splendid property of transfiguring blind necessities, of organizing, embellishing, and multiplying life; of holding back, in a more striking manner, the stubborn power of death and the great unconsidered stream that bears almost everything that exists into an eternal unconsciousness."

Therefore Mr. Maeterlinck is interested in bees because they lead him to reflect upon the fate of the world and of man. In the same way we like his book, less for what it tells us about bees than for what it reveals to us concerning man and the world. I do not know what specialists think of them, but for my part I own that I peruse the technical pages in which are described the swarm and the honeycomb with a certain amount of inattention. My attention is really awakened only when beyond the bee I perceive my fellow man, and still more when the author insists upon resemblances or yields himself up to his poet's fancy and follows out distant conclusions. The thought, so profound and pure, to which we owe the dramas and the preceding works, becomes more accurately defined, and so, as I close the book I may perhaps be somewhat better informed about bees, whose manners and laws, alas! I own that I was completely ignorant of; but more than all I seem to understand Mr. Maeterlinck better.

And in truth he is a noble representative of present day thought. He has the high culture indispensable to a man nowadays, a broad and wide culture that enables him to be entirely at his ease on very different sorts of ground. At the same time, as

though to avoid the inconveniences of too vast a domain, he has selected two or three more circumscribed fields, wherein he labors with more minuteness and love. Science, history, and philosophy are very vast, and it is easy to lose one's self in them. A fact in history, one or two questions in philosophy, a scientific problem, —these are ends more precise, and therefore more difficult tasks, since, in order to complete them, a man must work deep and not wide. Hence the translation of Ruysbroeck, with the fine introduction that precedes it, and the attentive study of a mind difficult to understand. Hence, also, the glazed hive in the drawing-room in the Rue Raynouard, the patient observing of the little world of bees, and the fine book I have just read. Far from proving hurtful to his imagination, these restricted investigations have given it, if one may say so, a solid base. Slower in starting (Mr. Maeterlinck did not make his *début* when very young), his imagination soars freely once it has taken flight. Besides, it is further sustained by a very powerful faculty that gives a real and almost tangible form even to his most fanciful creations. We have *seen* Mr. Maeterlinck's heroes and heroines; he has *shown* them to us with a few quiet touches, a very few words, so that we can never forget them.

This poetic faculty, in its turn, is accompanied by a gift of penetration which I believe to be unique among present writers. Mr. Maeterlinck does not indulge in analysis, which painfully takes to pieces the components of thought or sentiment, in order to examine them as though they were the works of a watch that have been taken apart; he works in simpler fashion; he knows intuitively the soul-truths and brings them out with the quiet ease of a seer who reads mysteries. It is thus that he has been enabled to formulate or suggest many essential things about life, love, duty, and religion. He does not, however, seek to reform the world, as does Tolstoi, nor does he interest himself in the problems of positive religion, but there is in him a sort of instinct that turns him toward these questions. By and by he may become more categorical, but at present he affirms nothing, and at most one might conclude from his love for the hive that he

inclines toward a certain form of socialism, and from some of his remarks that he is not quite an agnostic:—

“We do not know the aims of nature which is to us the one truth that prevails over all others. But for the sake of that truth and in order to keep alive in our souls the desire to seek it, we must necessarily believe it to be a great truth. Then, if some day we find that we have gone astray, that it is unimportant and incoherent, it will be due to the ardor inspired in us by its supposed importance, that we shall be enabled to discover its unimportance, and once this is assured, it will teach us what we ought next to do. Meanwhile it is well to use, in seeking for it, the boldest powers of our hearts and brains. Then, even should the ultimate outcome prove to be pitiful, it would be no small matter to have laid bare the meanness or the emptiness of nature's aim.”

This is surely a noble attitude on the part of a thinker and a poet in regard to the Unknown in the world, at least at the stage reached by humanity in its investigations, its discoveries, and its hypotheses. It is manifest in the whole of Mr. Maeterlinck's work, and imparts to it, along with remarkable unity, an irresistibly captivating transparency,—the double attraction of the shadow in which we are plunged and of the lights that flash around us, of the mystery that envelops us and of the consciousness that seeks to light it up.

WILLIAM CRARY BROWNELL AS CRITIC ON FINE ART¹.

RUSSELL STURGIS, *New York.*

Twelve years ago Mr. Brownell published a remarkable book devoted to the characteristics of the French people, and dealing especially with the relative force of the different forms of thought among them. The social instinct, sense and sentiment, manners, morality, the art instinct, the literary sense,—these and kindred themes made up the general subject of a small but weighty book. That book is one of the finest pieces of careful discrimination which the language contains. It is little to say that nowhere in English, among books that one handles or hears of, or that influence the thought of many students, is subtlety of criticism carried further. In the absence of a perfect familiarity with those truths which are set forth in this book, Americans of some thoughtfulness and of varied reading are divisible into two classes, those who share in the absurd coarseness of appreciation so common in Great Britain, according to which French social work is ineffectual, French morality debased, and French importance to the world easy to minimize, and those who are strong believers in the supreme importance of France in the modern concert of nations, and in the attainment by the French people of precisely the highest level of contemporary civilization. The people

(1) *French Art, Classic and Contemporary Painting and Sculpture.* By W. C. Brownell. New and enlarged edition with 48 illustrations. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901.

among whom the social instinct is carried the farthest, the people which gives the most attention to its own literary classics, accepting cheap editions of them as popular literature, and which also, alone among the nations of modern Europe, gives to the fine arts of representation and of nature study their due rank in the cultivation of a race, is sure to excite just these contrary prejudices. Those who care the most for thought and the results of thought, the men of whom Matthew Arnold is the best type, though he also was a limited Englishman in so far as his total ignorance of fine art is to be considered, will always be found enthusiastically advocating the claims of France to be, on the whole, the first among modern nations, while those observers of a different class who think only of comparing all the nations with the English or the American standard of personal initiative, of political management, and of social morality in a single one of its forms, will assume the contrary without reasoning it out, and will treat France and the French people as they now do,—with comparative disapproval and comparative disregard. A study of “French Traits” would set these people right, as showing in the clearest possible way just how far the elaborate and firmly established social organization of France at once grows out of and affects the national character. The subordination of every Frenchman to the general French spirit; the quiet fashion of looking at things as they are and avoiding our much too common optimism and our absurd assumption that, because a thing is disagreeable, it must therefore be false and should never be alluded to; the control maintained, in art and literature alike, of reason and measure over poetical rhapsody in all its forms;—all these things, if considered as Mr. Brownell has considered them, and as he expects his readers to consider them, too, would make the possibility of the Americans as a nation learning something from Frenchmen as a nation very much greater than it is. It need hardly be said that this is precisely what the American people most require. We are always hearing about our obligations to England, our need of following the example of England, and the rest; but few writers for the public seem to realize that the

people of the United States has already too much in proportion of the English virtues and of the English faults, and that what we need is a strong dose of that contrary habit of mind which is to be got from France, and which might be got very easily and very pleasantly by ourselves if only the unhappy wall of language did not separate the vast majority of our people from their possible teachers.

In the course of his argument, Mr. Brownell had made clear how great was his own interest in that manifestation of French thought which is to be found in painting and in sculpture. Nine years later, in 1898, appeared his volume on French art, the second and enlarged edition of which is named below. In this he went further into the matter of the French habit of mind as applied to that department of thought in which it is most powerful in the modern world. Beginning with the art of Claude and Poussin in the seventeenth century, and with sculptors of earlier date, such as Goujon,—though, indeed, still earlier men are named by way of reference,—the development of sculpture and painting is brought down to our own time, and finds its latest change of direction, its latest movement, in Rodin and Dalou, together with the impressionist painters. Careful readers saw, then, that the unexampled had occurred. A man primarily a social observer, and a student of the less artistic part of purely intellectual work, prose literature, had turned his thought toward painting and sculpture also, being led thereto partly by his personal intimacy with certain great French artists, partly by a strong natural instinct for visible form and the expression of form upon the flat surface, and partly by a sense of the necessity, in any study of France, of an ample recognition of that side of French life. It was to be noted, then, that he had crystallized his thought of many years in a series of important essays on fine art. It is apparently the most important piece of critical fine art work done in the English language by any person not a practicing artist. The nearest approach to the subtlety and truthfulness of Brownell's touch as a critic on fine art is to be found in Stevenson's epoch-making essay on Velasquez; but there is this

essay and nothing more, nor were we provided with any other means of judging of Stevenson's quality until there appeared the introduction to Armstrong's "Raeburn." Sir Walter Armstrong's excellent treatment of the questions which arise in connection with painting is limited to three English eighteenth century masters, nor have we yet his promised book on Turner, from which we expect so much. Hamerton has not the critical way with him; it never seems to occur to him to explain to his readers the artistic side of the fine art which he discusses. Indeed, there is nowhere, in writing of deliberately purposed and long sustained art criticism, anything to be ranked higher than that which fills this book of Brownell's; for the magnificent work of Fromentin in his three books, and of La Farge in the "Letters from Japan," is, as it were, parenthetical, nor does the hasty reader of those pages discover the fact that they are stuffed with critical notes upon fine art of the greatest refinement and of the highest possible authority. So with the scattered criticisms by Mr. Blashfield, occurring in notes to his edition of "Vasari," and too rarely in the pages of "Italian Cities"; they are put where the casual reader will find them easily, but unfortunately the casual reader is not prepared to read them and to assimilate what he reads. Artists will not write books, and the strong literary effort needed to put art-thoughts into words always tends to sink art in literature. Where to turn for another book on the theory of fine art which is to be ranked with Brownell's it is hard to say. He does not touch at all upon the metaphysics of the subject; he has taken the artist as he lives, and has tried to take his, the artist's, point of view,—a thing quite immeasurably difficult for the non-artist. That point once gained as nearly as possible, he then looks calmly and discreetly at French art as it is to be judged in relation to the life of the modern world.

It being established, then, that to me Brownell's book seems to be of very great importance, I propose to disregard a good general rule and to use the first person in the remainder of this paper. The questions to be considered in it will be wholly matters of difference of opinion; and it is very annoying to use other than

the most direct construction in expressing differences of opinion. There are many matters in which one who has approached the subject of fine art from the side of architecture and of the other decorative arts,—who has loved to study the application of artistic quality to things of utility, from cathedral churches to the pages and covers of books, and who looks upon painting (even that of Paul Veronese) and sculpture (even that of the fifth century Greek) as chiefly valuable for their ideal and transcendental beauty, will differ from one who has studied primarily the higher developments of painting, the loftier achievements of sculpture, and these mainly for their sentimental expressiveness. I find nowhere in Brownell's work any evidence of strong love for associated sculpture, mosaic, wood-carving, embroidery, and the like, nor any devotion to architecture, whether classical or mediæval, whether belonging to our own field or to the vast outside Oriental world; and I pass immediately to an actually existing difference of opinion, easy to express in words, which will embody the different points of view taken—by Brownell, as I conceive, and by myself.

This relates to the sculpture of Auguste Rodin and that of Paul Dubois. It is well to take those two significant names. In our time, no other name could so well stand for the academic sculpture of France as that of Dubois; nor is there any one to be compared to Rodin as a powerful sculptor exempted by his own act from any such influence. On page 209 of Mr. Brownell's new volume these words occur: "What one observes in a work by M. Paul Dubois, let us say, is quality. As quality it may be admirable or insignificant, but its appeal is to one's sense for the abstract, the general. * * * M. Dubois gets, as I say, quality. Rodin gets feeling. The difference is exactly antipodal,—or would be if there were not an immense amount of quality also in the expression of Rodin's feeling."

In the above passage, as in nearly all passages written about fine art, there is much that is left for the reader to interpret to himself. That is the difficulty with writing about fine art; you are driven to express in terms of one language that which has

been conceived and expressed in terms of another language. Translation, even from one word language into another, is notoriously one of the most difficult things in the world. Good translation is as rare as great original poetry; and this because one must be perfect master of two languages and profoundly versed in the ways of thought of the speakers of those two languages. In translating from painting language or sculpture language into word language, there is always this difficulty,—that in words we can first describe the visible outside, as of a man, his look, his bearing, and then go on to tell what he has “within which passeth show,” while in painting we deal with the outside alone. When you read or write about the sentiment in a painted head or figure or group, you mean that the painted surface before you has suggested that sentiment to you. But this is so very much the result of your own habit of mind! The French pietists seem to find religious sentiment in Bouguereau’s paintings. Surely it is their own spirit which puts it there! Fra Lippo Lippi is represented as asking:—

“Suppose I’ve made her eyes all right and blue,
Can’t I take breath and try to add life’s flash,
And then add soul and heighten them threefold?”

And the answer to the question is, or would be if it were conceivable that a painter should ask such a question, “No, you can’t! Your business is not to repaint and retouch; the ‘eyes,’ or rather the painted forms of the face in which the eyes are set, must be painted once for all; blueness, life, and soul expressible only by pigment put on with a brush, the simplest work the best, and *repentirs* not admitted.” Indeed Browning’s painter is really aware of his mission, for he says in the following lines:—

“Or say there’s beauty with no soul at all—
(I never saw it—put the case the same—)
If you get simple beauty and nought else,
You get about the best thing God invents,—
That’s somewhat. And you’ll find the soul you have missed,
Within yourself when you return Him thanks!”

Thus, in the present case one asks, What is really meant by the term "quality" as applied primarily to a work of art of Dubois, and as applied to "the expression of Rodin's feeling" as shown in his sculpture? It is probably this, and this alone,—modeling so fine, so perfect, so subtle beyond the ordinary capacity of the observer to follow its gradations and to seize its delicacy that he, the spectator, can only feel vaguely the supreme beauty of it. Now, modeling may be, as Brownell has pointed out in more than one passage, either that of "*le morceau*" alone,—that is to say, of the separate parts thought most interesting, now a wrist, now a cheek,—or it may be that of the whole figure perfectly adapted to express the action which the figure is supposed to be going through. Thus, an eminent painter and student of art, when asked for his critical comment by a sculptor of our own time, suggested this,—that when a number of persons were near together and in motion they would make different movements from those which they would make if each were alone; their attitudes at any one instant of time would be different, the neighborhood of each body and each moving limb affecting insensibly the movement of every other figure in the group. The modeling which would have expressed those peculiarities of attitude, the modeling which could have been produced only after the sculptor had himself witnessed many times these almost unseizable and wholly indescribable effects of one moving body upon another moving body, is the very reverse of modeling for "*le morceau*." Very similar is the treatment of the single figure,—the pose if in tranquility, the momentary attitude if shown in action, the grip of the toes on the ground, the participation of the torso in the movement of a limb, the balance, the poise. This also is a very different thing from the search for the beauty of separate roundings and flattenings. Now, both of these kinds of modeling, that for the Whole and that for the Detail, exist in great charm, one is tempted to say in great perfection, in the works of Paul Dubois and in the works of Auguste Rodin. It can be but a matter of opinion which of the two reaches the most triumphant achievement. But there are certain peculiarities

to point out. When it is the nude that is modeled, Dubois, as in the "Eve Naissante," accepts deliberately and with conviction a certain canon of proportions, a canon not expressible in words, but known to sculptors, and felt by every one who has studied the antique in a certain way. Nothing would have induced Dubois to change, in this statue, what is to him an ideally perfect proportion of length of thigh to width across the hips, of either or both to the span of the waist or of size and fulness of limbs and body to the frame—to the "charpente,"—it being, of course, premised that the type selected is that of a young maiden. On the other hand, Mr. Rodin in modeling, let us say, his "Kiss" (*Le Baiser*), illustrated in "French Art," or his "Amor Fugit" or his "Spring" (*Le Printemps*) makes it evident that he has disregarded as much as a learned modern sculptor can the standard of proportions set up for us by antiquity. If he desires to express the idea of adolescence in man or woman, he may give to the body and limbs a slenderness, a characteristic thinness of parts which, according to the classical standard, is inartistic. If, moreover, he wishes to express by means of combined movement a great deal of human emotion, he may unite his two or three figures in elaborately modulated groups which, in comparison with the classical standard, are contorted, are forced and exaggerated, and therefore inartistic. By the word inartistic is certainly not meant ugly or offensive or disagreeable or repellant in any way, or even other than beautiful. Inartistic means that which art avoids naturally, or traditionally, as you please. It means that which to the great world of artists is out of key. Therefore, if one spends an hour in close examination of such a group, or in going from one such group to another, as was possible last summer in the pavilion at Paris, the impression made upon such a student is not a wholly artistic impression, if that word is used in the common sense. The extraordinary refinement of the modeling, in which even those parts which are the least plainly seen, as the side close beneath and in shadow of the arm, or the attachment of the thighs to the trunk, will be the strongest single impression, perhaps; but the next strongest impression will be that of the oddity of the

whole thing, of the bold challenge it offers, the demand it makes upon the favor or sympathy of a community which is hardly prepared to recognize it as fine art. Dubois is conservative and traditional in the selection of the attitude; that is, he follows in the main the posing of the human body used by many generations of sculptors, by the Greeks, by the Greco-Romans, and especially by the masters of the Italian cinquecento. His modeling corresponds to tradition in that it is severe, in that the exact copying of a living model is foreign to him as to every great artist, and in that no excess would be allowed in the finished work of the sculptor; however excellent the model which showed such excess, however tempting the yielding to such excess might seem as a means of rendering a certain expression of the spirit within. With Rodin the case is somewhat different. Novelty of pose, boldness of grouping, even complexity and contortion of attitude, and such novelty and such boldness chiefly for the purpose of rendering certain thoughts, such as can hardly be expressed in visible form, but which the sculptor will still try to render,—these seem to be his chief aims.

Now, so far as the nude is concerned, these two ways of treating the human subject, singly or in group, are comparable for interest, and for that higher beauty which is not merely prettiness. I should always prefer the “Eve,” if I had to see it every day, to the most beautiful nude of Rodin. Brownell, as I think, would prefer his choice among the Rodins. To me the suggestion of Greek thought passing traditionally through the Renaissance men to ourselves is not a weakness, but an added charm; to Brownell, as I suppose, the very general avoidance of such tradition, and even its denial, in the important nudes of Rodin, is a new virtue,—a great and elsewhere unattained merit. To me the essential thing in the work of art is *external charm*, and that because there is nothing in the work of art except its own exterior, and that all the reading of inward sentiment into that work of art must be largely personal with the student himself. To Brownell, if I read aright his constantly repeated assertions concerning the relative importance of this and that master,—an importance based upon

the greater or smaller success in rendering inward sentiment,—the reverse is true. I remember passing through the long gallery of the Chiaramonti Museum in the Vatican, out of patience with the inferior late fragments which line the walls, and of being brought up suddenly “with a round turn,” as the boys say, by something, I knew not what, but which proved to be a fragment of an Athenian tombstone,—Greek work of the fourth century B. C. No such shock of surprise, passing immediately into the highest pleasure, would be obtainable from the most perfect piece of sculpture intended chiefly to express sentiment. It was the charm of the perfectly conceived sculpture as such, technically and mechanically perfect according to our human standard, and expressing nothing on earth except the idealization of human beauty; it was that and nothing less which distinguished the fine Greek fragment from the inferior Greco-Roman pieces around. It seems to me that Dubois has a vast deal of this quality, for here, after this explanation, I may use the word quality as expressing what I think it should always express,—what I think it does express as quoted above from Brownell,—the idea of very high artistic merit. And here I note a sentence from pages 181, 182, which seems to me self-contradictory. The author is asking what it is that distinguishes the work of Dubois from similar subjects when treated by some German or Italian professor, and he answers, “Qualities of style, of refined taste, of elegance, of true intelligence: its artistic interest is purely decorative and sentimental.” Hardly so! It is decorative, indeed, and full of a higher truthfulness, but “sentimental”? No! in the sentimental way it is very like the professorial work alluded to in the passage quoted. But it is none the worse for that, because sentiment of the purely human or of the religious sort is common to artists and non-artists alike. The higher expression of that sentiment is reserved for the artist in words, not for the thinker in form. The language of form cannot render it. On page 183 Brownell says that if the sculpture of the present day were lying about in ruin and in fragments it is the scraps of Rodin’s work which alone would appeal to the

explorer of the future century. Not so! It is rather the fragments of a good Dubois which would arrest that man, and would make him say to his companion, "Here is a fragment of Greek,—no, not of Greek, but of sixteenth century,—no, not of either, but of some more modern work which is worthy to be compared with either." What he would say of Rodin cannot be known, as yet. We of Rodin's own generation have not yet had time to look upon his work from any point of view except that occupied by the astonished contemporary, who, however, impressed by the amazing power of the work and with the profound knowledge shown in it, is still uncertain what to think of it.

Mr. Brownell, however, knows what to think of it. He has made up his mind that no modern French sculptor can compare with Rodin; and devotes forty-three out of a hundred and ten pages concerning sculpture to Rodin alone. I cannot accept such a view; there is a certain amount of modern sculpture which seems to me nobler than that of Rodin, and, while I know something about that modern sculpture, because the study of the past leads up to it infallibly, and goes far to explain it, there has not been time as yet to look at Rodin's work from every possible point of view, and to reach any profound conviction about it; more especially such a conviction of its all-round superiority as is suggested above.

So much about the nude; if now we consider the draped figures it is easier to decide. Dubois manages draped figures as perfectly as he does the nude; for each he has strong tradition perfectly understood, and for each he has so much of originality as every very great technical executant, who has also an intelligence of his own, will be sure to have; for the reader will observe that I am not now claiming any extraordinary creative genius for Dubois. The highest achievement of this power over the draped figure is in the recumbent "*Lamoricière*," under the pall through which are visible the masses of the uniform as well as of the body. The spectator is sure that the dead man, booted and dressed in his uniform of "*tenue*," has been laid upon a bier with his head raised, before the pall was spread over him and the crucifix laid

upon his breast above the pall. The tombal statue of the Duc d'Aumale is of kindred and almost equal merit. In the same monument with the "Lamoricière" are the youthful, maidenly figure of Faith in a robe fitting tightly to the body and arms, and spreading rapidly from the hips in loose folds; the figure of Charity, matronly, loosely robed, suckling a child, while two others climb or sleep upon her knees; the figure of Military Courage laced up in leather coat of fence; and the figure of Meditation, conventionally draped as if a Greek philosopher.¹ These figures differ in the degrees of merit which they reach. There is, I think, a good deal of feeble conventionality about the Meditation, and the Military Courage is more or less closely studied from a figure by Michaelangelo, and has, moreover, a certain undue alertness in attitude and expression; but the two female figures seem very excellent, and inferior only to the fine recumbent statue which forms the centre of the composition. Now, when a kindred problem is set to Rodin, his solution of it ends in something like the "Burghers of Calais" or in the "Balzac." In the first of these the figures are shown so loaded with the tragic sentiment of the scene that they lose all "statuesque," all architectonic, all comely distribution. Their pose becomes ignominious. They slouch, they crouch, they seem to desire to crawl recumbent on the ground, their humanity has lost all dignity in its misery and despair, and their pose and apparent movement are so ignominious that even pity disappears in a feeling of contempt or of sorrowful refusal to recognize such vermiform creatures as men, in any artistic sense. As for the "Balzac"; it has been so battled over, it has been discussed in so many ways, and has received so many adjectives of both sorts, that one hesitates to express the repulsion which it excites. For both these pieces let it suffice to say that they seem to me hideous, and that the only qualifying admission I can make with regard to my opinion of them is this, that I have seen neither in

(1) The admirable architectural setting, the canopied tomb designed by Boitte, is for much in the beauty and majesty of these statues; but that is another test to apply to grandiose sculpture. Will it stand the association of architectural forms? Well! Dubois's sculpture will; there is no doubt of that!

its place upon a monument. The placing of each in the Rodin pavilion of 1900 may be thought satisfactory to the artist. Whether the "Burghers of Calais" could be brought into some harmony with a pedestal or with that and a canopy, or whether such mounting might benefit the group, I do not pretend to foresee. So the "Balzac" might perhaps look less unintelligent as a design and less ugly as a supposed decorative object, if combined with a pedestal that should lead up to it and confirm and carry out its lines.

It is easier to explain this difference of point of view with relation to a work of sculpture than to a painting, and this because of the comparative simplicity of the impression made upon the spectator by the piece of sculpture. If painted sculpture were common, nowadays, or if the occasional use of polychromatic statuettes, and the still more uncommon appearance in the exhibitions of large statues treated as studies of color, such as the "Nature Revealing Herself," by Barrias, should lead to a school of sculpture in polychromatic material, the tendency might be the other way, and the piece of art highly developed in form and invested with delicate and highly wrought color would become still harder to judge than the painting on flat surface. Even today it is hard to be sure of your opinion of the artistic influence wrought upon you by the "Nature," and if such statues were numerous, the difficulty would be increased by the necessity of considering the art, not as an exception to be treated as such, and held up for admiration in an exceptional way, like a visitor from some other planet, a meteorite or the like, but as an instance of a pervading spirit in design. So long as sculpture deals with form alone, it will be easier to express in words one's opinion of it than of painting; and this without reference to the question whether that opinion is more or less likely to be right than in the case of the more complex and infinitely less comprehensible art of the painter. Now, if we would consider an expression of opinion with regard to the most painter-like of all modern painting, the work of the advanced impressionists, and especially of Claude Monet, we might find on pages 107 and 108 of "French

Art" the closing paragraphs of an analytic account of that artist's way of work. The process as described is nearly this,—that Monet is painting absolute values in a very wide range, plus sunlight, as nearly as pigment can be got to represent it, and that he secures in doing so an incomparably vivid effect of reality, of nature,—and of nature in her gayest, most inspiring manifestation. "After thirty minutes," he says, "the light changes; he must stop and return the next day at the same hour. The result is immensely real, and in Monet's hand, immensely varied." In the next paragraph we have the following sentences: "For decorative purposes a hole in one's wall, an additional window through which one may look satisfactorily during a period of thirty minutes, has its drawbacks. A walk in the country or in a city park is after all preferable to any one who can really appreciate a Monet—that is, any one who can feel the illusion of nature which it is his sole aim to produce. After all, what one asks of art is something different from imitative illusion. Its essence is illusion, I think, but illusion taken in a different sense from optical illusion—*trompe l'oeil*. Its function is to make dreams seem real, not to recall reality." It is a delicate matter to point out the differences of opinion of which I am conscious as I read this. Let us consider those pictures of Monet's which will probably be most familiar to most persons in America, the thirteen or fourteen different views of Rouen Cathedral from the same or nearly the same point, but by different effects of daylight, sunset light, moonlight, and lightning, too, for aught I now remember. It is incomprehensible to me that any one should compare one of those pictures with a look through a window. To me there is nothing more absolutely artistic, more foreign to our ideas of the imagined photograph in colors, more remote from "copying" or "imitation," than one of those studies of colored light. I will not cite in my own behalf the opinions of the public who, thoroughly impregnated with the ordinary gray and white tradition of landscape painting, consider that exactly like nature when it is most conventional; I will consider only the opinion of those who love Monet's work extremely, and look at it with the natural

longing to know what has been the artist's purpose. I cannot understand why it should be said of those pictures, among all others of modern art, that they are less to be desired than a walk in the country or in a city park. The lover of nature is free to prefer such a walk; but then he will admit frankly that he cares for art only as a reflex of nature, and that is what the people who take Ruskin seriously would say, if they were conscious of their own meaning. But the student of art who desires the square of canvas to be supremely beautiful, and is prepared to declare every other merit inferior to such beauty whether of color alone or of form and color, or of form and color plus a far-away expression of some memory or some sentiment,—for him to speak his mind would be to say frankly that he prefers the square of canvas to any walk in any city park, or to any walk in the country, unless it were through a piece of scenery so incomparably fine that for the time being it would banish all thoughts of that still greater triumph of nature, the work of nature's greatest achievement, the work of the human mind. Nor can one understand what is meant in this connection by the reference to "imitative illusion." It is not illusion. In no such way would the scene-painter, trying frankly to produce allusions, go at his work. It is not Illusion, it is Suggestion; the student in front of a Monet may feel that he has long known his Rouen Cathedral, and has long known how changing are the effects of color during the course of a single summer day,—to say nothing of a series of summer days; and his feeling will be that here is indeed a noble guide, a most useful expounder, one who shows him things that he would not have seen himself. That, indeed, is probably the highest object of plastic and graphic art, to call the attention of the purblind great majority to the things which the artist sees, and to provide that one who has eyes at all for the external world may find a way to see with him. But I cannot imagine calling it Illusion. On the other hand, the closing sentence of the quotation above seems to me as true as possible, "Its function is to make dreams seem real." That, indeed, is profoundly true,—that, indeed, reveals and expresses an important truth concerning the pictures

of the greater impressionists. Rouen Cathedral never looked exactly as it does in one of those pictures by Monet. It is a magnificent dream that it did so, a dream which Monet has put on canvas for us.

Probably my disagreement with Brownell in this case amounts to this alone, that he asks in art for the evidence of a non-artistic sentiment which cannot always be present, least of all in the works of the painters who are true painters, who seek form and color because that is their Trade as well as their Art. I am not conscious of non-artistic sentiment as at all prominent in Turner's "Fingal's Cave," or the great "Ostende," to name pictures in New York, nor in Homer Martin's "Villerville," any more than in the Monets,—any more than in Corot's dawn pictures. Landscape is bound to be free from it: and if figure-subject gives prominence to literary, to moral, to patriotic, or to religious sentiment, it does so at its peril;—it is most commonly ruined by the unwarranted intrusion.

There is on page 67 an important passage. "Painting, in a wide sense, is just as legitimately the expression of ideas in form and color as literature is the expression of ideas in words. It is perfectly plain that Meissonier was not especially enamored of beauty as Corot, as Troyon, as Decamps was. But nothing could be less critical than to deny Meissonier's importance, * * * in spite of his literalness and his insensitiveness to the element of beauty, and indeed to any truly pictorial significance whatever." (I am not conscious of misrepresenting the meaning by certain omissions. My purpose is, of course, to express Brownell's full meaning to the reader of the present article, and this can sometimes be better done without loading the page too much with quotation.) Now, with regard to this statement, it is to be noted that every word taken literally is entirely true, and will command the respect and even the adherence of every thinker on modern painting except one who is in a temporary fit of rage against Meissonier. The "importance" of that painter is in the way in which he has composed historical statements for us; he has told us how a guardsman of the sixteenth century dressed and

armed himself and carried himself, and what sort of quarrels he indulged in; and with equally historical truthfulness he has told us about the Napoleonic legend. So far he is important. There is a side of history which can best be told in form and in such using of bright colors as passes in modern art of the French school for Color. So Bouguereau gives us girlish sentiment in form and in more dusky colors. So Laurens gives us the more solemn and tragical episodes of history. Such painting as this is really Illustration; that is, it is the rendering in form and light and shade *plus* the use of different pigments, of something which words could tell, but could not tell as perfectly. No other importance than this can be ascribed to Meissonier, in view of the statement in the same sentence quoted above, that he is insensitive to any truly pictorial significance whatever. That is exactly the point of view which I desire to take in all writing upon pictorial art. In like manner, I say, with regard to sculpture, that all which has not a truly sculpturesque significance is of little account as fine art. So in any decorative art, from architecture down to street signs, it is to be maintained that nothing should be considered of which it can be said that the author has shown his insensitiveness to truly decorative significance. For that is the test,—*significance*, pictorial significance, decorative significance;—the question is, Does the work of art mean anything as a piece of painting, as a piece of sculpture, as decoration? It is not a question of primary importance whether it is good archæology, or true girlish sentiment, or an appeal to love of country. Your modern building has great value as an industrial production and may fill with patriotic joy one who thinks that he is inspired by artistic feelings; it may even have a certain impressiveness as being very big, very high, and as taking beautiful cloud shadows or showing sunset light from afar. None of these things, however, implies any artistic significance in the design of its exterior. It is often difficult, but it is always possible, to ascertain whether the designer had any strong decorative, that is to say, architectural, that is to say, artistic purpose in his mind, for if he did not, then the building will be without that

true significance which alone is important to the work of fine art. And I welcome this sentence, quoted from Brownell's page, the more because I think that that is the only thing I find lacking in this most admirable book,—such a distinct recognition of the fact that the important thing to the work of art is artistic meaning. Because of this, no one thing is to be regretted so much in the book as the absence from it of any complete analysis of the work of Puvis de Chavannes. Two pages are, indeed, devoted to him, but in two pages there could only be a most general statement of external facts. If the author could have found space to analyze and criticize the work of Puvis, he would have given the world the best of art criticism in an easily understood form.

It is to be regretted that there is so little call for the artist in architecture. Were there more need of the appearance among the architects of men of the highest artistic feeling, with or without the highest artistic ability, there would then be a call for the study of the sculpturesque and of the pictorial from the only true and necessary standpoint, that is, the standpoint of the Designer as distinguished from the standpoint of the Thinker, or that of the man of sentiment. Just as we are not prepared to accept the dictum on poetry of one who is not highly sensitive to verse and to the packing of language into verse, so we have a right to dispute the authority of any art critic who is not profoundly impressed with the artistic necessity of art, and who does not care, when he is before a picture more for the picture than for the sentiment, the narrative, the anecdote, the suggestions which it may contain or recall. It is on this account that I hold it the safest way to work with abstract design in form and color; to be busied, whether as designer or as student, with the decoration of boxes or palaces, the coloring of book covers or church walls, the inlaying of snuff boxes or Romanesque apses, the composing of scroll work in gold or in wrought granite set a hundred feet above the eye. To stop there,—to carry your studies no further than such decoration will lead them,—that would be to stop far short, indeed, of the desired result; but to begin there, and to study art always with conscious or unconscious reference to the point from which

you started, is, I think, vital to the thorough understanding of fine art. It is this, I think, that the modern world, this world of sentiment fed upon books and the expression of ideas conveyed by words alone,—most peculiarly requires.

The book we are considering is an ideally good example of art criticism undertaken in the other way,—undertaken in the way of comparing thought, sentiment, observation of humanity and of the external world as expressed in the graphic and plastic representation of objects and of humanity with a similar observation expressed in words. It has been pointed out in a review of the book published within a few days of its appearance ("The Evening Post," Nov. 21, 1901) that the author cares more for the free expression of sentiment than he does for tradition,—more for free play of thought than for continuity of thought, more for individuality than for the strong national sweep of French art down the centuries, more for independence of the schools than for the triumph of any school. The inference, as expressed in that review, is that Mr. Brownell cares for art in its non-French aspect more than for French art peculiarly so-called; and there is force in that contention. This might be expressed in other words. It may be said that whereas the book mentioned at the beginning of this article,—"*French Traits*,"—is an account of the French written by a most loving and admiring student of that great people, its past and its present, "*French Art*" is rather a non-laudatory notice of the triumphs of that race in graphic and plastic art. It is not unfriendly to French art; that could not be when there was such sympathy between the author and the several artists of whom he writes, but there is not a hearty belief in that which has made French art great. On the other hand, the success and the shortcoming of each artist with respect to that which to our author seems the most important part of art, its expression of human sentiment, is what the book deals with; and it is on this account that there is no injustice done in the statement made just above, that this is the best, as it is the latest, of the books which approach fine art in a literary spirit. Nothing the least derogatory to the book's value is stated or

implied. The book is far too good for anything to its discredit to be urged for a moment. Only this; if the student is looking for a book on fine art as artists look at it, then the book in question is only in part what he wants. Nevertheless, it will set him right in many things; it will be full of the most valuable suggestion; it will be the best of all possible guides to a right knowledge of how the most intelligent, non-artistic part of the community looks at fine art, and will always look at fine art; and what share in the work of civilization the non-artist world may be expected to allow to the artist.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF TRUSTS¹

EMIL STEINBACH, *Vienna.*

It is an acknowledged fact that the so-called trust problem is daily assuming more and more importance among the political questions of the time. In no country does this economic problem play a more important rôle than in the United States; nowhere do we find a greater diversity in its modes of presentation, and nowhere have attempts at its solution by legislative interference been more seriously agitated. It is necessary, therefore, in a scientific investigation of the problem, to examine, primarily, the experiences of this country.

On the continent of Europe the problem under discussion has not yet passed the stage of a "cartel." There have been numerous scientific investigations to determine the exact nature of a "cartel," and the word has been repeatedly defined. On the whole, we find a consensus of opinion with regard to the meaning of the term. Dr. L. Pohle, for example, suggests the following definition: "A 'cartel' is an association by voluntary agreement of members of the same or related industries, its object being to endeavor to procure the largest possible profits for its members, by means of the monopolistic influencing of market conditions through the limitation of free competition; the entire theory thus being based upon the system of free competition." Of course, in the present investigation we are concerned only with "cartels" of entrepreneurs.

The combination of independent entrepreneurs is, in all Euro-

(1) Translated by Professor Rudolph Tombo, Jr., of Columbia University, New York.

pean discussions, always regarded as the most important factor of the problem. In the Austrian "cartel" bill, the union of independent entrepreneurs is assumed to be the *sine qua non* for the existence of a "cartel." Strikingly characteristic in this connection is the attitude of French jurisprudence, which in its interpretation of the words, "par réunion ou coalition entre les principaux détenteurs de la même marchandise ou denrée" (Article 419 of the "Code pénal"), holds that the punishable offence there mentioned cannot be imputed to a trade or financial organization which endeavors to effect artificial changes in the price for its own benefit alone, even though this organization include the greater part of the producers or proprietors of the commodity. But the individuals themselves disappear to make room for a single entity, the company, so that in this case an indispensable element of the offence mentioned in Article 419 is missing, namely, the plurality of persons.

In the United States, however, the problem has, in the course of the past two decades, assumed an entirely different aspect. As far as the scientific and legislative treatment is concerned, the element of plurality of participants is relegated to the background. This forces us to a much more profound treatment of the problem,—one entirely independent of externals, particularly as we should scarcely expect the new development to be confined exclusively to the American continent. On the other hand, it is evident that this development arose in the United States by reason of the extraordinary business enterprise of the large American entrepreneurs and their striking initiative.

The agreements between entrepreneurs, which on the continent constitute the ordinary content of the "cartel," had in the United States originally assumed a similar external form, and were there generally designated as "pools." Their instability and their precarious status in the law gave rise to the desire for firmer and more enduring combinations. Hence the foundation of real trusts, the prototype for which was furnished by the Standard Oil Trust, formed in the year 1882. The character of such a trust is very clearly defined by Professor Jenks in his

excellent book on the trust question, when he states that the members of the various corporations to be amalgamated surrender their interests, as a rule, in the form of shares of stock, to a board of trustees, which is endued with the irrevocable power to manage the affairs of the several corporations at its own discretion. In exchange for their shares, the original stockholders receive trust certificates upon which dividends are paid. For this purpose the earnings of the different corporations are united in a fund, which is divided *pro rata* among the certificate holders, irrespective of the amount of the earnings of each individual corporation. Nor is the amount of the dividend affected by the length of time during which the various plants may have been in active operation. The business of the individual corporations is managed solely by the trustees, who appoint the superintendents of the different organizations.

This very ingenious combination, which furnished eloquent testimony of the inventor's sagacity, was short-lived. A hostile public opinion asserted itself, and in a number of States anti-trust laws were passed, while the courts shed much light upon the weakness in point of law of the new combinations. A striking instance of legal interference was furnished in 1890 by the decision of the court of appeals of the State of New York in "*People vs. The North River Sugar Refining Co.*," which pronounced the trust illegal and dissolved it. The decision was based on the reasoning that corporations which owe their very existence and right to act to state sanction, are not authorized to become members of an organization.

Nothing remained, therefore, but to transform the forbidden trust into a great independent corporation and to transfer to the new combination, now regarded as a single legal entity, the entire property of the united enterprises, settlement being made with the old stockholders by giving them shares of the new corporation. Speaking broadly, the above represents the latest development of the question in the United States. The material side of the problem has not been essentially altered, while a firmer and more enduring concentration in the management of

the different enterprises has been attained. This development has, however, put an entirely new phase upon the strictly legal aspect of the question, for instead of a company, that is, a combination of a majority of independent entrepreneurs formed for a definite purpose, we now have a single legal person, which is almost without exception not amenable to any existing legal regulations, whether of statute or decision.

As we have seen, the development of the problem has not taken the same course in the states of the European continent. It is not my purpose to investigate in detail the causes of this difference, and I shall touch upon them only in passing. The slower development in Europe may be due, in the first place, to the more stringent laws regarding share holdings in some of the European states, particularly the regulations governing the making public of the accounts of the formation and management of joint-stock companies, and the civil and legal responsibilities of the incorporators or managers. No doubt another cause for the phenomenon is to be sought in the increasing unwillingness of owners and managers of independent enterprises to give up their independence and submit to business control by others, no matter how capable. Furthermore, in a number of states, in Austria for example, the difference in the assessments levied upon individual enterprises, on the one hand, and upon enterprises of which public accounts are required, particularly joint-stock companies, on the other, and the fact that assessments are naturally always more effective in the case of enterprises subject to public accounting than in that of private individuals, have retarded the development. Finally, legislation and judicial decisions have undoubtedly had a share in determining the situation, inasmuch as the penal statutes against combinations of several entrepreneurs for monopolistic purposes, while maintaining their legal independence, in a measure force such enterprises to justify themselves also from a legal standpoint, and to become the property of one and the same entity, namely, a large, new corporation. However true this may be, it is not to be denied that the development in the United States is due to actually existing conditions,

and is, therefore, a normal evolution. The causes which have hitherto stood in the way of an analogous development in Europe are probably only temporary. The tendency to follow the lead of the United States is everywhere perceptible, and undoubtedly a movement toward concentration similar to that in America will soon make itself felt in Europe.

The rapid development of the trust problem and the related phenomena, which are often not at all in accord with prevailing economic theories, have aroused public interest in the United States, even more so than in Europe, and have given impulse to numerous scientific investigations, and particularly to extensive official examinations. The results of the latter instantly suggest an inquiry into the nature of the attitude hereafter to be assumed toward the movement by the government, especially the legislative branch. The answer will, of course, depend primarily upon such evils as have already affected the public welfare, and such as may be anticipated with reasonable certainty, since advantageous features of the new development, if any, would not call forth preventive or repressive legislative interference.

The palpable as well as the apprehended evils may be divided into two absolutely distinct groups. In the one class we shall place those evils that arise solely from the nature and formation of the large joint-stock companies, and are not concerned with the conduct of the business, in the other, those that result from the manner in which the business of such large companies is carried on, more especially from their monopolistic tendency.

The first of the two groups does not especially concern us here. It is a well-known fact, one corroborated by the experience of all states in which great joint-stock companies exist, that certain unavoidable evils result from the existence and more particularly from the organization of such combinations, which are entirely aside from the business management, and arise solely from the nature of the corporation and its peculiar organization. One of the most noteworthy of the abuses in the United States is stock-watering, that is, the excessively high valuation of the different plants of the new corporation, which results in the fix-

tion of a stock capital absolutely incompatible with the real condition of things. All the more recent trust legislation has paid particular attention to these evils, without, however, being successful in abolishing them altogether.

Among the measures that may be employed to eliminate abuses of this class, we have first of all the requirement of wide publicity of the transactions in question. Particularly instructive in this regard are the pertinent regulations of the new German code of commercial law of the tenth of May, 1897. Section 191 of this code prescribes that in case payments other than in cash are made by shareholders to the stock of a joint-stock company, or in case the proposed incorporation assumes control of existing or proposed plants or their effects, the incorporators must in a written declaration explain the fundamental circumstances by which the adjustment of the amounts guaranteed for the deposited or assumed effects were arrived at. The incorporators are furthermore required to state the preliminary legal steps taken in connection with the corporation's acquisitions, to state the cost of the raw material and the cost of manufacture during the past two years, and in case of the absorption of another enterprise by the corporation, its earnings for the past two business years. The accuracy and completeness of the statements are to be examined, not only by a board of directors and a supervisory committee, but also by special auditors to be appointed by the chamber of commerce or by the court. A written report of the inspection is required, which is deposited with the public commercial register, where it is open to the public (§§ 192, 193, and 195). The incorporators are responsible for the accuracy and completeness of all statements and are both civilly and criminally liable (§§ 202, 313). In case the stockholders at a general meeting fail to pass the motion for the appointment of commissioners, to examine into a matter less than two years old concerning the establishment or management of the corporation, the examiners may, nevertheless, be appointed upon petition of a number of stockholders, whose shares taken together constitute a tenth of the total stock. But the petition-

ers must give some proof that the matter in question was accompanied by dishonesty or gross infraction of the law or of the agreement of the corporation, and they must have been in possession of their shares for at least six months prior to the general meeting. The board of directors must allow these court inspectors to examine the books and writings of the corporation, and the cash balance as well as the securities and effects. In this case, also, the report of the investigation of the examiners must be furnished immediately to the public commercial register, and action must be taken on it at the next general meeting (§§ 266, 267).

The demands for publicity incorporated in the paragraphs mentioned, as well as in others that need not be given here, are assuredly not trifling. Indeed, in many respects, they are so far-reaching that we should be justified in anticipating abuses, particularly on the part of competing companies. We cannot, however, give too much importance to such scruples, when we consider the justifiable desire for publicity. To assure the practical success of such legislation, something further is therefore necessary, and this has been provided for in the regulations discussed above, namely, the facts made accessible to the public by law must be examined by impartial experts, officially appointed examiners, so that the public may have an impartial expert opinion upon the facts in their possession. Unless such measures were prescribed, even the far-reaching requirement of publicity would be of comparatively very little value, for the general public is by no means possessed of sufficient information in this matter to draw the proper conclusions from the published facts, and the judgments of the press in such cases are generally not sufficiently impartial to permit of their being regarded as a satisfactory source of information for all concerned.

In spite of all this, and when due allowance is made for the serious intent and precaution of the legislation, no one will claim that these or similar legal regulations can wholly and absolutely do away with the deplorable evils and abuses mentioned. On the one hand, these phenomena are so closely and indissolubly con-

nected with the real nature of the stock companies, and on the other hand, our present economic development is so closely bound up with the association of capital calling for the formation of a stock company, that it seems but a vain hope to expect a radical remedy from this source. A share, from its very nature, usually causes the relation between the entrepreneur and the shareholder to become considerably weakened. Shareholders who purchase their shares for the purpose of reselling them are interested only in the market quotations, and not at all in the enterprise itself. But even those shareholders who have in view a profitable investment of their property are seldom inclined to inquire into the nature of the management of the enterprise, or into the origin of the dividends, provided the amount of the dividends remains the same or is increased. Their distrust is not aroused until there is a falling off in the profits and a sudden drop in the quotations, but then it is too late, and the mischief has been done. On the whole, we may safely say that shareholders always cherish the firm conviction that in case of an imminent unfavorable turn in the affairs of their company, they will by reason of their sagacity surely be able to unload their shares in time, and thus it comes about that they do not take advantage of the power of supervision granted them by law or statute, until there is nothing left to supervise. Even the most stringent laws will probably be impotent to affect these idiosyncrasies of shareholders.

The second group of palpable evils is of much greater importance in our discussion and is most intimately connected with the real character of the problem. This group contains those abuses that arise from the monopolistic tendency of the large organizations in the conduct of their business,—evils which, unlike those of the first group, do not primarily affect the interests of the persons directly connected with the enterprise or of those that contemplate some participation, but affect all consumers.

The laws governing the regulation of prices, particularly such as are concerned with the influences of competition, have been

impressed upon us by theoretical economics with such imperiousness and emphasis, that only a few decades ago,—although even at that time contradictory phenomena were by no means rare,—scarcely any one ventured publicly to express a doubt of their universality. Then came the “cartel” and trust movements, which spread to an extent wholly unforeseen ; and the tremendous impression these new organizations made everywhere, caused people to realize that the regulation of prices can go on extensively even without competition among buyers or sellers, and that competition is frequently enough expressly excluded from the very first. The result of such a regulation of prices, to be sure, always differs materially from the scale of prices due to mutual competition.

The latter phenomena, particularly large discrepancies between the prices fixed by corporations and those current during universal free competition, as well as the apprehension of a still further increase of such discrepancies, first led the attention of the general public to the “cartel” and trust movements, and caused the consumers to appeal for protection to the state. In this battle against a movement that seemed detrimental to the best interests of the public, the stress was laid primarily upon the agreements of the incorporators providing for the exclusion of mutual free competition. The state was asked to demand the publication of full details of the corporation’s affairs, the supervision of their business by special commissions, and if necessary to declare them unlawful, to legislate against them, and to punish the participants. We are not concerned here with the legislative measures, generally well-known, taken by various states and particularly by the federal government of the United States, nor with the results obtained.

Certain it is, however, that the development of the trust problem in the United States above referred to has undermined the foundation for this method of battling with the palpable evils. In place of an association of entrepreneurs maintaining the legal independence of the individual organizations, we now have an amalgamation of the stock, accompanied by the creation of a

uniform legal entity representing all the allied interests. In the eyes of the law there is absolutely no distinction between a legal entity formed for the purpose of excluding mutual competition and other similar, legal persons; for the amount of the joint-stock and the purpose of the business do not give rise to any legal distinctions. If, then, it is desired to invoke legal interference, the measures of the government can in the new order of things be directed no longer against the form of the combination of independent entrepreneurs, since this form is no longer the exclusive one, but the proposed steps must be taken with direct reference to the disadvantages arising to the public from the manner of conducting the business, and from the object of the corporation. Such legislation presents one of the most difficult problems with which governments have to cope.

Difficult as the task may be, it is by no means a new question which confronts us. On the contrary, if we except the comparatively short periods of history in which it was considered most advantageous for the material welfare of the people to abandon economic conditions to the free and untrammelled play of economic forces, the identical problem has almost continually been a subject of anxious care to the state, in very different forms to be sure, depending in each case upon the existing economic situation. We are at present standing at the close of one of these periods of faith in the absolute virtue of the free play of economic forces; we have almost completely lost track of the historical connection with earlier conditions, and consequently it is not to be wondered at that the new state of affairs comes to so many of us in the nature of a surprise, and that we are unable to reconcile it with our partly contradictory theoretical convictions.

Historical proof of the statement is easily furnished; indeed, the material at hand would fill a volume, if any one were to go to the trouble of compiling the facts. I shall content myself here with calling attention to a few important illustrations.

A humorous reference to relevant laws of Rome is found at

the beginning of the third act of Plautus's "Captivi," where the hungry parasite Ergasilus unfolds his plan :—

Nunc barbarica lege certumst ius meum omne persequi.
 Consilium qui iniere, quo nos victu et vita prohibeant,
 Is diem dicam, inrogabo multam, ut mihi cenas decem
 Meo arbitrato dent, quom cara annona sit. Sic egero.¹

Later we have the Julian law against the exorbitant trading in provisions (*lex Julia de annona*), which probably goes back to Julius Cæsar, and which was added to by other imperial laws. The Justinian code, the *Corpus Juris Civilis*, however, contains very comprehensive and detailed regulations on the subject. Thus, we have in l. 6, D. 47, 11, "As a rule, particularly the corn-usurers (*dardanarii*) are accustomed to buy up provisions (*annonam*), in order to make them dearer." This practice was prohibited by mandates as well as by constitutions. The mandates make the following provision: "Furthermore, you are to see that usurers control no class of commodities, in order that the price of provisions may not be raised by those who store up purchased wares, or by the wealthy, who in anticipation of less abundant harvests will not sell their products at reasonable prices." According to l. 2, D. 48, 12, punishment is threatened especially against persons who form associations for the purpose of increasing the price of provisions. But the most important of these laws is a constitution of Emperor Zeno contained in the Codex (c. 2, C. 4, 59), which reads: "We decree that no one shall be permitted to exercise a monopoly in garments of any sort, * * * nor in any commodity serving as food or put to any other use, nor in any fabric, be it of his own accord or in pursuance of an existing or

(1) "I shall now certainly sue for my full right according to the foreign law. I shall sue those who have agreed to put restraints on our life and living, and I shall demand as a penalty that I may chose ten meals, although provisions are dear now. This shall I do." The foreign law referred to is that of Rome, as the comedy is of a *fabula palliata*, and consequently we must presuppose that the scene is laid in Greece.

proposed imperial edict or pragmatic sanction or our written decree, and that no one shall enter into an unlawful association not to sell certain commodities more cheaply than agreed."

For many centuries these laws underwent legal development. In the common criminal law in force in the Roman Empire of the German nation, the laws mentioned, supplemented by several imperial decrees of the sixteenth century, formed the basis for the penal law against the crime of "Dardanariat" or "Monopol," that is, a wilful attempt to raise prices or to effect a scarcity of commodities. This crime could be committed in divers ways, but more especially by forcing the price of commodities above the natural. To this class of monopolies belong, for example, enterprises which endeavor to eliminate competition among sellers or between buyer and seller, in order that they may in this way regulate the price as well as the market for commodities. Other examples of these monopolies were agreements between sellers to dispose of their goods to the public only at an arbitrary price fixed by themselves; also the storing and retention of supplies in anticipation of hard times, and interference with the supply or its destruction. The punishment for these offences was arbitrary, but in the case of a monopoly might extend even to confiscation of property and banishment. This condition of the law lasted to the end of the eighteenth century, partly even into the nineteenth, since it is only in the more recent German special penal codes, which show the influence of modern economic theories, that all but a few slight relics of the crime of "Dardanariat" are removed.

The legal development in France was identical with that just cited. Beginning with the capitularies of Charles the Great, countless royal edicts and parliamentary decrees refer to these questions in a similar manner. Merlin cites a judgment of the parliament of Metz of June 21, 1763, declaring an individual tradesman guilty of monopoly,—there being no agreement with others at all,—because he had assumed sole possession of the existing supplies of certain necessary chemical articles, and had then established exorbitant prices. The climax of relevant legis-

lation in France is found in the terrible laws of the year 1793, which forbade upon pain of death the usurious buying up of necessities,—“accaparement.” Important relics of this legislation are found in Article 419 of the “Code pénal” of the year 1810, which, however, has since been modified.

Substantially similar to the development in Germany and France is that in England. A cursory examination of one of the earlier editions of Blackstone’s “Commentaries” will convince us that even at the end of the eighteenth century “forestalling,” “regrating,” “engrossing,” “monopoly,” were acts punishable under the existing English common law, these acts corresponding substantially to the related crimes of the Roman and German criminal law. These offences were with slight exceptions recognized by the English law as late as the nineteenth century.

The above discussion shows clearly that the question of the regulation of prices and the removal of disturbing factors has been the subject of almost uninterrupted attention on the part of the state. Not until the end of the eighteenth century did the conviction gradually take hold, that such government interference is not one of the functions of the state, and that the best attitude to assume toward economic development is to surrender the regulation of prices in all fields of economic activity to the free play of economic forces. A natural consequence of this quite prevalent conviction was the express repeal, or at least the non-enforcement, of the relevant laws of the earlier times. Soon, however, experience taught that this theory of non-interference by the state in the field of economics and the free play of economic forces by no means led to generally satisfactory results; and a return to the old system was inevitable. Our laws for the protection of workingmen as well as our present laws against usury may be traced back to this experience. We are now again confronted by the question of state interference in the regulation of the prices of commodities. First, however, we must see whether, and how, if at all, the state should resist attempts to destroy or limit free competition in commercial intercourse and to prevent the resulting effect upon the regulation of prices.

This point of view has been most definitely expressed, for example, in Article 419 of the French "Code pénal" referred to above. This article is directed against acts which have effected a rise or fall in the price that would have been determined by the natural and free commercial competition (* * * "des prix, qu' aurait déterminés la concurrence naturelle et libre du commerce" * * *). The questions with which we are here concerned were, however, dealt with much more thoroughly in earlier centuries by the canon law, in fact, we may assert that these questions,—making due allowance for the economic condition of the time,—have scarcely ever been more thoroughly investigated than by the jurists of the Church. I shall confine myself here to the statement of a few results of their investigations, which assume practical importance in the discussion of our subject.

The canonists distinguish especially between legitimate prices (*pretium legitimum*) and natural prices (*pretium naturale seu vulgare*). The former is the price determined by the authorities, that is, the fixed price; the latter is determined by the general judgment of the public. As factors determining the regulation of these natural prices, the various authors cite those which have up to the present time been defined in economic theory as determining factors in the regulation of market prices, namely, the utility of the commodity, the cost of production, and the relation of supply and demand. It was universally admitted that the natural price is not stable but fluctuating, and three classes were distinguished: a minimum or favored price (*pretium infimum seu pium*), below which things could not lawfully be purchased; a medium or moderate price (*pretium medium seu moderatum*); and a maximum or rigorous price (*pretium summum seu rigorosum*), above which nothing could lawfully be sold. All three classes, however, fall within the limits of the just price (*pretium justum*). The unlawful prices are those beyond the two extremes. The fixing of an exorbitant price is not ground for an action in civil law, as long as there has been no infraction beyond the half (*laesio ultra dimidium*); but *in foro conscientiae*, that is, before the

priest, the establishment of a considerably unlawful price is a remediable wrong. It is easy to see from the preceding what views the canonists held with regard to monopolistic attempts, particularly among tradespeople. Such attempts regularly tend to establish unnatural and unlawful prices, and therefore violate justice from the very outset. These acts, which were punishable also under the secular law, that is, by the laws of the Roman emperors referred to above, naturally render the offender civilly liable. Indeed, many canonists hold that monopolistic agreements violate justice even when they do not aim to establish a price beyond the rigorous price. On the other hand, almost all these writers maintain that the state authorities are justified in creating monopolies for the general welfare and in transferring them to private individuals. In this respect, the later authors frequently refer to copyrights and patents. One of the shrewdest of these jurists, Cardinal Joannes de Lugo, in his "*Disputationes de justitia et jure*," first published in 1642, even makes the remarkable statement that whenever the state decides to concede a monopoly to tradesmen, a moderate selling price must be established as a fixed price for the commodity in question, "in order that the sellers may receive moderate earnings without detriment to the common weal."

Thus we see clearly that the apprehension aroused in us by recent experiences with the monopolistic tendencies of organizations of entrepreneurs, as well as of their successors, the large corporations, is not, as is frequently supposed, peculiar to this day, but has been felt in earlier centuries. There has, however, been a profound change in the economical as well as the national and social conditions, in connection with which these apprehensions have manifested themselves. The question of the regulations to be enforced by the government under existing conditions therefore deserves close study here.

In this connection, a view has found wide favor recently, that the safest and simplest way to combat monopolistic tendencies is to decrease or entirely abolish for a definite period the import duties on the commodity affected. Doubts as to the efficacy of

this plan have been expressed on many sides, as, for example, by Professor Jenks in the book above cited, and these doubts I share absolutely. In the first place, the plan is not universal, but restricted in its application to conditions where high import duties exist. Besides, it affects not only the entrepreneurs against whom it is primarily directed, but also their competitors in the interior. The present complicated market conditions will scarcely permit any force to the argument that competition will be entirely eliminated by the very powerful monopolies. Furthermore, Professor Jenks is no doubt correct when he points out that the plan mentioned fails absolutely in international agreements, for the success of such a governmental regulation depends upon the entrance of foreign competition as a consequence of the lower tariff. But this very competition is prevented by the international agreement itself. Indeed, there is reason to suppose that such a legal regulation would give an unlooked for impetus to the conclusion of international agreements, particularly if similar laws were enacted in a number of states. In this case, the existence of such an agreement would really constitute an insurance against legal interference, while the state would reap insult as well as injury.

However, under all circumstances this plan would in its actual application have to overcome serious scruples, and the authorities would presumably hesitate at the critical moment. For such a step is in reality nothing less than discrimination against a branch of home production in favor of foreign production, and it cannot be estimated in advance whether the injury, instead of being temporary, will not become permanent. The enforcement of the plan will throw a certain number of domestic employees out of work, and the entrepreneurs affected will take good care to make all the capital they can out of this special phase of the question. Moreover, if the duties are wholly or partially for purposes of revenue, a restriction in them will, in addition to the other evils, entail considerable losses upon the public treasury. Finally, the plan would seriously affect all the good features which the concentration of enterprises undoubtedly possesses, as for example, a

greater uniformity in production, and the permanent stability of the demand for labor. Thus in certain cases the cure might be worse than the disease.

Of the other plans proposed for the curbing of monopolistic tendencies, the most important is the demand for publicity of the business transactions of the enterprises or combinations. This demand presupposes the creation of a special authority, vested either in a bureau or in a commission, to enforce publicity. The function of this office is to gather and arrange the information furnished by the corporation and to acquaint the general public with the facts by publishing the necessary material in suitable form. Special rights of examination and investigation are, of course, vested in the office. As a matter of fact, such a board or commission is absolutely indispensable for the realization of compulsory publicity, for the simple reason that even among the most advanced nations the majority of persons are incapable of understanding and properly appreciating the public reports made by the corporations themselves, particularly as the latter will presumably be more or less reserved. Compulsory publicity can thus no doubt be made effective within certain limits, and may succeed in checking a widespread exorbitant increase in price, so long as the corporations stand at all in awe of public opinion. But as soon as this element of fear disappears, which is beginning to be the case, then even the widest publicity will not check the most detrimental monopolistic abuses. It is scarcely likely that publicity will increase competition, for experience has shown that new competitors are as a rule soon absorbed by the existing monopoly, or else they are induced to surrender the field for a consideration. Moreover, the practical enforcement of compulsory publicity presents considerable difficulty, for as soon as the apparent character of the combination of several independent entrepreneurs can no longer be made the point of attack, the selection of what enterprises shall be subjected to the constraint must depend upon the presence or absence of monopolistic tendencies; and to settle this latter question a minute investigation of the entire business is requisite.

We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that if a state wishes to protect its subjects against monopolistic abuses, as was done in past centuries, it must grapple with the difficult problem of determining through the agency of a special commission whether, and to what extent, monopolistic abuses exist in each particular case. In the United States legislation has hitherto been directed mainly against such corporations as seem powerful enough to pursue monopolistic tendencies. But this is a gross error, for, in the first place, there are no external characteristics distinguishing such corporations from others, as the development in the United States has well illustrated, and, furthermore, the concentration of enterprises has, also, its good features, which should not be lost sight of. Whenever the magnitude of an enterprise or a corporation seems to indicate monopolistic tendencies, all its business transactions should be subjected to constant supervision by specially qualified experts, as is now done in many states in the case of railroads, insurance companies, and other enterprises, particularly such as produce dutiable articles. If this investigation, or the statements published by the corporations themselves, or outside information establishes the presence of monopolistic tendencies, suitable steps must be taken to meet impending evils. The measures employed should not consist of immediate severe punishment, nor need the corporation or combination be at once dissolved, although even such drastic measures might be enforced to punish recalcitrance. But, above all, the plan to be pursued should be directed primarily toward a removal of the evils resulting from the monopolistic character of the enterprise. Such means may be found in regulations governing business transactions and particularly the scale of prices established by the consumers. All this, by the way, is no new scheme. Similar measures have frequently been employed in the case of railroads, steamship companies, light and water companies, without being regarded at all unnatural. We have here to deal with nothing more than a somewhat broader application of a well-known experience, namely, that the monopolistic efforts of certain producers will always invite state interference and the regu-

lation of lawful, that is, fixed prices, whenever the monopoly increases in extent and importance. Indeed, it may lead even to the expropriation of the establishment. In this field, also, the development will surely not be different, although extensive expropriations are scarcely to be anticipated within the near future, solely by reason of the late almost overwhelming growth in the functions of the state and of the great difficulty of creating satisfactory government commissions. On the whole, we are confronted here with the same natural relation between monopolies and state influence upon the scale of prices that Cardinal de Lugo noticed, as above quoted. This relation is not determined by the causes to which the monopoly owes its existence, that is, whether it was created by law, founded by agreement, or called into being by particular economic conditions. It arises naturally from the fact that most persons consider it improper for a small number of entrepreneurs by legislation to procure advantage to themselves at the expense of the general public.

Simple as the condition of things seems, viewed in the light of mere theory, the practical difficulties arising in each individual case not in line with established decisions will be almost insurmountable. An equitable judgment can only be reached through a perfect acquaintance with actual existing conditions. Those inclined to monopoly will scarcely be inclined to countenance the necessary commissions. And yet we have here perhaps an indication of the only method by which effective results may be obtained, without at the same time sensibly injuring home production and related industries. Only by the employment of this plan can the regulations be made to conform to the exigencies of each individual case, and be so constructed as to abolish existing evils, without at the same time limiting the commercial freedom of the entrepreneur further than appears absolutely essential to the attainment of the object.

Very much depends, also, upon the personnel of the government commission entrusted with the solution of so important and difficult a problem, and I shall in conclusion pay some attention

to this phase of the discussion. No one will deny that such commissioners should be not only sufficiently qualified, but also impartial, and as far removed as possible from political influence. It would, therefore, seem inadvisable to impose the task upon the chiefs of the executive department. In states having a strictly parliamentary government, the ministers in the main serve only as an administrative board for the majority in power, and it would surely not be desirable to have such decisions affected by the interests of a majority. Experience has conclusively shown that the management and supervision of economic enterprises as well as legal interference should in no way be subjected to the influence of politics, even though a political party have a majority in the legislature. It is probably not an accident that states with a strictly parliamentary government as a rule refrain from the management of large and complicated economic industries, and when they interfere, they seldom attain particularly favorable results, in contradistinction to those states where such matters are removed more or less from legislative influence. Of course it would be even more undesirable that decisions as to the presence of monopolistic abuses should be subject to political influence.

This consideration would make it seem advisable, particularly in all states where the government is not entirely exempt from the influence of politics, to confer the decision as to the presence of monopolistic abuses, and as to the prohibitory regulations to be enforced, upon boards or commissions which are not only properly qualified, but independent and impartial as well. These qualifications at once suggest the analogy to a higher court. To be sure, it has been said that decisions such as we are discussing are not solely of a declaratory nature, that is, they are not intended merely to determine existing legal relations, but also possess constitutive force, namely, the power to establish the correct proportion for the harmony of public and private interests and to consider the probable future economic development. However, the rendering of these decisions exceeds the function of a judge. I do not regard as final these considerations of principle. The

great desideratum is the creation of a sufficiently independent and impartial body to assume this difficult and weighty responsibility. It may seem more desirable to endow the office with judicial functions, just as in past centuries the decisions as to monopolistic abuses were left to the court. So-called scruples from principle are scarcely sufficient in themselves to check such actions. Of course we shall have to consider the question of the personnel of the commission and the course to be pursued as a guarantee of the greatest effectiveness, rapidity, and energy. In this connection I would emphasize the fact that it might be found advisable to give a hearing to both sides before the final authority, in order to secure a thorough consideration of all relevant conditions. Furthermore, the initiative in this proceeding should be vested in a special body, preferably that which in accordance with the previous discussion should have control also of the supervision of the various enterprises as well as of the required publications.

If I have succeeded in throwing some light upon the questions to be considered in eventual legislative regulations against monopolistic abuses, this article has attained its object.

EXPORT BOUNTIES ON SUGAR IN EUROPE¹

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The issue which at present most engages the attention of the European manufacturers of sugar is the question of the removal of the bounties on its export. The removal of this bounty, as is well known, has for a series of years been the subject of negotiations among the European States. So early as 1864, 1875, and 1876, negotiations were pending between England, Holland, France, and Belgium with reference to a uniform regulation of the sugar tax in the European States, and the granting of a mere tax-restitution on exported sugar. But the negotiations came to naught.

In 1888 a conference was held in London representing all the sugar-producing European States, at which it was agreed to do away with the bounties on the export of sugar, and at the same time to establish a uniform sugar tax; but in consequence of the opposition of France and Denmark this agreement was, after all, not ratified.

The international conference that assembled, for the same purpose, in 1898, in Brussels was also dissolved without results. In 1900, representatives from Germany, France, and Austria-Hungary met in Paris to discuss the methods by which a removal of the export bounties on sugar might be effected; and in fact they are said to have agreed that Germany and Austria-Hungary

(1) Translated by Professor A. L. Daniels of the University of Vermont.

should do away with the export bounties on sugar which they had been allowing, on the condition that France should remove her direct bounty and reduce the indirect bounty one half. The representatives of the whole sugar industry of Germany and Austria-Hungary, however, rose as one man against the proposed removal, and pointed out the great injury to their interests which would result if they should lose the whole bounty, while the French sugar industry was still enjoying a bounty on refined sugar of nearly five francs per centner (≈ 220 lbs.). But the French sugar industry was not at all satisfied with even this solution. The protests of those directly interested, and objections which other States also made, resulted in the demand for another international conference in which this question might be settled definitively, and which was to meet in May, 1901, but which has so far not assembled, and to all appearances will not assemble very soon. Certain it is, however, that the question of the removal or non-removal of the export bounty on sugar is a very acute one, and must find an answer sooner or later. On this account, it will be of interest to set forth briefly the origin of the export bounty on sugar, its present form, and the probable consequences of its removal.

No elaborate proof is necessary to show that the conditions of production in the manufacture of beet and cane sugar are not at all alike. Sugar-cane is in itself much richer in sugar than the beet, and its cultivation, thanks to the more favorable climate of the countries where it grows, much easier, cheaper, and more largely productive. This very difference in the cost of the raw product gives the manufacturer of cane sugar an advantage which amounts today to about three marks (≈ 70 cents) per centner, and with better methods of cultivation of the cane, and improvements in the machinery for manufacturing the sugar, may be increased two or threefold, or even more; for while the cultivation of cane and the machinery used in its manufacture are today relatively primitive, all this in the case of the sugar beet has been developed to the highest degree of excellence.

Now, the bounty which the States exporting beet sugar grant

to this industry is designed to remove the great difference, unchangeable and lying in the very nature of things, between the cost in the production of beet and of cane sugar.

The export bounties on sugar were originally given by individual States, unconsciously and unintentionally, and resulted from the impractical form of the sugar tax. At first, the tax was reckoned, as a rule, on the amount of beets worked up, assuming thereby that a definite number of centners of beets was necessary to make one centner of sugar. Very naturally when the sugar was exported, compensation had to be made for the tax laid on the sugar for domestic consumption; and this was effected on the basis of the assumed yield of sugar; that is, for one centner of exported sugar compensation was made for the tax laid on x centners of beets. But the assumed yield of sugar was too small. For example, it was estimated that one centner of sugar required twenty centners of beets, whereas even at that time the yield was much greater; and a centner of sugar, for instance, was made from only ten to twelve centners of beets. The manufacturer of sugar paid for twenty centners of beets a tax of, say, four dollars, and produced therefrom two centners of sugar, but upon exporting only one centner of sugar he received back the full tax of four dollars; so that when he had exported but one half of the sugar produced from the twenty centners of beets, he got back the whole of the tax, and consequently, as a matter of fact, paid no tax at all. As for the second half of his product, which he sold at home, he coolly added the tax to the price; in this way, he escaped any taxation whatever, and added the whole duty imposed to his own profits. This sum he could put into his pocket as clear profit, or employ it in lowering the price of the exported sugar. He was forced, indeed, to the latter move, because his sugar would otherwise have been too dear to compete in the markets of the world with cane sugar.

In this way, the beet sugar industry of Europe was enabled to place its more costly product in competition with the cheaper cane sugar in the world-markets, and only thus did it become possible to export the product at all. And since, with this concealed

export bounty, those had the largest profit who exported more than they sold at home, the exports continually increased. The proceeds from the tax on beets, however, sank lower and lower, and at times it happened that the State paid out more in tax-restitutions than it had received in taxes.

The State endeavored to overcome this difficulty by raising the tax on beets; but the sugar industry met this move by improving the beet culture, by planting beets richer in sugar, and by making more complete the technics of manufacture; and the difficulty still remained. The system of taxation was then changed and the tax estimated according to the efficiency of the manufactories or according to the density of the beet juice; but the perfected methods of manufacture defeated even these measures. Thus arose a continual rivalry between the tax department and the sugar manufacturer, which has led in the main to the present really colossal technical development in the processes of sugar manufacture.

Finally, the State gave up this hopeless struggle, and laid a definite tax upon the refined sugar which completely excluded any such concealed export bounty. Since, however, the export of beet sugar without a bounty would be impossible, as it could make no stand in competition with the cheaper cane sugar, open and direct export bounties were allowed on exported sugar along with the direct tax on the finished product.

And so, export bounties remain in all States that export beet sugar; and these, according to the system of taxation employed, are open or concealed, or, as in the case of France, both together. Austria-Hungary grants an export bounty amounting to 63 $\frac{1}{3}$ cents per centner of raw sugar, on the condition, however, that the total yearly disbursements shall not exceed eighteen million crowns (\$3,600,000). Whenever the export of sugar is so great that this limit would be exceeded, the bounty is correspondingly lowered. As a matter of fact, the bounty is always considerably less than the nominal amount, and during the last two years came to only 48 $\frac{3}{4}$ cents.

Germany grants an open bounty of 2.50 marks net (57.2

cents) per centner of raw sugar less 10 pfennigs for a tax on the plant; France, bounties open and concealed, amounting altogether to about \$2.60 per centner of the refined sugar; Holland, open bounty, limited, of about 64 cents per centner of raw sugar; Belgium, an indirect bounty of about 81 cents per centner of raw sugar; Russia, an indirect bounty of about \$3.50 per centner of raw sugar.

The new English sugar tariff, which is graded according to the degree of refinement of the sugar, secures a premium on refining of about 15 cents per 100 kgs.; and, in this way, at the same time,—since the full tariff is repaid on all sugar exported,—an indirect export bounty on refined sugar.

The United States have, as is well known, laid a differential tariff on all sugar supported by export bounties; that is, they lay a heavier tariff on sugar imported from those States which give export bounties than on sugar from other countries. The tariff is greater, by a sum very nearly equal to the respective bounties. Since this policy was inaugurated, the movement toward removal of the sugar bounties by the European governments has again become stronger. It is held that the export bounties are no longer justified because they are neutralized by the above-mentioned differential tariff, and that the assurance of a bounty serves only to fill the coffers of the American and the Indian governments; and thus that the money given for bounties is practically thrown away. This view is entirely correct, so far as regards the export of sugar to the United States and India, but there are still other countries to which European sugar is exported in great quantities, and which do not levy differential tariffs, so that the export bounty has not yet been given up, and is not likely to be very soon.

If England also had introduced differential tariffs against bounty supported sugar instead of her uniform tariff, the question of removing the export bounty would have become more acute than it is today. England has not done this because of well-understood interests of her own. In the first place, she has no independent sugar-growing industry, so that whatever profit might arise from

a differential tariff would go to the foreign producer of cane sugar, and the cost would thus be borne by the English consumer, who would have to pay dearer for sugar by the whole differential tariff; and, in the second place, England perceives most clearly, in the example of the United States, the consequences of a differential tariff. Even in the United States, it is not the lower tariffs on cane sugar that are effective, but only the higher tariffs on beet sugar. The price of sugar is determined according to these *higher* tariffs, and the profit from the cheaper cane sugar lodges in the pockets of the American sugar dealers, the Sugar Trust. The American consumer, on the other hand, is in every way a loser from the higher tariffs.

A removal of the sugar export bounties in Europe is therefore hardly to be thought of at present. A single government dare not venture it,—for its sugar export would be crippled at once by the competition of the others,—and we can hardly expect concert of action very soon because of the differences in the systems of taxation, and because of a mutual suspicion, which is by no means unjustified. On its own merits the export bounty on beet sugar, when we consider the great difference above mentioned in the cost of production between cane and beet sugar, is fully vindicated, and the beet sugar industry is for the whole of Europe of such vast economical significance that no State would care to face the perils that would follow the removal of the export bounties. It would be cutting into its own flesh. It would, in particular, be damaging its agricultural production in a hardly measurable way. It is precisely the sugar beet whose cultivation yields the European farmer today his greatest profit, since the rental value of land devoted to grain has fallen because of over-sea competition. Besides, what remains of the beets after the juice is extracted, and certain other by-products (all generally returned gratis to the farmer), form a most excellent fodder for cattle and a good fertilizer. Also many sugar manufactories are the property of associations of the farmers themselves. In view of the fact that many European countries export more than two thirds of their whole sugar product, it is

easy to estimate the enormous injury to European agricultural interests that would result from the loss of this export trade, and the ensuing necessary reduction of the manufacture of sugar and of beet growing.

Of no less importance is the sugar industry in itself. This powerful, highly developed, tax-paying industry gives employment to a great number of laborers just at the season when they can find nothing else to do; and it is of extraordinary importance, besides, to a whole series of other industries which furnish it supplies, such as machinery, paper, chemicals, etc. Any restriction in the production of sugar would bring, therefore, the greatest injury, from this point of view also, to the European States. And not least in importance is the great commerce which the export of sugar creates, and which for many States is just the factor that determines a favorable balance of trade. In Austria-Hungary alone, in the last decade, about 800 million florins entered the country for sugar exported, and the activity of the balance of trade in Austria-Hungary depends almost wholly upon the sugar exports. From that moment, however, when the export bounties on sugar are removed will begin the end of European exportation of sugar, and the inevitable preponderance of the cheaper cane sugar. In a few years the production of cane sugar would be so developed and expanded that it would be able to dominate alone the markets of the world, as it did a few decades ago.

From the fact that the quantity of sugar exported is greater than the production for domestic consumption, a shifting of the lost export bounty on to the home consumption would be for the European sugar industry only possible in small measure and in the case of a thorough consolidation of interests. This shifting of the burden of taxation would necessarily follow the removal of the official export bounties, or else the European sugar industries would completely lose their export trade, and could in no other way save themselves from inevitable ruin. The German Sugar Refiners' Syndicate had just such a case in view, and in their mutual compact expressly declared that "a compensation for

exported sugar of domestic manufacture can be demanded by the Syndicate in case such compensation is recognized as judicious, and should be so determined by the Refiners' Syndicate." It is evident that this provision was made in view of a possible removal of the export bounties, and it is no less clear that in this case the example of the German refineries would be followed also by the manufacturers of raw sugar and of necessity by all the other European sugar industries.

It is a matter of course, however, that the entire sugar industry of Europe prefers the present official export bounties, which it can rely on, to any such bounty by compact,—likely at any moment to vanish through some breach of the compact, by the erection of new refineries, etc.,—and which could be influenced at any time, by unfriendly legislation. And that even the best devised bounty by compact would be unpopular, needs no further proof.

We may, therefore, reasonably assume that the European governments will not allow their sugar industries,—which by reason of new competitors are holding their own with the greatest difficulty in the markets which they have already secured,—to be exposed to the collapse that would immediately follow the removal of the export bounties. They will be the less able to do this because a general understanding among them, even in regard to removing the open export bounties and unifying their systems of taxation, would be extremely difficult; and at all events, it becomes impossible in view of the extreme difficulty in detecting and removing the concealed bounties. Without unmistakably *clara pacta*, however, the European States, even in the matter of export bounties on sugar, cannot become *boni amici*.¹

(1) Since the above was written the international sugar conference at Brussels, of March, 1902, has agreed to abolish all sugar bounties, direct and indirect, after September, 1903. Little change, however, seems to be anticipated in the sugar market for some years to come owing to the fact that the action does not take effect until after two harvest years, and also to the immense stock of sugar now on hand.

CHRONICLE OF THE MONTH

JOSEPH B. BISHOP, *New York City.*

Theodore Roosevelt has been President for six months, and it is now possible to form an estimate of his ability to conduct that great office so as to command the confidence of the country and the continued support of his party. He entered upon his duties with the virtually unanimous good will of the American people. The tragic and heroic death of President McKinley silenced for the time all opposition. Newspapers of all parties united in assuring his successor of their earnest desire to sustain him in the task to which he had been summoned; those that had been most bitter assailants of McKinley being especially fervid in their assurances of confidence and in their pledges of support and coöperation. That there was behind these assurances a doubt in many minds as to whether Roosevelt would be as safe a President as McKinley had been, it would be idle to deny. The impression that he was an impulsive and impetuous man, lacking in steadiness though not in steadfastness, had been widely disseminated by his critics, and was not confined to his political opponents. That he was "straight," that is, open, honest, direct, and fearless, all men were agreed. The only doubt was about his judgment and conservatism.

His first message to Congress went a long way toward removing this doubt. It was not only a thoroughly conservative document, but it revealed an intellectual grasp of the whole field of governmental action which of itself won public confidence.

The press of the country was nearly or quite a unit in commending it. The first important step had been taken and it had proved a long step in advance. Then came the question, How will he get on with his party leaders and with his party majority in Congress? On this point there was wide diversity of opinion, and not a little anxiety. Washington was filled during the first few weeks of the session with predictions of open rupture, first, between the President and the party leaders, and, next, between the President and the majority in the two houses. All the "old stagers" were convinced that his decidedly brusque ways with the politicians would lead to trouble. Nothing like it, they said, had been seen in the White House, with the possible exception of what occasionally happened there in Cleveland's day, and it would not be tolerated. One of the first delegations that called upon President Roosevelt came away in an extremely agitated state of mind. Their spokesman had presented his case and had said, "Now, Mr. President, we *must* have these places." The President's teeth closed firmly, and from between them, rather swift and strong, came the words, "You don't mean 'must'; you mean 'should.'" Another petitioner for a place for a henchman found himself engaged quite unexpectedly in the following dialogue:—

The President. Has not your man served a term in the penitentiary?

The Petitioner. He has, but it was an indiscretion of his early manhood, and he has since reformed and has led a reputable life.

The President. Well, we will first go through the list of men who have not been in the penitentiary, and see if we can find one who is fit for the place. After we have exhausted that, and have failed, we will take up the list of those men who have been in the penitentiary.

It was very difficult to find fault publicly with that position, however much wrath might be expressed about it in private.

I cite this dialogue because it is typical. There were many similar surprises subsequently, and they are occurring constantly. The trouble is that most of them occur in the presence of other

people, who go away and relate them to outsiders ; and thus they find their way into the newspapers. Not many weeks ago, in the presence of several persons, a caller said to the President, "Mr. President, I want to bring some of my constituents here to tell you about that post-office in my town; when can you fix a time for me to come with them?" "Never," was the terse and strenuous response. "But," said the petitioner, "I want you to talk with my constituents about it. I don't want you to take my word about the candidate I am opposing. I want you to learn from them that he is a scoundrel. Fix any time and I will bring them." "I will not fix any time," said the President, "and I will not consent to talk with you or with them about it. I have enough to do without spending my time over post-offices. The man for you to see is the Postmaster-General. If he cannot decide your case without appealing to me, and if he comes to me about it, I will talk with him, but not otherwise." That was again a position which could not safely be complained of in public, for virtually the whole American people would decide, on appeal to them, that the President was quite right, that he had enough to do without bothering himself about post-offices.

In general, his attitude toward applicants for office, as expressed to them and to party leaders, has been this, stated as nearly as may be in his own words, "I shall be glad to have the advice of the leaders of my party in regard to appointments, and I shall be glad to follow it whenever I can. I shall only insist in all cases upon one thing, and that is that the party leader who recommends a man to me shall assure me that he has the qualifications he himself would require if he were to employ him for some position of like responsibility in private life." The net result of this method of settling questions relating to the filling of public offices is that not a single unfit appointment has been made. One or two were criticised, but on grounds that were subsequently shown to be false. The general level of all important appointments has been exceptionally high, and this result has been accomplished without either rupture with party leaders or without serious offense to any of them. As for the majority in Congress, most

of its members like the President's direct and open way of dealing with them. They know precisely what he means, and precisely what he will do. He does not temporize, does not hold out false hopes by pretending that a favorable decision is possible when he intends nothing of the sort. Like the people of the land, they say, "Well, he's straight, anyway, even if he does bring us up rather short at times."

The most notable achievement of the first six months has been the permanent squelching of the Sampson-Schley controversy. In nothing else that he has done has the President exhibited in so striking a manner his ability to handle a delicate question with complete success. He took the first step when, in opposition to the advice of many of his official counsellors, he administered a sharp reprimand to General Miles for expressing an opinion as to the merits of the controversy. General Miles is a very popular man, and a rebuke of the kind that the President administered would have called forth for almost any other man than Roosevelt a formidable volume of disfavor. But popular as General Miles is, President Roosevelt is still more popular, and behind the latter's popularity is that unshakable belief that he is "straight." The people simply said, "Well, it was an unusual thing to do, but if Roosevelt did it, you may rest assured he had a good reason for his action." His reason was good and it was not hard to find. For several years there had been a steadily increasing practice among the officers of the army and navy of violating the rules of the military service and of expressing in public their views upon matters in controversy relating to that service. The President believed that this had become a public scandal and was demoralizing the service. He saw in the somewhat conspicuous offending of General Miles an opportunity to call a halt upon this practice, and he called it. He closed not only the mouth of General Miles, but the mouths of every officer in both arms of the service. Nobody questions today either the justice or the wisdom of his action.

When the Sampson-Schley controversy came before him, through the personal appeal of Schley, he had an opportunity

which, if rightly improved, would put an end to the matter, but which, if not so improved, would add fresh fury to it. That he improved it to the best possible advantage, the result shows. He closed the controversy forever. He did it by applying to the subject that indomitable industry which he brings to bear habitually upon all questions which come before him. His capacity for mastering details is really phenomenal. No matter what the subject upon which he must pass judgment, be it a petty office or an international treaty, he will possess himself of every detail of it before he begins to make up his mind. He went laboriously through every document bearing on the Sampson-Schley case, and when he formulated his judgment upon it, there was nothing more to be said. Both sides were satisfied because both recognized the absolute justice of his decision. It was a really extraordinary triumph, as well as a striking demonstration of intellectual power.

In only one instance has the President taken a step that has been criticised sharply. His announcement that he had decided to bring suits through his Attorney-General to test the validity of the anti-trust and interstate commerce laws startled Wall Street and seriously unsettled prices for several days. The great financial interests complained that the move was unexpected and that they should at least have had warning of it. Sober second thought has considerably modified this opinion, and it is quite generally seen now by these interests that the President's course may result in benefit to them and to the whole country. It will at least result in putting an end to all doubt about the validity of the laws in question, and it will put an end also to all efforts to use the anti-trust cry as a political issue. The President has shown that he is an absolutely free man in the Presidency, that he stands there for law and for the enforcement of all laws, and that no interests of any kind, no matter how powerful they may be, can turn him aside from his duty. There is nothing demagogic in his attitude, and the most beneficent result of his course will be to take away the chief opportunity which demagogues have to stir up class strife in this country; for the litigation cannot fail to

define more clearly the respective rights and obligations of the public and of the great aggregations of capital.

* * *

By far the most important international event since the ratification of our new treaty with England is the defensive alliance of Great Britain and Japan for the maintenance of the integrity of China and Corea. It is directly in line with the policy of the United States government, as outlined by Secretary Hay in the note which he addressed to the powers in July, 1900, and is a striking tribute to the Secretary's sagacious management of our relations in the Far East. In his note Secretary Hay said:—

“The policy of the government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent peace and safety in China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and in law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.”

That is the policy of the “open door,” and the new treaty is designed to sustain it. In fact, the instrument follows very closely the language of Mr. Hay's note. It is a defensive and offensive alliance between Great Britain and Japan, not only to maintain the Chinese Empire intact, but to check the efforts of Russia, especially, to absorb Chinese territory. Briefly summarized, the treaty is as follows:—

The preamble sets forth that Great Britain and Japan are “actuated solely” by the desire to maintain the *status quo* in the Far East, to maintain the integrity and independence of China and Corea, and to secure equality of opportunity,—that is, the “open door”—for all nations. The first article declares that either high contracting party may take such measures as may be indispensable to protect its interests in China or Corea when those interests are threatened by the action of any other power. Article 2 declares that if either Great Britain or Japan becomes involved in war the other will maintain a strict neutrality. But by Article 3, if any power or powers shall join in hostilities against whichever ally is fighting, then the other ally shall come

to its assistance, and the war be conducted in common. Article 4 makes provision that no separate arrangements shall be made which can prejudice this agreement; while Article 5 enjoins that the powers shall communicate with each other fully and frankly when "any of the above mentioned interests are in jeopardy." Article 6 states that the agreement shall last for five years certainly, but after that can be terminated by a year's notice. The right of notice of termination is not, however, to come into operation while either power is at war.

General opinion on both sides of the Atlantic inclines to the belief that the treaty makes for peace. In England there has been much adverse comment based on the opinion that the treaty places Great Britain at the mercy of Japan without sufficiently compensating advantages in return. It is argued that if Japan considered that France and Russia were simultaneously injuring her interests in Corea so deeply that she must send an ultimatum to both powers, Great Britain would become automatically involved in war. This fear is based upon the theory that whether or not Russia succeeds in bringing China to terms as to her occupation of Manchuria, evacuation of the province by Russian troops can be compelled only by force of arms. But, however this may be, Russia is much less likely to appeal to force now than was the case when she had only Japan to oppose her; for Japan and Great Britain combined would be a very different foe from Japan alone.

So far as the United States is concerned, the alliance does not affect our position in the Far East except as it makes England and Japan defenders and upholders of our "open door" policy. It makes Japan entirely dependent in financial matters upon us and upon England, and her financial condition is such that she needs aid. The greater part of the indemnity received from China has already been expended on war-ships and coast defenses. New loans must be negotiated, and neither France nor Germany will turn to the financial assistance of a country bearing such close relations with a nation they distrust, and for a purpose so manifestly contrary to their interests. It is supposed that all this

was considered by England and Japan before the treaty was signed.

While the United States was not asked to give, and did not give, its consent to the new treaty, the substance of it was communicated to our government before publication. This fact furnishes striking evidence of the firm, friendly relations now existing between us and Great Britain, and affords gratifying assurance, also, that these two great nations are working together for the peace of the world. That the new treaty makes temporarily for peace, cannot be denied. Danger of war between Russia and Japan, which has been imminent for some time, has been averted, for the present at least. Russia will hesitate to attack Japan now that she knows she would thereby involve herself in hostilities with Great Britain. She is by no means superior to Japan as a fighting power. She is in a bad way financially and industrially, and her military forces in the Far East are inferior to those of Japan. In a contest with Japan supported by England, Russia would be almost certain to get the worst of it, unless she could induce France and Germany to come to her aid.

THE QUESTION OF "GREATNESS IN LITERATURE"

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It is hard to conceive of a rasher attempt, at least in the sphere of thought, than the one implied by the above title. A discussion of "greatness in literature," and of some of the standards by which it may be determined, involves the inference that the person who voluntarily enters upon it, thinks he knows something definite about a matter over which critics have been disputing for centuries as violently as physicians and theologians have wrangled over their respective subjects of contention. Such an implication hampers both him who conducts a discussion and him who follows it. Yet it is obvious that if every man stood in awe of being deemed presumptuous, and kept silence with regard to all vexed problems, few attempts would be made either to settle or to come nearer settling them. In consequence, the world of thought would almost stand still and the world of action, to use a homely phrase, would surely slow down. A certain amount of rashness in theorizing is therefore permissible, especially in connection with topics of marked importance, even though the results obtained should, after all, appear very commonplace.

That it is important to be able, approximately, to estimate "greatness in literature" seems apparent. Never before has literature meant so much to the public at large as it does in our democratic age, in which books are wonderfully cheap and education is widely diffused. It follows that the struggle between good

books and bad, between great books and trivial, has never before meant so much to mankind. When readers were few, the harm done by bad or poor books was comparatively limited, and the world could well afford to wait for time to do the necessary sifting. But now that we are all readers, now that our daily newspapers describe countless new books and new editions, while our department stores set them before our eyes at any price we may desire, the question how we may best pick and choose among the thousands of volumes offered us, is one that no conscientious man or woman who cares for literature can dismiss lightly. But this question of the Choice of Books, about which critics like Frederic Harrison have written helpfully and delightfully, is indissolubly involved with the question of "greatness in literature," and of the standards by which this may be determined. The marked importance of the latter question being thus apparent, the rashness of discussing it is minimized, and further apologies may be waived.

The use of the word "greatness" implies standards of comparison, which may be individual or collective. It is clear that a poem or other piece of literature may be great to me and not to the rest of the world, or that it may be accepted as great by a majority of critics and readers and not seem at all great to me. Furthermore, a piece of literature may be great to contemporaries of its author and by no means great to posterity, or *vice versa*,—although, as a matter of fact, it seldom happens that posterity sees real greatness in what did not profoundly appeal to contemporaries. It often sees interest, charm, but rarely greatness.

From these facts we infer that collective standards are not of paramount value when they mean merely that a majority of contemporaries think a book or writer great, but that they do gain tremendous value when they have been held by a number of generations. For example, it is probably not wise, but it is certainly permissible, to affirm that Tennyson is not a great poet. It would be the height of unwisdom to maintain that Homer is not a great poet, provided we admit his existence, or to announce as Joel Barlow, our own half-forgotten epic poet, once did,

without Plato's excuse, that Homer has exerted a most immoral influence on mankind. But while this is true, it is equally true that our individual standards are of paramount importance to us. If we cannot for our lives see that the *Iliad* is great, we are reduced to three unpleasant modes of procedure, —we either stifle our thoughts, or pretend to admire what we do not, which is unedifying conventionality or rank hypocrisy, or else we proclaim our disagreement with the world's verdict, and run the risk of being sneered at or called stupid for our pains.

Such being the case, we may infer that it is a matter of some importance, if we care for literature at all, for us who study or read books, to put our individual standards as far as possible in accord with the collective standards. In this way we shall approximate true culture; to apply Matthew Arnold's words, we shall learn to know and agree with the best that has been thought and said in the world about literature. This is not all of culture, but it is a most important part of it. It is only fair to add, however, that a whole school of critics has of late more or less denied the need of our taking account of collective standards. These are the Impressionists headed by M. Jules Lemaitre, and their shibboleth seems to be, "I like this book; if you don't, you can keep your own opinion and I'll keep mine." This is a very independent, and apparently liberal, statement of principles, and is naturally popular, but a fool can make it as complacently as a wise man, and it leads to chaos in matters of taste. In its extreme forms, impressionism is individualism run mad, and has few or no uses; in more moderate forms, it has uses which, however, need not be discussed here.

But what has all this to do with the question of "greatness in literature"? This much at least. Greatness implying standards of comparison, those standards being individual and collective, and the collective being the more important of the two, but the individual nearer to us, it seems to follow that we ought first to examine our own ideas of "greatness in literature," then consult the chief critics to determine what writings the collective wisdom of mankind has pronounced great, and finally try to corroborate and

enlarge our own ideas by means of such consultation and of wide reading. In this process we start with what is nearest to us, our own feelings and thoughts, and widen out our conceptions until we embrace as much of the universal as we can. This appears to be logical and to be analogous with other mental processes.

Now how do we as individuals use the term "great" in literature? We use it loosely, but no more loosely than we do in other connections, and presumably we all use it mainly of things or persons that do something, not of things or persons that are on the whole quiescent, no matter how full they may be of potential energy. The great statesman, for example, is to each of us the man who accomplishes something in the sphere of politics, not the man who has merely the potentialities of success. And he must accomplish something which in our view is large, important, influential, comparatively permanent, more or less original, and unique, or we shall not call him great. Do we not apply the term in literature in some such way? The poem or the poet, the book or the writer, must actually do something with us, and that something must be large, important, influential, comparatively permanent, more or less original, and unique. Obviously there are two spheres in which this large, important something may be done,—the sphere of our emotions and the sphere of our intelligence. One book stirs our feelings deeply and permanently; another opens out a range of new ideas which make an impression upon our lives; we call both these books great, and rightly.

Perhaps I may venture by way of illustration to give two instances out of my own experience. When I first read it, I called Balzac's "*Père Goriot*" a great book because the life of the devoted old father who gave up everything for his heartless daughters, left upon me a large and deep impression of the power of the paternal instinct; it left a permanent sense of the pathos of much of this mortal life; it was important and influential, I trust, in widening my sympathies; and the novel seemed original and unique because I saw that Balzac had not imitated Shakspeare in "*Lear*," but had accomplished the wonderful feat of taking a situation not dissimilar to that treated by Shakspeare, and develop-

ing it into something very different from "Lear," and almost as impressive, though not so grandly poetical. So I called that a great novel when I first read it, and I have continued to call it such. The other book I shall mention only, but its effects upon me might be analyzed as easily. It was Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire." That book enlarged my knowledge and my conception of history so immensely and permanently that I rose from perusing its final pages as certain of its tremendous greatness as I was of my own existence. But it should be observed that while Gibbon's great history affects the mind primarily, it affects the emotions also,—think of the splendid pictures it contains,—and that "Père Goriot," while it affects the emotions primarily, affects the mind also by giving it many fresh ideas about human, and especially French, life. It follows that while it is convenient to distinguish between the two spheres in which literature acts,—the emotions and the intelligence,—as a matter of fact, almost every piece of good literature will operate in both. One cannot really separate the effects of a book any more than one can separate, save in theory, the faculties of the person that feels those effects.

From these two instances of the application of the individual standard to determine "greatness in literature," let us turn to consider the application of the collective standards. With regard to "Père Goriot" and the "Decline and Fall" I naturally knew beforehand that the world had pronounced them both to be great books. It was, therefore, not necessary to verify my main conclusions, although I have found it worth while to read criticisms of Balzac and Gibbon in order to determine if I could, whether the various grounds on which I based my judgments were correctly taken. That is usually a very good thing to do. But it may easily happen, especially if we are not widely read, or are desultory in our reading, that we may chance upon a book the name and reputation of which are unfamiliar to us, which nevertheless moves us profoundly and seems to us great. This is a case for using the collective standards. We may find that the book has long been regarded as great by a sufficient number of readers fairly to entitle

it to rank as a classic,—in which case our own standards are proved to be in harmony with those of the world, and we are encouraged more and more to trust our own judgments. This is the way, it seems to me, that we best educate ourselves in literature,—by constantly reading and verifying the judgments we pass,—not slavishly, not giving up our own points of view simply because we do not find the best critics on our side, and, on the other hand, not dogmatically or egotistically maintaining our own views,—but quietly and with an open mind confirming our presumably correct judgments, and reconsidering and revising our presumably erroneous ones by reading and conversation and reflection.

But in case the book we have accidentally read and thought great is condemned by the critics, or not even mentioned by them, what are we to conclude? That we were entirely mistaken? That is scarcely necessary. The book has done great things for us, and is really great thus far. We may be the one reader out of a thousand for whom the author was writing,—his fit audience, though very few. It may be because the book or poem suited a transient mood. It may be because it suited our special epoch of life, or our class instincts and prepossessions, or what not. Here we have one reason why books are immensely popular with one generation, yet are scarcely read by the next. Generations change,—progressing in some ways, losing in others, but, as we trust, on the whole progressing. What wonder, then, that the book that exactly suited our fathers, but did not go much below the surface, so as to touch uniquely and profoundly permanent ideas and emotions, should be unread today! As we rise in culture, we leave behind a novelist like E. P. Roe, and turn to Thackeray; but this does not mean that we should sneer at the popular American novelist, or at the people who liked his books, much less at those who still like them.

Are we not led to conclude that there is a relative “greatness in literature,” as well as, what we may call for convenience, an absolute greatness, and that we can safely use the word “great”

only in connection with works that have stood the collective standards successfully? It seems better for practical purposes to emphasize the latter conclusion. Let us call that "great" which has produced large, important, influential, permanent, original, and unique results both in ourselves and in a majority of readers and critics, past and present. Let us put in a "perhaps" or a "probably" or some other qualification before the word "great" used of any living writer, except, perhaps, in the case of an author like Count Tolstoy, whose chief works have been long before the world, and have attained that cosmopolitan fame which is no bad substitute as a criterion of merit for the fame awarded by time. This may seem cold and heartless and pedantic, but it surely raises the dignity of literature, and gives us a better chance for free and honest contemporary criticism.

But let us look for a moment at the negative side of the question. If we so limit the word "great" in its application, what terms are we to apply to the enormous masses of literature that lie below the line of greatness? There are several terms that seem available. The writings that have appealed to us and to those similarly minded may be delightful, as in the case of the society verse of Matthew Prior. They may be charming, as in the case of the delicate verses of Mr. Austin Dobson. They may be good, as in the case of perhaps eight out of ten of the poets who survive sufficiently to be represented at considerable length in such a standard anthology as Mr. Humphry Ward's "English Poets," or of the essayists and novelists whose works continue to be published in uniform collected editions. Probably at least eight tenths of the literature which the best critics discuss ranges from fair to good as a whole. If it is only fair, we need not read it, unless we are trying to make critics of ourselves, or historians of literature, and we can tell very accurately whether it is only fair by observing the amount of attention it receives from critics whose judgment we have learned to respect. In the case of good literature,—a very considerable amount of which is being written today all over the world,—we must pick and

choose. We should have to live to be a thousand to read it all or nearly all, and our real concern is with the great, and with that portion of the delightful, the charming, and the good that appeals to us especially. It is plain that we must discover for ourselves this specially appealing literature, for no one else has precisely our tastes; but we can, of course, be aided by wide reading in criticism, and by using the other instrumentalities of culture.

It goes without saying that there are other classes of books or rather that the term "good literature" may be resolved into various classes. One book is interesting, because the main fact of which we are conscious when we put it down is that it held our attention remarkably well. We read on to see what the end would be. We did not pause for contemplation, we felt no rapture,—if we had, we should probably have immediately pronounced it "great,"—but we did feel interest, we recommended the book to our friends, and perhaps were among the hundred thousand readers whom the jubilant publisher advertised in every conspicuous place. Another book is valuable, because we frequently use it or the ideas it contains. Another is agreeable, because it helps us to while away the time. Against these books, when they have not through the lapse of years become standard, it would be only a pessimistic, almost an inhuman, critic who would inveigh; they have become necessities of life. What would the publishers or the literary supplements of the newspapers do without them? But they are either not literature at all, or else in many cases lie outside the province of the serious critic or of the teacher and student of literature. That enigmatical personage, the average reader, is fully capable of attending to them without assistance.

There is, however, one further class of compositions that needs a word. There are books, and especially single poems, which it is our first impulse to call beautiful. Are these really great?

We may safely answer, "Yes," provided they are truly and more or less completely beautiful, and provided the beauty is pure and elemental. Keats's line will help us here, "A thing of

beauty is a joy forever." An eternal joy is bound, unless there is something the matter with us, to produce in us large, permanent, important, and unique emotions. Thus it is that many of the poems of Keats himself are great poems in a true sense,—although they may seem at first thought to lie outside the sphere of our normal life, and thus to lack vitality. As their loveliness takes possession of us, it energizes our souls, perhaps just as much, in the case of many of us, as the more obvious power and passion and contagious optimism of Browning do. But if the work is merely beautiful in parts, not as a whole,—if it is the so-called purple passages that affect us,—then it is no more great than a picture of a woman is great, merely because the painter has succeeded in giving her a pair of beautiful eyes. And if we suspect that the poem or book is merely pretty, if it leaves us with a sense of placid contentment, we may be very sure that it is not great for us. Some of Longfellow's poetry seems, as we advance in culture, to produce fainter impressions upon us than it did upon our fathers and mothers,—which is perhaps the main reason why we are hearing so many people assert that he is not a great poet. Personally, I think that some injustice is being done Longfellow, but the main point here is to understand why his work seems to be losing ground.

Now, while Longfellow has been apparently losing ground, another American poet, Edgar Allan Poe, has been gaining it. This leads us naturally to consider a question fully as important as that of "greatness in literature," to wit, What standards must we apply in order to determine the relative greatness of writers? After we have learned approximately to recognize the best literature, we are almost inevitably bound to observe that, while we may call two books great, and refrain from further comparison, we cannot disguise the fact in most cases that we find one decidedly superior to the other, and that thus we pass to asking the question which author is the greater.

But some critics and readers, notably the Impressionists, object to this emphatically. Why not be content, they say, with the fact that you like this writer for one reason and that for

another? Why run down any one? Why compare writers when it is almost certain that you do not know them equally well, and are thus in constant danger of being unfair? Why try to measure what is incommensurable, since you cannot measure so subtle a thing as literature, at least when it is imaginative, and you have no inflexible standards?

There is truth in this point of view so far as it protests against our discriminating against one writer, because by our standards we find another greater. A catholic taste will enjoy everything that is good. Our love for Shakspeare and Milton need not impair our affection for Charles Lamb and Goldsmith and Irving. Great writers will kill mediocre or bad writers; for example, many people cannot read trashy novelists after great ones,—but no great writer ever kills by comparison a genuinely good one, who has done well his own work no matter how small. Thus we see from the world's experience that the attempt to rank authors has not killed or cast into the shade the lesser writers who have genuine qualities, and that the plea of the Impressionist against running writers down does not in fact apply to us when we set up our standards of measurement.

But there is a positive reason for setting up these standards, which the Impressionist is inclined to overlook. It is a law of the human mind and heart to seek the best and to pay it due homage when found. Could we check the operations of this law, we should do much to stop human progress, much to sap the foundations of society. The law is universal, it is seen in monarchies and republics, in politics and literature; nay more, is it not the mainspring of every religion? The highest deserves the utmost homage, when, in that highest, truth, beauty, and goodness are found in supreme measure. How useless, then, to ask us to stop applying our standards; that is, to stop measuring to determine the highest!

Now for generations on generations men have been comparing the various arts, and on the whole have given the palm to poetry, for reasons which may be found in such critics as Aristotle and Lessing. All the other arts have their advocates and devotees,

of course; but thus far the consensus of opinion seems to be in favor of poetry, and for the present we can let the question stand as if it were settled. Then, by inexorable law, men began to classify poetry, and to ask which kind of poetry is greatest. Here, again, there is no unanimity of opinion; but collective standards, which in these more or less general and abstruse subjects are the only safe ones to use, have put either the poetic tragedy or the epic first, have placed the impassioned, highly wrought ode above all other forms of lyric, and have ranked the satire and the didactic poem beneath the other categories of poetry. This is not saying, to be sure, that a very good satire may not be better than a mediocre or even a fairly good ode,—the only point that need be emphasized here, is that, since the days of the Greeks, there has been what is called a *hierarchy of the genres*,—that is, a ranking of the kinds of literature, especially of poetry,—and that if we are to give this up, we must do so for better reasons than are advanced by the critics who attack it.

But just as there has been a comparison of the arts and of the kinds of literature, so there has been a comparison of the artists and the writers. The poets, for example, have been compared and ranked according to the kinds of poetry they have attempted, and according to the total power and value of their work. Thus, until Shakspeare arose, Homer was regarded as not merely the Father of Poets, but as, take him all in all, the greatest of poets. Some of us still think him the greatest, but nearly all the world has given the palm to Shakspeare. There is room, however, in this case as in others, for the individual standard to apply, because it is generally admitted by persons who know both poets that they are so very great that estimating their greatness is almost like taking the altitudes of two tremendous mountains of nearly equal heights. The slightest deflection of the instrument may cause an error; it is, therefore, permissible to take new measurements from time to time. So it is with Milton and Dante. But merely because two sets of observers differed slightly in their measurements of those two mountains, would be no reason whatever for inferring either that the mountains were not very

high or that the methods employed in observing them were without scientific value. Just so, because there may be some question still whether Shakspeare is greater than Homer, or *vice versa*, is no reason for denying the proposition that they are in all probability the two most marvelously endowed poets that ever lived, or for holding that the collective standards applied to determine their unique greatness are valueless.

But enough has probably been said on these points; let us turn to the practical matter of endeavoring to determine how writers are to be ranked in the scale of greatness. One fact seems settled,—it is that there is a small group of what are sometimes called world-writers,—writers, chiefly poets, supremely great; who are read in nearly every land and have been so read almost since they wrote; who seem to be separated in point of genius by a wide chasm from all other authors. The writers of universal genius we may call them, although probably supreme writers is a better designation. They are very few in number; Homer, Sophocles, Virgil, Dante, Shakspeare, Milton, Goethe nearly exhaust the list. Molière, however, should be added because he represents the comedy of manners so marvelously, and we should doubtless include Cervantes and a few others. It is clear that the writers named are supreme in their excellence, and it is also obvious, that they have no living peers. In fact, there are scarcely more than two recent authors known to us who seem possibly entitled to such a high rank, and they are Victor Hugo and Balzac, about whom the critics are still arguing *pro* and *con*.

Below these writers, yet far above the majority even of writers to whom the term “great” is freely applied, comes a small group of writers of very eminent originality and power, of great reputation outside their own nationalities, but still not universal in their genius, nor so dazzling in their achievements as the supreme or world-writers. These writers are often not separated from the classes above them or below them; hence there is no classification for them that is accepted everywhere. It will not do to apply Mr. Swinburne’s suggestive division of poets as gods and giants, because, while it is fairly easy to recognize a giant, the gleaming

presence of some divinities, especially of Mr. Swinburne's own, is occasionally hidden from mortal eyes. Then, again, there are semi-divinities; indeed, there is no telling how minutely the divine essence may be parceled out. In the case of the writers we are now discussing, it might be permissible to call them the *dii minores*,—the minor divinities of literature, if we chose to call the world-writers the *dii majores*,—the major divinities of literature; emphasis being laid on the fact that they differ from all writers below them in fairly seeming to surpass in their power and influence what merely great writers might be expected to accomplish. This implies, to be sure, a somewhat stable standard of level greatness, a point which we shall discuss in a moment, and there is probably no need at this late date of taking refuge in such an undefinable term as "divinities." It is perhaps better to distinguish this class as that of the very great writers. Into it would seem to fall such poets as Pindar in Greek, Lucretius in Latin, Petrarch, Tasso, and Ariosto in Italian, Chaucer and Spenser in English, Schiller and Heine in German. It is not unlikely that some critics, desiring to give the French a place in the list, would insert the name of Victor Hugo; but as we have just seen, he is a candidate for higher honors, and personally I should unhesitatingly assign those same higher honors to Voltaire in his capacity of prose writer and poet combined. But whatever we may say of French poets, there are at least two French prose writers who seem very great,—Rabelais and Montaigne,—and to balance them we may name two very great British prose writers, Swift and Gibbon. But we must be tentative in our illustrations, for there is little unanimity among the critics, as may be seen by comparing the rank given Chaucer by Matthew Arnold and that given him by Mr. Theodore Watts-Dunton. Not a few of us would doubtless like to assert emphatically the supreme position of the author of "The Canterbury Tales," but, while his merits are being more and more acknowledged by foreign scholars, it may be questioned whether he has even yet attained a truly cosmopolitan fame.

Immediately below these very great writers comes a class

which is plainly great, yet also plainly not supremely great, sometimes not great enough to be well known outside of their respective countries, but cherished by their countrymen as national glories. These are the writers one would never think of calling supreme, although one would as little think of calling them minor. We may call them, as is usual, simply "great writers," for if we speak of them as writers of the second class, as is sometimes done, we ignore the real distinction between them and the very great writers of whom mention has just been made. Of these really, but not supremely, or very great, writers every nation that has an important literature can point to several. No attempt at enumeration is here demanded, but we may be reasonably sure that both Catullus and Horace belong to the Roman list and Leopardi to the Italian. In English we have in this class such poets as Marlowe, Ben Jonson, Dryden, probably Pope and perhaps Gray, Burns, Coleridge, Keats, very probably Tennyson and Robert Browning, as well as Wordsworth, Byron, and Shelley, unless the partisans of the last group succeed in elevating one or more of them into the class of the very great poets. The reason one cannot speak more definitely is mainly to be found in the facts that not even yet have we settled the places of the eighteenth century poets, and that the critics have too often spent their time in anathematizing one another instead of attending to their real business of attempting to reach such a consensus of opinion with regard to our classic writers as would correspond with, let us say, the consensus obtaining in France. Still, scarcely any critic denies the existence of this class of great but not greatest writers, and the places of a majority of the names given are probably secure. This is enough for us, nor need we add the names of many corresponding masters of prose. Those of Charles Lamb and Landor and Hawthorne will be sufficient.

As for the rest of the writers of a nation, for we have passed from the sphere of the cosmopolitan authors, critical usage is perplexingly various. Some critics have two or three classes, especially of poets, and speak of Dryden or Ben Jonson as the head of the second class. Some write indefinitely of third and

fourth classes. Some use the qualifying epithet "minor." In the midst of this confusion, which often puzzles students, and presumably general readers also, it may not be presumptuous to hazard the suggestion,—which harmonizes in part with a remark made by Sainte-Beuve to Matthew Arnold,—that it might be well to divide all worthy writers who fall below the class universally or usually called great into two classes as follows:—

First, important writers,—writers who have not power and range enough to be called great, although they often have a considerable range and have written some poetry, or a book or two, that may fairly be regarded as great;—writers whom every cultivated person should read in whole or in part because their genius, within well defined limits, is genuine, and because they stand for something important in culture and in the history of literature and are also likely to interest in themselves. Such a writer is the poet William Collins. He did not write enough to be called great; his range of powers was not sufficiently wide, but he is regarded by those who know his work as a thoroughly genuine poet; he wrote several poems like the "Ode to Evening" that are truly classic; and he is very important because with Gray he helped to inaugurate the romantic movement among the eighteenth century poets. To call Collins "minor" would be misleading, yet he is not great. He is, however, important as is also, for example, in the realms of prose fiction, or at least of American fiction, our own first novelist, Charles Brockden Brown. To this class would probably belong those writers of large endeavor who, with a little more genius or under more favorable circumstances, might have been indisputably great; such a writer, let us say, as Robert Southey.

Secondly, the minor writers,—a class which should consist of writers of genuine quality, but of no conspicuous excellence,—poets, for instance, who are not mere versifiers, novelists who are not mere manufacturers of saleable fiction,—writers in whose works any lover of books would be likely to find things well worth reading, but who might be neglected with no great loss. In other words, our class of minor writers should include

those whom (without being impelled to blush at owning the fact), we might never find time to read, but who make a genuine appeal to many persons, and sometimes a strong appeal to a small class of readers. Such writers are very numerous and are sure to be increasingly numerous in the future, in view of the fact that so many men and women have become fairly equipped for the profession of letters. If concrete examples are needed, we may cite such a poet as the late Mr. Aubrey De Vere and such a novelist as Henry Kingsley. It should be remembered, however, that a minor or an occasional poet whose entire works we need not read, may write a poem we must all read. Perhaps the name of the Rev. Charles Wolfe means nothing to most of us, but we do remember his

“Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note.”

It is superfluous to add that below our minor writers fall the versifiers, the scribblers, the authors who won applause for a day, but were soon forgotten, and need not be revived. For these no classification is needed here.

We do need, however, some practical tests to enable us to separate and place writers for ourselves. I think that in the description or definition of what I proposed to call the important and the minor writers, tests will be found for determining who should belong to these classes; but, after all, our main concern is with the greatest and the great, and we can leave the lesser authors to one side. Are there any tests by which the greatest writers can be set apart; that is, tests other than the test of universal consent? There seem to be.

If we examine the works of the supreme or world-writers we shall find that they have many of their wonderful characteristics in common.

Their art, their technic is nearly always high and uniform. We may open any page at random and we shall discover some evidence—whether a noble line—or a passage of supreme metrical power and beauty—or marvelous turns of expression or command of language—something that makes us exclaim,

Here is a great artist ! In other words, the style of the world-writers rarely flags. This is not true of most of the merely great writers ; it is not true, for instance, of Wordsworth, or Byron, and, where it is in the main true, as with Tennyson, there is some unevenness of matter, some deficiency of poetic energy, that counterbalances the perfection of style.

In the second place, the genius of none of these supreme writers seems cramped ; their power is sovereign and sustained ; their range is either universal or very lofty. Homer, for example, and Shakspeare seem to set every phase of life and character before us. They do not really do this, but they seem to do it. Milton and Dante, on the other hand, make up for lack of this universality by being able to rise to sublime heights and to maintain their elevation. They penetrate heaven itself. Goethe appears to be universal in his knowledge of life and art, and he succeeds in almost every form of literature. Balzac's acquaintance with human nature seems portentously wide and deep. These things are not true of the merely great writers. On their own ground they may be great, nay supreme ; but off it their genius flags. Wordsworth, for instance, is almost unrivaled as a nature and a reflective poet, but he had no dramatic genius, no humor, and little sympathy with many phases of life.

In the third place, each of these supreme writers has a long, sustained masterpiece to his credit, or a number of masterpieces. The *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, the *Oedipus Rex*, the *Æneid*, the *Divine Comedy*, *Othello*, *Hamlet*, and *Lear*, *Paradise Lost*, *Faust*—at once rise before us. The great writers, on the other hand, when poets, rarely succeed when they attempt long masterpieces, and when novelists, rarely give us a series of genuine masterpieces. Wordsworth's "Excursion," Shelley's "Revolt of Islam," and "Prometheus Unbound," Tennyson's "Idylls," Browning's "Ring and the Book,"—are either acknowledged failures as wholes or else have so many critics and readers against them that the question of their eminent greatness remains undecided. But the world-writer has his practically undisputed masterpiece, although he may have much besides. So, also, the very great

writers like Spenser have their undisputed masterpieces, but these authors, as we have seen, lack some of the characteristics of the world or supreme writers.

In the fourth place, the world-writer, as his name implies, has conquered the civilized world. Whether he is read or not, his name is widely known, and his place is yielded him ungrudgingly. Milton is not very generally read, but his place is secure, and if his name were mentioned to a cultivated Frenchman, the latter would know something about him. The Italians, on the other hand, know very little about Wordsworth, while we do know not a little about Dante. Most of us do not know Leconte de Lisle, but the Frenchman, while he does know Poe, retaliates by knowing practically nothing about Bryant. As the world is drawn closer together, this test of cosmopolitan fame may cease to mean very much, but at present it is only supremely great writers, or exceptional ones like Byron and Poe, who acquire really world-wide fame, and the test is useful.

Our fifth and last test is one that applies also to the other classes of writers,—the test of duration of fame. But in the case of the genuine world-writers a longer period of probation is normally required. Victor Hugo, to use an example already given, is probably a very great poet, but it will be some years, perhaps some generations, before we shall know definitely whether he will rise to the dignity of being a world-poet.

There are obviously other tests that might be applied, but they are less concrete. World-writers are generally marked by supreme qualities in every respect,—supreme imagination, supreme versatility, supreme command of language and rhythm, supreme seriousness and splendor of thought.

It would seem plain, in conclusion, that if we apply these tests, we ought to tell quickly whether any given writer is worthy of the highest praise, and that we ought to make it almost a matter of duty not to indulge in hyperbolic laudation of any but the noblest authors.

A few words remain to be said about tests that may be applied to writers below the highest rank,—to the writers I have pro-

posed to denominate "very great." This, as we have seen, is a perplexing problem, but if we will lay hold of the masterpiece test it will help us. Any writer who has a long masterpiece or, in the case of prose, a series of books pronounced admirable by successive generations in his own country, and respected by competent critics abroad, seems entitled to rank among the very great writers,—the *dii minores* of literature. Thus, Spenser, Tasso, Ariosto, and their peers belong to this class, and so, also, do novelists like Fielding. It is clear that none of these writers is characterized by universality of genius as Homer, Shakspeare, Goethe are, nor by sublimity as Dante and Milton are; nor do any of them completely fulfill any of the other tests just given, although all do partially fulfill them. This class includes, also, however, writers who have not a long masterpiece to their credit, but who can substitute for it a body of work of sufficient power, uniformity of merit, and important influence to be fairly equivalent to a masterpiece. The odes of Pindar, the lyrics of Heine, seem to entitle them to rank with or very near the writers of sustained and indubitable masterpieces. Thus we perceive that the fundamental test, both for the supreme writers and for the very great writers immediately below them, is splendor or excellence of sustained achievement.

Finally, as to the class of great writers, who are in the main of national importance only, we observe that they are separated from the classes above them by one fact, at least. They have no undisputed masterpiece,—indeed, they are generally marked by having an attempted masterpiece which is, on the whole, a failure or only fairly good,—nor have they a body of work of uniform and very high excellence. Wordsworth, for instance, has his "Excursion" and "Prelude," when (if he is to rank with Spenser) he ought to have something equivalent in value to the "Faery Queen." He has in the body of his poetry poems like "The Idiot Boy," and "Vaudracour and Julia" to offset the "Ode to Duty"; he has not left a body of poetry marked by uniform excellence in its kind, such as the Sonnets of Petrarch. He has ups and downs, and while his ups, if the colloquial Eng-

lish may be pardoned, are probably better than anything in Petrarch, his downs more than neutralize this advantage, and have limited his influence. But is not this another way of saying that Wordsworth and writers of his class often lack the power of self-criticism? They leave us mixed work because they cannot criticize themselves and cut out the poor work. This seems to be a good test for separating these poets from their superiors. A Spenser almost invariably appears to know what he is about; a Wordsworth, a Browning, a Tennyson does not.

It is less easy to separate the great writers from those whom I called merely important. The critics are at sea in the matter, but there are one or two tests that seem applicable. The great writer is supreme or nearly so on his own special ground, in his peculiar line, at least when he is at his best, and his special line makes a genuine and wide appeal. The great writer, furthermore, in most cases, has versatility enough to try other lines of work, in some of which he achieves partial success. The merely important writer, on the other hand, is not supreme in any broad or really noteworthy sphere. Wordsworth is confessedly supreme as nature poet, but he also achieves success in reflective lyrics dealing with human life, and in classical themes. Byron is supreme in the poetry of revolt, Browning for his optimistic energy, Keats as the apostle of pure beauty. But Collins and other important writers are either not supreme in anything or else, as in the case of Thomas Campbell, are supreme only in a rather narrow class of compositions; in Campbell's case, in battle lyrics. Campbell's "Hohenlinden" and "Battle of the Baltic" are fine things, yet they cannot fairly balance Wordsworth's supremacy as a nature poet.

But there is a limit to human endurance and a time or space limit ought to be set to all theorizers. In view of these facts let me summarize the points I have tried to make. I have tried to show that it is proper to apply standards in order to answer questions relating to absolute and relative "greatness in literature," and that, whatever else "greatness in literature" may mean, the

truly great book or writer must do something with us that is large, important, influential, permanent, original, and unique, and must do it either in the sphere of our emotions or in that of our intelligence, or in both. I have tried to show also that the universal tendency to rank writers and the forms of literature is founded in a law of our nature, and that the application of collective standards of judgment will enable us to classify writers in a useful and not too arbitrary way. I have tried to show that writers worthy of attention may be conveniently divided according as they are supreme, very great, great, important, and minor; I have distinguished these classes from one another, and have endeavored to give practical tests by which any reader may at least begin to discriminate in his reading. All that has been said is intended to be suggestive merely. Even if the classification attempted has been made on correct lines, it needs filling out and requires many qualifications. There are writers who can only with difficulty be classified under this or any other scheme. Is Herrick, for instance, a great or only an important poet? Then, again, by the classification here suggested, a writer might be put in a rather high class, yet certain obvious defects might make it very questionable whether his rank ought not to be reduced. And we must always remember that any scheme of classification is bad if it tends to make our judgments hard and fast, if it induces us to think that we can stick a pin through a writer and ticket him as an entomologist does an insect. But if we use such a scheme intelligently, it may prove useful, if only by stimulating us to candid objections, for candid objections imply honest thought, and honest thought on such a noble subject as literature cannot but be beneficial.

GERMANY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE¹

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It is difficult for a foreigner to understand the present situation of Germany. Modern Germany is the product of an extremely complex historical development which extends over many centuries, and in which periods of the highest prosperity have alternated with those of the deepest adversity. Many political institutions of the modern German Empire, especially the constitutional and social conditions, the economic relations, and the intellectual culture are intelligible only to one who is familiar with the achievements and the fortunes of the generations that are past. There are those so ignorant or so foolish as to wish to regard and to treat Germany as an upstart in the councils of the nations, when, in fact, since the fall of the Roman Empire, scarcely a great historical event has happened in which the Germans have not taken a prominent part,—often that of leaders. The memories of the periods of the Frankish, the Saxon, and the Hohenstaufen Emperors, of the Hansa and the Reformation, of the achievements of the Great Elector and Frederick the Great, of Stein and Bismarck, as well as of the contemporary poets and philosophers, are still living forces in the modern German Empire.

One who does not know these mighty traditions of Germany and who has failed to apply himself with love and appreciation to the study of the character of the German people will be unable to comprehend the present position of Germany in inter-

(1) Translated by Professor W. H. Carruth of the University of Kansas.

national politics and international commerce, and will be constantly surprised by its future development.

It is not possible within the limits of the present sketch of the economic situation of Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century to enumerate and characterize all the forces that have produced its present economic greatness. But we shall endeavor to call attention to the most important phases of the subject.

First the facts will be enumerated which characterize Germany's present economic situation; then we shall examine the foundations upon which the most recent economic development of Germany rests; and finally we shall discuss Germany's prospects in the future international commerce of the world.

I.

The economic development of Germany in the nineteenth century may be briefly summarized in the statement, that Germany has passed from the condition of an agrarian nation to that of an industrial nation. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, about eighty per cent of the population were engaged in agriculture; shortly before the Franco-Prussian War, the proportion of farmers had fallen to fifty per cent of the people, and at the close of the nineteenth century the percentage of agricultural population had sunk to thirty per cent. On the other hand, commerce and manufacture have enjoyed a vigorous development. The rural population has not increased since the establishment of the new German Empire, while the urban population has increased by nearly one half. Twenty-five years ago there were but ten cities in Germany with a population that exceeded 100,000, whereas in 1900 there were thirty-three such cities,—fourteen with more than 200,000 inhabitants, seven with more than 300,000, and five with more than 400,000.

However, the productive capacity of German agriculture has not been reduced by any means; on the contrary, the acreage cultivated has been extended, the total yield of farm products has become greater, and the amount of live stock has increased. There has been a decided improvement in intensity of culti-

vation. From a given acreage the German farmer of today harvests, on the average, twice, and sometimes thrice, as much as he did forty years ago.

But German manufactures have enjoyed much greater progress. The consumption of raw cotton within the German tariff limits has been nearly six times as large in the last few years as it was forty years ago. Germany's production of raw iron in the years 1876-80 amounted to 2,000,000 tons annually, while in 1899 it was 8,000,000 tons. The output of coal in Germany has doubled within the last twenty years.

The domestic economic transformation of Germany has manifested itself outwardly in her participation in foreign commerce. During the greater part of the nineteenth century, Germany exported principally agricultural products, while her imports were manufactures and groceries. The change set in soon after the foundation of the German Empire. Now Germany alone imports, annually, grain to the value of \$119,000,000 besides many other products of agriculture, grazing and forestry, while it exports manufactures to the value of almost \$714,000,000.

The importations of Germany rose from \$714,000,000 at the beginning of the eighth decade of the last century to between \$1,300,000,000 and \$1,400,000,000 in the last few years, and the exports from \$714,000,000 to \$1,071,000,000. The difference in the character of the various articles of import and export may be seen from a comparison of the most important goods handled in each way. Among the imports the most prominent are provisions and raw materials for manufacture; among the exports the chief are finished manufactures. In the year 1900, according to German statistical reports, the most important imports were, in relative order: raw cotton, raw wool, wheat, raw coffee, gold coin, coal, Indian corn, raw copper, lumber, woolen yarn, uncolored raw silk, gold unminted and in bricks, eggs, tobacco leaf, hides, machinery, rye, barley, lard, petroleum, horses, nitrate of soda, unsawed wood, and iron ores.

The most important export wares were the following: cotton goods, woolen goods, machinery, coal, sugar, silk goods, hardware,

clothing, millinery goods, gold coin, books, maps, music, aniline and other coal-tar dyes, gold and silver ware, cutlery, chromos, chromo-lithographs, etchings, coke, stained and lacquered leather, and toys.

The countries from which Germany draws her most important imports are the United States, England, Russia, and Austro-Hungary; in recent years Germany has bought from each of these countries goods to the value of over \$166,600,000 annually. After these there is a wide gap down to France, from which the imports amount to about \$71,400,000, and then comes a group of countries each of which sends to Germany goods to the value of \$47,600,000 annually,—Argentina, British East India, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and Switzerland.

The most important market for the exports of Germany is England, which has purchased, annually during recent years, goods to the value of \$202,300,000 from Germany; then follows Austro-Hungary with almost \$120,000,000; in the third rank stand the United States, Holland, and Russia, with \$96,000,000, each, in round numbers; while to Switzerland, France, and Belgium, Germany exports goods valued at from \$48,000,000 to \$72,000,000 each.

As is evident from these figures, the greater portion of Germany's foreign trade is not with remote parts of the earth, but with Europe itself. In the year 1900, the importations of Germany from European countries amounted to \$903,700,000, those from Africa to \$35,000,000, those from Asia to \$88,000,000, those from the United States to \$380,300,000, and those from Australia to \$30,000,000, while Germany's exports to European countries were valued at \$880,300,000, those to Africa at \$17,300,000, those to Asia at \$55,000,000, those to America at \$166,000,000, and those to Australia at \$12,000,000. Moreover, the greater portion of the foreign commerce of the United States is also with Europe.

A comparison of the extent of Germany's foreign trade with that of other countries is difficult because the statistical methods for the compilation and the estimates of the value of products are

different in almost all countries. However, the following estimate is probably correct in the main. In its share in the commerce of the world Germany is surpassed by England alone. The extent of Germany's foreign commerce (exports and imports combined) averaged in the years 1897-1899, \$2,142,000,000, while that of England reached \$3,094,000,000. Next to Germany came the United States with \$1,904,000,000 in round numbers, and France with something more than \$1,428,000,000. Far below these follow Russia, Austro-Hungary, and Italy with less than \$720,000,000 each.

As a maritime power also, Germany holds the second place at the beginning of the twentieth century. To be sure, it is still far behind England, which possesses almost one half of the total merchant marine of the world,—almost 14,000,000 tons,—while the merchant fleet of Germany has a total of 3,000,000 tons. The fleet of the United States is somewhat larger than that of Germany, but in America a larger percentage is occupied with interior and coastwise trade. The next two countries in order, Norway and France, have a merchant marine only half as large as that of Germany. Germany has almost as many large vessels (over 10,000 tons) as England; in addition to the twenty-six English vessels and twenty-four German vessels, there are but eleven steamships of equal size in existence, six of which belong to the United States. The two largest steamship companies in the world operate under the German flag.

The balance of trade for Germany is "passive," that is, the imports exceed the exports. The incorrectness of the popular impression, that it is a grave sign when a nation "buys more than it sells," was shown long ago. And Germany is not at all unfavorably affected by the "passivity" of her balance of trade; this feeling is explained by the fact that Germany is prosperous. Foreign countries are compelled to send great quantities of goods to Germany for which they receive no equivalent in products. They have interest and dividends to pay to Germany, inasmuch as a great deal of German capital is invested in foreign countries; furthermore, they have to pay to Germany considerable sums for

the transportation of freight in German vessels, and for other services as agents. These payments are made only in small measure in cash, but, instead, the settlement of these debts is made mostly in goods. As a result of this, the importations grow in larger proportion than would otherwise be the case. It is estimated that there is German capital invested abroad to the amount of \$3,600,000,000, which probably yields an income, in many years, of almost \$240,000,000 annually; and this does not take into account the interest on foreign national loans carried by German capitalists. The profits of the German steamship companies are estimated at \$72,000,000 per year. Other sources of income and the expenditures of foreign travelers in Germany cannot be estimated, even approximately, but they certainly amount to a considerable sum.

Furthermore, a portion of our imports is due to the fact that foreign securities which have hitherto been in German hands are to some extent moving back to the countries from which they emanated, according as the capital of these countries increases; the return of American securities especially from Germany to the United States is said to be extensive, since the United States is making an effort to leave the ranks of the debtor nations. The export of securities, which unfortunately cannot be arrived at statistically, is also balanced in some measure by the importation of goods.

But to offset these reasons, which explain a one-sided importation of goods into Germany, there are others to be taken into account which represent a one-sided exportation of goods from Germany. The most important item in this line is due to the investment of German capital in foreign countries, to which is to be added the payment of interest and dividends to foreign countries, payments to agents and for freight, the expenditures of Germans traveling abroad, and so forth. However, the amount of the items on this side of the account is far less than the sums which are paid to Germany.

Consequently, if Germany has, in recent years, imported from abroad on an average about \$333,000,000 worth of products

more than it has sent out to foreign countries, this is not at all surprising. It has enabled the population of Germany to increase its consumption, while encouraging the development of capital.

As may be confidently concluded from the statistical data, Germany takes the second rank in the market of the world at the beginning of the twentieth century. In international commerce she is surpassed by England alone, but is making relatively more rapid progress than England. Her boldest sons are already dreaming of a time not far distant when she shall overtake England in the commerce of the world. The United States has a considerably larger population than Germany, and a territory about sixteen times as large; notwithstanding this, and notwithstanding her remarkable economic advance, she is still surpassed in international trade by Germany.

II.

Upon what is this economic greatness of Germany based? It is the product of many natural and sociologic factors, the most important of which will here be briefly enumerated.

Nature has equipped Germany with a soil and a climate which are very favorable to the economic development of the country. Equally removed from too severe cold and immoderate heat, the soil of Germany has been able to support a healthy economic life. The German Empire has broad and fertile plains, mountains rich in minerals, great navigable rivers. The hand of man has made the less productive regions useful by planting great forests in them. If the German grain producer is unable to compete with the American farmer, this fact is due, not to the lack of fertility of the German soil, but to its relatively smaller extent; if there were more tillable land in Germany grain land would be cheaper, and if the ground rent were less the German grain producer could easily compete with his foreign rival.

Germany is especially endowed for industrial development by her abundance of coal and minerals (iron, zinc, copper, lead, silver, etc.); and the coal deposits are not very far removed from the mineral deposits, or the principal places of coal production

are so situated that foreign mineral ores (from Sweden, Spain, etc.) can easily be brought to them by water.

The physical geography of Germany has encouraged an active domestic commerce; over her broad plains it was easy to construct highways and railroads, and it was possible to get around the few high mountains without great difficulty; the usefulness of the natural water supply has been increased at slight expense by the digging of canals.

Being located in the heart of Europe, Germany is especially adapted to international commerce. Her borders touch almost every important country, while ocean traffic with England, Sweden, and Norway is very easy. Starting from the mouths of her great rivers, Germany can maintain direct connections with all parts of the globe. In this respect Hamburg and Bremen are especially favored; Rotterdam and Antwerp may be regarded also as to all intents German ports, although they are not now politically parts of the German Empire.

Nevertheless, the most favorable location and the greatest natural wealth frequently avail nothing for a country if there is a lack of competent men to make use of the exceptional conditions for production. But in this respect, also, Germany has been under the sway of a kindly destiny. The German is, in general, a good manager,—industrious, tenacious, and conscientious. He works methodically and thoroughly; he knows how to make the results of scientific research serve his productive activity. As a rule he is serious and economical,—the North German in particular; the South German and the Rhinelander, who surrender themselves to the cheerful enjoyment of life, can do this with impunity because nature has remembered them with more abundant gifts than she has bestowed upon the inhabitants of the German North and East, where the soil is for the most part less fruitful and the climate more severe.

“Practical” nations have often smiled at German “idealism”; and it is true that the best sons of Germany, in their striving for the highest ideals, for the true, the good, and the beautiful, have often overlooked and forgotten the most immediate concerns, the

useful and the necessary. But in the end all the greatest deeds and fairest successes of German genius are dependent upon this marvelous buoyancy of the German mind which carries it toward the highest goals. And this is true also of the economic activities. Science, which has been cultivated in Germany largely for its own sake, is now enriching economic life. A thorough education enables the great mass of the German working men to devote themselves to occupations the practice of which demands more than the exercise of mere physical power; accordingly, a relatively large proportion of skilled labor can be performed in Germany. In the education of industrial specialists, such as engineers, chemists, etc., the Germans excel all other peoples of the world. The German institutions of higher education justly enjoy a world-wide fame.

While the qualities mentioned enable the people of Germany to compete successfully with their products in the markets of the world, there is another peculiar trait in the character of the German which impels him to take an active part in international commerce, and this is the love of travel. The German is fond, especially in youth, of going away from home in order to make the acquaintance of other lands and men. The desire for adventure also impels many to seek foreign lands. In the time of its political disintegration the Fatherland was unable to pay much attention to its offspring who went abroad; a great many were lost to it forever. Today the German Empire aims not to lose sight of the Germans who go to foreign lands, and tries even to make up for its former neglect in this matter, so far as this is possible; it is one of the ambitions of good German patriots to gather up the fragments of German nationality in foreign countries and to unite them organically with the mother country. From their distant foreign homes many Germans have established economic relations with the old home. Those who return from abroad bring back to the Fatherland information regarding new and advantageous sources of supply and remunerative markets. Thus the domestic economics of Germany are involved in a thousand ways with the economics of the world.

This tendency is strengthened by the rapid increase of the German population; in the last thirty years the figure has risen from 41,000,000 to 57,000,000; for some time the annual increase has been from 700,000 to 800,000 souls. The new arrivals in the wage field find the best employment for their powers in the manufacturing industries; the industrial products prepared by them are profitably exchanged in the markets of the world for the agricultural products of more fertile and less densely populated lands.

Only one who is ignorant of German history will ask why the Germans have waited until the last few decades to celebrate their triumphs in international commerce. The reply may be made that the Germans have played an important part in international commerce in the centuries past; during the palmy days of the Hansa they were incontestably the leaders in the trade of the world. Furthermore, the achievements of the German race that occupies the Rhine delta are fairly to be credited to the German people, although an unfortunate combination of political events separated Holland from the union of German States. Through whose fault the achievements of former centuries have been lost cannot be explained here. Whenever the German nation has been united, it has almost always been great and respected; no other nation ventured to lay claim to the highest civil dignity, the crown of the Holy Roman Empire. But the Germans have too often drawn their swords against one another; only thirty-five years have passed since the last great arbitrament of battle was fought out between German States, and in the periods of dissension foreign countries sometimes got the lead of Germany. The bloody struggles over religious matters in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries weakened Germany terribly—nearly annihilated its wealth, and ruined its civilization. Between the days of Luther, Hutten, and Dürer and those of Goethe, Schiller, and Kant lay more than two centuries of deep humiliation for the German name.

It required, in the nineteenth century, the political union of the German States in order to make room for the full development of

Germany's economic forces. After the gifted Prussian statesmen had succeeded by means of "blood and iron"—for peaceful means had proved a lamentable failure—in overcoming the century-old resistance of the smaller German States and of the House of Hapsburg, and in frustrating the efforts of France to break down the new German Confederation, the many valuable forces were liberated in Germany which had before been restrained by the endless political entanglements of the country. Once politically united, Germany could now turn to the solution of other problems.

The great task was begun of unifying German law, and it was in the main completed by the end of the century. Science and art were cultivated with renewed zeal and with more liberal endowments. What well-informed person would now venture to doubt that the German universities and other institutions of higher learning are the best in the world? Numerous talents were also applied to economic enterprise, inspired by pride in the reëstablished glory of the German Empire and eager to outdo France in the realm of economy as well, and to win for the German pennant respect on every sea, even to threaten the commercial supremacy of the English. Enjoying peace and legal security, supported by growing uniformity of laws and the increasing coöperation of science and art with the practical industries, German political economy was prepared for a vigorous development and for forming connections with all the other economic regions of the earth.

The German Imperial Government in conjunction with the Bundesrat and the Reichstag has been zealously endeavoring to make the economic relations of Germany with other countries as profitable as possible, especially by the conclusion of commercial treaties. True, the old dispute over the relative advantages of free trade and protective tariff is carried on in Germany also, but the number of those who see salvation in the restriction of the international distribution of labor by means of protective tariffs is not so great as in other lands. The commercial policy of the German Empire has never been that of extreme protection.

Until 1879 it was liberal; then, under the influence of a coalition of agrarians, iron manufacturers, and cotton spinners, whom Bismarck managed to win over to his side, there came a reaction, the chief outcome of which was a gradual increase in the duty on grain. A return to liberal principles followed under Bismarck's successor, Caprivi, who formed reciprocity treaties with Austro-Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Russia, Roumania, and Servia. As a result of the reduction of many specific tariff items, the trade of Germany with foreign countries increased extraordinarily: the value of German imports rose during the last decade from \$1,050,000,000 to \$1,428,000,000, and the value of German exports from \$785,000,000 to \$1,140,000,000.

Other means employed by the German Government to encourage foreign trade are the organization of a bureau of information conducted by the consulates, periodical publication of reports on foreign trade, etc., and the subsidizing of German steamship lines which carry the direct trade of Germany to important foreign markets, especially Africa, Australia, and Eastern Asia.

The German Empire has never resorted to violence for the advancement of its foreign trade. But the appearance of German war vessels off the coast of countries in which the political conditions were disordered and unsettled has sometimes been needed to inspire the population with respect for the property and other rights of German citizens. In some cases, the German Empire has found it necessary to meet the unfriendly tariff attitude of foreign countries with retaliatory measures; but this has occurred only when German goods were treated less favorably by some state than were the goods of other countries. The most important tariff war conducted by Germany, that against Russia in 1893-94, was successful in so far as it led to the adoption of the Russo-German commercial treaty.

This survey has shown, I trust, that Germany's prominent position in international commerce is not the result of chance, but the fruit of German intelligence, German thoroughness, and German energy, which have been enabled, by the long-delayed

enjoyment of political peace, to devote themselves unhindered to the solution of economic problems.

III.

The question now suggests itself, whether Germany has a fair prospect of maintaining herself in this commanding position, or even of making still further progress. Let us cast a glance here over the various factors upon which Germany's economic future will depend.

Many of the natural advantages which have made Germany a powerful industrial and commercial country are to all human foresight permanent. Among these are the advantages of the German soil and climate, Germany's favorable location, and, probably, the thorough qualities of the German race. Germany's abundance of fuel and minerals will not be exhausted for centuries to come. The hope that the German people will not lose its inherent nature, its energy, its endurance, its idealism, is justified by the experience of centuries in which the German nation, despite transient decadence, has always recovered its better self and regained the respect of other nations. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that the accumulation of capital will continue to advance in Germany; it is founded upon the industry and economy of her population.

Pessimists have maintained that the foreign trade of Germany—as well as that of all industrial states—cannot by the most desperate efforts secure a prosperous future. They believe that in all countries which still import manufactured articles there will be a gradual development of manufacturing industries that will be able to supply all the home demands. They fear, also, that the present agrarian countries, in the degree that their manufacturing industries increase, will cease to export agrarian products to foreign countries. They declare, accordingly, that foreign markets will eventually be closed to German export goods, and that Germany cannot count upon drawing any considerable portion of its future supply of provisions from foreign countries; consequently, that it will be compelled gradually to withdraw

from the markets of the world and to supply all of its own wants.

Such fears are unfounded. They greatly exaggerate the tendencies of development. Of course every vigorous country has an ambition to develop its own manufactures. But not all countries are by any means qualified to cultivate all forms of manufacture. In many regions the climate forbids every sort of industrial activity; in others textile industries flourish, indeed, but not the metal industries. In many cases the industries are restricted to certain definite localities, as in the case of mining, salt-works, quarries, etc. In addition to these there are many other influences which prescribe variations in economic development. In fact, there is today not a single country which wholly satisfies its own demands in the way of manufactures; England, the foremost manufacturing country, procures many finished factory products from foreign lands, and about one fifth of the wares imported into Germany are manufactured articles.

There is no evident reason why the various countries should not continue to exchange with each other the goods which they can respectively produce best. The folly of the declaration that the present agrarian countries will soon cease to be able to export provisions is best shown from the fact that Europe, small and old as she is, produces to this day more food grain than all the rest of the world together.

Immense territories are still available for the production of foodstuffs, and the productivity of the areas already under tillage may be greatly increased. Agriculture and grazing will remain more profitable than manufacture and commerce in many countries or parts of countries. Danger of an insufficiency of foodstuffs can arise only from the over-population of the earth. And over-population is not to be anticipated for centuries to come.

Now if it is true that the international exchange of merchandise is sure to continue, and even to increase, it is certainly not improbable that there will be considerable alterations in the present proportions of international commerce. Staple articles which can be produced in most countries advantageously will gradually be forced into the background as articles of export, as for

instance, woolen goods. International commerce will be restricted more and more to specialties, in the production of which are involved the particular qualities of the producing countries. What products of Germany, then, will hold their own permanently in the markets of the world? Those, I believe, in the manufacture of which a higher degree of technical, scientific, and artistic training is required,—the product of professionally trained labor, whether in the employer or the employee. Even now German exports consist in large measure of such products, for instance, as chemical goods, machinery, books, pictures, maps, music, scientific apparatus, the finer grades of iron, copper, nickel, gold, and silver manufactures, the finer textile fabrics, the finer sorts of leather work, the finer varieties of wood manufactures, musical instruments, etc. A countless host of higher and intermediate educational institutions in Germany are devoted to the training of thorough mechanical talent for the production of these finer specialties. It is noticeable that these schools have, for some time, laid stress not only upon the quickening of the understanding and the increase of manual skill, but also upon the artistic cultivation of the young; everywhere there are arising in Germany schools, expositions, and museums for the industrial arts.

Has Germany much occasion to fear the competition of foreign countries in the realm of manufactures? The question may, it seems to me, be confidently answered in the negative, in view of the success with which German manufactures have entered into rivalry with the older established industries of England. The country that has driven the foremost industrial and commercial nation of the last century out of numerous markets may rightly anticipate the competition of other nations with serenity. True, there are today many branches of industry in which other nations are superior to the Germans; the Germans can better afford to buy many wares from England, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, etc., than to manufacture them at home at a higher expense. And thus it will remain in the future. But Germany possesses many branches of industry in

which it surpasses or at least equals other lands, and these are a guaranty of its success in international competition.

It is probable that the rivalry of Germany with the United States will be very sharp along certain lines, inasmuch as the conditions of production are in some measure alike in the two countries; for instance, in the iron and the leather industries. Which country will win in this competition cannot be foretold today; probably one in one line, the other in another. Moreover, such a conflict need not necessarily end in the complete destruction of the opponent in the other country. Many markets are almost inalienable on account of their geographical location. At great distances the cost of transportation is often so great that superiority in production does not avail to counterbalance it. The world is wide, and there is still room for many diligent hands of the most various nationalities to take part in supplying it with the products of industry; and the more each individual wins by his work, the more liberally he can consume the products of others.

Many German employers complain that the German insurance laws in favor of working men have placed burdens upon them which are unknown to their competitors in other lands, and that they are consequently seriously handicapped in international competition. But this view of the case is incorrect, for there are "social burdens" in all countries. The form in which they are carried is, indeed, different; the German form of compulsory insurance has many advantages, even for the employer. It is very doubtful whether the burden thrown upon employers by individual indemnity for injuries, by support of the poor fund, and other "social taxes," is any lighter than that which comes from compulsory insurance.

The financial condition of Germany is prosperous. The burdens laid upon the population by taxes and other imposts are not so great in Germany as, for instance, in England and France. This is another reason why the German manufacturer and merchant have a good prospect of success in international competition.

In these reflections on the possibility of successful competition,

it has been assumed that industrial development will be undisturbed by violent interference. Are we justified in this anticipation? The truth is that, in this respect, many Germans have come, in the last few years, to regard the future with an anxious eye. England's course in South Africa, especially, has raised the question whether the present mistress of the seas will not attempt, at some time, to use violence against her inconvenient rival in the economic field, to destroy the merchant fleet of Germany, and to exclude German manufactures from the markets of the world, or at least from transmarine markets. If ever the war party should come to the helm in England, contrary to the doctrines of Cobden, the danger for Germany would be very grave; for hostile cruisers in the chief marine highways of commerce, the Skager Rack, the English Channel, the North Coast of Scotland, the Strait of Gibraltar, the entrance to the Suez Canal, and at the Cape of Good Hope, would make German steam transportation almost impossible, as has been shown in an official German memorial.

Aside from the danger from England, Germany is always threatened by France, which desires revenge for its fearful defeat in 1870-71. Moreover, there is no dependence to be placed upon Germany's Eastern neighbor, the Empire of the Czar. Finally, it is not to be concealed that the expulsion of Spain from Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines has given the impression that even the Americans propose to resort to a policy of aggressive violence. Accordingly, Germany is constantly on her guard and is strengthening her army and her navy. On the basis of her present military organization she is able to mobilize an army on her own soil of 3,000,000 men. The present German war fleet is not correspondingly strong, but in the past year it has been decided to double the number of battleships. Germany has no intention, indeed, of conquering commercial advantages at the cannon's mouth, and of destroying the economic development of other nations by brute force; but she demands in turn that she shall not be violently checked in her progress, and has prepared to repel with mailed hand all assaults upon her commerce.

Germany's colonies in Africa and Oceanica are not very valu-

able; whether they will become so in the future is still uncertain. The best regions outside of Europe had already been appropriated by other countries at a time when Germany was still wrestling with domestic dissensions and was powerless at sea. This is a fact that is greatly regretted by many patriotic Germans, who would like to see German emigrants saved to the German nationality. But Germany will certainly not, on that account, enter upon an aggressive policy of expansion. But if there come about further liquidations of the colonial possessions of decadent foreign powers, such for instance, as Portugal, Germany will not stand idly by while England, Russia, etc., prepare to divide the spoil, but will demand her share also. However we may judge in general the moral justification of such seizures, one thing is certain, that it will never be possible to convince the Germans that they have any less right to the acquisition of extra-European territory than have the English, the French, or the Americans. The memory of their former weakness, when other nations were taking possession of almost the entire globe, will spur the Germans to secure, in the future at least, their share of the dominion over the earth.

The world has been reapportioned several times already; many regions have been successively in the hands of the Portuguese or Spaniards, the Dutch, the French, and the English. European wars, the outbreak of which had nothing to do with the dominion over extra-European territory, have often led to a change in the possession of colonies, and this is also a possibility for the future. Unfortunately we cannot yet count upon the early dawn of an era of universal peace, in which emigrants would find security and the protection of law in all foreign countries. The world is still full of tinder for the kindling of the torch of war. If Germany should win the victory in such a war, she would certainly aim to secure as indemnity some colony situated in the temperate zone, in order to direct thither the stream of German emigration. Germans certainly make good colonists, as has been shown by the experience of the countries in which German immigrants have formed colonies under a foreign flag.

Energetic negotiations are now being carried on with reference to the future character of Germany's commercial policy. Until the close of the year 1903 Germany will be bound by the commercial treaties of 1891-94. It is a question whether Germany will continue to pursue the course hitherto followed and attempt to secure the further improvement of her commercial relations to foreign countries by means of reciprocity treaties. To me this seems to be a matter of course, although the proposals of the Imperial Government for the reform of the independent German customs duties appear to indicate the contrary. The German Government is proud of the importance which German foreign trade, especially the transmarine trade, has attained, and it knows what estimate to put upon the value of this trade for the economic prosperity of Germany.

That the future of Germany lies upon the water, is a proposition often emphasized by the German Emperor. As a result of the tremendous agitation of the German agrarians, whose ancestors were once pillars of the State, the Imperial Government has determined for the present to propose a considerable increase of the duties on all agricultural products. But if it should turn out, as is probable, that these high duties are an obstacle to the conclusion of new commercial treaties, the Government would presumably drop the agrarian duties in order to make possible the continuance of the policy of reciprocity treaties. Such a policy on the part of the Government would be supported by all the progressive elements of Germany, by most of the representatives of the science of political economy, by the most prominent representatives of manufacture, trade, and commerce, and by the labor organizations. However, the reactionary, protective tariff party is also very strong and vigorous, and the number of those who are in doubt as to what attitude they shall assume on this important question is large. The intermediate parties, which are to give the casting votes, the National Liberals and the Centre, are in an awkward position, since they depend in part upon peasants who demand a large increase of the duties on grain, cattle, etc., and in part upon laboring men who are opposed to the

increase of the prices of breadstuffs by tariff charges. What the action of these parties will be in the future is still uncertain.

There is no denying that the political and commercial struggle that is now enkindled in Germany is a very serious one. The friends of the policy to which Germany owes her success in international commerce will find it necessary to be very wakeful and energetic in order to save Germany from serious loss. Nothing, indeed, would be more mistaken than to suppose that Germany can afford, after attaining such noteworthy success in the trade of the world, to rest upon her laurels. Nowhere more than in this field is it necessary to work incessantly ahead,—to push forward. Here the saying of the poet applies :—

“ Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern hast,
Erwirb es um es zu besitzen.”

A wise couplet of Goethe's which may be paraphrased, What you have inherited from your ancestors must be earned anew if you would possess it in any true sense.

I have felt justified in speaking of those good qualities of the German stock upon which Germany's success in international trade has been based. But it would be folly to deny that there are no possible dangers for the German Empire in the bad qualities connected with the German character. There are many things in the German Empire which cause deep concern to the true friend of the Fatherland. The Imperial Government has often shown itself weak and vacillating in its domestic policy ; in the Bundesrat (the Imperial Senate) there is a sensible lack of true statesmanship, and even the Reichstag has fallen much in public esteem. Too often a brilliant and empty display takes the place of plain and thorough reality. To be sure, the unity of the German Empire is so thoroughly established that the petty jealousies of the individual German tribes cannot shake it. Dissension, the ancient weakness of the Germans, continues to show itself in the frequently bitter strife of the political parties. In no other country is there such a gulf between the Social Labor party and the parties representing the established order, as

there is in Germany. This inner dissension tends, of course, to paralyze Germany's efficiency in her foreign relations. The far-sighted friends of the Fatherland have much to occupy them in overcoming their domestic difficulties.

And yet, there is no ground for a pessimistic attitude. The German nation is still in the vigor of youth. It will undertake with courage and energy the solution of the problems set by the Twentieth Century.

Of course, unforeseen events may greatly alter our prognosis. The history of mankind is not accomplished under uniform laws. The past cannot be summarized and interpreted by brief formulæ. Still more difficult, indeed impossible, is it to forecast the future. However favorable the opportunity may be, in every individual case all depends on its being properly used by men,—individuals and races alike. And he who deals with such uncertain quantities as human hearts and human thoughts may well hesitate to declare any certain future course inevitable.

THE RECENT RIOTS IN ATHENS

RUFUS B. RICHARDSON, *Athens.*

In the great number of questions directed towards Athens from both Europe and America in regard to the riots of last November, perplexity and surprise are commingled. One writes, "To us, at this distance, it seems like a case of homoousion and homoiousion." It did seem altogether inexplicable that the Greek people, who generally take their religion so quietly, and as a matter of course, like their daily food, with an absence of fanaticism which is quite commendable, should in three days be roused to a frenzy which resulted in bloodshed, over a translation of the New Testament,—the avowed object of which was to make it more intelligible to the common people. It is perhaps audacious for a stranger, who cannot know all the workings of the Greek mind, to attempt an explanation of these singular disturbances. What is here attempted may be regarded as only a partial explanation.

There can be no question of the fact, to begin with, that, although every well-educated Greek finds no difficulty in reading the original text of the New Testament, the only text recognized by the Church and authorized in the kingdom, there was a certain need of a translation. The following incident seems to prove that clearly enough. About two years ago the Queen of Greece distributed to the patients in the Evangelismos, the hospital of which she is the patroness, and to which she devotes much of her time, copies of the New Testament in the original

text. These were shortly afterwards returned to her with the statement that the patients were unable to read them, whereupon the Queen, who is untiring in good works, procured by the aid of several scholars a translation which, without making radical changes, approached somewhat more nearly the language spoken by educated people in Greece today. This translation has been distributed more or less widely in hospitals and in the army; but the edition was small and was soon exhausted. Even this, however, is by no means the first translation which has appeared in Greece. People more than forty years old recall using in childhood copies of the Gospels in simple language. These, nevertheless, are perhaps better called paraphrases than translations.

This need of a translation has always been freely conceded in the case of the classics. Herodotus, for example, although a prose writer with a simple style, is read by school children, not in the original, but in a translation. It is true that dramas of Euripides and Sophocles are occasionally produced on the Athenian stage in their original form. These presentations are, however, looked upon as a "tour de force," and are never popular, while the same plays presented in a translation into modern Greek have a certain drawing power for the people. A translation of "The Clouds" of Aristophanes made quite a hit both last winter and this winter.

If a translation was needed, why not have it? is the first question that would be asked by a stranger. But, granted the desirability of a translation, there was something in the character of the latest translation that provoked antagonism. It appeared in the "Akropolis," one of the leading daily papers of Athens, in thirty-three instalments, the first appearing September 22, of that year, and the last, November 2. It proceeded only as far as the end of the Gospel according to St. Matthew. The first instalment was accompanied by an explanation, presumably by the translator, of the scope of the translation, which was, in brief, to bring the story of the Gospel home to the people in language with which they were familiar. This prefatory article, which mentioned the Queen's translation in terms of the highest praise,

might be looked upon as an adroit attempt to use her great name as a shield against possible attack. It is, however, certain that she was not in any way a sponsor of the undertaking. The translator, Mr. Palli, a Greek merchant living in England, was already known as the translator of the Iliad into a language so little elevated that he himself declared that he should not regard his life as safe if he should appear in Athens. In the translation of the Gospel, he followed, as in that of the Iliad, the linguistic principles of Professor Psichari of Paris, who is considered the leader of that energetic coterie among the Greeks which is trying to make the demotic language, that is, the language spoken by the common people, into a literary language. This effort exasperates the larger part of the educated people of Athens, who are desirous of proving to the world that the language of Demosthenes and Xenophon, so far from being a dead language, still survives in its essential features in modern Athens; that it is still not only written but spoken in the chamber of deputies, on the street, and in the house. And so by a counter effort they have brought it about that two styles of talking as well as of writing are in vogue in Athens. A Greek host will talk to a foreigner, who perchance has worked up Greek from a handbook, in a language which both of them handle fairly well; and the stranger takes great satisfaction in the consciousness that he has learned to talk Greek. But if the host has occasion to turn and give some directions to a servant, he uses language of which the well-taught foreigner knows next to nothing. But this language, which sounds to him like so much Choctaw, is also Greek, and when he has occasion to go down into the older parts of Athens to buy queer red shoes or old souvenirs, he finds that he must learn this kind of Greek also if he will make himself intelligible. One who knows only the high style Greek, the so-called "pure Greek," is much worse off when trying to converse with the working classes than a cultured clergyman from New England would be when confronted with rough miners of Nevada who "don't pan out on prophets," and who answer his serious questions with, "I pass that, pard." The influence of the public schools and of most of the news-

papers is on the side of the "pure style"; and under this influence its area is constantly enlarging. It is quite likely that it will at the same time that it approaches more and more the classical model, gain ground steadily, and will ultimately become the normal language at least of the cities. To the linguist there is something peculiarly interesting in this reactionary movement which is forcing a language back to an ancient standard from which it has departed. The standard is in this case a language so noble, and the bearer of such a noble literature, that one may well wish the movement Godspeed, especially as the vulgar language contains neither such a wealth of picturesque phrases as do our own negro dialects, nor the quaintness of the Scotch. The only valid claim which the demotic has to be spared is that it is a natural growth, or, if one must say it, a natural deterioration. At least nobody has labored to make it, and there is nothing artificial about it. If it finally dies out it will not be for lack of enthusiastic champions. Psichari wields a sharp blade, and does not go down before the broadsword strokes of the enemy.

But it is not my purpose to enter further into this eternal linguistic quarrel. It is one in which "a stranger doth not intermeddle," or at least had better not intermeddle. Enough has been said to show how Mr. Palli's translation of the New Testament made its way into a linguistic war. It is no wonder that there is a grand thrusting and slashing over it. Probably the translator's motives were far from being those of pure benevolence, as was the case with the Queen. His was preëminently a literary feat in which he took pride. But one can hardly believe that he was actuated by baser motives such as have been attributed to him. It is hardly probable that the "Akropolis" paid him enough to tempt his cupidity; neither can an outsider believe that his purpose was to break down the national spirit of Greece, to Slavize it. It may be conceded that he erred greatly in making his translation more colloquial than was fitting for so high a theme. He translated many words which, being perfectly intelligible, might better have been left as they were. It is of course difficult, in many cases, to recognize as slang what would

at once be felt by a Greek to be such. Perhaps it would be doing no injustice to the translation to say that it is in places downright slangy. But having made this concession, I wish to record certain indications that the translation has been unjustly maligned and condemned without being thoroughly read. A physician told me that Palli used instead of *δεῖπνον* the awful word *συμποῦσι*, which now has a meaning something like "debauch." He seemed to intimate that this word was applied to the Last Supper; and this did seem shocking and sacrilegious. A professor also declared that while he did not object to read of Christ riding into Jerusalem on an *ὄνος*, he could not bear to read of his riding on a *γαῖδοῦρι*. My attention had not been directed to the translation until the disturbances broke out. Subsequently I procured a file of the "Akropolis," and in one long Sunday session read the translation from beginning to end, comparing it carefully with the original. To my surprise neither *συμποῦσι* nor *γαῖδοῦρι* occurs in it. My informants had spoken from hearsay. The translator had been condemned without a hearing. He uses vulgar words enough, *ψωμί*, *κρασί*, and *νερό*, for example, always instead of the more stately *ἄρτος*, *οἶνος*, and *ὑδωρ*; but the particular faults ascribed to him he had not committed. I refrain from mentioning other similar cases which have come to my attention.

Of course there is always a strong attachment among readers of the New Testament to the very words. There was hardly a person brought up on King James' version, so as to know its expressions by heart, who did not shrink from the changes made by the revised version thirty years ago, not because one thought that the new words had a lower tone or failed to give the meaning of the original, but simply because they were changes. Most people would rather see tabernacle and phylacteries retained, because they had so often heard them, than accept plainer equivalents. So, doubtless, it is with the Greeks.

But we are already passing beyond the purely linguistic phase of the matter, and are trenching upon the territory of religious feeling, inasmuch as religious feeling is closely bound up in

questions of language when sacred themes are being treated. The disturbances over the translation in question were far from being a mere linguistic quarrel. If we ourselves feel that the very phraseology of our New Testament has become to us as dear as sacramental wine, we can understand how much more tenaciously the Greeks might cling to their New Testament, which is not like ours a translation. They are certainly convinced that they are reading the identical words penned by the Apostles. They are proud of being the only people on earth who need no translation, and therefore they will have none. Even if we grant that there is some vainglory in this, that many of them do not understand the meaning of parts of the original text as well as they think they do, (a well-educated Greek said the other day with unconscious irony, "Of course we understand the words of the Gospel; it is the ideas only that are difficult to grasp,") we must admit, nevertheless, that this pride is thoroughly explicable and natural, even if not entirely justifiable.

But there is another reason for their attachment to this text which the whole world must regard as compelling. The book in this form is closely bound up with their nationality. During the four centuries of Turkish oppression, in many respects a worse than Egyptian bondage, adapted to crush the spirit of any people, the two things that kept alive the feeling of a common nationality were a common language and a common sacred book. The language, it is true, did suffer considerable contamination, and in spite of the efforts of Koraes and his forerunners to keep up a common literary language, it did split up into dialects. But the common sacred book remained,—a rock and a fortress. As Protestants look upon the institution of the Last Supper, which has survived the war of creeds and "the Church's long eclipse," as the one great sacrament, "symbol of one common faith," so the Greeks look upon the text of the New Testament.

Had it not been for that book, the Greek race would probably have been completely merged with the Turks, as was so nearly the case in Crete. The inhabitants of free Greece feel this; and therefore the book is to them a symbol not only of their religion,

but also of their nationality. It is to them everything that the ark of the covenant was to the children of Israel, and more also. It must still remain for them the *only* New Testament, because it alone brought them out of bondage. They will not cut off one iota of the utterances of the inspired Apostles. Anything added or detracted or changed is to them a pollution. The Queen's translation had been tolerated out of regard for her high personality. Palli's translation was at first treated with ridicule, but this soon gave place to a rising indignation, until it was felt that even the Queen's translation had been a laying of profane hands upon the ark of the covenant, and that Palli's translation was an overturning of it.

This gathered wrath was sure to discharge itself somewhere. Palli was at a safe distance, and so it fell upon the offending newspaper, which was close at hand. The "Akropolis" stood at bay, falling back on its right of publication. The other journals, with the exception of the "Asty," which stood up in defence of its old enemy and rival, joined in the hue and cry.

The ecclesiastical affairs of Greece are managed by a body called the Sacred Synod and by the Minister of Religion and Education, who acts with it. The Synod is composed of five archbishops and bishops of the kingdom, of whom the archbishop of Athens, called the Metropolitan, is the presiding officer. The Sacred Synod was called upon by the press to stop the translation, which it was doubtless empowered to do. The Metropolitan, Procopius, a lovable man, and averse to controversy, declined, or at least hesitated, to act. Suppressions and anathemas were abhorrent to his nature. It is currently reported that when he was consulted by the Queen in regard to her project of translating the New Testament, he said that personally he was in sympathy with the enterprise, although as head of the Church he could not sanction it. To anathematize this new translation, now that the people in their mutterings were connecting it with that of the Queen, would seem to be administering a reproof to her. It was for him a trying situation.

After a few days of waiting and uncertainty as to what was

going to happen in this atmosphere surcharged with electricity, the university students took up the matter and brought on the storm. The medical school took the initiative. If one is inclined to wonder that they should be more active in ecclesiastical affairs than the theological students, one must bear in mind that religion, in the case with which we are now dealing, is not that personal and deep feeling which is known as religion in the Protestant Churches of America, and which would here be called mysticism. Membership in the national orthodox Church is the sum of the religion of a Greek. It is a plain, simple, open affair. Religion and nationality are conterminous, if not identical. This religion involves no deep searchings of heart in answer to the question whether one loves the Lord or not. There is in it no devotion of self, no deep personal piety; and yet it is very likely that some of these same persons whom we might think lukewarm or absolutely cold, would go to the stake for their religion. How true to nature is that incident in "The Tragedy of the Korosko" where men who up to that moment had hardly been conscious of having any religion, when asked to abjure Christianity on pain of death, summoned up their energies like good Christians to suffer martyrdom.

Neither does being a good Christian in the mind of a Greek imply frequent reading of the Bible. It is enough for him to know that it is all there, and that he can read it if he wants to. But if the New Testament, which he calls the Evangelion, is attacked he will stand by the Holy Book, not so much because he loves its teachings as because it is, as has just been said, the symbol of nationalism and religion together. So the medical student or the law student was just as likely to have his holy zeal stirred as was the theological student.

That the initiative came from the students is characteristic of Greece. These, numbering five or six thousand, form a body with an "esprit de corps" and a solidarity of interest which make them a force that has often been felt in Athens as no other element has been felt,—not even the army. They are, it is true, rather young looking compared with other university students;

but they feel, none the less, confidence in their ability to regulate the affairs of the university, and even to settle grave matters of state. In 1897, for example, because an eminent surgeon lost his temper over some stamping and stirring up of dust at a critical surgical operation which he was conducting before the medical school in his operating room, and applied some rather strong epithets to the student body, they passed resolutions declaring that he had broken the "charm" (*γόητρον*) of the university, and must be deposed. As the offending professor was not discharged or even reprimanded, the whole body of students, theological and all, went out and staid out for about two months. During that time there were constant demonstrations and collisions with the police force, the university serving as a base of operations for the students. The theological students showed especial courage and zeal in the fighting. The last stage of the affair was a siege of the university, in which the students intrenched themselves. After food and water became scarce they capitulated, and were allowed to march out with the honors of war, that the "charm" or the university might not again be broken. Not quite two years before that strike, the students had by their demonstrations caused the fall of a ministry. In view of the time taken from the curriculum and devoted to statecraft, one can understand why a recent writer in "The Spectator" could with some bitterness speak of "those loafers who in Athens are called students." But that is not the view taken of them in Athens. Here they are spoken of as "the noble student youth," "the champions of nationality, religion, and the faith." Even the members of a ministry which has fallen by their instrumentality speak of them as actuated by noble motives. Of course the students are proud to feel that they are a body to be reckoned with in political affairs, and indeed they would be more than mortal if they were not puffed up at the adulation bestowed on them by press and people. It has been insinuated more than once, not however in print, that the students have been manipulated in this affair by astute politicians who keep behind the scenes. One may believe this when he sees some leading

politician successfully resisting their influence or openly controlling them.

From November 18 to November 21 they filled the public mind, and were the leaders and shapers of events in Athens. They were successful at every point. They stirred the people of Athens to a violence that bore down all barriers; they procured the fall of the ministry and the deposing of the head of the Church.

On the first of those days the medical students, sallying out in a body, went around to the other lecture rooms, and after breaking up the exercises of indignant professors in other departments, in a body numbering about five hundred, ostentatiously visited the offices of the two offending newspapers, which were insufficiently protected by the police, demanding of their managements an abjuration of the translation, a confession of wrong doing, and an apology,—all to appear in an extra edition. But when the two papers, instead of conforming to this request, in their next regular edition spoke rather jocosely of the affair, and appeared anything but contrite, a much larger body made a more threatening demonstration against the offices, which were now locked up. The cordon of gendarmes which was drawn up around the offices was repeatedly broken through. The students tore down and carried off the signs of both offices, the officer in command of the gendarmes saying in one case, "If that is all you want, boys, take it." The head of the whole force had now promised in behalf of the papers that an apology should be forthcoming.

By this time the Government had committed two errors fatal to its continuance. It could have allayed the gathering storm by compelling the Metropolitan to pronounce a curse upon the translation as something forbidden by law, though it now appears that there were only unwritten laws, immemorial custom, to which it could have appealed. But, having failed to perform this disagreeable duty, it was called upon to suppress any violence against the newspapers with a stern hand or to resign. A strong government in any European state would have suppressed the

disorder with prompt severity by means of its regular organs. Leniency now was likely to lead to more serious disorder.

No apologies and no satisfaction having been given to the students, they proceeded the next day to organize mass meetings at the university, which were watched by a force of gendarmes, now strengthened by a part of the garrison of Athens. They made fiery speeches on the steps of the university to the gathering crowds, beginning "O students and people!" or "O people!" Collisions took place with the guards, who, having been instructed to abstain from violence, were treated with contumely, and remorselessly pelted with cracked stones, which lay piled up near at hand for repairing the streets,—jagged stones especially fit to use in pelting. As the crowd was constantly increasing, the suffering soldiers were made to feel that they were on the unpopular side. It was astonishing that quiet Athens could produce such a mob. But disorder spreads more rapidly than anything else.

A great mass meeting of all Athens having been planned by the students to take place the next day at the columns of the temple of Olympian Zeus, the university now declared that no procession to or from the place of rendezvous should be allowed; the right of meeting and passing resolutions, however, was not to be interfered with. When the day came, as it was a great holiday and the weather very fine, all Athens was afoot. For some reason the order forbidding the procession had been withdrawn. At the same time the garrison of Athens had been reinforced by a detachment of marines from Piræus who brought stretchers with them, which particularly irritated the populace. In only one way, however, was its freedom of motion interfered with. The marines drawn up in front of the palace turned the multitude aside from the direct route to and from the rendezvous. This served to exasperate rather than to control. The crowd that gathered at the rendezvous was variously estimated at from thirty to fifty thousand. This body, in which the students were the principal speakers, passed *viva voce* three resolutions:—

1st. To request the Sacred Synod to take care that our Holy

Gospel remain intact as it was bequeathed to us by the Apostles and inspired Fathers.

2d. To demand that the Sacred Synod as a supplement to its pronunciamiento¹ shall proceed to anathematize the translation made and put in circulation, and excommunicate those who took part in it, and shall order the seizing and burning of existing copies of the translation.

3d. That a committee give this vote to the Metropolitan and the Government, calling on them to take thought to carry out the decisions of the people.

As the enormous crowd surged back to the university, a caricature of the Metropolitan was borne aloft on a pole, and was greeted with jeers and execrations. It is said that proposals were made to go to his house and cut off his hair and beard, which all the clergy wear long as a sign of their office. After the return to the university came a scene of violence. The programme of the day had been completely carried out, and at this point one might have thought that the lenient policy of the Government had been successful, that the excitement having fretted itself out would now ebb. But it is easier to arouse a mob than to quiet one, and it is doubtful whether the students, if they had desired to do so, could now have controlled the movement. It was already growing dark, when the crowd began to surge away from the university in one direction, towards Stadion Street through the very broad Adimantos Koraes Street. Here the military force blocked their way, either because it was thought that it was enough to have allowed them to carry out the whole programme of the day, or because it was feared that violence was intended to the Metropolitan. The mob had had its own way so long that it was not disposed to be stopped now; and it pressed forward, pelting the soldiers with stones, as on the preceding day. When this could be endured no longer, several rounds were

(1) The Metropolitan and the Sacred Synod had, at last, under pressure of public opinion, and after considerable hesitation and delay, condemned the translation, but had not proceeded to anathemas and excommunications.

fired by order into the air, while the cavalry charged, and the crowd dispersed. When Adimantos Koraes Street was cleared, eight or nine dead and some thirty wounded citizens lay on the ground. The bloodshed that the Government had taken such pains to avoid had come. To relieve itself as far as possible from the charge of bloodguiltiness, it instituted an examination of the wounds, from which it appeared that the balls extracted from them were neither those of the garrison nor those of the gendarmes. It is not unlikely that it was the promiscuous firing done by the crowd that produced the slaughter. Several persons, however, came forward with affidavits to the effect that they saw persons shooting into the crowd from the office of the university of finance, or that they saw gendarmes in civilian's clothes taking deliberate aim at various citizens. The case will doubtless form a subject for protracted investigations in the future. The immediate result was damaging to the Government. The untoward event having occurred in a collision between citizens and organs of the Government, there was no hope that the latter could escape the odium. The fallen citizens were proclaimed martyrs and buried the next day as such.

In the very night of the bloodshed the resignations of the commander of the garrison of Athens and of the chief of police, who had been severely wounded, were accepted. The case of the Metropolitan, against whom the popular feeling was most intense, was very bad. The Minister of Religion and Public Instruction sought him at midnight at his house, and telling him that he could not be responsible for his life if he did not at once resign, went with him and the Prime Minister to the palace. When the Metropolitan found that the King also advised his withdrawal, he wrote a letter of resignation with a trembling hand. As the students have since passed resolutions that he never again be appointed to his former position or to any other ecclesiastical position, his career seems ended. This resignation had some quieting effect upon the excited spirits. But when a little later in the night Mr. Theotoki, the Prime Minister, was returning to his house, a short distance below the univer-

sity, he was repeatedly shot at, but showed great coolness, at the same time begging that the firing should cease, and ordering the guards posted at his door to refrain from returning the fire.

Immediately the affair was taken up in the chamber of deputies. The leaders of various branches of the opposition united in a severe attack on the ministry. In the first session Mr. Theotoki was so deeply agitated that he broke down, and burst into tears at the imputation that he was a murderer. Mr. Dragoumi, with mingled severity and sympathy, said to him, "If, sir, you had resisted certain demands with the same courage which you showed when you were exposed to fire, the position of the ministry would have been different." This meant that subserviency to the royal family had ruined him and overthrown his ministry. But the ministry, in spite of the dreadful odium incurred, received a vote of confidence. In the face, however, of this vote of confidence, the ministry, in consideration of the public excitement, decided to resign, and the King appointed Mr. Zaimes to form an *ad interim* ministry. This ministry was at once felt to be one with whom the fallen majority could act in perfect harmony, and cries for an appeal to the country in a new election began to be heard. The long holiday recess put a stop to all serious business. But when the deputies came together, at the beginning of February, the battle opened in earnest.

In what spirit the opposition, the largest faction of which is led by Mr. Deliyianni, enters the contest may be understood from the following extracts from a speech which that gentleman made from his balcony to the populace which had conducted him from the chamber of deputies to his house :—

"Never have I beheld scenes like these in the long life that I have lived, nor has it ever occurred in Greece that those connected with the university, and their attendants, should take aim at citizens and at members of the noble student youth, and shoot them down as if hunting quail.

"Be assured, fellow citizens, that as often as you shall be exposed to arbitrament or violence exercised for depriving you of your legal rights, you will find us also by your side, ready to defend you, because we also belong in your ranks."

The "Proia," the organ of Mr. Deliyianni, in its issue of the same date, inveighed against an "unholy and blood-besprinkled ministry," which it farther characterized as "defilers of the Holy Gospel, revilers, and plotters against the religion of the Greek race." "They shed," it declared, "the blood of citizens lawfully standing on guard, within the sphere of their prerogatives, in behalf of the chief symbol of our Holy Church, because the great Church of Christ had announced to them that the Holy Gospel had been polluted and perverted by audacious translations, and because the Greek people saw those who had the right and duty to stop the defilement and to suppress and destroy those unholy books in its households,—it saw these for a long time neglectful and silent, from contempt for the voice of the Great Church, or from some other feeling incomprehensible to us."

In the first session of the chamber after the riot Mr. Levidhi, once Minister of Marine under Deliyianni, turned upon the ministry and said, "We have all the elements for an accusation against you of unrighteous murder. And afterwards we shall proceed to another question, the vital one, the question of the translation, and we will ask you why the Government for a space of two years has not laid hands upon the unrighteous person who undertook to translate and put into circulation the translated Gospel." It is evident that all the leaders of the opposition regard the defence of the Gospel as the trump card; but it is not yet clear who is to play it, whether Deliyianni, Dragoumi, Delagiorgi, or some other man.

Meanwhile, with the whole party of the former minister Theotoki acting with the present ministry, there is a strong expectation that after a little time Theotoki himself will return to power unless a new election is forced by popular clamor. As the excitement which has so shaken Athens seems to have found only a comparatively feeble echo in the provinces, there is some doubt whether such an election would change the complexion of the chamber of deputies.

The description of the late events would be incomplete without a passing reference to a feeling which pervades the utterances

of public men and editors on the subject of the New Testament. Since the New Testament has in the past done so much for the nation, they hope and expect that it will do yet more, namely, unite that larger Greece which they never lose from sight. They feel that Russia is exerting all its influence to steal away from them the charm of an undiluted Gospel. They see her influence in this new translation, as well as in the former one. They speak of their Gospel as "the power by which we hold the sceptre over the Slavs and over every orthodox nation." Every well-wisher of Greece would desire to tell her to cast off, in her contention for a greater place in the East, reliance on such a charm, and to put her trust in discipline, obedience, subordination, which make a nation strong.

THE SOCIAL LIFE OF ANTS¹

AUGUST FOREL, *Zürich*.

The discussion of present day psychological and social problems, and above all the relations between the artificially separated body and soul, so-called, must necessarily lead us to seek for guiding marks in the animal kingdom. Psycho-physiology, joined to the anatomical examination of the brain, has made us understand that the soul and the living brain are one and the same thing, however diverse may be its manifestations. But while it is the brains of the higher mammals, our near relatives, and especially of the anthropomorphous apes, that are nearest to ours, from an individual point of view, and that present the closest relation in structure and working, it is relatively inferior animals, the social insects, that exhibit a psychology nearest to that of man. This is due to the immense development of their social organization, which is far more coherent and far better adapted to fulfil its ends than is our own, though it rests on a very different basis.

Among these insects the palm must be awarded to the ants. They belong to the order of hymenoptera, comprising, at the present time, more than one hundred and fifty genera and three thousand species that have been described. The diversity of their manners in the various parts of the world is greater, even, than the diversity of their forms. Their communities are based upon what may be termed social instincts, to which correspond

(1) Translated by Professor F. C. de Sumichrast of Harvard University.

specially adapted structures of the body, or at least special cerebral functions.

Ants are polymorphous, that is, every species and every community comprise several forms of very different individuals, that are all the offspring of one mother or of similar mothers, the differentiation between them taking place during a certain embryonic stage, and almost always in germs already specially destined to be of the female sex. These forms are:—

1. The male, usually winged, resembling a fly, light, stupid, and with a very rudimentary brain.

2. The female, usually winged, heavy, fat, and already much more intelligent and with a more highly developed brain.

3. The working ant, always wingless, with highly developed brain. It is this ant that rules the community and disposes of the males and the females.

4. Very often, also, the ant called the soldier ant, which is another form, different from the female, intended for some special function, and usually provided with a very large head and strong mandibles.

Polymorphism, indeed, produces still other and more exceptional forms, such as the females called ergatomorphous, which resemble the working ants and are wingless, etc.

All these individuals originate in eggs laid by the mother or mothers that have founded the community. After the pairing of females and males of different communities, which usually occurs in the air and on one day only, the fecundated females get rid of their henceforth useless wings, and proceed to found, either alone or in groups, other ant-swarms. Their *receptaculum seminis* (seminal pocket) is filled with a stock of spermatozoids which remain living as long as the female itself lives.

Each egg destined to become a female, a working, or a soldier ant, is thus fecundated on its emission, while every egg intended to produce a male is not fecundated, but is developed by parthenogenesis. A fecund female may live eleven or twelve years and remain fecund during the whole of that period. It is probable that in certain cases colonies renew later their stock of fecund

females. It is especially to Pierre Huber and Lubbock that we are indebted for the knowledge of these facts. MacCook, Blochmann, Wasmann, Janet, and myself have also contributed our share.

From these eggs issue small, white, apodal, powerless, weak larvæ, which are cared for, carried about, and fed by the working ants until the time of their transformation into chrysalids or nymphæ that, until after they have emerged, are likewise cared for by the working ants.

The anatomical structure of ants presents certain peculiarities closely related to their social manners. Their very expansible abdomen contains, at the end of the œsophagus, a first stomach or crop, to which I have given the name of social stomach. This stomach, the walls of which are wrinkled and susceptible of being dilated to an extraordinary degree, is absolutely wanting in digestive glands. In it the ants store and preserve, fresh and intact, the food they collect in the nectaries of flowers, and especially by lapping up the sweet excrements of aphides, coccides, larvæ of telligometers, or the secretions of caterpillars of *Hycænides*, for they turn all these insects into domestic animals, into milch cows. Returning to their abode with an abdomen which is often twice as large as usual, owing to the distension of the social stomach, they disgorge its contents for the benefit of their fellows or of the larvæ, and thus feed the community.

Next to the social stomach comes a chitinous gizzard closed hermetically or opened at will by means of four valvulæ in the shape of wedges that form a median cross. When the ant desires to feed itself, it opens one of these valvulæ, and causes a small portion of the contents to pass from the social stomach into its individual, succentorial stomach, which comes next to the gizzard, and is used for digestive purposes. I have established these facts by coloring honey with Prussian blue, and administering it to ants that had been kept fasting. Disgorged to the other ants by the one that had eaten it, the blue honey remained many hours in the social stomach, and it was only later, and very slowly, that the ant allowed a portion of it to enter its indi-

vidual stomach. The gizzard is therefore the mouth of the insect. Janet and Wheeler have shown that ants also give to their larvæ pieces of insects cut up, and that the larvæ are able to suck these themselves.

The mandibles, which are usually toothed, vary greatly in shape, according to the particular use which is to be made of them. They are used for nipping, carrying, sawing, cutting, building, piercing, hooking on, and sifting. They constitute both the weapon and the primary tool of ants.

On the anterior tibia of these insects is a mobile spur, shaped exactly like a comb, with which they comb the sensitive hairs on their antennæ and their other feet. It is most entertaining to watch an ant performing its toilet in this fashion, passing its various limbs between the comb on the spur, which is projected to one side, and the brush of the tibia, which at this point presents a corresponding concavity bristling with short, sharp hairs. The posterior feet have either no comb or merely a rudimentary one. On the other hand there is another brush on the side of the tongue with which ants clean their larvæ and their companions.

The armament of the working ants and of the females is completed, according to the species, by a sting, a venom gland provided with an ejecting apparatus, or else anal glands that emit a stinking secretion which, as it comes in contact with the air, changes into a resinous substance and entangles the limbs of the enemy. Males have no arms and defend themselves by taking to flight.

It is the sub-œsophagic ganglion that constitutes the brain of ants. Histologically, its structure is extremely delicate and complicated, and calls for a thorough study yet to be undertaken. It has two large lobes, corresponding to the two principal senses,—the optic and the olfactory lobes. In addition it has two hemispheres independent of the senses,—Dujardin's pedunculated bodies. These hemispheres have a cellular skin composed of very delicate elements, and recalling the cellular skin of vertebrates. They are highly developed in the working ants,

less so in the females, and are almost atrophied in the males. I have established by vivisection that they constitute the nerve centre which directs the instinctive, social, coördinate, adapted actions of the insect, particularly its memory, its will, and its emotions. If they are destroyed, or if a lesion, even, is wrought in them, the ant is in a condition analogous to that of the pigeon from which Flourens removed the cerebral hemispheres.

The study of the senses of ants is an indispensable preliminary to the understanding of their social life. Much has been said of their powers of hearing, but there is nothing to show that they are endowed with such, and every action of the ants may be explained without the sense of hearing being required. Their sense of touch is extremely acute, as well as their sense of temperature, for they pack off their larvæ whenever the least change in temperature occurs. Mechanical tremors are perceived and distinguished by them with much sharpness, as is the case with all insects, thanks to the lightness of bodies that are displaced by the least breath, the least tremor. The sense of taste is highly developed, and is situated in the nervous organs of the tongue, the palate, and the jaws. Their likes and dislikes in matters of taste are very marked (Forel, Will). Their power of sight, of which I have made a special study,¹ varies according to the number of facets and the convexity of the eye. Relatively good in the winged sexes, it is poor in the working ants. The latter perceive mostly the motions of objects and the intensity of light, but very inadequately the form of objects. They perceive very strongly ultra-violet, *which we do not perceive*, red very slightly, and do not distinguish between colors very well. They can make out forms only when very close to them. The totally blind species find their way about as easily as the seeing species, thanks to the high development of their antennæ (olfactory sense). But the tree species, and those that go out a great deal, have much better vision and combine this with the sense of smell.

(1) *Experiments and Critical Remarks on Sensations in Insects*, republished in the *Rivista di scienze biologiche*. Como: 1900 and 1901.

The social sense, par excellence, of the ants is situated in the antennæ, which have three fundamental kinds of nervous sensorial terminations,—tactile hairs, olfactory maces, and olfactory depressions with flattened hairs transformed, more or less, into plates (olfactory plates). Numberless experiments have established that the antennæ, besides the sense of touch, are endowed with a chemical sense for distance and a chemical sense for contact that constitute a sort of modified sense of smell. The very position of the sense of smell at the extremity of very mobile limbs constantly waving in the air and busy feeling objects, implies a function, that is, a communication of external impressions to the brain, differing widely from our own sense of smell. The whirlwind of air that conveys olfactory particles to our nasal mucus, is incapable of conveying to us any notion of space and time, for the impressions we derive from them do not reach us in the form of precise relations of coexistence or of sequence. Therefore they cannot help us to form clear olfactory perceptions, that is, memories associated in precise relations. We can barely represent to ourselves a single odor. But the case is very different with ants, and in general with all insects provided with mobile antennæ. Two fundamental facts endow their sense of smell with higher qualities that must necessarily enable them to comprehend space:—

1. The direct contact of odorous objects, an easy contact that enables the ant to perceive, as soon as it has touched them, the chemical nature of the objects by which it is surrounded and the relative disposition in space of different objects of diverse odors. Thus, as they go on their way, they perceive by contact with their antennæ, which feel everything, one odor in front, another behind, one on the left, another on a blade of grass, another on a clump of earth, and still others on a stone or flower. All these successive odors by contact, arranged for them in a fixed and determinate way in the fields of space, as in our case by the form and color of the objects we perceive, impart to the ant's sense of smell a character eminently relational to space, and even to time, through the sequence of the odorous fields that

have been perceived. They must necessarily enable the ants to find their way in either direction, and prevent their confounding the direction of going with the direction of the return, no matter at what point of the road, known to the ants, they may be placed. Now this is the fact, as I showed no less than fifteen years ago. Noting also among ants this power of distinguishing between the two directions of their tracks, Bethe assumed that it was more or less a polarization of the track. He would not have done so had he studied and understood the ways of these insects. I name this sensorial faculty the sense of smell of the rational contact.

2. Further, the mobility of the antennæ enables them to perceive, probably by means of the olfactory plates, odorous particles dissolved in the air, and also, to a greater or less degree, the direction from which they proceed. I am of the opinion that this faculty is not so fundamental as the first. Nevertheless it exists, and it orientates ants as to the direction from which odors, more or less distant, come, by combining with the first, much more effectively than our nasal whirlwind does for us.

This sense of smell in the antennæ, which enables the insect to perceive exact relations of space, might be called the antennary topo-chemical sense.

The fact is that with the help of their antennæ ants recognize and distinguish between the objects they are in search of, their companions, their larvæ, their enemies, etc. Their antennæ constitute at one and the same time their social sense and their sense of orientation. If they happen to lose one of their antennæ, they manage to get along with the one that is left, but if they lose both, they suddenly become like one who is blind, deaf, and dumb. They can no longer tell their friends from their foes, they cease to perceive the food that is placed by them, they can no longer find their way, even within their own nest; in a word, they are absolutely lost, remain motionless, and only lick and clean their feet with their tongue. The rapid approach of an object which they see indistinctly will make them start and

induce a defensive movement of the mandibles, but this is all. Ants that but a moment before were bitterest enemies now live peaceably together and mutually lick each other, no longer recognizing who they are, while the fore parts of hostile ants, still provided with their antennæ, but separated from the rest of their bodies, go on fighting furiously.

It is from analogous facts that Pierre Huber deduced the existence of an antennary language among ants. In truth, the antennæ not only constitute the social sense, but they are at the same time a mobile organ that touches other ants most delicately and easily renders them attentive. On the one hand, they incite, on the other, they receive sensorial impressions.

Careful observation, however, compels me to affirm that the antennæ are first and foremost receptive organs, and that their inciting function is less than appears to be the case at first sight. Ants most frequently incite their companions to the performance of some act or another by abrupt and repeated shocks produced by striking with the mandibles or bumping with the forehead. Sometimes they accomplish the same purpose by striking the walls of the nest with their abdomen. It is in this way, for instance, that the danger signal is given by the *Camponotus*, while the slave-owning *Polyergus* strikes its companions with the forehead, the *Lasius* and the *Formica* with their mandibles, etc., to alarm them or to change the direction in which they are proceeding. When the *Tapinoma* wish to induce a motionless mass of their companions to follow them to a new home, they jump in among them, shake them, and then start slowly in the direction decided upon, while touching the ground, at every step, with the lower part of their abdomen, which contains glands that emit an odoriferous secretion. In this way they speedily induce the others to follow.

Language means signs and understanding. It goes without saying that understanding in ants must necessarily be quite rudimentary. We must take care, at this point, not to fall into anthropomorphism. The signs made are perceived by the senses of touch and smell. Of course they are not conventional, but

inherited, in other words, instinctive, and ever the same in every case and with every species. These signs enable one ant to communicate certain emotions, certain resolutions, certain directions to its companions, which understand these inherited signs, and obey them instinctively also.

In this language, memory and emotions play an important part. Ants are capable of recognizing sensorial impressions previously experienced by them, of remembering after many days, sometimes even after weeks have elapsed, either a road along which they have traveled, or companions from which they have been separated, whether friends or foes. They can remember places, objects, and living beings by means of their antennary sense, or specified and relational sense of smell. But they are incapable of communicating to each other the least reflection, for their associations are probably too rudimentary to allow of their forming general representations, even the simplest. On this point, however, interesting experiments have still to be made.

Of course abstract notions are entirely out of the question. An ant that has been touched, in a certain fashion, instinctively responds to the touch by a series of adapted and coördinated actions in which the senses intervene. It is quite certain that the reciprocal action of ants, one upon another, leads them to act in common in order to attain a complex end. As we observe them, we are often rendered impatient by what appears to us to be stupidity, that is, their inability to discover the most elementary solutions that are staring us in the face. But we forget that they do not possess sight like our own, that they have not, above all, a brain like ours, and that their preoccupations are very different from ours. The difficulty consists in attributing to them either too much or too little, and in interpreting rightly what we have observed.

A society of ants is limited to the ant-swarm or hill, that is, to the company of descendants of the mother or mothers that have founded the community. An ant-hill may contain several nests communicating with one another either on the surface or under ground. I have given to these ant-hills with

many nests, the name of colonies. All the dwellers in the same ant-heap are friends, a complete solidarity of interests, but hostile to any ants that do not belong to the ant-hill, save in the case of certain privileged guests of which I shall speak.

The enmity of an ant-swarm towards living beings, and especially towards other ants, ranges from indifference to fury, passing through aversion and fear. The fury is absolutely maniacal and leads to complete disregard of life and of the most elementary precautions. The most usual cause of the pitched battles fought between various ant-swarms, whether of the same or of different species, is the struggle for life, that is, for food, and especially for the conquest of trees and plants covered with aphides, or else for the conquest of a nest. In these battles every form of weapon is made use of, but the mandibles, venom, sting, and the secretion of the anal glands play the most important part. The larger species endeavor to crush or decapitate the smaller. The latter cling to the feet and antennæ of the larger, hold them down to the ground, and cover them with bites or stings. The soft species hide themselves or are distinguished for their agility. Those with hard shells are generally slow; they allow themselves to be bitten or else shrink up and simulate death. As a general rule, the courage of ants increases with their numbers, exactly as with men. Single ants, feeling themselves unsupported, are inclined to flee. But this varies a great deal according to the species.

When the hottest of the fighting is over, some of the victors often vent their fury upon some of the vanquished or of the prisoners, and this in deliberate and cruel fashion. They refrain from using their venom, and are content to pull at the legs and antennæ of their victims, slowly sawing off these members with their mandibles. It is to this that I have given the name of cold-blooded fighting. It might well be called torturing.

Let me state, by the way, that the population of an ant-heap varies from twelve or fifteen ants to several hundred thousands, and, in the case of certain exotic species, it reaches probably into the millions. Now the strange and fundamental fact we have to

face is that all the members of the same community know each other as friends, while the inhabitants of another ant-heap, though of the same species, are immediately put down as enemies. I have carried out on this point a series of experiments with the results stated below, but it must not be forgotten that the various species behave very differently and that one must not indulge too readily in generalizations. Some species bring up foreign nymphæ, while others devour them, and still others throw them out. The same species, indeed, will act differently under different circumstances.

I took first some nymphæ and a few ants just hatched, of five different species of the genus *Formica*, and drawn from different ant-hills. These ants formed a single community and lived together on the very best terms. They also forthwith attacked and drove out every strange ant placed among them.

Next I placed nymphæ of *Formica pratensis* in an ant-hill of *Formica sanguinea*, and these were brought up. Long after they were hatched, I placed a number of their adult sisters, taken from the swarm of the *pratensis*, upon the dome of the abode of the *sanguinea*. The former sisters fought each other furiously, *pratensis* against *pratensis*, and slew each other in numbers.

From these facts, and many other analogous ones, I have come to the conclusion that ants learn to know each other after they have been hatched only. On the other hand, Lubbock has caused nymphæ of *Formica fusca* and *lasius* to be bred up by ants of different species, and found that these insects, if returned to their native ant-heap after they were hatched, were generally made welcome. But, since the species used and the conditions under which the experiments were made, are both different, further experiments will have to be carried out before the question can be settled.

On taking up nests of *Formica pratensis* and placing them by the nest of a hostile ant-swarm, I have invariably witnessed the outbreak of a war to the knife, such as has already been described by Pierre Huber. But when I took handfuls of these same *Formica pratensis* from various swarms, mixed them up all together in a

bag and then set them free in some place they were unacquainted with, a rapid and lasting alliance was always the result of the confusion and trouble in which they found themselves. This is very generally the case, and it may be said that war or alliance is the result of the circumstance. I desire to point out that the mixing in a bag is not a necessity; the contents of two ant-heaps may be taken in separate bags, and it is sufficient to empty them out side by side in some strange place. The feeling of hostility is forgotten in the need of caring for the nymphæ, of building an abode, and finding food. It is only at the outset that a few passages at arms are indulged in by some individuals, and these are merely temporary. Very soon the alliance is consummated and a common swarm formed, while, on the other hand, if one of the bags be emptied within a yard of the normal and intact nest of another swarm, a war of extermination and the flight of the vanquished are the result. I find it necessary to lay stress upon this fact in view of the opinion held by several contemporary writers, who believe they can explain everything by reflexes and the odor of the nest. Besides, results vary according to the species.

Taking now another way, we may put a number of individuals of different swarms, and even of different species, together in a bowl, when the most extraordinary alliances and the most unexpected combats will take place. A *Formica pratensis* will ally itself to *sanguineæ* and fight members of its own species. Another will separate itself from a *Formica fusca* with which it had formed an alliance in order to consort with *pratenses* belonging to another swarm. I cannot cite every case, and must refer my readers to my "Ants of Switzerland."

Here, however, is one of the most interesting experiments I have carried out. *Formica sanguinea* and *Formica pratensis* are two species inveterately hostile to each other and always at war. I chose two populous swarms and put into the same bag a large number of ants of each of these species, mixing and jumbling the whole lot at once. During the course of the next hour great tumult reigned within the bag. At the end of that time I

connected the mouth of the bag with an artificial glazed nest by means of a tube. The ants rushed into it in utter confusion, and greatly excited. Many were fighting; many were dead; every time individuals of the two species met, they threatened each other with their mandibles, and they were all a prey to terror. The sanguineæ were the first to recover their composure, and started to move from the bag to the glazed nest. The pratenses, though more suspicious, followed; the fighting soon became less fierce; the ants wounded in the first encounters died, and by evening there was only some squabbling and threatening. The next day, save for some instances of bickering, nearly all the ants were at work together. I then placed them in a larger nest, and in the course of a couple of days the alliance between them was almost perfect. On the fifth day of the experiment some minor quarrels broke out, but the sanguineæ and the pratenses were beginning mutually to disgorge honey and to treat each other as comrades. Thereafter the harmony was complete. On the tenth day I let my ants loose in a meadow. They united in attacking a nest of *Formica rufibarbis* and settled in it, without exhibiting the least inclination to separate. The moving was done in common, the foes of a few days before helping and carrying each other. True, two or three sanguineæ did exhibit some animosity and attacked some pratenses, but the latter let them have their own way and did not attempt to defend themselves. A small sanguinea hung on to the foot of a pratensis, and died in the act. This was the end of the fighting, and the mixed swarm lived in perfect harmony within its nest. On the sixty-third day of the experiment, I took a handful of *Formica pratensis* from the original swarm, placed them within a few centimeters of my mixed swarm, and watched the result with the keenest interest.

This is what happened. The sanguineæ attacked the newcomers quite fiercely, but without making use of their venom. The allied pratenses then came up, and, though they did not fight their former sisters, they started to remove their nymphæ into the nest. The new arrivals showed themselves hostile to

the sanguineæ, and at the outset treated their former sisters rather badly, but they soon joined them, having no doubt recognized them, and allowed themselves to be borne to the nest by them. The sanguineæ proved comparatively gentle in their treatment of those ants that were personally unknown to them, but the scent of which must have been the same as that of their new comrades. They plainly did not take them for the latter, however, and upset and bit them.

On the next and six following days I observed some cold-blooded fights, or tortures, rather, inflicted by some sanguineæ upon some of the pratenses, whose legs and antennæ they sawed off, mutilating them with remarkable fury and perseverance. The pratenses remained absolutely passive, fleeing, whenever opportunity offered, into the recesses of the nest. A few pratenses were slain under these conditions, but the greater number were received as allies by the sanguineæ. As early as the sixth day harmony was fully established.

In several other cases of alliances between adult ants of different swarms, as, for instance, among the *Leptothorax*, I have noted specific and persistent hostility on the part of some members of the newly allied party towards a few of the others. Ants that have been submerged or chloroformed recognize their companions, and are recognized by them very quickly on awaking. On the other hand, among the *Camponotus ligniperdus*, I noted that working ants which, in the course of an experiment, had been placed for six weeks in a bowl, failed to recognize their former comrades at the end of that time, and that war broke out between them. There are, therefore, great diversities to be noted, according to the genera and the species, both as regards the power of memory and the tendency to unite or fight.

Powdered corrosive sublimate has a singularly paralyzing effect upon the antennary sense of ants belonging to the subfamily of the Myrmicids, depriving them for a certain time of the capacity of recognizing each other. If the dwellers in an ant-hill are dusted over with corrosive sublimate, they immedi-

ately fall upon each other and fight. And if the antennæ of the *Myrmica* are cut off, the same result is produced.

Taking all these curious facts into account, we are forced to conclude that the antennary sense of ants and their capacity for distinguishing their comrades from their foes, of finding their way about, etc., are inseparable, and constitute one of the most singular biological problems. I do not think I err in attributing the puzzling part of this faculty of distinguishing to the very special properties of the antennary sense of smell on contact, of which I have spoken above,—properties that naturally escape the organs of our human sense of smell and consequently its subjectivism.

It goes without saying that it is by means of the antennary sense of smell that ants distinguish their friends from their foes, and that the related remembrances are olfactory (topo-chemical). It is not surprising, therefore, that after having plunged a *Tetramorium* (a variety of ant) in a mash made of crushed individuals of a hostile species, Bethe should have observed that the said *Tetramorium* was attacked by its comrades. The result was certain, and the experiment was childish. Man acts precisely in the same way when his senses are deceived. But it does not follow from this fact that everything can be explained by the expressions “nest odor” or “family odor.”

I shall not dwell at length upon the family relations of ants within the nest. Utilitarianism rules in them, having adapted itself to a social instinct in which altruism has become synonymous with egoism, and realizes the dream of anarchists: there is no government, no head, no law, no authority, no bureaucracy, no “cracy” of any kind, no parties, no civil war. No one commands and no one obeys. We shall see that even the supposed slaves are free and masters of their own fate. There is, therefore, absolute liberty and a large amount of solidarity; that is, each one works for all the others, but all do not help the individual. Even the idlers are fed and cared for, but they exist in special cases only. In spite of this there is perfect order in ant-hills, and much ability is shown in the righting of any disorder.

If a nest of ants be upset and the contents poured out into a bag and thrown out elsewhere, the ants will at first seem quite bewildered, but they speedily reconnoitre the ground, carry the larvæ into the shade, find a temporary shelter to be used as a nest, and thither they transport everything. The enemy is fought, aphides are sought for and found, and usually within the space of one hour the main matters have been settled, and the regular construction of a nest has been begun.

Ants, on being observed individually, are seen to divide the work up among themselves and instinctively to harmonize their efforts. Yet one is impressed by great differences in the individual activity. Some individuals, especially those whose social stomach is full, are lazier and let things go, while others are working feverishly. One working ant happens to have discovered a shelter for the larvæ and nymphæ under a leaf, and is taking them there one after another, on a dead run; another ant has found a cricket's hole, fitted to become the needed nest, and carries her companions to it in succession, drawing them along by main strength and inspiring the others to follow her example. A third begins to heap up materials at the entrance to the nest that is to be, and barricades the opening, while still another is burrowing below. It often happens that two working ants interfere with each other in such labor, but not for long; the less determined one leaves or else helps the other and adopts her plan. Often, too, a working ant will tear down the work done by another and proceed in a different way, but ere long the better conceived plan is preferred and the worse given up. Slight outbreaks of impatience, not unlike disputes, are frequent, as well as some snapping, rather painful perhaps to the victim; but the peculiarity of ants that are friendly is that such divergences in action are always very short lived, and, save in very rare cases, of which I shall speak, leave no heart burnings behind. One or the other speedily yields and adopts her comrade's plan.

One of the best opportunities of studying these facts is provided by the migrations of the *Formica* which Pierre Huber has described so well. The recruiting ants often exhibit downright

violence in the way they seize their companions, in order to bear them to the new nest they have settled upon, and the latter often resist before they curl up and allow themselves to be borne away. Some resist at times so energetically that the recruiting ant gives up. It is then something like a "friendly combat."

Larvæ are largely nourished by the working ants disgorging food for them. It is true that the larvæ are very well cared for, but when their number exceeds that which the swarm can feed, the surplus larvæ are unhesitatingly devoured, for nothing must be wasted. The same fate befalls every wounded larva or nymphæ, but not, curiously enough, a wounded adult working ant, even among carnivorous species that devour other varieties of ants. The working ants feed their comrades and clean them; they also take them in when they have lost their way, but they cast out the dead and the seriously wounded. Those that are slightly wounded are licked and cleaned like the others. It is evident that disgorgement and work for the community form part of the natural appetites of ants and, like the satisfying of every instinct, give them pleasure. Disgorgement doubles their enjoyment of fresh food.

The most remarkable instinct is that of devoted defence of the nest, for which, in the majority of species, so many ants are ready to sacrifice their lives.

Now let us pass to the different special adaptations of the social instinct of ants.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

MOTIVES TO IMPERIAL FEDERATION

CAPT. ALFRED T. MAHAN, *U. S. N.*

Within the last twenty years Great Britain has passed through two crises which should appeal strongly to the attention and intelligence—if not also to the practical sympathy—of Americans. Not only have they an analogy to problems we ourselves have met and solved in the course of our national existence, but the result to which they tend, by confirming the power of the British Empire, will probably strengthen likewise the external policy of the United States during the next generation. Interest, due in any case, is emphasized by the fact that the issue at stake has been the same in both these momentous instances. Under all superficial divergences and misleading appearances, the real question about Ireland and about South Africa has been, "Shall Great Britain exist as an Empire, or shall it fall to pieces by a series of willing or tolerated secessions?" As Joseph said to Pharaoh concerning the two visions of the lean kine and the blasted ears,—the dream is one. The impetus given to Imperial Federation by the South African War, the striking root downward and bearing fruit upward of the imperial idea, has doubtless been immense; but the moment really decisive of the Empire's future—as an Empire—is to be sought in the period when Mr. Parnell's effort at disruption obtained the support of Mr. Gladstone. That was the critical instant, which determined both that the conception should come to the birth, and that, being born, it should not be strangled in its cradle.

An impressive article, published in 1885, on the eve of the general election which resulted in that disastrous stroke of policy, Mr. Gladstone's Irish Bill, both foretold its coming and, in a spirit of prophecy, perhaps not fully conscious of the scope of its utterance, predicted likewise the inevitable revulsion of the nation from a foreign policy marked by constant feebleness and repeated disgrace, as well as from an economical propaganda which, whatever its possible fitness to a future yet distant, had too far outrun the general sentiment of the people to be practicable. The foreign policy—summed up in the words of Candahar, Majuba, Suakim, Khartoum, and Gordon—was identified by the writer with the name of Mr. Gladstone; the economical programme with that of Mr. Chamberlain. Neither the one nor the other was longer acceptable. The issue indicated, and since fulfilled, was the abatement of interest in internal changes and the concentration of national sentiment upon external policy.

It needed only the announcement of Mr. Gladstone's Irish Bill of 1886 to precipitate the conclusion, for which men's minds were already prepared. The Irish measure, in form a matter of arrangement internal to the United Kingdom, was in essence one of which the gravest bearing was upon external policy; for in principle it involved the dissolution of the Empire. It is to the undying honor and distinction of Mr. Chamberlain that he quickly recognized the issue, and decided without hesitation that the existence of the nation and of the Empire, in undiminished power, involved the interests of every class of the community, and therefore utterly exceeded in immediate importance all projects of social readjustment. Subordinating to the general welfare the objects with which he had been most closely associated, he separated himself from the party of his lifelong allegiance, in which lay the best hope of accomplishing his social programme, and thenceforth has given preëminence to the imperial interests which he saw threatened. This postponement of political objects involved a sacrifice of personal ambition, to be appreciated only by recalling the conditions of that time. The same astute observer, writing but a year later, when the moment-

ous step had been taken, derided its finality. "Mr. Chamberlain is the obvious successor of Mr. Gladstone in leadership of the democracy. It is idle to suppose he would sacrifice this prospect for the sake of taking a subordinate position in a Conservative or even a Coalition Ministry. Sooner or later the logic of facts must separate him from his present associates. * * * His assistance to Unionists is welcome as long as it lasts. Of its essence, however, it is transitory. Mr. Chamberlain will return to the Liberal fold, probably at no remote date." The logic of one great thought, Imperial Unity, the exclusive leading of the single eye, has falsified these predictions; but it is only fair to accept their measurement of what Mr. Chamberlain surrendered by his act.

It is to be apprehended that the recent striking outburst of blended national and imperial sentiments in Great Britain and her colonies, the display of unified enthusiasm sweeping over the various quarters of the Empire, has been an unpleasant surprise to the world at large. In it has been recognized the strong bond of national feeling, oneness of origin and blood, joined to and inspiring the imperial conviction which involves a fundamental unity of policy. If, in the union of the two, deed answered to word, if success followed upon attempt, a power nothing short of new had arisen in the world. The fluttering conception of twenty years ago had become a reality; incipient, perhaps, but with what a possible future! To this, doubtless, has been due in great part the corresponding unanimity of denunciation on the Continent. An unexpected manifestation of power and resolution has elicited an echoing outcry from disappointed anticipation. It is not quite thirty years (1874) since a foreign naval captain remarked to me that in his belief England was a "*colosse à pieds d'argile*." This impression was general. The phrase voiced a wish as well as a thought; and it may be said that then there was much to justify the implied prophecy, whether it took the shape of a hope or a fear, prompted by dislike or by affection. The tendency of the great money-getting era of trade and material prosperity, of exclusive devotion to purely commercial ideas,

of the prevalence of strictly national, internal, domestic interests over colonial sympathies and imperial ambitions, was then culminating to its decline; and one looked in vain for the appearance of higher aspirations and broader views, bearing promise of a fresh spring to national life. A down grade seemed at hand.

After the long supremacy of the dollars-and-cents standards of policy, which arose and flourished in the middle of the nineteenth century, to languish and droop with its closing decades, experience is refreshed, and hope stimulated, by the sight of two great peoples, who speak the same tongue and inherit the same tradition, casting aside considerations of mere monetary cost and abandoning themselves to the domination of a lofty ideal. This the United States did in 1861 under the tremendous impetus exerted by the simple words "The Union," which, cherished almost to idolatry by the boyhood of the North during preceding generations,—as the writer well remembers,—lifted the nation to its feet as one man, when disruption threatened. The Union was to us a personification, devotion to which probably afforded the nearest approach to personal loyalty that the spirit of our institutions warrants. Again, although to a less degree, in the Philippines matter, where no such commanding motive or long tradition exists to inspire, there is nevertheless to be found, surely disengaging itself from the confused tumult of impressions inevitable upon decisions taken in the heat of pressing action, the deep conviction, widespread among the people, that here is no mere question of gain or loss, of land or money, but one of moral responsibility. Upon us has devolved, by an inevitable sequence of causes, responsibility to our conscience for an assemblage of peoples in moral and political childhood; and responsibility further to the world at large, and to history,—the supreme earthly judge of men's actions,—for our course in the emergency thrust upon us. As such, the United States has accepted the burden. Its duties are not to be discharged by throwing them overboard, or by wrapping our political talent in a napkin for our own national security and ease.

The noble record of Great Britain in Egypt during the past

twenty years, justly considered, gives inspiration and direction to our purposes for the Philippines. External conditions are doubtless most diverse; but, if the informing spirit be the same, it will adapt itself to the circumstances, and the good will find the way to manifest itself in the damp lowlands and mountains of the islands as surely as in the dry Nile Valley. Here the example has been set us for encouragement; and to cavilers at the integrity of our purpose, or the advantage of our efforts to a subject people, we have but to cite Egypt, which, like the Philippines, and but a few years before them, is emerging from a long period of oppression, to advance through national childhood to such measure of self-administration as its people may prove fit for.

As regards the question of federal union, the priority of experience is reversed. However great the difference of conditions here presented to the British Empire and to America,—and it is at least greater than the diversity between the Philippines and Egypt,—the United States has been first to find a solution. The American colonies began their attempt under the difficulty of mutual alienation, due to long standing tradition, and with interests differing probably more radically than those which now exist between the several English-speaking parts of the British Empire. Despite this serious initial obstacle, the thirteen original States, aided later by those afterwards constituted, worked out the problem of union through a prolonged period of perplexity, anxiety, repulsion, and dissension, to final achievement, in the completeness of which the men of today have almost lost the very memory of the antecedent travail, and of the narrow margin by which ruin was more than once escaped. Here, as in Egypt, but with more vital issues, there is the cheering example of success; wrung in this instance out of the jaws of imminent failure. Hence, while the difference of circumstances surrounding the problem of Imperial Federation precludes in great measure any advantage of precedents to be found in the historic path by which the American communities made their way to union, it may safely be argued that, if the informing

spirit of desire be present, the adequate motive to a closer imperial bond recognized, the questions of form and method will be solved in the one case as they have been in the other. In both, the purpose and end is the same: to assure unified, or imperial, external action, by the means of an adequate organ, common to all, while preserving the independence of the several parts in their internal affairs. Whatever the particular solution appropriate to either, both present the difficulty of reconciling in practical working two principles, which in terms appear contradictory, whereas in fact they may prove complementary.

Questions of such difficult character do not recommend themselves to practical mankind as political conundrums, in answering which the satisfaction of the intellect is its own sufficient reward. They are not accepted by men as recreations, but are forced upon them by urgency. They must supply their own adequate motive, and propose their own reasonable end, or they receive no attention. Only by motives most grave, by danger most pressing, by inconveniences serious in the present and threatening to be intolerable in the future, were the American States first driven into a combination, imperfect and often grudging. From this, still under the pressure of renewed urgency, they advanced into a union more perfect in form but still sadly lacking in unity, either of understanding or sentiment, until finally, to avert dismemberment, physical force itself had to be exerted by those who had come not only to believe in the Union, but by long, unquestioning devotion to love it supremely. Mutual jealousy, quite as much as mutual love, characterized the first efforts of the States at association. As feeling grew kinder and warmer, divergence of interest and of political ideals still tended to preserve and to promote the element of repulsion, as was shown in the debates on the acceptance of the present Constitution, and in many incidents of checkered national life through two generations. Ultimately, translated into broader action, from individual States to groups of States, the last manifestation of the disruptive tendency took on a sectional form, upon a scale

so large that the ensuing war was in character rather international than "civil," as it has been commonly styled.

With one exception, there does not exist among the different bodies which should compose a federal Empire of Great Britain the traditional alienation which hampered the movement of the American States in their first efforts towards union. The exception, of course, is Ireland. Practically regarded, it is impossible for a military man, or a statesman with appreciation of military conditions, to look at the map and not perceive that the ambition of Irish separatists, if realized, would be even more threatening to the national life of Great Britain than the secession of the South was to that of the American Union. It would be deadlier, also, to imperial aspirations; for Ireland, by geographical position, lies across and controls the communications of Great Britain with all the outside world, save only that considerable, but far from preponderant, portion which borders the North Sea and the Baltic. Independent and hostile, it would manacle Great Britain, which at present is, and for years to come must remain, by long odds the most powerful member of the federation, if that take form. The Irish question, therefore, is vitally important, not to Great Britain only, but to the colonies. The considerations that swayed the mind of the Union in the Civil War apply with peculiar force to the connection between Great Britain and Ireland. And let it be distinctly noted that the geographical relation of Ireland to Great Britain imposes as indispensable a political relation which would be fatal to any scheme of federation between the mother country and the remote great colonies. The legislative supremacy of the British parliament, against the assertion of which the American colonists revolted, and which today would be found intolerable in exercise in Canada and Australia, cannot be yielded in the case of an island where independent action might very well be attended with fatal consequences to its partner. The instrument for such action, in the shape of an independent parliament, could not safely be trusted even to avowed friends.

The constant lightening of control by the mother country, and the concession of substantial self-government, have removed from the problem before Great Britain and her colonies the initial disadvantage under which the American States drew together; but, on the other hand, the idea of Imperial Federation long awaited the impulse which they received, first from a common extreme danger, and afterwards from their close contact with one another, which emphasized the general injury that mutual independence and inconsiderate action were daily causing. It is not fanciful to say that, as the common dangers to the American colonies from the power of Great Britain, which was to them irresistible unless they combined, supplied the first motive to effectual association; so the needed impulse, urgent if not imperative, was found by the members of the British Empire in the danger and threatened oppression of one of their number by alien blood. The feeling of nationality, the sentiment of one blood and one political tradition, wrought powerfully in support of imperial action in South Africa; and it is a commonplace that action intensifies sentiment.

When the American colonists united in form, however defective, they had made a large practical step towards the sentiment of union, which as a constraining force is even stronger than interest. In that which has been well named "the critical period" of American history, between the War of Independence and the adoption of the Constitution, the love of the Union showed itself forcibly in the utterances even of those who dreaded union on the terms proposed. When we consider the narrow majorities by which these were accepted, it is easy to believe that only the realization in act of the first union, that of the Confederacy, made possible the second,—the federal Union. When the British colonies and the mother country, three years ago, rose together in defence of a threatened brother and child, translating into action an idea nascent but as yet weak in its grasp of men's affections, they also advanced a first stage, the most important stage, in the direction of a further unity, under such ultimate form as their particular relations may demand. The analogy of

the two cases is perfectly real. The idea of union was not new to Americans before their Revolution. On the contrary, its advantages were obvious; but all attempts prompted by manifest interest fell abortive, until pressure was supplied by the Stamp Act and its train of incidents. The legislation of the Transvaal, supplemented by the Afrikander Bond, has fulfilled the same office in the history of Imperial Federation; unless, indeed, a prior claim to that honor be established for Mr. Parnell. Not the conception nor yet tentative theories were wanting; but languid inclination had to be quickened into stirring life by contact with pressing occasion.

Two successive dangers, Ireland and South Africa, have thus contributed to the onward movement of imperialism. They have indicated a need and furnished a motive. The first gave birth to aspiration, conscious and definite, towards a higher form of imperial development; corresponding in analogy, though by no means necessarily in outward resemblance, to the "more perfect union" of the once loosely combined American States. The second emphasized the wisdom of such a policy by a concrete example of its advantages. Aspiration, having found its opportunity, was translated into action; and action in turn reinforces and stimulates aspiration by demonstration, and by its powerful effect upon sentiment, the great motive force of humanity. Happily, too, for the general impulse, the illustration of advantage has been afforded in one of the great colonies, where national self-existence, entire independence of outside control, and exemption from the exposure attendant upon an imperial war, might have a preponderant hold upon men's minds. The specific utility of the imperial connection to the large secondary members was shown; for the menace to one of them came from a state which, though in form internal to the Empire, was in fact and power external as well as alien.

Similar conditions may well arise elsewhere, with extreme increase of danger to one of the great colonies, if severed by independence from the support of the British navy. Canada, doubtless, whatever she might lose otherwise, would find territo-

rial immunity in the policy of the United States, avowed in the Monroe Doctrine,—as applicable to her as to South America; but to South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, in the absence of the imperial bond, local difficulties,—such as those of the Transvaal, and of New Guinea twenty years ago,—would assume a very different aspect, if incurred with a powerful European naval state. But these instances also bring into conspicuous evidence the general truth that sea power, the material strength and bond of an empire the component parts of which are separated by thousands of miles of ocean, is equally essential to the individual security of the several members. Imperial Federation, in action, will manifest itself preëminently along ocean and naval lines.

At present the large colonies, while retaining their hold upon the support of the Empire, to the power of which they in turn can contribute much, substantially control all that relates to their internal affairs. Taxation, regulation of commerce, the purse and the sword, are in their own hands. Were they to become immediately independent, no jar would be felt in the continuance of the local administration. The appointment of the governors by the Crown, may, if choice be judicious, materially help to maintain the reality, as it does the form, of political attachment to the mother country; but the actual government is parliamentary, and assumption of independence would not necessarily involve any serious modification of institutions. Add to this, that in two out of the three large aggregations of colonial communities, in Canada and in Australia, there exists now a federal compact, uniting what but a few years ago were politically separate bodies, linked only by common allegiance to Great Britain, and we have the present political condition of the principal factors, of which an Imperial Federation, if realized, will be composed. British South Africa still remains an assemblage of colonies, with particular local and domestic difficulties of their own, on which it is inopportune here to enlarge. It seems inevitable, however, that, when the resistance of the Boers shall have ended, some form of union will be requisite to insure the

dominance of British political ideas and traditions throughout the mass; for in such community of sentiment a federal union of the Empire must find the homogeneousness without which it will be but a vain word.

Imperialism, the extension of national authority over alien communities, is a dominant note in the world-politics of today. Comparatively a newcomer, it already contends for preëminence with commercial ambition, to which also it ministers. This out-reaching of an imperialistic arm by all the greater nations, whether voluntary or compelled by circumstances, constitutes and summarizes the motive to a closer union than that which now exists between the members of the British Empire. In the past, Ireland and the Transvaal have given impulsion; the present and the future have further reason, no less imperious. The conditions have ceased under which independence might conceivably be more advantageous to the larger colonies. If ever true, it is no longer so that the colonial tie brings them no compensative advantage for exposure in war. They are now surrounded by ambitions and confronted by navies which till recently did not exist. Once war meant to them only incidental injury; now it may well mean permanent mutilation to a colony thrown by independence upon its own resources. Not now, if ever, much less now than ever before, can colonial interests be viewed as separate from the politics of Europe and America. In peace as in war, in peace to avert war, or to stay trespass which armed power alone can restrain, each colony now needs the strong arm of the mother country's fleet to sustain its local strength. According to the circumstances, such support may be given either immediately in colonial waters, or by diversion, in Europe or elsewhere, keeping the enemy's battleships remote. In one way or the other it is indispensable. With it the colony will be—not invulnerable, perhaps, but—invincible; without it, immunity can be insured only by the maintenance of a local navy approaching equality with those of Europe.

The greater European powers are now colonially present in several quarters of the globe, and there renew through their

colonies the contact and collision of interests which have marked European history. The histories of Australasia and South Africa, possibly of Canada also, are yet to make. Colonial jealousies in turn are transmitted back to the mother countries, and there give rise to diplomatic friction perhaps more dangerous, certainly more frequent, than do questions purely European. In the latter, rulers meet facts of territorial tenure so founded in popular acceptance and mutual jealousies as to give little expectation of facile modification by resort to war. In newer countries, as the history of North America witnesses, the undetermined conditions which exist, and the resultant unrest in men's minds, predispose colonists to jealousies which readily find or give provocation; and strife is promoted by the comparative ease with which great territories may change masters by the fortune of war, as Canada and India, for instance, passed from France to Great Britain in the eighteenth century. In our own day, the political future of the vast tract known as British South Africa is being decided by a war that has found its origin in colonial friction, but to the successful issue of which imperial intervention and sea power were essential. The consequences to Great Britain and her colonies of failure in this case, and the possibilities inherent in the proximity of German East and Southwest Africa, illustrate further the contingencies with which the present and the future of the British Empire will have to deal.

This reliance of the colonies upon the mother nation finds its correlative in the fact that European states in turn rest upon their colonies for maintenance in necessary activities. They can no longer extend freely within their own continent, nor there find adequate markets for their ever increasing production; yet, in order that they may securely expand elsewhere, they must have local support in the several quarters whither their energies reach. This interaction of mother countries and colonies, their reciprocal dependence and importance, are decisive facts, to which development and organization should be given. For local security, or for the assertion of external rights or interests, the

colonies cannot as yet dispense with the material force of the home government. Without it they are unequal to a conflict, necessarily in the main naval, with any one of three or four foreign nations whose colonial possessions are near them. A European fleet, on the other hand, must rely upon local bases of action far more than in the days when coal renewal was not a question. For this, isolated fortified stations, like Bermuda and Gibraltar, may be most useful from unique geographical situation; but in intrinsic value they do not compare with positions which have behind them a loyal continent, with extensive social and commercial organization, such as Canada, Australia, and South Africa afford.

This reciprocal service and utility constitute the chief general and common interest in which the motive to Imperial Federation at present lies. It is not alone, but it is paramount, and will, I think, be found to embrace all the many minor interests which now, and in peace, tend to union; for it defends them, and in defending perpetuates. It is essentially an interest of general defence imposed by novel and growing world-conditions. It must be recognized as covering, not only the local welfare of each and all the parts, but also the communications between them, chiefly by sea, which may, and in large measure do, lie remote from any one of the federation. The several members, and the highways between them, together make one whole, to the maintenance of which each even now contributes. The object of federation is to promote the security of this imperial system and its development on firmer lines. To the general acceptance of this fact of a supreme common interest must be added on all hands a hearty disposition to subordinate local interests to the general welfare, when they clash. Just here, of course, arises the difficulty of realizing any federation, especially in its early stages; later, like everything possessed of inherent usefulness, federation gains strength by its hold upon men's affections. The difficulty is very real, for not only does each member naturally exaggerate its own claims, but it also tends to disregard the needs of others, of which it has not immediate

experience. Out of touch, out of mind, is the evil genius of all federative efforts, to be expelled only by the superior influence of a dominating affection for the tie of union, through experience of its benefits.

In the order of logical sequence, federation finds its origin and motive force in a common interest, which is the first impulse in the direction of the desired object. The next step is to recognize clearly what is this object, this goal of attainment, by reaching which the admitted interest shall be subserved. The object, I suppose, is to provide the several members with an organism, an instrument common to all, which shall be specifically efficient in the maintenance of the common interests, and inoperative towards strictly individual concerns. This object is loosely styled Imperial Federation, but its particular form and the method of attainment are yet indeterminate. The form of an instrument, and the method of its fabrication, though dictated by the use for which it is designed, are in process distinct from it. The States of the American Union, for example, having recognized certain common interests, formed the common object of making a special provision for the care of those specific interests and of none others. The particular method,—adapted subsequently to the recognition of interest and object,—was a central government fully equipped with executive, legislative, and judicial functions. This form suited them, but most probably may not suit the conditions of the British Empire, the members of which at present seem in the position of having recognized, somewhat imperfectly, a community of interest. Thence has arisen a desire, vague and somewhat feeble, for an object, an instrument, they see not yet just what, to which the common interest may be solely intrusted. When minds are definitely settled on these two points, that they have the interest and need the instrument, thinking men will sooner or later evolve methods. In a recent excursion into that realm of unfulfilled prophecy, the magazines of twenty years ago, I found affirmed the hopelessness of Australian federation. Following by a few numbers, perhaps elicited by this, Sir Henry Parkes stated that all the

more thoughtful men in Australia had thought out in one form or another the question of federation. The result in Australia is now before us. Imperial Federation is doubtless a problem very different in kind, but not necessarily more hopeless. The need being recognized, individuals will frame methods, from the discussion of which feasible measures will result. Interest is the foundation of the whole; the object is the building to be raised thereon, the plan of which depends upon the needs of those who shall use it. The interest, again, is self-existent; whether men like it or not, there it is; the object—union in some form—is a matter of voluntary acceptance and purposeful effort on the part of those interested. The method by which the object is to be attained is the last in the mental processes.

The contrivance of methods requires close detailed knowledge of the political conditions of the several parts, to be attained only by prolonged personal contact. A foreigner of reasonable modesty will here forbear suggestion, but may with less presumption consider some of the obvious circumstances which make the object more or less desirable, and the methods of its attainment more or less intricate.

From the wide dispersion of the principal members it is evident that each one, by acquiescing in any federal bond, enters into such new relations with its fellows as involve a policy external to itself, additional to that already existing towards distinctly foreign nations. Internal affairs remain in the hands of each one; foreign relations continue unaltered; but superimposed upon both come relations to one another on the part of communities geographically far apart and heretofore practically severed, save for the loose tie now uniting them to the mother country. These relations are new and are external; their maintenance involves an established politic action—policy—distinctly external. Moreover, whatever the nature of the federal bond, there is conceded to it a certain amount of the virtually entire independence previously enjoyed. This will be true of Great Britain as well as of the colonies. At the present writing, in the absence of any federal union, the mother country has entire management of the

foreign policy of the Empire. Concern for the interests of the colonies, regard to their possible action in case of serious discontent with particular measures, certainly and necessarily modify the decisions of the British cabinet. In this way the colonies possess influence; but influence is different from power, less assured in exercise, and less dignified in recognition. Colonial interests, as affected by foreign relations, not only are not in the hands of the colonists, but they have no constitutional voice in determining them. In this chiefly their dependency now consists; and Sir Henry Parkes, whose ideal of Australian independence was not severance from the Empire, but entrance upon a due share in the government of a united Empire, avowed his conviction that there was no possibility of permanent contentment with the status of dependency. Deprecating separate independence, he defined the only alternative to be "sharing on equal terms in all the glory of the Empire." The precision of this phrase is in one respect noteworthy. It does not demand an equal share, but a share "on equal terms." This not only admits, but prescribes, that the power constitutionally exercised by each member shall bear some proportion to the strength contributed by it to the whole. Otherwise there is no equality.

Here, apparently, whatever the method adopted, there will have to be concession on the part of Great Britain. Constitutional restraint upon her present unlimited control of the foreign policy of the Empire, by some clear voting power on the part of the other members, would seem an inevitable concomitant of federation. In return, evidently, the colonies by acquiring a voice in the determination of foreign policy would incur a proportionate obligation to bear the burdens necessary to its enforcement. In place of the purely voluntary and unregulated assistance now given, there must be accepted a compulsory and determinate contribution to the general defence. The amounts may be fixed at the first by an agreement to which all the parties may be voluntary participants; but, unless the federation is to be periodically renewable at choice,—a most unsatisfactory arrangement,—its terms must provide the means for readjustment of

obligations, as the several parties advance in strength, at rates probably unequal. This is, in effect, entrusting the power of taxation to a central organ established by the federal Constitution. Unless acceptance of this reapportionment of burdens, as provided for by the terms of federation, is obligatory upon every member, the federation carries in its constitution the seeds of decay. It is doomed from its birth; for not only is each member at liberty to withdraw, but the sense of that liberty will continually sap the sentiment for union which supplies the spirit of federation, as mutual interest does its body.

We meet here clearly an initial difficulty in the inequality of population and resources among the members of the supposed federation. I assume that these would be the United Kingdom, the Dominion of Canada, the Australian Commonwealth, New Zealand, and the group of South African colonies, as yet uncombined. These, at least, would be the principal pillars of the federated Empire. Among them the United Kingdom is now so greatly preponderant, upon any ordinary basis of comparison, as to outweigh all the others put together. As in the case of the province of Holland among the seven United Netherlands, this is in effect a cohesive force now, but it evidently introduces a grave difficulty in the way of formal federation. Shall the colonies put themselves under bonds to any central body, in which their total voice is outweighed by the vote of the home country? Could Great Britain accept an arrangement like that of the first American confederacy, where each State, large and small, had one vote? Is there any feasible combination of these two alternatives, such as is today presented by the national legislature of the United States?

It is needless to insist upon the practical difficulty as to method. Evidently, to overcome it, motive must be strong. We must fall back upon the common interest which points the way to the common object, leaving to the ingenuity of those directly concerned, or to evolution—perhaps to both—the determination of means. The common interest demands increased mutual support throughout the Empire, in view of the new conditions of the

world which have transferred the rivalries and the needs of Europe to colonial and other foreign regions. The object is to reach some working arrangement by which the several contributions of the various parts of the Empire to the general support and defence may be not only determined but enforced. In peace things may drift along as they are; but Imperial Federation is needed for probable emergencies, to combine military preparation, to avert war by evident readiness, or to meet it if it come. It requires, therefore, the power of the sword and the purse, guaranteed by something more binding than the voluntary action from time to time of the individual communities composing it. For sustained effort Imperial Federation will be impotent, unless at the very least the several members are willing to accept a fixed burden, periodically determined by some competent body, external to all, but in the constitution of which each, of course, has a voice. The experience of the United States goes farther. They found it not sufficient to determine in a lump amount the proportion due from each member; effective union, efficiency for the defence of the whole, was not obtained until power was given to the central government,—not merely to fix the quotas in men and money of the several States,—but to lay and to exact taxes upon the citizens of all the States, passing over the State governments directly to individual men. The power refused by them to the British parliament was deliberately, for the sake of union, granted to the Congress of the United States, in which the States and their citizens were severally represented.

This it will be seen was a question of method. Its adoption resulted from long, bitter experience. Only so, and hardly so, was it conceded. It was the final step in the progress to union. Like its predecessors, it was extorted by dire emergency. This imparted the motive; bringing men to desire, as a political object, the organism, the scheme, which out of the States framed the Nation and started it on the road to success. To the American motive geographical nearness contributed much; for the different communities could not help seeing the injury all were receiving from their mutual indifference or antagonism. The members of

the British Empire are in this less fortunate. Their remoteness makes less evident the interaction of conditions and events. That the suffering of one member involves injury to each, because of its effect upon the whole, becomes less easy to realize. Motive thereby becomes less clear and less imperative. The impulse to form an object, and to grapple with the difficulties of method which impede its accomplishment, is weakened.

Still, the motives are there. Let each member of the Empire consider, for instance, what it would mean to the general welfare to have an independent and hostile Ireland lying across the access of Great Britain to the outer world. What would the weakening of the chief member of the Empire be to every other? What would a conquered and hostile South Africa have meant to Australia? and beyond Australia, to British influence in the Far East? Can decay of British influence in China be seen with equanimity by Canada, with its Pacific seaboard? For the same reason, it cannot be indifferent to Canada whether the British navy and commerce, in war, find their way to the Farther East through the Mediterranean, or be forced to the long Cape route. It is, therefore, matter of interest to her, and to Australia, if a hostile naval power be firmly based on the Persian Gulf. In a way, these are internal questions. They are so immediately, with reference to the Empire at large; but it is easy to see that their determination affects powerfully, possibly even vitally, the external and foreign relations of the whole and of each part. One member has just been saved from destruction by the combined effort of all, supported by the supreme sea power of the mother country. This result, too, is internal to the Empire; but is it not also of vast importance to its external security and foreign policy? What has made the Transvaal so formidable to the adjoining colonies and to the Empire? It is because not only was the population hostile, but the hostility was organized, armed, and equipped, under the shield of complete self-government. Had Ireland been conceded the substance of Mr. Gladstone's bill, or should she hereafter attain it, would not her power of mischief, in case of foreign war, make such demands upon the

presence of the British navy as seriously to lessen its ability to protect commercial routes and colonies? She is to the United Kingdom what the Transvaal has been to South Africa. The consideration shows both how important the status of Ireland is to the colonies, and how much, by the development of their own forces, relieving the navy of the United Kingdom, they can contribute to its security, and thereby to that of the commercial routes, which is the common interest of all.

In the question of foreign relations are conspicuously to be seen the advantages of federation, which on the internal side is not without its drawbacks. Its look is distinctively outward, recognizing that there conditions have undergone decisive change. It faces the world, and sees that to do so with success it must show a united body. For that purpose it seeks to find a means, an organ, in which and by which union may be established and maintained. For that purpose it must be willing to endure the internal sacrifices, the inevitable concessions of individual independence, and the burdens of additional expense. For these concessions on either hand there will be compensation. The colonies by entering upon a share in determining the foreign policy of the whole, gain wider scope of action, elevation of idea, increased dignity of existence, and state equality with the United Kingdom, actual in kind, partial in degree; an equality resembling, doubtless, in principle that of the lower house of the United States, where the representation for all the States is the same in character, but in voting power proportioned to the respective populations. Individual colonists would claim and find imperial careers, as the interests and obligations of their native land gained ever increasing expansion in the general growth and interaction of the Empire. To Sir Henry Parkes this seemed, for Australia, a higher destiny than independence; he called it "a rightful share in what may be a more glorious rule than mankind has ever yet seen."

It is not to be denied that superficially, perhaps by force of tradition, the benefit of federation seems chiefly to inure to the mother country. This impression probably derives from the old

idea of state property, underlying the colonial relation. Under such a conception, the benefit of the owner of this estate, the mother country, was naturally the primary object in administration. The subordination of the colony was not merely in political connection, but in economical treatment. This was admitted by the American colonists, who, though they rebelled promptly at commercial regulation by tariff, for the raising of imperial revenue, as being indirect taxation, acquiesced in regulation which alleged the benefit of imperial trade as a whole, though they suffered by it.

Such conditions, however, have passed away ; and after the temporary domination of the contrary belief, that colonies are of little or no advantage, it is now recognized that in the mutual relation there is reciprocity of benefit, even though there be not equality. Colonies trade more readily with the mother country than with others ; and the capital of the latter, other things being equal, seeks investment more readily, with greater feeling of security, in communities kindred in political and legal tradition, and of a common allegiance. The question of military and naval reciprocity of usefulness has been touched on. To this is to be added the wider and grander sphere open to the colonies, as communities and as individuals, when closer relations gain them increasing entry and opportunity for activity, in the internal administration and foreign policy of a great established state like the United Kingdom. In the present threatening and doubtful question of the future of China are the elements of a world-conflict, in which the British navy is one of the largest among several determinative factors. Its strength can be supported and enlarged by the conditions attendant upon federation, and the colonies can thus share in both the benefits and the distinction of influence upon great political issues ; but what of weight or of prestige can they there display, if severally independent ? They may receive the benefit of the open door, but not the self-contentment of self-help. Self-dependence, as distinct from nominal independence, is to be found in federation, not in separation. As time passes, it can hardly fail that the premier and government of

the Australian federation will be greater in position and wider in activities than the corresponding officials of the several states; and in like manner a man will be larger in his own eye and that of the world as a citizen of Australia, than as belonging to a particular division of the Commonwealth. The federation of the United States exalted irresistibly the name American far beyond all local designations. So Imperial Federation will dignify and enlarge each state and each citizen that enters its fold.

Imperial Federation proposes a partnership in which a number of younger and poorer members are admitted into a long standing wealthy firm. This simile is doubtless not an exhaustive statement, but there can be little doubt that it is sufficiently just to show where the preponderance of benefit will for the time fall. The expenditure of the United Kingdom on the South African War offers a concrete example of this truth, doubly impressive to those who, like the writer, see in this instance great imperial obligation but little material interest, save the greatest of all,—the preservation of the Empire. On the other hand, in view of the spreading collision of interests throughout the world, it is hard to overvalue the advantage of healthy, attached, self-governing colonies to a European country of today. Blessed is the state that has its quiver full of them. Under such conditions, and with the motives to union that have been presented, it is petty to fasten attention on comparative benefit to the exclusion of mutual benefit. Not by such grudging spirit are great ideas realized, or great ends compassed. Sentiment, imagination, aspiration, the satisfaction of the rational and moral faculties in some object better than bread alone,—all must find a part in a worthy motive; not to the exclusion of reasonable interests, but to their ennoblement by marriage to loftier aims, seeking gratification in wider activities. Like individuals, nations and empires have souls as well as bodies. Great and beneficent achievement ministers to worthier contentment than the filling of the pocket.

Finally, the broadening and strengthening of British power by the progress of Imperial Federation is necessarily an object of

profound interest to Americans. In many quarters it will find deep sympathy; in others, perhaps jealousy may be manifested. For this there is no good cause. The American Commonwealth and the British Empire have had many jars in the past, the memory of which has not wholly disappeared; but more and more clearly are coming into view the permanent conditions that from the first have existed, but until now have been overlaid and buried by the wreckage of past collisions and disputes. In language, law, and political traditions there is fundamental identity; and in blood also, though to some extent differentiated in each by foreign admixture. Coincidentally with these, there is a clearly defined and wide belt of geographical separation between their several spheres,—save the one common boundary between Canada and the United States. These constitute permanent factors, tending on the one hand to promote understanding, and on the other to avert misunderstandings. To reinforce these, there is rapidly arising a community of commercial interests and of righteous ideals in the Far East. In proportion to the hold which abiding factors such as these have upon the mind of the statesman, will be the light he finds to thread his way through the passing perplexities of revolving years. The tactical changes of front and redistribution of arrangements, which the incidental progress of events necessitates from time to time, will lack intelligence, coherence, and firmness, unless governed by constant reference to the things which cannot be shaken, and which bear to policy the same relation that the eternal principles of strategy do to the conduct of war.

SOME ASPECTS OF ROME IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND DURING THE RENAISSANCE¹

MAURICE PALÉOLOGUE, *Paris.*

THE AVENTINE.

The long and rugged hill is almost uninhabited, as if the ancient curse of the patricians still rested heavily upon it. One sees there only empty spaces, fields, fruit gardens, a few churches, a cemetery, and two convents. No situation in Rome is more quiet, more deserted, more secluded from the stir of life. One finds it hard to realize that in the olden time it was the centre of such a ferment of passions and of so many political storms.

From the reign of Servius Tullius a temple of Diana in the midst of a wood crowned the summit of the hill. The worship of that goddess continued to be celebrated there until the day when the Goths of Alaric burned that quarter.

An interesting event in the history of Christianity was connected with this catastrophe. Near the sanctuary of Diana there rose a costly mansion belonging to a young and beautiful widow of illustrious birth,—Marcella. On becoming a Christian, she suddenly renounced all the luxurious elegance in which she had until then delighted. For the benefit of the poor she sold her jewels, her fine apparel, her carriages, her costly furniture, and resolved to use no longer paint, perfumery, or silk.

(1) Translated by Professor H. A. P. Torrey of the University of Vermont.

Nevertheless, she did not withdraw from the world. On the contrary, she desired the world to come to her for mutual religious edification in her palace, now devoted to this purpose. Despite the scandal which the event caused in aristocratic society, where conversions were as yet very rare, Marcella succeeded in gathering about her a considerable number of her female friends. Assembling there nearly every day they read the Gospel, listened to St. Jerome, repeated hymns, and engaged in works of charity. Further than that they imposed upon themselves no rules whatever, but, although they did not live in common, they were already inspired by the monastic spirit. It may be said that they founded the first female convent of the Occident.

This experiment in the religious life had a mournful ending. When, on the 24th of August, 410, Alaric surprised the gates of Rome, his drunken soldiers sacked the city. Arriving at the Aventine they set fire there. Vainly did Marcella try to stop them by representing to them that they were Christians like herself. They commanded her to deliver up the treasures which they assumed were concealed in her palace. She replied that a long time ago she had given away all her wealth in charity. Believing that she was deceiving them, they beat her unmercifully and brutally assaulted her; her companions suffered in like manner. Bleeding and half naked, the poor women fled for refuge to the basilica of St. Paul without the walls, which the barbarians had respected. Marcella died two days afterwards.

STA. SABINA.

Fifteen years later Pope Celestine I. caused to be built on the ruins of the temple of Diana a church dedicated to Saint Sabina. The plan is that of the basilicas. Two rows of beautiful Corinthian columns divide the edifice into a nave with side-aisles. Its general proportions are excellent; they make upon the eye that impression of balance, of propriety, of stability which are the indubitable marks of genuinely artistic production. Some important mosaics formerly decorated this monument. There remains of them but a single fragment, affixed to the

interior wall, above the entrance. It is an inscription in large letters of gold upon a background of blue, in which the circumstances of its foundation are brought to mind. At each end a draped female figure stands erect, holding a book in her hand. These two figures probably represent the two churches, that of Jerusalem and that of Bethlehem. There is a nobility in their pose, a dignity in the fall of the folds of the drapery; we see here one of the latest examples of the antique style. But there is more yet. The principal portal presents to us in fact one of the most precious relics of the first Christian art. It is encased between the door-posts and lintel of carved Parian marble which probably once served for the entrance to the Aventine sanctuary of Diana. This portal is entirely of cypress wood and formed of twenty-eight panels, eighteen of which are adorned with bas-reliefs. The work is of the fifth century; it appears to be that of Greek artists; some of the panels were worked over in the ninth century during the Carolingian Renaissance. The subject chosen by the sculptor is a parallel between the Old and the New Testaments. In this double series of tableaux, some are remarkable from the scenic and picturesque point of view. Moses receiving from Jehovah the command to put off his shoes, Pharaoh with his chariot of war engulfed in the Red Sea, Elijah ascending to heaven, St. Peter denying Jesus, exhibit striking dramatic truth. Of course the work would not bear comparison with the panels of the Baptistery of Florence; but it has this merit at least, it makes us think of it.

In the thirteenth century a vast palace extended to the basilica. Pope Honorius III., whose favorite residence it was, installed there in 1219 the rising order of the Preaching Friars. Tradition points out even today, in the garden, the orange tree in the shade of which St. Dominic used to rest, if it can be said that that ardent soul ever knew repose. This spot was then the cradle of a very important movement. It was thence, in fact, that the Church drew its sturdiest champions, its most redoubtable instruments of warfare and of domination. Authorized inquisitors of heresy, official guardians of orthodoxy, the Preaching Friars

played till the end of the sixteenth century a preëminent rôle in the spiritual direction of Catholicism. To relieve them of this mission it became necessary that another order should arise, more resourceful, more supple, more open to the modern spirit,—the Society of Jesus. There remains to the Dominicans as a convincing evidence, an eloquent witness of their former supremacy, the privilege of appointment to the three most important offices of the pontifical court,—the jurisdiction of the Sacred Palace, the secretaryship of the Index, the commissariat of the Holy Office.

We must not take leave of Sta. Sabina without recalling that Lacordaire passed his novitiate there when he undertook to restore in France the Institute of St. Dominic.

THE PRIORY OF MALTA.

A few steps from Santa Sabina and quite near the insignificant basilica of San Alessio, a wall encloses a church in the midst of a villa. It is the Priory of Malta, one of the scanty vestiges which the order of St. John of Jerusalem has left in the world, and which reminds us that it still exists. In truth, the institution is a mere phantom. When the soldiers of Bonaparte expelled it from Malta, it wandered for some time from Catania to Ferrara, before discovering that Rome was the only honorable refuge for decayed sovereignties. Deprived of all its property, the order gradually confined itself to hospital work, which was, indeed, its first field of action. It brought together upon the Aventine its archives, its relics, its principal tombs. The paintings exhibited in the villa recall the glorious days when the purple banner with the white cross gave such sharp chase to the Moslem galleys. They show the hardy pursuit, the intrepid boarding, the heroic capture,—a whole naval epic. How can we forget the illustrious part which France took in so many of those exploits?

The most celebrated of the grand masters bear French names: Villiers de l'Isle Adam, La Vallette, Amboise, Vendôme, De Rohan. And it was also the fleet of Malta which furnished to

the French marine two of its greatest captains,—Suffren and Tourville.

CASTELLO DI CONSTANTINO.

One last point of the Aventine region merits attention,—the Castello di Constantino, which dominates the northern slope, near to Santa Prisca. The view from that point is wonderful. We have before us the watered vale where the Arcadian Evander led his flocks in the olden time, the Palatine and its proud ruins, the Baths of Caracalla, the Tomb of Cestius, the Appian Way, the Aqueducts, the immense vista of the Roman Campagna, and far off in the background the faint summits of the Alban Hills drowned in light. For nearly six years a young German emperor, with this spectacle before him, nourished the dreams of a wild ambition,—the Emperor Otho III., the last male descendant of the House of Saxony. His mind possessed with the memorials of antiquity and intoxicated with mysticism, dreamed of nothing less than the restoration of the majestic unity of the Roman power, of making the Orient and the Occident a single empire of which Germany should be no more than a province. The approach of the year 1000, which discouraged the ambition of all others, seemed on the contrary to exalt his own.

He built for himself, upon the Aventine, a fortified castle in which one might believe himself to be at the court of Byzantium, so magnificent was the pomp, so strict the etiquette. The Romans, to flatter whom he exhausted his resources, execrated him on account of his foreign origin. Nevertheless when he died of fever, at the age of twenty-two years, there was general consternation, as if a world of hopes had vanished with him. At his funeral this dirge was chanted:—

*Plangat mundus, plangat Roma !
Lugeat Ecclesia !
Sit nullum Romæ canticum !
Ululet palatium !
Sub Cæsaris absentia
Sunt turbata sæcula.*

SAN SABBA, SANTA BALBINA, SS. NEREO ED ACHILLEO,
S. CESAREO.

Lost to sight at the extremity of the Aventine among fields and wastes, these four churches owe to their desolate condition a potent charm of melancholy. One may well believe that he breathes here all the misery and the desolation which afflicted Rome during the Middle Ages. The convent of San Sabba, founded at the time of the iconoclastic Emperors by the Greek monks, stands apart by itself upon an eminence. The church, fronted by a porch, is divided into a nave with side-aisles; formerly it had five divisions, as one observes from certain anomalies of the low side-aisles. A mosaic of an hieratic character quite Byzantine glitters in the height of the apse, a rich pavement of porphyry and marble, work of the thirteenth century, covers the space of the choir. There is no other decoration. In an adjoining court some dilapidated structures alone recall the ancient monastery. A garden surrounds them with its silence.

Santa Balbina has a bishop's throne, of a grand style, a beautiful tomb executed about 1300 by Giovanni Cosmati in the manner of the school of Pisano and lastly a crucifixion scene, upon which Mina da Fiesole has left the impress of his delicate realism.

A little farther down, the narrow basilica of SS. Nereo ed Achilleo borders on the Appian Way, quite near to S. Cesareo. In the sixth century two churches already existed upon the same site. St. Gregory the Great, who held them in particular veneration, frequently preached there. And one of these cathedral churches, of which he mentioned the height, still exists.

This region of the Aventine has changed but little in appearance since the reign of the illustrious Pope; it was not more deserted then, nor less in ruins. A famous homily of Gregory, delivered in this very tribune of SS. Nereo ed Achilleo, depicts for us in striking colors the distress of the Christian metropolis at the period of the Lombard incursions. The spectacle which the environs of San Sabba offer us today seems a part of that mournful picture which all Rome presented during the greater part of the Middle Ages.

One can hardly imagine the decay of the Eternal City in that phase of its history. Everywhere monuments are falling in ruins, the ground is strown with débris, the roads are sunken in hollows, or obstructed with rubbish, the Capitol is covered with brushwood, the Campus Martius is a sewer, the banks of the Tiber are falling in. All conception of art has perished. The Romans are building no longer, except to fortify the ground. It was then that one might see arising that forest of feudal towers of which the Torre delle Milizie is one of the most perfect specimens. The principal edifices of antiquity are being transformed into redoubts and donjons, where each noble family arms itself against the adverse faction. The Caetani occupy the slopes of the Quirinal and the island in the Tiber; their outposts are at the Tomb of Cecilia Metella. The Frangipani entrench themselves at the Arch of Titus, at the Septizonium, and the Coliseum; the Savelli at the Theatre of Marcellus and upon the Aventine; the Colonna at the Mausoleum of Augustus; the Orsini at the Tomb of Hadrian and the Theatre of Pompey, etc. Sheltered within these fortresses, the barons soon become the sole masters of Rome. The papacy, enfeebled, impoverished, is their prey, which they seize upon by turns. Every pontifical election is a signal for riot, massacre, and conflagration. Sometimes even, the disorder is so great that several popes are elected simultaneously. Thus, in 1046, there are as many as three,—Benedict XI. with his seat at the Lateran, Gregory VI. at St. Peter's, and Sylvester III. at Santa Maria Maggiore. As to their temporal domain, it is reduced to the ancient duchy of Rome. And the barons practice there with impunity their exactions upon the peasants, their robbery of pilgrims. The apostolic city is fallen to the lowest depth of misery, physical and moral.

Nevertheless, by a strange paradox, Rome never appeared greater to popular imagination. Viewed from afar, extraordinary prestige encircled her. Legends grew up about her, marvelous stories were spread abroad.

To begin with, she was believed to be very rich. Antique medals, jewels, and precious vessels, which were sold here and

there in Europe, kept up the illusion. The ancient capital of the world continued to be for all the *aurea Roma* of Ovid. It was held for certain that her ruins concealed immense treasures. And it was estimated that the Capitol alone was worth, in money value, "the third of the world."

From the religious point of view, she enjoyed absolute supremacy. All consciences paid her reverence. Dishonored by so many popes, she was none the less the Holy City "par excellence," the head and heart of Christianity. One might despise the occupants of the theocratic throne, but the throne itself preserved in the eyes of all its sacred character.

Considered from the political point of view, the illusion partakes of the nature of sorcery. Rome is nothing more than a phantom, a corpse. Nevertheless, she inspires in all a superstitious respect, a sort of magic terror. By virtue of her past greatness she stands as the symbol of power, of unity, of law. There is no legitimate earthly authority which does not emanate from her. No monarch dares to wear the imperial title until he has received it from her. One might comprehend, perhaps, how her fascination would have its effect at a distance. But she exercises this even in the immediate presence of her ruins. The idea that her ancient glory might revive is the fondly cherished dream of the Roman mind. And three men, Crescentius, Arnold of Brescia, and Cola di Rienzi, sacrificed their lives to that insensate dream. As for the poets, their enthusiasm borrows the language of mystical adoration, the vocabulary of the litanies,—*Orbis honor, urbs super omnes, caput mundi, immortale decus, rerum suprema potestas, vivida virtus*, etc., are their customary appellations. Dante mingles with his invectives against Boniface VIII. a passionate reverence for the holy walls within which Providence had placed the centre of history and of humanity. Petrarch writes in his Canzone to Stefano Colonna :—

"L'antiche mura ch' ancor teme ed ama,
E trema 'l mondo quando si rimembra
Del tempo andato, e 'ndietro si rivolge."

Lastly, Boccaccio addresses to the Eternal City this charming invocation :—

“O fior d’ogni città, donna del mondo
O degna, imperiosa monarchia.”

STA. MARIA MAGGIORE.

If one is seeking for religious impression he must not expect it at Sta. Maria Maggiore. No more than at St. Paul’s without the walls, or St. Peter’s, is this a place for quiet meditation, still less is it a place for mystery and for prayer. No idea is less present here than that of the supernatural, of the hereafter, of the Infinite. The heart does not feel itself stirred in any degree; pious reverie does not appear even in shadowy outline. The reason is the decoration is too showy, too splendid, too brilliant.

But, regarded from the point of view of history and of art, this monument is most precious. All the ages of Christianity, in fact, have left here their traces. Antiquity has its witness in the general plan of the edifice, which is that of the primitive basilicas. Consecrated in 364 by Pope Liberius, reconstructed in 432 by Sixtus III., the church consists of a vast ceiled enclosure which two rows of columns divide into a nave with side-aisles. This design so simple, so familiar, acquires here its very high degree of beauty, because a perfect harmony reigns throughout its parts. One could not conceive proportions more just in the different architectural members, a feeling more delicate in the dimensions of the orders, a more happy distribution of filled and empty spaces. The columns of white marble come from the temple of Juno. Quite pure and bare, they have no other ornament than the elegant volute of their Ionic capitals.

Unfortunately an arcade was opened in 1585 upon each side of the nave, to give access to the sumptuous side chapels in which the Popes Sixtus V. and Paul V. built their tombs. Two inter-columniations have thus disappeared, and at this point the unity of the plan has been broken. The original decoration of

the church is represented only by the mosaics of the triumphal arch and those of the impost. Executed under Sixtus III., that is to say, about the middle of the fifth century, they represent scenes from the Bible,—the story of Abraham, of Moses, of Joshua, then the annunciation, the adoration of the magi, the massacre of the innocents, Jesus disputing with the doctors, etc. They are clumsy in drawing. When they are compared with the masterly work in Sta. Pudentiana, earlier by fifty years, one is surprised at the rapidity with which an art may decline. They show, nevertheless, an interesting care for costume and for composition. It is plain that the artist had before his eyes the bas-reliefs of the Column of Trajan and that he knew enough to study them. Perhaps we should assign to the fifth century the apsidal mosaic also, which is commonly believed to be of the thirteenth. There is no question that Pope Nicholas IV. (1288-1292) entrusted to the mosaicist, Jacobo Torriti, the task of restoring the decoration of the tribune. But it is evident that one important part of the original work has been preserved. The superb vine branches which spread themselves over the vault are quite similar to those of San Clemente. Why might they not be of an adjacent period? Likewise the picturesque details of the fluvial scene which unfolds itself in the zone below, are they not of an inspiration quite approaching the antique? To Torriti must be reserved the noble group of Jesus crowning his mother, the graceful vision of adoring angels, the devout figures of St. Francis d'Assisi and St. Anthony of Padua, and the twining garland which borders the arch. Below this beautiful picture other mosaics are inserted between the pointed windows. The story of the Virgin is there depicted. The author, Gaddo Gaddi, a Florentine, was working at Rome about 1305. From him, also, and his fellow townsman, Filippo Rusutti, are the compositions which are set in the wall of the façade under the loggia. One may see traced out there the poetic legend which, at the first, was the occasion of the bestowal upon Sta. Maria Maggiore of the title, Our Lady of the Snows. The work of the two Florentines bears the visible marks of the great reform in art of which Cimabue is the harbinger and

which Giotto perpetuated,—flexibility, expression, freedom, life.

Of the same period is the tomb of Cardinal Gonsalvo Rodriguez, which rises in the right aisle and which is perhaps the masterpiece of Giovanni Cosmati. The work of a sculptor as much as of an architect and mosaicist, the monument exhibits superior technique and refined taste; the faces have an expressive value, a moral delicacy, of which the artists of the preceding age had no conception.

Sta. Maria Maggiore possesses one of the most beautiful creative decorations of the Renaissance,—the golden coffered ceiling which covers the central nave. Giuliano and Antonio da Sangallo are reputed to have executed it by order of Alexander VI. There is nothing more sumptuous than this paneling of deep and brilliant mouldings where the arms of the Borgia jut out, here and there, between the ovoli, the pendentives, and the carved foliage. Under such a ceiling one takes pleasure in bringing before his imagination the religious displays of which this sensual period was distractedly fond,—festivals of worship and of jubilation, marriage ceremonies, funerals, and coronations, spectacles of unheard of luxury, in which no fault of taste could be detected.

What shall be said of the famous side chapels, which contain the tombs of Sixtus V. and of Paul V.? Domenico Fontana and Flaminio Ponzio, who built them in 1585 and 1611, sought to produce the impression of magnificence. They succeeded in doing so. But the accumulation of figures, the excess of reliefs, the superabundance of profiles, the exuberance of ornamentation, the profusion of vivid colors, the abuse of gold and of jasper, blind one to the strong organic character of the work; we look at it and pass on.

ST. JOHN LATERAN.

In the year 326 the Emperor Constantine made a brief sojourn in Rome, from which city the war against Licinius and the charms of the Orient had kept him long absent. He returned thither loaded with crimes and covered with blood; he had put to death his wife, his father-in-law, his son, his principal councilors.

The dark days of Nero seemed to have come again. But his murderous delirium over, he was now racked with the pains of remorse. Among all the religions which then divided the Empire he sought one which would consent to absolve him and to purify him. The flamens to whom he applied rejected him. Christianity accepted him. In his fervor of expiation, he filled Rome with sanctuaries, of which the principal, the most famous, the most venerable is St. John Lateran. *Omnium ecclesiarum urbis et orbis mater et caput*, first of all the churches of Rome and of the world, episcopal see of the Supreme Pontiff, the seat of innumerable councils, St. John Lateran remained until the close of the Middle Ages the centre of the Christian world.

About the basilica are grouped the Baptistry, the Palace of the Popes, a convent, a cloister, a hospital, a cemetery,—all the appurtenances of a great religious institution.

The church, constructed according to the classic plan, existed for almost a thousand years without other change than restorations and enrichments. But in the fourteenth century fire consumed it twice. That was the time when calamities fell upon Rome, when the successors of St. Peter lived in disgrace at Avignon, when the Eternal City, according to Rienzi, “resembled rather a den of brigands than an abode of civilized men.” Petrarch then might look upon the basilica in ruins; and his cry of grief has come down to us, “The Lateran lies upon the ground! The mother of churches, despoiled of her roof, is open to the winds and the rain!” When the Holy See was brought back again to the banks of the Tiber, the reconstruction of the Lateran was the first care of the popes. But instead of simply restoring the original edifice, they set about everywhere to embellish and improve it, so much so that two centuries afterwards the work was still going on. Is it surprising if after so many vicissitudes the basilica no longer preserves in any degree its unity? Even before entering it, one is only too conscious of the lack of it. The façade was constructed in 1735, in the pontificate of Clement XII., by Alessandro Galilei. The motif consists of a row of great columns and pilasters of the composite order,

forming a portico of two stories with five bays. At the centre a pediment is backed by a high balustrade, upon which stand erect statues of Christ and the Apostles. Considered by itself, this celebrated architectural composition is not without beauty. But the serious defect of it is, that it is not in keeping with the rest of the edifice. It is not connected with this by any rational and organic bond; it is arbitrarily thrust against it. It is not a façade, it is a front merely, a piece of veneering. How many times the Italian architects of the eighteenth century, those ill-starred virtuosos, committed similar errors!

We enter the narrow vestibule; we pass through into the basilica. The first impression is of grandeur, of majesty rather, for the idea of grandeur implies more simplicity. The five aisles unfold magnificently. And over the greater nave stretches a wonderful ceiling of broad panels of azure and purple and gold. But when we examine the details, there is abundant occasion for criticism. For the beautiful columns of the ancient church Borromini substituted, about 1650, enormous piers adorned with pilasters, every one containing, in a niche with an uncouth front, the most contorted, the most pretentious statues which the school of Bernini has produced. There is worse yet: the bas-reliefs and the medallions stuck upon the niches. All the mannerism and bad taste of the times are visible here.

The same blemishes appear in the decoration of the famous Corsini Chapel, which Alessandro Galilei erected in the left aisle to receive the tomb of Clement XII. In view of its architectural merits, however, the building deserved better treatment. Its ground plan is the simplest possible, the same plan which Bramante conceived for St. Peter's,—the Greek cross. The structure itself consists of beautiful pilasters of the Corinthian order supporting four great arches from which rises a dome. The composition of lines, the proportions of masses, the distribution of light, all, in fine, that is not decoration, shows intelligent and refined art.

By an inestimable good fortune the two conflagrations which laid waste the church in the fourteenth century spared the mosa-

ics which covered the primitive tribune. The effects of time, nevertheless, have rendered necessary some restorations, which, undertaken in 1880, have not in the least changed the style of the work. There is wanting to the restored parts only the mellowing of years. At the top of the vault the colossal figure of the Saviour appears between the clouds. His features are delicate. His dark and abundant locks fall pliant the length of the neck. In his large open eyes there lingers an unforgettable look of sweetness and of resignation,—the look of the morning by the sea of Tiberias, and of the evening at Emmaus. In the middle of the apse a gigantic cross, a constellation of gems, is seen upon a hill, the stronghold of the Holy City, the New Jerusalem, “tabernacle of God.” The four rivers of Paradise flow down thence, across a flowery landscape enlivened by the presence of children, animals, and birds. At the foot of the cross stands the Virgin, with St. Peter, St. John, St. Andrew, St. Anthony of Padua, St. Francis d’Assisi, and Pope Nicholas IV., the restorer of the basilica.¹ Below, between the pointed windows of the hemicycle, are represented the nine Apostles for whom there was not room in the higher zone. Among them one discerns two small Franciscans kneeling, who hold in their hands the tools of the worker in mosaic and of the marble cutter. An inscription gives us their names and characters. One is the mosaicist, Fra Jacopo Torriti; the other is his assistant, the marble cutter, Fra Jacopo Camerino; they worked at Rome, about 1290. To Torriti is commonly attributed the marvelous picture which he has, so to speak, signed with his portrait. But, just as at Sta. Maria Maggiore, the part which belongs to him here seems to need considerable reduction. He repaired, he completed the original work; he did not replace it. An attentive examination enables us to recognize the inspiration and the workmanship of the fourth century in the majestic visage of Christ, in the noble

(1) Nicholas IV. (1288-1292) professed an exalted devotion for St. Francis, to whose order, moreover, he belonged before he became Pope. When he was elected, it was with great difficulty that he consented to exchange his friar’s robe for the mantle of the pontiff.

figures of the Virgin and the three Apostles, finally, in the picturesque and animated decoration displayed in the lower part of the vault. The rest, which is more naïve in feeling, less free in execution, may perhaps be claimed for Torriti, and his part is still excellent.

St. John Lateran formerly possessed beneath the loggia of the lateral façade a work of high importance for history and art, which almost entirely disappeared at the time of the repairing done by Sixtus V. upon this part of the basilica. It is a fresco in which Giotto had represented Boniface VIII. inaugurating the memorable jubilee of the year 1300. Of this vast composition a single fragment only has been preserved; it may be seen attached to one of the piers of the right aisle. The Supreme Pontiff appears in it, wearing the tiara, followed by two of the clergy, one of whom is carrying the bull of indulgence. Despite some coarse retouching, the figure still has power to bring the dead to life. We recognize in it the crafty, violent arrogant Pope who exalted so high the pretensions of the priesthood and under whom, by the irony of fate, the entire theocratic edifice of the Middle Ages fell to the ground. When Giotto was painting his portrait, Boniface was at the highest point of his prestige and his pride. He was living in imperial luxury. Two kings, with their crowns upon their heads, waited upon him at the festival of his election. Never had the palace of the Lateran shone with such magnificence. Besides the cardinals, the bishops, the prelates, the chamberlains, the chaplains, and the throng of the clergy, there was an innumerable staff of valets, of pages, of cooks, of cup bearers, of squires, of equerries, of grooms,—all the train of the court of a great monarch. Dante, at the time of his embassy to Rome, was an eye-witness of this pomp, and throughout his life he retained in his memory a dazzling picture of it, which he sums up in this verse:—

“Laterano

Alle cose mortali anda di sopra.”¹

(1) “There is nothing mortal which the Lateran does not surpass!”
Paradiso, XXXI.

The environment was but the just measure of the occupant. More daring, even, than Gregory VII. or Innocent III., Boniface VIII. ventured to declare that the Pope is supreme over all human sovereignties, "because he carries all rights enclosed within his own breast," *omnia iura fert in scrinio pectoris sui*. Laying aside the title of "Vicar of St. Peter," in which his predecessors had gloried, he arrogated to himself that of "Vicar of Christ," which the popes have borne since his day. Finally, to make the increase of his power visible, he added a second crown to the tiara.¹ It may be said, without exaggeration, that his fall was determined in the very ceremony in which Giotto represented him as officiating. The pomp of the jubilee, in fact, brought him to the acme of his pride and infatuation. Since the days of antiquity, Rome had seen nothing like it. Pilgrims were counted by hundreds of thousands. Finding no longer lodgement in the houses, they encamped upon the piazzas and among the ruins. When from the loggia of the Lateran Boniface saw the multitudes bending beneath his hand of benediction, when their acclamations rose to him, he lost his head; he thought himself the master of the world. Enfeebled by age, he never recovered from his delusion. Events precipitated themselves. The fresco of Giotto was hardly finished before the drama came to an end at Agnani.

THE CLOISTERS.

South of the basilica is the monastery. The first occupants of it were monks from Monte Casino, whom the Lombards had just driven thence (589). It was a common occurrence in those doleful times. The monks, obliged to flee from their monasteries, were continually arriving at Rome. St. Gregory

(1) The tiara is of Asiatic origin. It was the customary emblem of Eastern royalty, as we learn from this verse of Ovid, *Tempora purpureis tentat velare tiaris*. At first the pontifical tiara was nothing but a simple mitre of white woolen. In the ninth century it was ornamented with a circle of gems. The addition of a third crown dates from Urban V. (1362-1370).

the Great distinguished himself by his zeal in receiving them all, by his never allowing them to implore in vain the apostolic hospitality. The Benedictines lodged at the Lateran until 774, the year when the regular canons took their place.¹ The cloister alone exists. It dates, like that of St. Paul without the walls, from about the year 1210. The marble worker Vassaletus is the author of it. From an architectural point of view the work is clumsy and poor. But the decoration is charming. Vassaletus, moreover, borrowed the motifs from the Sicilian schools, from the masters of Palermo and Monreale. The shafts of the columns, the capitals, the friezes, the cornices, the archivolts serve merely to give opportunity for marvelous work in carving and mosaic. One never tires of studying this efflorescence of incrustated stone, this luxuriant and delicate work of fancy.

THE BAPTISTERY.

Legend has it that the Emperor Constantine was baptized here, in 326, by Pope Sylvester. But Constantine was only a simple catechumen when he left Rome, in 327, never to enter the city again. He did not receive baptism until ten years afterwards, in Nicomedia, when he perceived that he was near his end. Finally, the Baptistery of the Lateran was not built till about 435, by Pope Sixtus III. With the above exceptions the legend is veracious. The façade of the edifice was originally turned toward the apse of the basilica. It is at present the vestibule of S. Venanzio in which are set up two superb columns of the times of the Antonines. The plan of the interior is an octagon, in the middle of which eight porphyry columns surround the baptismal founts. Upon the architrave eight more columns, of a lighter

(1) During three centuries France provided for the support of eight canons at the Lateran. The endowment had been established in 1482 by Louis XI., who, on the other hand, reserved to himself the appointment of the beneficiaries. In recognition of this, the chapter and the clergy of the arch-basilica celebrated, every year, a solemn mass on the festival of the sovereign. The allowance was discontinued by the French government in 1871.

character, serve to support a cupola. Two oratories belong to the building. Access to one is afforded by a bronze door with broad leaves, cast about 1195 for the palace of the Lateran. A picturesque mosaic of the fifth century adorns the walls. This elegant, but quite simple, arrangement enables us readily to understand what Christian baptism was in early times. The Pope officiated in person and with great formality of observance. Usually, Easter eve was the day chosen. The neophytes, almost all adults,—for infant baptism was seldom practiced then,—began by divesting themselves of all their clothing. Two side chapels served for the separation of the sexes when disrobing. Then, one by one, the candidates descended into the *piscina*, which a beautiful basalt urn afterward replaced. And there, the Pope, after having thrice questioned them, immersed them thrice, while pronouncing the sacramental words, *Ego baptizo te in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti*.

THE SCALA SANTA AND THE TRICLINIUM.

On one of the sides of the Piazza of St. John an edifice encloses the Scala Santa, a staircase of marble, which, according to tradition, was ascended by Jesus when he appeared in the pretorium of Pilate. Special indulgences are granted to the faithful who go over it upon their knees. At the top, behind a gilded grating, may be seen the chapel of the *Sancta Sanctorum*, the last vestige of the ancient patriarchate of the Lateran. A wonderful treasure of relics has been deposited there since the twelfth century; the inner frieze bears this significant inscription, *Non est in toto sanctior orbe locus*.

Quite near this building, an apse surmounted by a clumsy pediment, opens on the esplanade. Clement XII. caused it to be constructed in 1730 to receive an important mosaic of the ninth century, which adorned the audience hall or *triclinium* of the first pontifical palace. The panels having been broken in transportation, the subjects represented were worked out anew, the principal one of which recalls the great event consummated in the basilica of St. Peter on the 25th of December, 800,—the

coronation of Charlemagne. For this memorial alone, the mosaic, although disfigured, was worthy of preservation. The event which it illustrates, is dominant in the history of the Middle Ages. For centuries it was held as indisputable that the imperial power was inseparable from Rome, that they were necessary the one to the other, and that upon their union depended the order and the progress of the world. In the eyes of Dante, Rome without Cæsar is a widow in distress. And when the Emperor delayed to come, the poet flung out to him this appeal:—

“ Vieni a veder la tua Roma che piagne,
Vedova sola, e di e notte chiama :
Cesare mio, perchè non m’accompagne ! ” ¹

THE SISTINE CHAPEL.

A vast, rectangular ceiling, the edges bent in the form of an arch; surfaces all bare, without a relief, without a line of contour, without an offset; most barren in all that pertains to monumental architecture,—this is what Michael Angelo had before him in the month of May, 1508, when he set up his scaffolding in the Sistine Chapel.

Before illuminating these inert walls, he animated them, as it were, with architectural life by tracing upon them with his pencil compartments, mouldings, arches, pilasters, friezes, archivols, brackets,—an entire decorative framework.

The central part of the ceiling presents the great scenes of Genesis, and first the Creation of the World. In the depths of the infinite ether Jehovah soars in majestic flight. Around him nothing exists. The words “ Let there be light,” have not yet been spoken. But in the radiance of the Divine Being already the darkness is melting away. In the succeeding fresco, God reappears, hovering over the abyss. His brow, broad, like that of Olympian Jove, is wrinkled. In a gesture, ample and brief

(1) “ Come and see her, thy Rome who mourns for thee, a solitary widow, who night and day, cries out to thee : My Cæsar, my Cæsar ! Why hast thou abandoned me ! ”

as a verse of the Bible, his arm is outstretched. And, suddenly, light shines forth, chaos is subdued to order, the world is formed. The physical act of creation is barely indicated. What fills the picture is the energizing mind and will of God. The invisible is thus made visible to us; the inconceivable becomes comprehensible; the most transcendent of mysteries is explained. Never before had art attained to this force of composition, this power of evocation. Before such works one can only remain silent, and call to mind that fine word of an ancient writer, "The highest privilege of mortals is the power of imagining the gods." Not less imposing is the third panel. The Eternal, bending over the world, with full hands pours upon it the streams of his benediction. The genesis of the world concludes with this thought of love.

Now behold the Creation of Man. From the heights of heaven, Jehovah, surrounded by a multitude of angels, descends to the earth. At his approach Adam awakes. Half reclining, he stretches out his arm to the Omnipotent, who with his finger communicates to him the vital spark. And this simple gesture—so expressive of the artist's genius—shows us the man receiving, with his life, a breath of divine inspiration. In the first father of humanity Michael Angelo has given expression to the type of the race. Greek statuary never conceived a form more masculine, more noble, more harmonious; the Ilyssus and the Dionysus of the Parthenon do not incarnate a beauty more simple or more vigorous. But that which a modern artist alone could imagine is the look of these eyes which are opening on the world. Great, melancholy, penetrating eyes which seem to have prevision of all the drama yet to be, of all the sorrows of future generations, of all the misery of living.

The Creation of Woman is the subject of the next painting. Adam sleeps, in the exhaustion which follows the pangs of travail, for God has just caused Eve to come forth from him. Fresh and vigorous and robust, with full bosom, supple limbs, her long hair falling in waves down her back, she bends toward the Creator and with clasped hands adores him. In contrast with the man,

she is full of joy at having received life. Tender emotion suffuses her eyes and makes of her an inimitable flower of youthfulness and grace. In the entire work of Michael Angelo this figure is unique in the purity of its contours, in the rhythm of its lines, in the delicacy of the modeling, in the softness of the coloring. That great magician of the painter's art, Leonardo da Vinci, alone was equal to such a mastery of technique.

After the Genesis comes the Story of Original Sin and its Punishment. The two episodes are combined in a single compartment. At the foot of the fateful tree, Eve plays the principal part. Already she is no more the woman of earlier days. Her form is expanded, she delights in languishing attitudes. A sensual charm has taken possession of her. She is now, and preëminently, the creature of desire and of perdition, the seductress whom the man henceforth will resist no more. When the sin is committed and the pair depart from Paradise, Adam bears his grief with fortitude. Eve, who follows him with trembling step, can only weep.

The decoration of the ceiling terminates with three panels, representing the Sacrifice of Cain, the Deluge, and the Drunkenness of Noah. Of an inferior style to the preceding frescoes, this tryptich nevertheless is superb. Michael Angelo has displayed there a masterly knowledge of dramatic effect. All the horror of universal destruction hovers over the Deluge. And such an episode as that of the swimmers who are contending for a boat, is a fearful sight which one does not forget.

A similar emotion is excited by the paintings which adorn the angles. The Execution of Haman is the agony of a hero; the calm grandeur of the Death of Goliath is equaled only by the cruel frankness of the Murder of Holofernes; and a whole people cry out in anguish beneath the folds of the Brazen Serpent.

When Michael Angelo had finished these great compositions, his task was hardly yet half done. He was still brooding over the precursors of Christ, the Prophets, the Sibyls, and that multitude of accessory figures which fill with life all the triangular spaces of the vault. Without the aid of the moulding of the tympana

one could hardly make out the genealogy of the Redeemer in the panels which rise above the windows. They are scarcely anything more, in reality, than genre paintings, the subject of which is taken from the private life of the humble. Almost all the spaces allow room for three persons,—the husband, the wife, and the child,—so that one may see in them anticipatory representations of the Holy Family. Some of these frescoes, too little studied in general, have a beauty of line and of sentiment which would be quite enough to make a painter's reputation. Michael Angelo has proved in them that he possessed all the resources of his art, that he could excel in sweetness and grace, as well as in grandeur and force.

The first impression when one looks at the Prophets is that they surpass actual humanity, that they come from a super-terrestrial and unknown world. On considering them more closely, one perceives that although infinitely superior to ourselves, they are none the less of our race. Doubtless nature has never produced such bodily frames as these, or souls like theirs; but she might have been able to produce them; for all that was needed was to raise to their highest power the physical and moral qualities with which she has endowed the human being.

Studying still more closely these majestic figures, one experiences a little surprise at their title. That which preëminently characterizes the prophet is the receiving of a revelation. Bearer of the word of the divine prescience, he is not the author of the oracles which he utters; his sole office is to transmit them. In him, then, there is no operation of creative intellectual activity. All the more may he rejoice in or tremble at the apocalyptic utterances which fall from his lips. The Prophets of the Sistine Chapel, on the contrary, personify, and in the most striking manner, independent mental activity. Reasoning, calculation, meditation, analysis, all the forms of speculative activity, appear in their attitudes and their physiognomies. Is it the spirit of God which excites in Daniel such lively enthusiasm? No! And the arrangement of his books proves it. That in which he exults is his having discovered, by investigation of texts, the

great truth which he was searching for. By what signs do we recognize Joel as a seer? Does he not represent rather the cool, patient, and methodical observer, the calm and lucid intellect in which the laws of nature are reflected as in a mirror? Jeremiah, also, that colossus, whom mute sorrow overwhelms, has nothing of a visionary; he is a logician and a patriot, to whom the philosophy of history has demonstrated that his country is going speedily to destruction and will not stop short of it; his despair is only too intelligent and well-grounded.

Lastly, it is not to respond to the appeal of a voice from on high that Ezekiel turns around with such impetuosity; it is, visibly, to silence with a crushing answer an opponent who has dared to interrupt him. In the case of each one of them, cerebral activity is depicted in its fulness and at the decisive instant. A single descriptive title, then, is appropriate to these imperial figures: it is genius conceiving its ideal, elaborating its work, attaining its object.

The Sibyls are more conformed to the character of their sacred function. There is a single exception,—the old Cumæan, whose eyes are inflamed with deciphering an obscure page. But she is less a priestess than a magician; she is the servant of Hecate, and not of Apollo; the witches of Macbeth descend from her. The others have manifestly received divine inspiration. It was not in the land of Judea, however, that they received it. By the expression of their countenances and the style of their apparel, they are all pagans. And shall we not see in these beautiful soothsayers the daughters of Hellas and of Ionia; in this Erythœan, so proud, so elegant, so chaste; in this half nude Lybian, twisting her body around so grandly upon her hips; in this Delphic sibyl, eager, high-strung creature, whose fateful glance assures us that it is truly a divinity who possesses her and exhausts her?

After such a profusion of decorative wealth, Michael Angelo had not even yet spoken his last word. It remained for him to call into being a whole world of figures, that throng of youths who, under the form of supports and of caryatides, make the

framework of the numerous compartments of the vault. Since the days of antiquity, since the age of Praxiteles and of Scopas, there had not been seen the equal of these youths, in whom life is beaming in all its brightness. Slender, agile, vigorous, incomparable in their grace of bearing and their audacity, one never tires of admiring them. By a kind of æsthetic paradox, they owe to two different arts the secret of their beauty. Are they frescoes or marbles? One hesitates for a moment. Painting alone could give them the flesh tint. But what but the hand of a sculptor could impress upon them that plastic accent?

And now the work is finished, the cycle is completed. If one tries to sum up the impressions he has received beneath that famous vault, the one word he finds is that of grandeur. But a grandeur such as the history of art has known few examples of,—a grandeur which attains to the sublime without effort, a grandeur quite spontaneous, quite natural, and which the artist seems to have achieved as if it were play.

What a contrast when one turns to the high wall where, twenty-two years afterward, Michael Angelo, taking up his pencil again, painted the Last Judgment.

Surely, if there is any subject suited to the powers of the artist who painted the Genesis and the Prophets, it is the *Dies iræ*, it is the final appearance of souls before the tribunal of God. The moral idea which penetrates all Christianity illumines, indeed, the terrible epilogue of the human drama. But at the time of the Renaissance, few men were more sincere idealists than Michael Angelo. An assiduous reader of the Bible, a fervent admirer of Dante and of Petrarch, a zealous disciple of Marsilius Ficinus, an enthusiastic votary of Savonarola, the mystical lover of Victoria Colonna, he joined to a very pure and vital religious faith a passionate devotion to Platonic doctrines. Every one of his works bears witness of a mind preoccupied with the things of religion, of intellect; every one bears the impress of profound thought; every one expresses a sadness, an inquietude, a hope, an aspiration, a revolt,—in a word, an idea. No artist, then, was better fitted than he to treat a subject in which the soul

alone is interested. And, nevertheless, upon the immense fresco, one sees nothing but bodies,—three hundred athletic, nude bodies,—ascending to heaven or precipitated to the infernal regions, exhibiting the most violent movements, the most strained postures, and the boldest foreshortening. In the scenes of the Last Day, the painter seems to have seen nothing but a subject suited to display his prodigious knowledge of perspective and of anatomy, an occasion for the exhibition of all the shapes which the framework of the bones and the play of the muscles could give to the human being in all possible positions. Gazing in wonder on this spectacle, Delacroix said, “The Last Judgment is the carnival of the flesh.” The expression is appropriate, but one has the right to be surprised that the artist should chose this occasion to celebrate a carnal apotheosis.

Further, it is to be said that the work has a certain monotony, which the blackened surface of the fresco makes still more apparent. The Christ and the Apostles, the angels and the demons, the martyrs and the patriarchs, the elect and the reprobate are all of herculean type; all resemble one another in the excess and ostentation of their physical force. In vain would one seek among them for those fine traits of spiritual beauty, of moral delicacy, of mystic beatitude, in depicting which the religious art of the fourteenth century excelled.

The Saviour himself, whom Michael Angelo has represented as beardless,—contrary to sacred tradition,—is devoid of nobility; his low brow, his prominent jaw, his sturdy waist, his protuberant muscles, give him the appearance of an Olympic wrestler. And the Apostles who surround him, struggle and tumble and strain like so many gymnasts. Everywhere one perceives a striving to exhibit technical ability, a yielding to the attraction of some difficulty to be overcome. Science has nearly suppressed the poet and the thinker within the artist. Therefore this colossal painting is powerless to move and to persuade us.

But one quality lifts it above all our criticisms, the quality which in art is supreme, namely, style. Michael Angelo does not ask for our admiration; he compels it, he lays hold upon it.

Before those superb groups, inspired by the Apocalypse and the Inferno of Dante, the moment comes when the spectator no longer reasons; he is overmastered. How can he help being carried away by that prodigious flight of angels bearing up to heaven the Cross of Calvary and the pillar of the flagellation, by the stupor of the dead whom the trumpet has awakened and who are shaking off their shrouds, by the terror of the damned whom a demon is driving, with blows of the oar, to the infernal boat? Was ever style more vigorous, more lofty, more imposing? Had it no other merit, the work would be absolutely unique in this.

Upon the side walls of the Chapel, the Tuscan and Umbrian masters of the fifteenth century, Ghirlandaio, Botticelli, Pinturicchio, Cosimo Roselli, Perugino, and Luca Signorelli have represented the classic scenes of the Bible. When one has but just torn himself away from the embrace of Michael Angelo, the contemplation of these figures brings a delicious sense of repose. Sincerity of inspiration, play of fancy in pictorial invention, perfect alliance of gracefulness and nobility, tranquil joy in giving expression to life and disclosing beauty,—this is what we find everywhere in these charming pictures in which the Renaissance offers us its earliest flower.

THE MATTER OF THE PLAY

MINNIE MADDERN FISKE, *New York.*

It is doubtful if there is any other feature of public life in this country that at all compares with the theatre in the number of persons interested in it. It would seem that a majority of the people habitually or at least occasionally go to the theatre, for everywhere this place of amusement is usually thronged. There are thousands of theatres now where there were but hundreds a generation or so ago, the increase in their number seemingly being even relatively larger than the vast increase in population; and one may arrive at some idea of the matter by observation in any large city, where night apparently finds almost everybody theatre bound. The scenes in New York are typical in this respect. During the day the congestion of people is in the business districts, which at night are dark and deserted, while the theatre districts are ablaze with light, brilliant with color, and teeming with life. Thus the play would seem to be the common source of amusement.

"Amusement" is the word, although that word may have different shades of meaning for various persons. A great majority of theatregoers no doubt may be classed in two general divisions. One division, probably the larger, is composed of persons, strained or wearied by the struggles of the day, that rush to the theatre for mere relaxation. They do not care particularly what they are to see at the theatre if the play or the performance is of a character to make them forget for the moment, without taxing

their minds, the inevitable and pressing affairs that they must resume on the morrow. If the play or the performance is something that will excite mirth, so much the better. They look upon the theatre as a means of relaxation; and to them, indeed, the theatre is a wise and beneficent institution. The other division of persons is composed of those wearied by inactivity or by social commonplaces. They go to the theatre for excitement, and they also, no doubt, prefer something light and mirth-inspiring. There are, of course, many persons that drift into the theatre because they have nowhere else to go, and a considerable number that go from mere vanity and with no definite wish beyond that of impressing other persons with the fact that they can engage the best places and make a fine sartorial showing; and there are others,—the very salt of the theatre, because they are attentive and appreciative above the many,—that go but occasionally, because to them it is a luxury. But, in spite of the commotion they make in print,—one would think they are numberless,—there are very few persons that go to the theatre with deliberate and serious purpose. I mean there are few of the class that are forever preaching that the stage should be used exclusively for serious purposes. They are far too few to mean much in the way of supporting a theatre.

What has been said here in the classification of theatregoers should not be understood exactly as including women, who are in a class by themselves. They are a majority in all theatre-going. Without their support the theatre would fare ill, and with their favor the theatre is bound to fare well. Women usually seem to go to the theatre for the purpose of having their emotions stirred. They never enjoy a play or an actor unless their emotions are played upon. They are fountains of sympathy, because that is the feminine nature. And just as in life itself, their sympathy is often sadly misplaced in the theatre.

In spite of all the talk about degeneracy, it is in the natural order of things that people should grow better. The great mass never was so enlightened or so intelligent as now; but there seems to be a barbarian streak in humanity that never can be

eliminated. Perhaps it is good for the race that there should still remain in it some savor of the barbaric to temper excessive refinements. It may seem strange that people of an age that first saw "Hamlet,"—an age that produced Shakespeare,—should have enjoyed bear-baiting. Queen Elizabeth, the learned, and the great patron of learning, herself witnessed this "sport," which was not prohibited in England until 1835, although it was suppressed in the Puritan days, as an unlawful pleasure for those that witnessed it, and without reference to the feelings of the bears. We have no Shakespeare in these days, and the world probably never will see Shakespeare's equal; but we have many things that make for refinement that the people in Shakespeare's age never enjoyed. The theatre now, though lacking in master works of the time, is in many things superior to the theatre of Shakespeare's day, or to the theatre of any former time. Yet we also have the barbarian impulse still, for although bears are not baited,—my words should be construed, of course, as relating to Anglo-Saxon amusements, for bull-fighting, which is as bad as bear-baiting, survives in some Latin countries,—we have something akin to it in the prize-fight, which is practiced in spite of prohibitive laws. And although there seem, at times, to be doubts as to the honesty of intention of the fighters as well as to the interference of the police, it is true, if one may believe the newspapers, that when one of these contests between noted fighters takes place, among its witnesses will be found men whom Queen Elizabeth would consider it a pleasure to know were she still alive.

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to define in just what things the theatre of the past was superior to the theatre of today, though most of us who respect the traditions will admit on tradition alone, that the older theatre was in some respects better than the theatre of today. Yet we must hold, also, that the theatre of today is far superior to that of even fifty years ago in many respects. This would be so because of the vast improvements in almost all phases of life. What was luxury in the old days would not be considered as comfort, even, by the poor in our own

time. And persons in moderate circumstances now enjoy details of comfort that were impossible even less than a hundred years ago to those of unlimited wealth. And the theatre, like all other features of life, has felt and illustrates the multiplication of betterments. It may be, however, that the improvements the stage discloses are for the most part merely material and mechanical and superficial.

The stage, years ago, was undoubtedly more homogeneous than is the stage of today. It would seem that its work on the whole was more dignified, and that it showed the classics more regularly. There may be as much of value on the stage today, in the way of plays, as there ever was; but the dignified work is almost lost to view in the conglomeration of matter put forth, much of the mass being really nondescript. It may be that those of the classics that have not fallen into disuse from obsolescence—the works of Shakespeare, for instance—are represented as often as ever. In fact it is probable that they are more often represented than ever. The manner of their representation is another matter, for the actors of classic training have almost disappeared, and the school that made them is no longer here. Yet we get Shakespeare in some sort, dressed and pictured with magnificence and set forth with archæological accuracy, and few there are that will refuse him in any form. The vast growth of the theatre, however, to meet the possibilities of a great and ever-increasing population, has developed a multiplication of attractions, and the earnest, the beautiful, the poetic, are almost lost in the crush.

The artistic spirit of the stage never has been wholly controlled by pecuniary considerations in the past, and it has always been more or less ignorant of "business" methods. Thus it is natural, perhaps, that with a view solely to profit, the American stage has been seized by commercial persons and that art is secondary in all matters that pertain to it. The theatre is thus given over much to the bizarre, the sensational, the curious, and to superficial appeals to the senses. There is much in the commercial idea, no doubt, that pleases the careless public and the mass of persons for whom the lighter forms of entertainment suffice. With all the

exploitation of notorieties, of persons that have no call to the stage, of pictorial prodigies, of assemblages of women that are grouped only because they are women, and of other "attractions" that fill houses and coffers, there is much that is by no means harmful, although, also, it is by no means worth the time of the thoughtful. Naturally the thoughtless dissipate their time. But the artistic is incidental only, and he who would make it primary and essential has a difficult problem to solve, unless the powers that be find a material interest in it, and the creator is willing to become really a servant of Mammon.

The question, however, as to whether art shall control the stage for its development or whether it shall continue in absolute subordination is one that time will solve in an inevitable way. No great institution can lose sight of the principles upon which it was founded, and decline in characteristic effort, and long prosper, and this matter is bound sometime to adjust itself by a recurrence to conditions that mean life and progress. There is another question, not by any means a result of present conditions, that relates to stage art, upon which a great deal depends. That is the matter of the play.

Hamlet's exclamation, "The play's the thing," based on his purpose to discover the guilt of the King, his uncle, has been wrested from its original significance, yet its accepted sense is its true sense. The play *is* the thing. It was the thing in Shakespeare's day, when the stage had none of the accessory elaborations that make plays today studies in all the arts that have come to relate to the stage. And it must have been the thing even a hundred years ago or more, when the intelligent English public applauded its prominent actors who played the classic parts in the costumes of the day,—costumes so grotesquely incongruous from the present artistic point of view, that they now would have no place except in burlesque.

If the play is the thing, what is the tendency of the greater dramatists of today? I mean the dramatists who write seriously for the theatre; and thus it is not necessary to consider the writers of comedy. As to comedy, no doubt the best contemporaneous examples of it are at least up to the standard of the comedies of

former times, excluding, of course, those that have become classic; and I think it may be said that the few comedies of the better class written today are in some respects better than the comedies of, say a hundred years ago,—with the exception, as stated, of the classics,—because they are more refined, and are truer to life. I need not say that I ignore utterly in this consideration all the more recent translations from the French that have been exploited for their salacious qualities. But what of the serious plays?

Another distinction must be made in the consideration of the serious plays. By serious plays I do not mean historical or romantic dramas, so many of which have of late been wrested from the contexts of books so ruthlessly that the crude results have, no doubt, done much to try seriously the affection of the intelligent public for the theatre. I mean the plays of original scope that deal with matters neither historical nor romantic.

To me it seems to be an unfortunate matter that most of the serious plays are what may be called "problem plays." And thus I regard it as an omen of evil for the theatre, that the greater and more powerful minds devoted to dramatic literature are, almost without exception, evolving a drama that deals with unhappy or repugnant aspects of life. It would be impertinent in me to set myself up as a critic of what are called the master works of the immediately modern repertory, when those works are so admired by great persons the world over. All I claim is an individual right to express my own dislike of this sort of drama generally, and my belief that a nobler literature should distinguish the theatre of today. No one questions the genius of some of the foremost writers of the stage of this time, but some of us may wish that their great gifts had been and may be exercised in nobler directions. Nor does one question the ethical and human value of the greater works of the greater dramatists who seem to be concerned with social problems and human abnormalities almost exclusively. Such plays may well have an incidental and occasional place in the theatre. But shall the theatre in its serious purpose be wholly surrendered to such plays?

I do not think that the problem play is properly within the main province of the stage. Not that the theatre should not make people

think, or that it should not hold up examples. Every play worthy the name teaches a lesson, and the more subtly this can be done, if the play in the meantime amuses, the better. But plays written deliberately upon subjects akin to those that the courts and the hospitals treat professionally seem to me to be out of place on the stage, unless specially performed. Your exponent of the problem drama will say that such plays are necessary as teachers of morality, in that they hold the mirror up to society, whose shortcomings we all know are lamentable. But there is a broader thing to do and a better thing. The play more commonly should hold the mirror up to nature in nature's normal and healthier moods. There is no person that needs a lesson in matters that the problem play exploits that cannot find his lesson, no matter what the need be, in actual life about him. If he needs improving, and if he will be improved by warning, he has but to study persons whom he knows or knows about and profit by their misfortunes and by the example of their shortcomings. If his vision and acquaintance are narrow, and he needs to read stories of such things, he still has the newspapers, which, like the poor, are always with us; and few of them nowadays spare the particulars.

The stage should deal in a multitude of things, I admit; but the repertory on the whole should be recreatively happy and nobly tragic and poetic, and even romantic; for what this workaday world wants and needs is inspiration. A wholesome comedy is like a tonic to the jaded system. A profound tragedy works beneficently upon the emotions,—and many in these days of convention so starve their emotions on the routine contacts of life that as a mere matter of humanity those emotions should be played upon by something of deep moment that will inspire rather than depress. There is need, also, for the exercise of the poetic and the romantic, and there is no place like the stage for that exercise. Here, too, I think, arises a question as to the real effectiveness of the stage for good. Our imaginations are so lively that we can enjoy the representation of something romantic and poetic on the stage much more readily and truthfully than we can accept the mimicry of seamy life, in its extremely modern representations. There can be no such illusion in the

modern problem play, put forward as it is with commonplace detail, as there is in those stage pictures that excite the fancy and take one away to romantic scenes where life seems for the moment ideal. There is inspiration and aspiration in these things. What is there helpful or ennobling in plays of the other sort, if we are to see them one after another?

The man—the dramatist—who has most widely influenced writing for the modern stage is Ibsen. To the brilliant young writers of Germany he is a prophet, and to all Scandinavia he is a model. He has influenced English dramatists,—notably Pinero, the greatest of dramatists that writes in English,—and even the younger dramatists of Italy have fallen under Ibsen's spell.

This Ibsen is a wonderful man. But is he a normal man? We have strange accounts of his recluse habits and of his peculiar vanities. He is said to be a solitary man, who manifests a real dislike for the domestic life which his plays so effectively dissect, in that they expose individual shortcomings or sins that have unhappy results. If the reports of interviewers and observing travelers are to be believed, Ibsen is a man apart from normal life. Yet the genius with which he has pictured human foibles and weaknesses in his plays has given him a vogue in certain circles and a following that promises almost to obscure the modern drama with the shadow of pessimism. It is useless to pretend that Ibsen is local or even national in his portraiture of character. Unquestionably he is human, although many of his characters are perverts or abnormal. He pictures many that are too petty, it seems to me, to have place in the drama, which should concern itself with more admirable subjects. But no one can dispute his genius, or his marvelous technical skill as a dramatist.

It would seem that the greater minds that have influenced serious dramatic writing in this generation have been and are, as a rule, believers in the problem for the theatre. At the time—or about the time—that Ibsen was beginning to develop his impressive and far-reaching pessimism, half a century ago, the younger Dumas, Augier, and other French writers were in the full flower of a like purpose, more romantically expressed.

The greatest of the French was Dumas, whose "Dame aux Camélias," like some other works whose appeal defies analysis, seems destined long to remain "popular." To my mind, his "La Femme de Claude" is much more admirable as a play, and I say this with full knowledge of the fact that my opinion will be scoffed at. And without consideration of the younger Dumas' other notable plays, several of which also were problematic in nature, I will state briefly why I think his *Césarine* is superior as a chief figure in a drama to his "Lady of the Camélias."

Here enters the question of sympathy with a character that some of us consider false and demoralizing, and of appreciation for a character of true strength, although an unenviable character. It is interesting to note the wide range of a mind that could create such remarkable contrasts of character and conform them to such diversity of purpose. In *Césarine* Dumas pictured a woman so outside of all sympathy that his sentence that she be destroyed awakens no protest. Many that have studied this character have erroneously conceived *Césarine* simply to be a voluptuary whose doings were inspired by her passions. It is true her husband called her "the beast," but he called her also "the mate of Cain." Her treachery, cowardice, venality, and depravity are all strongly marked, but they are all so characteristic that mere wantonness is but an incident employed to an end. The great mental strength and ingenuity of this character appeal to us, while nothing abhorrent in the character excites sympathy. In her vicious and sinister power there is simply an intellectual charm. No one could be the worse for seeing the play performed, for its other characters foil the wickedness of *Césarine*, and her punishment is felt to be deserved. But it seems to me that it is different with the play known as "Camille." No capable or artistic player that I have seen in "Camille" could arouse in me a jot of sympathy for that "lady." Yet I never have seen it represented that it did not profoundly move most of the women in the theatre. To me "Camille" is untrue to life in the aspect of life that it treats. It is immoral and inartistic in consequence and, as I think, evil in its influence. If Camille, moved by the pleading of the father of Armand, believed it her duty to relinquish her lover, she might

have fled without dishonor or killed herself. Either course would have ennobled her affection or her passion. As it was, she returned again to a vile life; she flew directly to the arms of another lover, and when the result of such a course was death, she died,—and she does die in the play an innumerable number of times in a year, with the effect of inspiring a maudlin sentiment in women. Where is there aught of sweetness, nobility, unselfishness, and womanliness in the character of Marguerite Gautier?

There are many plays of the French school of a generation or more ago that present social problems, like others of Dumas and Augier and other authors, but few of them ever won sustained public interest even in France, although most of them are skilful dramatic works.

There is one great mind—that of Tolstoi—that employs the drama as an incidental means to his general end, and of course he perforce must speak after the manner of those that deal with problems. His play, "The Power of Darkness," has recently been performed in New York, and its very unpleasing character has been commented upon. However revolting the details of this play may be, a competent critic declares that "they are mitigated by the colossal simplicity and truth with which they are presented. Every situation, every line, is stamped with the hall mark of truth." Tolstoi's labors have been in the interest of the ignorant, debased, and unfortunate peasantry of Russia, and this play deals with phases of the wickedness of woman in such an environment. For an ethical and reformatory, and thus a humanitarian, purpose, such a play is perhaps valuable, if it can be represented where it may work good; and it undoubtedly is valuable as literature, in which form it might come into the right hands. But is it a play that should be indiscriminately performed? And what will its influence be on the theatre and on a public to which its story is foreign and revolting?

"Magda," Sudermann's play, is great as a drama, but in the admiration inspired by the excellence of the play itself one is apt to lose sight of certain facts that relate to the character of its heroine. Magda is calculated to inspire sympathy because

she has overcome misfortune and established herself through sheer force of character. We are prone to contrast her freedom of action and thought and her liberality, so-called, with the provincial narrowness and smallness of the people in her old home. Yet the more I study Magda, the character, the less I admire her. If we are to commend her breadth in merely conventional things, we must respect the smallness and narrowness of her people, who as surely are the results of their own environment, as Magda represents the consequences of a different life. And in wholly disregarding the characteristics of her people I think Magda herself shows a supreme selfishness. Moreover, the more one studies this remarkable play, the more one sees a sinister influence exerted by Magda upon her young sister.

While the plays of Dumas that deal with problems have been imitated, it may almost be said that Ibsen has revolutionized the drama. The German and Scandinavian playwrights seem to vie in putting forward dramas that the future historian of the theatre must, it seems to me, trace directly to the influence of Ibsen. A recent Berlin chronicler remarked that the invasion of French farces in that city was an agreeable antidote for the volumes of serious, gloomy plays with which the Berlin theatres were flooded and still are struggling. Sudermann, Hauptmann, Schnitzler, Phillippi, Ernst, Halbe, Hartleben, and others persist in psychological and kindred "studies." It seems to me a strange thing that most of the writers of distinguished ability should together labor to such ends. Of course the greater of the plays of this character will survive in stage literature as descriptive of an epoch of the theatre. But what is their future influence to be?

It is almost the same in England. It is true that Stephen Phillips has lately come forward as a notable poetic dramatist. His present fame may be the result of his isolation. He stands almost or quite alone among English dramatists in tendency. Pinero, possibly in a measure influenced by the opinions of the ablest English critics, who are Ibsenites, has gradually fallen bodily into the problem maelstrom. But Pinero, brainy and brilliant as he may be, and skilful as he is as a dramatist, reveals no such truths as Ibsen reveals. Ibsen, with all his pessimism,

and in spite of his dealing with so many commonplaces, still is true to the disheartening aspects of life to which he adheres. And his characters, aside from certain essential local habits, are real persons. Pinero deals with damaged characters that belong to a peculiar segment of the civilized world,—to London and to places that reflect its life. Aside from his characters themselves, his plays represent more clearly than anything else the peculiarly sophisticated manners of this practically unique "society." If the English drama ever shall throw off the problem influence and resume those universal truths and motives that characterize drama good for any time and all times, the future student of the theatre will discover in the Pinero plays perhaps the most faithful and suggestive scheme of mere "manners" that ever freighted the drama of any period. Pinero is a worshiper of "good form" and the convention of society in spite of his themes. "Gentlemen," he makes one of his characters say, "should be gypsies"; and his lady Imogen remarks that "A man with a good heart should wear a good hat." These little things not only illumine Pinero's manners; they emphasize the difference between Pinero and Ibsen.

Yet, with all his art and strength, there is that in Pinero's later plays that seems to me, like other "problems," to be unhappy in its influence on the theatre. Moreover, where is the utility in such a character as Mrs. Ebbsmith, an unlovely, mentally depressing woman who simply irritates?

The Italian stage is the same. There the "modern" influence is as remarkable as elsewhere. A very suggestive thing, it seems to me, was an interview recently had with Ristori by the representative of a prominent Russian newspaper. One might think that Ristori, who has passed her eightieth birthday, and who has long been retired from the stage, should be considered as the superannuated commonly are considered. It is natural to regard the great and retired and aged artist as out of touch with current movements, and insulated from appreciation of notable contemporary effort by an egotism born of past individual achievement. But Ristori is an exception. Although removed from the ceaseless activities of the stage, she is alert to its doings and from her

very aloofness is enabled to pass comparative judgments that should command respect. Ristori has no sympathy with the dramatic tendencies of the day, and regards the plays now given to the public, as a rule, as devoid of beauty, vital significance, and artistic merit. In her view the theatre is decadent. She explains the disappearance of "great acting"—and has it not practically disappeared?—as due to the modern repertory, which gives talent little or no opportunity. Unlike most of the superannuated,—and this to me proves her integrity as a judge of the matters of which she speaks,—she admits that there still are many geniuses in the theatre. She simply holds that genius is fettered, misdirected, confined, and put to unworthy uses. Of the drama she says: "Dramatic literature today differs radically from that which it was my privilege to represent and interpret. In fact, it is like looking into two worlds. We used to play Shakespeare and the classics, and all our efforts were directed toward realizing the conceptions of the great masters, to whom we owe so many splendid images and characters. Today the stage is wholly different. The classical repertory has suffered fatally from the changed demands of the public. In obedience to these demands playwrights now produce pieces that are by no means badly constructed, but which, broadly speaking, are trivial, reflecting the prosaic and seamy side of routine life." One needs but to scan the modern repertory to realize the truth of this.

The critical may dispute the question "Is acting an art?" without agreeing among themselves, as they long have disputed it without agreement, yet acting has been and will continue to be an art measured by its greater examples. The degree in which acting is an art varies with the opportunities vouchsafed to those that practice it on a sound basis of technique and along the lines of truth. It seems to me that the revelation by the actor of a noble character is as surely a work of art as is the painting of a noble picture, with even greater possibilities of an inspiring effect. It is true that the actor's work is evanescent, while the painter's work survives. Yet, although the painting may be perused by succeeding generations, and carries its influence indefinitely, the picture that the actor embodies is endowed with life, in all its

appealing variants, and its impression, though fleeting, is for the time profound and fruitful. The true revelation by the actor of a commonplace character is also an artistic work, within its limitations, for truth, when revealed by all that practice the arts, is relatively the same in any form.

Acting, too, is an art in this, that the actor, like the poet or the painter, must so master a technique that his expression involuntarily following that technique, has a form that may be clothed as genius may dictate. In other words the actor, like the trained worker in another field of art, must have his means so readily at hand that he can achieve his ends without so much as thinking of the machinery of his effort. No poet can write without relation to the rules of poetry and win acceptance; no painter can express a scene truthfully without employing trained skill, as well as imagination and colors; and the actor must have perfect control of himself in order truthfully to reveal a character.

The actors of the past whom the critics of their times called great, and whose traditions have been a source of inspiration to their more earnest successors, had repertories that awakened their enthusiasm and led to arduous work to excel. During the long period that saw in the theatre a dignified series of plays almost exclusively, the actor of one generation had before him the example of actors of the preceding generation in the same parts, as well as the traditions of players in the same rôles from time immemorial. There were, no doubt, actors in the old times possessed of genius for true revelation,—great artists whose impersonations were so faithful to nature that the details of costume and the artifices of accessory minutiae, so perfect in these days, and so crude and lacking in seemliness in those days, were lost to view in the power and integrity of their work. In the older days, too, as it was even a generation ago, transitions from play to play, from character to character, kept the intelligence alert, and the consequent artistic facility was remarkable. It goes without saying that many things that were relative merely were not true or satisfying; but the actors of chief parts had so manifest a power and ease, such an ability to seem to be in reality the personages whose characters they assumed, that minor matters

were not noted. The public, too, had a pleasure denied to the public nowadays. It saw at different hands the most vital and the most beautiful characters of the drama. After studying one artist of note in a part and enjoying an impersonation that was thought to be perfect in its way, it had the privilege of seeing another artist in the same character and experiencing the second pleasure, varied from the first by the charm of a different individuality. And better than this, the public could see its favorite players in a round of the great and impressive and inspiring parts and dwell in analysis on a multitude of excellencies.

There was an artistic expansion in the former system that the present system absolutely lacks, without reference to the manner of the play, the degenerate tendency of which I have suggested. It is probably a fact that no one saw repeatedly in certain parts Garrick or Kean or Forrest or Cushman or any of the players whose memories are a rich possession of the theatre, without noting on each successive appearance, after an interval, a truer revelation. A wide repertory on the part of an artist must react most favorably on the conception and portrayal of the individual part, must necessarily lead to a profounder study of the characters with the result that every reappearance should disclose some deeper significance as a result of reflection. This is not so with actors that for long periods appear in a single part, for long runs and persistent repetition benumb the artistic sense and make the acting purely mechanical.

There is inspiration, too, in a noble part that is lacking in an ignoble part. The trained actor, of course, may be able to impersonate a repugnant character, and may seem to be at one with it. But there is that in the beautiful and lovable character that makes the actor's work the easier, and thus more true, while its influence as the actor lives it, or seems to live it, is altogether happy. With the problem drama it is different. Its characters are narrow, petty, sinister, oblique, eccentric, seldom admirable, and never exemplary. They are of such peculiar types that but an actor here and there can fitly picture them, and the atmosphere in which they move is stifling to persons of normal mind, who dominate life for the world's good. I think it an error forever

to be preaching that the problem play has a moral tendency, for it seems to me that its influence is, on the contrary, against moral health. As Edward Dowden says, the Shakespeare drama, though without an ethical tendency, yet produces an ethical effect. "There are seasons," says Dowden, "when a sterile world-weariness is induced by the superficial barrenness of life. The persons we know seem to shrivel up and become wizened and grotesque. The places we have loved transform themselves into ugly little prisons. The ideals for which we lived appear absurd patterns, insignificant arabesques, devoid of idea and of beauty. Our own heart is a most impertinent and unprofitable handful of dust." Dowden was not thinking of the problem play that is now so frequently projected in the theatre, but he has to my mind pictured exactly the effect upon the normal human being that the problem play enforces if frequently seen. It colors life with a leaden hue. And Dowden, though not prescribing for the gloom that travels in the wake of the problem play, names a specific when he says: "To this mood of barren world-weariness the Shakespeare drama"—and he might also say any great drama of normal life—"comes with no direct teaching, but with division of life. Even though death end all, these things at least *are*,—beauty and force, purity, sin and love, and anguish and joy. These things are, and therefore life cannot be a little, idle whirl of dust. We are shown the strong man taken in the toils, the sinner sinking farther and farther away from light and reality and the substantial life of things into the dubious and the dusk, the pure heart all vital and confident and joyous; we are shown the glad, vicarious sacrifice of soul for soul, the malign activity of evil, the vindication of right by the true justiciary; we are shown the good common things of the world and the good things that are rare; the love of parents and children, the comradeship of young men, the exquisite vivacity, courage, and high-spirited intellect of noble girlhood, the devotion of man and woman to man and woman. The vision of life rises before us and we know that the vision represents a reality. These things then being actual, how poor and shallow a trick of the heart is cynicism!"

THE CHRONICLE OF THE MONTH

JOSEPH B. BISHOP, *New York.*

CECIL RHODES AND HIS WILL.

The death of Cecil Rhodes, followed speedily by the publication of his extraordinary will, has constituted literally the world-wide sensation of the past month. Thackeray said of the death of Swift that in thinking of it one thought of an empire falling. If any one thought of an empire falling on hearing of the death of Rhodes, the empire builder, he could not escape the thought on reading Rhodes's will that he aspired to remain an empire builder after his death. He was in life a visionary, a political idealist absorbed in the dream of imperial expansion for Great Britain, a politician whose boldness and brilliant resourcefulness touched the imagination of the world, an accumulator of vast wealth which he used merely as an instrument toward the realization of his ideals. Dying, he left a fourth or fifth of his colossal fortune to be devoted for all time to the work of making his visionary ideas, his dream of Anglo-Saxon unity, a reality. What that dream was, he endeavored to set forth in writing in 1890. The rough, unfinished sentences in which he did this have been published since his death, and they explain, more clearly perhaps than his will does, the ideas which lay behind his remarkable bequest. The key to his "idea" for the development of the English speaking race was, he said, the foundation of a society copied, as to organization, from the Jesuits, a secret society organized like Loyola's, and "supported by the accumu-

lated wealth of those whose aspiration is a desire to do something." Wealth, money, was to be the lever with which he would move the world into one great family. "The only thing feasible to carry out this idea is a secret society gradually absorbing the wealth of the world to be devoted to such an object. There is Baron Hirsch, with twenty millions, very soon to cross the unknown border and struggling in the dark to know what to do with his money, and so one might go on *ad infinitum*." And what was the "idea" when reduced to writing? Here is his clearest exposition of it:—

"They are calling the new country Rhodesia. I find I am human, and should like to be living after my death. Still, perhaps, if that name is coupled with the object of England everywhere it may convey the discovery of an idea which will ultimately lead to the cessation of all wars, and one language throughout the world, the patent being the gradual absorption of wealth and human minds of the higher order to the object. What an awful thought it is that if, even now, we could arrange with the present members of the United States Assembly and our House of Commons the peace of the world would be secured for all eternity! We could hold a Federal Parliament, five years in Washington and five in London. Fancy the charm to Young America, just coming on, and dissatisfied, for they have filled up their own country and do not know what to tackle next, to share in a scheme to take the government of the whole world."

As death hovered over him two years later, he murmured, "So little done! So much to do!" What he had not done, he sought to accomplish by the ambitious and adventurous youth of the Anglo-Saxon race in the British colonies, in the United States, and in Germany. To lure them into the same path that he had trod, he provided a method of education which he hoped would make them followers in his steps and imitators of his career. His bequest has all the spectacular and visionary characteristics of his career. He believed in himself and wished to bestow upon the world a continuing line of men of his type. At the age of eighteen he went to South Africa, a physical wreck, to die. The climate cured his disease, and the discovery of diamond mines in his neighborhood gave him the opportunity

to amass wealth. Instantly he started on a career that became in a few years the wonder of the world. From the outset he was dominated with the idea of building up a great British empire in South Africa, and all his energy was devoted to its realization. He did not stop with dreaming dreams; he went to work to fulfill them. Wealth in his eyes was of no use save as the means of extending dominion and power. He was the first rich man in South Africa to take that view, and he wrought miracles by means of his adherence to it. At thirty-four years of age he controlled the diamond market of the world, and was many times a millionaire. He then began that rapid acquirement of outlying territory which in a few years resulted in the creation of a great British empire in South Africa,—a part of which was called after himself, he being the first subject of the crown to be so honored,—and in the establishment of British predominance in that section of the world. "At an age," says a writer in the London "Spectator," "when an English barrister would be a rising junior, and a home politician might, if he were lucky, look for minor office, Mr. Rhodes was a Premier of Cape Colony." He held this office for five years, and was forced to resign it for complicity in the Jameson raid, which converted him from the most popular man in South Africa into the most thoroughly hated one. He himself could not justify his conduct in that instance, for when asked at the official inquiry what he had to say in defense of it, he replied, "The best answer I can make is that I cannot defend it at all." The zeal of the empire builder had in the end outrun all discretion. He had fallen a victim to his own o'er-leaping ambition.

Can money in the form of educational endowments train up a race of Cecil Rhodeses? That is the question which his bequest asks and which its operation will answer. He has bequeathed a fund of \$10,000,000, the income of which is to be divided into scholarships for the education of "young colonists" from the United States, the British colonies, and the German Empire, for the purpose of "giving breadth to their views and instruction in life and manners, instilling in their minds the

advantage to the colonies as well as to the United Kingdom of the retention of the unity of the Empire." The United States is to have the largest number of these scholarships, two for each State and territory, or ninety-six in all. The British colonies are to have sixty, and Germany fifteen. His object in establishing those for the United States is thus set forth in the will :—

"I desire to encourage and foster appreciation of the advantages which I implicitly believe will result from a union of the English speaking people, and to encourage in students from the United States of America, who will benefit from American scholarships to be established for the reason above given at Oxford under this will, an attachment to the country from which they sprang, but without, I hope, withdrawing them or their sympathies from the land of their adoption or birth."

In regard to qualifications for scholarships, because he desired that the "students so elected shall not be mere bookworms," Rhodes directs that in their election "regard shall be paid to their literary and scholastic attainments and fondness for and success in manly outdoor sports, such as cricket and football, and their qualities of manhood, truth, courage, devotion to duty, sympathy for and protection of the weak, kindness, unselfishness, and fellowship exhibited during their school days, moral force, character, and instinct to lead and to take interest in their schoolmates, for these latter attributes will be likely in after life to guide them to esteem and perform public duties as the highest aim." He suggests as ratings for students who will be likely to meet his ideal, three tenths for literary qualifications; two tenths for fondness for sport; three tenths for qualities of manhood; and two tenths for exhibition of moral force. The marks for the several qualifications are to be awarded independently, for the first, by examination; for the second and third, on ballot of their fellow students, and for the fourth, on the report of the head master of the candidate's school. The awards are to be sent for consideration to the trustees or some person appointed to ascertain by averaging the marks in blocks of twenty the best ideal of a qualified student. No student shall be qualified or disqualified

for election to a scholarship on account of race or religious opinions. A qualified student who is elected shall take up his residence within six months of his election to the scholarship payable from such residence.

The scholarship for American and British colonial students is to be £300 a year, and for the German students £250. These are extremely liberal, for the usual value of an Oxford scholarship is £80, while some are only £70 and others only £60. A student would live in positive luxury at Oxford on \$1,500 a year. In commenting upon that part of the bequest which applies to German students, Rhodes says that they are to be nominated by the Kaiser, and that "a good understanding between England and Germany and the United States will secure the peace of the world, and educational relations will form the strongest tie." This is the dominating note of the will, and it is the note of political idealism. Whether the scheme is practical, whether if it works at all it will work in the way he hoped it would, are questions which only time can answer. That there will be no lack of candidates from the United States can be taken for granted.

THE NATIONAL CIVIC FEDERATION AND STRIKES.

Within three months the National Civic Federation, with Senator Hanna as its official head and inspiring force, has settled seven strikes and prevented the occurrence of two others, involving the employment of more than 200,000 men. In not a single instance in which its services have been engaged in settling troubles between capital and labor has the Federation failed of success. This is an extraordinary record for a body that came into existence only last December, and which held its first formal meeting and adopted a plan of action in February of this year. The reason for this uniform success is not far to seek. It lies in the personnel of the Federation's Arbitration Committee, a body of thirty-six men who constitute one of the most remarkable courts ever assembled anywhere. In it sit the foremost representatives of organized capital, Charles M. Schwab, Presi-

dent of the Steel Trust, S. R. Callaway, President of the American Locomotive Works, James A. Chambers, President of the American Window Glass Company, and other great "Captains of Industry," and side by side with them the foremost representatives of organized labor, John Mitchell of the United Mine Workers, Frank P. Sargent of the Brotherhood of Railway Firemen, Theodore Shaffer of the Amalgamated Steel and Iron Workers, and Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor. On the same bench sit Bishop Potter and Archbishop Ireland, the representatives of the moral and religious and philanthropic forces of the land, and such eminent representatives of the people as ex-President Cleveland, Cornelius N. Bliss, and Oscar S. Straus. It would be impossible to assemble a body which could command more universal confidence in its justice and fairness than this committee has received from the moment of its announcement. Any one can see by a glance at the names of its members that all sides would be certain to receive from it a fair hearing and a just judgment.

Senator Hanna, who is its chairman, said recently in speaking of the objects of the committee and of the Civic Federation which it represents, that the "necessities growing out of the vast productive capacity of the country have compelled the aggregation of capital,—the creation of wealth in concrete form. To absorb it, and to render it valuable as an industrial investment, we must have industrial peace. The Civic Federation is beginning to lay the foundation of such a result." He went on to say that his experience of thirty years as an employer had taught him that the employer is expected to go more than half-way in meeting the employee. He had first become interested in the subject of the amicable adjustment of differences between employer and employee during the Ohio coal strike in 1874. At that time, he said, an agreement was entered into between the employers' association and the miners' union to meet each other and to exert every effort for conciliation before resorting to drastic measures. As a result, there were no more strikes of consequence in that region. In a large way the Civic Federation's Arbitration Committee accom-

plishes what this Ohio agreement did,—it enables employers and employees “to meet each other” and to seek to agree rather than to fight. It gives them an opportunity to come face to face before a tribunal in which they, as well as the public, have entire confidence, and to state each his case. Both have thus the chance of hearing the other side, under conditions which tend to allay passions rather than to arouse them. In all the nine controversies which have been before the committee, there has been no wrangling between the opposing forces, and very little difficulty in reaching an amicable agreement. Both sides were surprised to see how easily their differences could be adjusted after a friendly discussion.

The new method eliminates one of the most pernicious influences in labor controversies in the past,—the sensational newspaper. Once a strike got under way and the leaders on both sides of it began to conduct their contest in the columns of the newspapers, a settlement became steadily more difficult as time went on. Everything that could be done to arouse passions on both sides, and to arouse popular passions throughout the country, was done. Political demagogues hastened to contribute all that they could to make the contest bitter, and it became inevitably a “struggle of endurance” with enormous financial losses on both sides. Now the newspaper is out of it. The case is laid in private before a tribunal whose personnel commands absolute confidence. Neither side, after submitting its case to this tribunal, would venture, if it had the wish to do so, to refuse to accept the verdict; for to do that would be to invite popular condemnation. The demagogue of all varieties is put out of business by the new method. The pestiferous walking delegate’s occupation is gone. The kind of strike that he orders cannot stand delay or daylight. It must come at once and come in the dark. What a figure he would cut, standing before this tribunal and attempting to argue his case! He would never venture into that presence, least of all when he had endeavored to get up a strike at the instigation of a political demagogue who desired it for campaign advantage.

Every strike or controversy that the Civic Federation settles will give increased moral force to it and make more certain its continuing success. If it becomes the established court of final appeal in all disputes between labor and capital, the labor issue, which first and last has been one of the most pernicious influences in our politics, will disappear forever. No more deadly blow than this could be administered to the political demagogues who seek to climb into favor by arousing class prejudices and class antagonism in this country. But above and beyond all other advantages will be the enormous sums of money on both sides, the needless and utter loss which every great strike entails on employers and employees, the burden falling most heavily upon the latter.

POLICE BLACKMAIL AND SUNDAY SELLING IN NEW YORK.

Mayor Low's reform administration in the city of New York has come face to face, in the fourth month of its existence, with a very perplexing problem. It is a problem which could not arise in any other large American city because the elements entering into it are peculiar to New York. For many years the police of that city have exercised for their own profit the State's power of licensing the sale of liquor on Sundays. The revenue collected by the police from this source has been enormous, ranging from \$500,000 to \$1,000,000 a year. This estimate is not mere guesswork, but is based upon authentic knowledge. There are in the city over 7,000 licensed places in which liquor is sold and fully 1,000 more where it is sold without license. A regular system of tariff is levied on all these places, ranging from \$5 a month to \$25 a month, according to the privileges granted. Thus, to sell for a few hours on Sunday, early in the morning and late at night, the tax is \$5. For longer hours \$10, and for both illegal hours and other forbidden privileges than liquor selling, \$20 or \$25, according to the number and extent of the privileges. This money is not collected directly by the police. There is an organization called the Liquor Dealers' Association to which all the keepers of licensed places belong. They pay their dues to a

representative of their own, and he pays it to somebody who represents the power behind the police. The names of all liquor dealers who pay are known to the police, and so long as their "dues" are paid regularly, they are safe from interference in their violation of the law. Who gets the money thus collected is not known. Of course, the police captains get their share, but it is not believed that the rank and file of the force get any of it.

Mayor Low came into office under peculiar conditions. He pledged himself in his letter of acceptance not to enforce rigorously the laws forbidding liquor selling on Sunday. It was understood by the voters that he would, as Mayor, permit quiet violations of the law through the side doors. In this understanding he was upheld and approved, not only by the newspapers which favored his candidacy, but by the great body of the respectable people of the city. Most of these would refuse to favor a law for any selling whatever on Sunday, but they are quite willing to "wink" at the illegal selling on that day provided it be done quietly through side doors. But Mayor Low came into office pledged also to abolish official blackmail of all kinds, including that of police blackmail on the liquor traffic. The problem before him was to separate the excise question from the blackmail question, that is, to allow the police to retain the licensing power and at the same time prevent them from collecting revenue from its exercise. The police were, naturally, not disposed to help him make this separation. As soon as they were pressed on the blackmail issue, they began to close tightly all the liquor saloons in the city, hoping thus to force the Mayor into a position in which he would be violating his preëlection pledges, thus incurring an amount of popular hostility that would lead to the defeat of his administration in the next election. They felt confident that if they could compel him to give the city what is known as a "Dry Sunday," they would have no difficulty in defeating him for reëlection in November, 1903, and restoring Tammany to power.

Whether Mayor Low can extirpate blackmail and still allow Sunday selling in violation of law, remains to be seen. Curiously enough, the separation is maintained without difficulty in the Borough of Brooklyn. In that part of the city, police blackmail has never been associated with side door selling. Neither has it been so associated in other large cities of the country, at least with nothing approaching the systematic perfection attained in the Borough of Manhattan or old city of New York. Whether this confirmed association, with its enormous profits to the police, can be broken without either enforcing the law rigidly or without organizing a virtually new police force composed of men who have not been demoralized by the blackmailing habit, is the problem before Mayor Low. Upon its solution depends in large measure the success of his administration. He was chosen on the issue of police reform, and if his administration cannot accomplish that reform, it will have great difficulty in securing another term of office.

LATIN EUROPE AND AMERICAN IMPERIALISM¹

SCIPIO SIGHELE, *Rome.*

In the field of sociology two theories are at the present time contending for supremacy in the minds of scientists and in the feelings of the multitude. According to one of these theories, the life of nations is subject to the same laws that govern the life of man; that is to say, every nation, like every man, passes through a period of youth, glowing with ardor and giving promise for the future, then of virility, acting and grasping, and lastly of senility,—the period of decline,—the fatal prelude to social death.

According to the other theory, nations cannot be compared to individual organisms whose course of life is inexorably traced out, like that of the sun, by the laws of nature. After the smiling morning comes the burning midday, after midday sad evening, and then dark night. Those homogeneous aggregations of men which are called nations show, instead, that they are immortal, or at least that they possess the power of resurrection; that is, that even ancient nations may continue without intermission to be prosperous and flourishing; or that after a period of decadence or apparent death they may revive and regain the splendor of the past. Which of these two theories is the true one?

An absolute answer to this question would be presumptuous. The previsions of scientists have so often, especially of late, been

(1) Translated by Salvatore Cortesi, Rome.

negated by the facts, that ordinary common sense warns us to turn from the prophets, and to trust no hypothesis as to the future. In my own humble opinion, each of these theories contains some fundamental truth, as is clearly demonstrated by history. Without a shadow of doubt, there are "decaying nations," as Lord Salisbury says, which show a constant phenomenon of social decadence that may be compared to the phenomenon of senile physical retrogression; such, for instance, is Greece, a country which, once the source of high civilization, has for centuries been one of the lowest among the nations. On the other hand, there are nations which, after periods of decadence, more or less long, rise suddenly, inspired by a new and youthful energy. Such is Italy which, after a long political and economic night, has dawned into a new day. Such, too, is England which, from 1838 to 1845, was so much harassed by bread riots raised by a starving people that certainly no one anticipated her present riches and power. Now, I ask, on what do these apparently contradictory phenomena depend? Why do some nations grow old and decay without possibility of resuscitation, and why have others, within themselves, the great privilege of awaking from sleep, and a capability of alternating, so to speak, periods of glory and power with periods of silence and misery, in the same way that certain countries have alternate years of fruitfulness and sterility?

The reason is perhaps easier to find, and the question to answer, than the gravity of the subject would lead one to suppose. We may clearly perceive the truth of my previous observation that these opposite theories are in a certain sense both true and both false, for we find in history instances by which they are both confirmed and both refuted. Their greatest and perhaps only fault is in their being too absolute.

As with proverbs, so it is with theories. Proverbs are created by many minds on the basis of a series of positive facts, and of them (proverbs) it has been justly observed that they represent and are crystallizations of popular wisdom. Let us, however, remember that for every proverb there is another of directly

opposite import. But this, instead of leading to the rigidly logical consequence that one of the two must be entirely false, rather teaches that the incidents of life are so varied that we may accumulate an immense number of facts to prove, for instance, that "he who works for himself, does the work of three," while as great a number go to prove that "four eyes see more than two."

By the same process of reasoning, before we conclude that one of two opposite theories contains all the truth, and the other all the error, let us not forget that each is based on a series of facts, and that the superiority or victory of one theory over the other can be only relative; for this victory must depend on whether a greater number of facts may be accumulated in support of the one rather than of the other. And it is this idea of relation which gives us without difficulty the answer to the above questions.

Enemies as we are of absolutism, moral, political, or scientific, we do not believe that there are in sociology any eternal and final laws that condemn to death certain nations and hold forth the hope of resurrection to others. We believe that the rise and fall of nations depend on a combination of circumstances often fortuitous, rather than on any internal development, or any atrophy either original or racial. In a word, as we believe that the facts of the life of man are determined not only by his anthropological and hereditary qualities, but also by his social surroundings, so we believe that the history of nations is determined not only by racial traits, by soil and climate, but also by those social influences which arise from chance and from fortune.

It is by this mysterious crossing of social influences that one nation which seemed to be slowly sinking into decay and death suddenly manifests the most vigorous vital forces, while another as suddenly declines before it has completed the cycle of its historic life.

* * *

What we have said up to the present point is a necessary pre-

face to the discussion of that world-problem which is represented by the word imperialism. We are now passing through one of the decisive periods in the history of civilization. Passions which we thought had totally spent themselves ages ago have risen again in all their former violence. The raging mania for the great game of war and conquest, which we believed to be attributes only of the people of antiquity and of the Middle Ages, has awakened with tremendous vitality in the men of today. Progress was compared by Goethe to a spiral which, though ever turning back on itself, is still ever rising. It is clear that the world often retraces its steps, for England and the United States of America, possessed by their present ambition, like imperial Rome and the Spain of Charles V., are returning to a past condition, although undeniably rising as does the spiral. With the exception of a few barbarous episodes and some selfish aims, the imperialism of today is morally better, and socially more useful, than that spirit of conquest by which Rome and Spain became powerful.

To this modification by time may be added another remarkable feature of imperialism, namely, the fact that it has passed from one race to another. First, it was the prerogative and characteristic of the Latin race, now it is the new, the grandiose, and the unforeseen attribute of the Teutonic. Much as we may desire that war may cease, there is no denying that it is, and will be for a long period, one of the most positive indications of a nation's power. In later times we can point to proofs of this assertion. On one side, we have seen the Greek and Latin nations invariably defeated. First, Italy in 1896, in her African campaign, lost the battle of Adua, a disaster so great that its effects have not yet been measured. Next, Greece was defeated in her unhappy conflict with Turkey in 1897, and lastly, Spain in her short but tragic war in Cuba. These are facts which force even the most incredulous and optimistic to see some truth in the pessimist and fatalist theory of the decline of the Latin race. We have seen the other side also. We have beheld England, of all European nations the most liberal, the most advanced, and the most opposed to militarism, suddenly and violently seized by the fever

of conquest, and, departing from her former methods of commercial invasion and colonization, enter upon the war in the Transvaal. How this war will terminate is easily foreseen, yet, from the heroic resistance of the Boers, it is difficult to predict when that end will be reached.

The United States were by many sociologists held up as an example to the Old World for their anti-militarism, their civilization, and their riches,—the fruit of industry. Almost contemporaneously with England, they suddenly became transformed into an aggressive power, conquering in a war for which they had to improvise soldiers as well as officers.

These facts, bursting on the world like a sudden tempest, have surprised and confused, not only the thinkers whose mission and pride it is to foresee the far off future, but also the politicians whose duty and trade lead them to study nearer probabilities, and to hold themselves ready for every development.

Anticipations of an unknown future arise to occupy the minds and agitate the patriotism of all,—that unknown future which contains and mirrors in its many-sided aspects the eventualities to which humanity is hastening. Must we not boldly proclaim the worn-out condition of Latin Europe? Must we not believe that the Latin race will yield more and more before the Anglo-Saxon? And must we not consider that Europe has less to dread from the *yellow peril* than she has from the *Teutonic peril*? And must we not consign to the moles and the bats that rose-water theory which declares that the world is to be conquered and ameliorated by the slow process of a peaceful civilization, and, instead, must we not resurrect from the arsenal of ancient and barbarous prejudices the theory that progress can be made only through force and martial exploits? Is the breath of imperialism that is now moving over the world but a passing return to atavistic conditions no more important or significant than certain morphological anomalies which are produced in normal individuals, without, however, affecting their organism? or is it a certain proof that the modern world, like the ancient, is leavened by the spirit of imperialism, and to obtain its conquests must employ the brutal methods which

constitute militarism? We shall see if it be possible to answer at least some of these questions.

* * *

The war with Cuba, in spite of the international forebodings which appeared as soon as it broke out, seemed at first likely to be confined within the limits of an episode of secondary import, when compared with the immensity of the world's history. It seemed to be merely a logical application of that which has always hitherto been the foreign policy of North America, that is, the affirmation of the Monroe doctrine, which denies to Europe the right of imposing her will on the nations beyond the Atlantic. The war with Cuba was, on the contrary, a fact of immense importance in the world's policy, and instead of being descended in direct line from the Monroe doctrine, it was the manifestation of a new sentiment which may be called American Imperialism. Liberal and radical parties throughout Europe all sympathized with the United States in the belief that they were actuated by a love of liberty. On the other hand, the conservative and reactionary parties sided with Spain, and to these was united that small nucleus of chauvinism which, not contented with an exaggerated patriotism which consists in always defending the actions of its own country, has also an exaggerated pride of race, and always defends the old continent against the new.

The radicals were right in siding with America, and wishing it success, because, independently of any other reason, the cruelties committed by the Spaniards in Cuba during their rule, the material cruelty, so to speak, of the soldiers, the moral cruelty and infamy of the Jesuits, were such as to rouse universal indignation. But they were not aware that underlying the pretext of applying the Monroe doctrine, a pretext which gained a certain amount of sympathy for the war, there was among the Americans a less liberal and less altruistic but much deeper motive, that is, the unconscious desire of every growing organism to expand, and to impress itself on its surroundings as soon as its force will permit.

This is a law of life which I believe has no exceptions, and with regard to which I confess to feeling absolutely certain. The healthy, strong animal exercises authority over its fellow creatures, and becomes a despot respected and feared. The rich and powerful individual continually extends his influence in the society in which he lives, and increases his fortune at the expense of his weaker and poorer neighbors. This appetite for power extends by degrees from individuals to nations, and from national to international interests.

This is the transition, or more correctly, the inevitable evolution by which the single phenomenon of the instinctive impulse of one individual, who is strong enough to overcome others, is transmuted into the collective phenomenon of imperialism.

The three greatest civilized nations of the world, Germany, England, and the United States, are examples and clear proofs of this theory.

Germany, whose wealth and population have marvelously increased through the development of her industrial resources, has introduced that fearful word, *Pangermanism*, which contains a threat to neighboring nationalities. These are forced to struggle, and they can only with difficulty defend themselves against a slow but continuous invasion of the German element, which by peaceful means, such as schools, newspapers, books, commercial institutions, etc., tends gradually to extinguish the germs of other races, and to substitute its own.

England, that distant island, which five centuries ago was wrapped in solitude and mist, has succeeded, owing to her rapid progress in moral and material force, in becoming mistress of the seas, in diffusing her language over a great part of the world, and in forming an immense colonial empire.

The United States of America also adopted imperialism as soon as the increase of wealth permitted that monstrous growth of national pride to show itself.

Imperialism in America is merely the consequence of colossal fortunes amassed by private individuals, and of the extraordinary commercial enterprises undertaken by them. As the mad dream

of the "kings" of the bank and the market is continually to accumulate and concentrate wealth, so, also, the tendency of the people from which these "kings" have sprung must be to subjugate all the nations within the reach of their ambition.

There is an indirect proof of this affirmation in the fact that the Western States of America, where wealth is not so great and is more equalized, are most opposed to imperialism. Imperialism, therefore, is but the international manifestation of that pride and ambition which are the inevitable results of power and wealth.

Every nation that flourishes inevitably becomes imperialist, just as every man who succeeds in life absorbs and centralizes subordinate elements.

From an impartial and philosophic point of view, it is therefore vain and unjust to condemn imperialism *a priori* and without any regard for the extenuating circumstances, as is the habit of sentimental and superficial minds. We must accept it as one of the great factors—perhaps the greatest—in the history of the world; and since this history is interwoven with misery, grief, and infamy, and also with marvelous moral and intellectual conquests, we must judge imperialism calmly, and acknowledge that amidst much evil it has done much good also.

* * *

There are two kinds of imperialism, the ancient and the modern,—a distinction of essential importance for our comparison of Latin Europe with America; the first imperialism, characteristic of the Latin races, was military and aristocratic, the second, characteristic of the Teutonic races, is economic and capitalist. The one, a manifestation of violence and brigandage, belonged to societies no longer savage, but still barbarous, because they despised labor as the vile occupation of slaves or tillers of the earth; the other, a manifestation especially of moral awakening, though still necessarily violent, belongs to progressive and civilized societies which have elevated labor as the thing of greatest worth in the world. The ancient imperialism was personified in the military conqueror; the soldier was its only

means of victory, and taxation its only object. The underlying reason of this brutal imperialism was to attract into its own orbit, and to place under its own power, new nations in order to despoil them, not always improving but often depraving them. Imperialism sometimes gave to these some idea of art, or some just law, but it never elevated them, never trained their characters.

Modern imperialism (still making use of the soldier, but we shall see in what proportion and from what motives) is impersonated in the successful trader. Its best troops, those that have gained the greatest victories, do not consist of armed men, but of artisans, agriculturists, manufacturers, and engineers; its weapons of war do not carry sterility and death, but serve to perfect and to increase agriculture and industry, and are called railways, roads, electric ploughs, etc. This imperialism also seeks gain from the countries it subdues, but it gains without impoverishing; it does not make the land a desert as did the ancient imperialism, but improves and fertilizes it, often discovering natural wealth previously unsuspected. And together with the undeniable vices of civilization, it sets an example of the greatest of civil virtues, the virtue of labor, which is the chief spring not only of all economic, but also of moral, progress. Thus we may, with an easy conscience, since facts themselves declare it, affirm the superiority of modern, over ancient, imperialism. There is between them the same difference as that between the two forms of civilization from which they emanate.

But while acknowledging the merits of modern imperialism, we must not be blind to its defects, and first of all we must combat, or at least explain, a remark which seems to arise spontaneously from what we have said in apparent condemnation of the Latin races. If this race—it will be said—created military and political imperialism, and the Anglo-Saxon race economic and industrial imperialism, and if this modern imperialism is superior to the ancient, we are compelled to acknowledge that the Latin race is inferior to the Teutonic, since the goodness and vitality of an organism must be measured by the quality of its products. We do not deny that between these two races there are differences

nearly all in favor of the Anglo-Saxon. The Latin temperament, eager for glory and for the appearance of glory, prone to enthusiasm and heroism, but opposed to the slow labor that prepares future victories in silence, productive of all that makes life beautiful, but much less productive of that which is the basis of life itself, must necessarily impress itself on the world by means of an imperialism more impregnated with art and sensuality than with knowledge and conscience. This imperialism was like a drama performed on the stage of history, a marvelous scene, in which was displayed all the ardor of a brave race, with cruel instincts and conscious of power; a scene possessing all the fascinations of art, but wanting in that which is durable and productive, namely, the consciousness of the end to be attained, and the order which is the means of reaching it. For these reasons the drama dissolved and disappeared like a frightful incubus.

On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon temperament has gifts which are wanting in the Latin; it has not the brilliancy of a fleeting enthusiasm, but a clear and distinct vision of the distant object to be attained; it has faith in the continuous and humble work of the whole community rather than in the fortunate genius of any single individual; therefore its imperialist idea, originating in motives similar to those of the Latin race, is of a totally different character; it is not luminous, brilliant, and fleeting, but the serious result of a determined will and of patient labor; it is enduring, because resting on the principle of life; that is, on reasons, not only political, but economical.

In spite of these differences which I, though Latin, am ready to acknowledge, we must nevertheless take into account, and thus make the comparison more just and less odious, that perhaps the two kinds of imperialism have been even more determined by social influences than by any quality inherent in either race. We must not claim, or even imagine, for ancient Rome an imperialism not exclusively military and political, nor must we ascribe to the Teutonic race alone the merit of having inaugurated industrial imperialism, because this imperialism originated not only in the special gifts of that race, but also, and I may say,

especially, in the present condition of society. It is this civilization of labor which, being substituted for the ancient aristocratic and military civilization, has made it possible for the inevitable and universal tendency of imperialism to take peaceful and civilized forms,—but forms that are not free, however, from defects. A pessimist might say that in reality the progress of civilization is nothing but a Jesuitical transformation of savage instincts. What is the real difference between ancient and modern civilization? The first rested on bold and open violence, the second on treachery and fraud. In old days the struggle for life was fought out by armed force; at the present time it is fought out with craft, its weapon being money. Political power is obtained by corruption, and wealth, no more to be found on battle-fields where life at least was risked, is now sought on the battle-field of the exchange, where every day there are a few colossal conquerors and an infinite number of obscure victims. What, indeed, are commerce, banks, and gambling on the stock exchange, from the point of view of rigid morality, but colossal frauds and deceptions? The course of progress is now gold instead of blood, corruption instead of cruelty. A pessimist might point out the difference between ancient and modern imperialism, the first brutal and militarist like the civilization from which it emanated, the second fraudulent like modern civilization.

We do not deny that there is much truth in all this, but we affirm that as a theft is less criminal than a murder, so a civilization based on fraud represents progress in comparison with a civilization based on violence, and in the same way an economic is superior to an aristocratic imperialism.

The real defect and danger of modern imperialism consists in this, that in its latest and most important manifestations (the wars in Cuba and the Transvaal) it has insolently displayed that which hitherto has been the great protagonist of history, that is, militarism.

And militarism has reappeared not only as a necessity of government, but with the warmest support of public opinion. It is hardly necessary to refer in proof of this to the demonstrations

of the populace in London and New York, and to the unexpectedly militarist feeling of the English and American nations. We do not, indeed, maintain that military force is entirely useless at the present day; sometimes both international and private questions alike arrive at a point where there is no means of deciding except by the *ultima ratio* of violence,—painful and theoretically worthy of blame, but still practically necessary. We merely affirm that war among civilized people, and educated and upright men, should be resorted to only in extreme cases, such as homicide, and, in general, in cases of acts of violence, or in legitimate self-defense, and it seems to me that England, especially, has failed to restrain herself within these limits. Let us remember, besides, that the most fruitful and fortunate period of industrial imperialism was when it made use of armies of colonists and merchants rather than of armies of soldiers. We ask, not without a certain timidity, whether modern imperialism is not approaching a descending plane worse than that of ancient imperialism, the faults of which it is adding to its own by uniting to the fraud, which is the basis of the commercial activity of our civilization, the violence which was the characteristic of the ancient.

But perhaps this phenomenon of degeneracy, this atavistic return to the forms of ancient imperialism may not be a sign of the degeneracy of modern imperialism, although it is a sign that the nations or races by whom it is manifested have arrived at the acme of their power,—at the full meridian of their splendor, and must, like the sun, decline toward their setting, and yield their places to others who will be better able to diffuse modern imperialism.

* * *

With this last remark, we have reached the problem comprised in the title of this article, namely, what the position of Latin Europe is in presence of American imperialism, and generally speaking, of that of the Teutonic races. Must the Latin races remain in their present condition of undeniable inferiority to the

Teutonic? Will they sink lower or will they rise? Are the gleams of hope which we see delusive?

Certainly the present time is not favorable to Latin Europe. Spain, Italy, and France, which more properly constitute it, now play a secondary part in the life of international politics, and must be satisfied to watch with envy the immense progress daily made by England, Germany, and Russia, which constitute a younger Europe, and by the United States, the youngest and most promising portion of America. Spain and Italy, as I have already said, have been conquered in war, and thus roughly awakened from their dream of imperialism. France, though she has escaped material disaster, has experienced the moral disaster of the Dreyfus affair, which revealed the clerico-military gangrene from which she suffers. Besides this, there is the terrible phenomenon of a continual diminution of her population. We must now resign ourselves to the necessity of recognizing that not only does the political sky contain minor and major stars (small and great powers), but that on the horizon new stars have risen, the World Powers, as the English press has happily called them. These World Powers have given up as too restricted the ideals of race and nationality which once limited the political ambition of every people; they seek to extend their influence over the world, and justify their unbounded ambition by this principle, that when an inept or decadent nation cannot use its possessions for the good of all, a stronger people has the right to usurp its place in the name of this general good. Germany, England, and the United States are now putting this maxim into practice, forgetting that their greatness originated in very different and more liberal principles. They now threaten to obscure by the shadow of their influence a great part of the world. This danger is not only political and social, but also numerical. Already the increase of the Teutonic population is superior to that of the Latin. According to the following figures, which I take from the "Cosmopolitan" of July, 1901, the Teutons (United States, United Kingdom of Great Britain, and Germany) which were forty-three millions in 1800 ascended to one hundred and forty-

nine millions in 1890, while the Latins (France, Italy, and Spain) during the same period increased only from fifty-five to eighty-six millions.

In the last ten years of the nineteenth century, the difference was still more accentuated; in 1900 the Teutons had risen to one hundred and seventy-one millions, while the Latins reached only ninety millions. If the proportional increase of the respective races remains unchanged, the following previsions speak volumes:—

	TEUTONS.	LATINS.
Year 1900,	171 millions,	90 millions.
Year 1930,	258 millions,	105 millions.
Year 1960,	388 millions,	122 millions.

This means that in about another half century the Teutonic nations will treble those of the Latin.

Arithmetically, then, as well as socially, we may safely predict that the Teutonic race will have the supremacy in the future as it has at the present time.

In opposition to this, at least partially, there are other phenomena to be considered.

Above all, we must observe that every imperialist nation passes through two very distinct phases. In the first, an imperialist nation in building up its internal power cultivates all its capabilities and active energies by devotion to duty, by courage and the more obscure virtues of industry and thrift, and succeeds in making itself rich and politically strong, thereby winning the admiration of foreigners.

In ancient nations, such as the Greeks and Romans, the outcome of this cultivation of capabilities and active power was, as might be supposed, military. In the present age, its aspect is economic, as with England and the United States. Supremacy established, an imperialistic nation enters into the second phase. To the humbler virtues succeed the pride and intoxication of triumph; not content with her own greatness and strength, she seeks to domineer over others; vain of her riches, she squanders

them in the orgies of war and conquest; and, losing the balance of reason, she rushes headlong, or lets herself be drawn, into enterprises which she imagines will lead to yet greater glory and power, but which will more probably open an abyss beneath her feet. England and the United States have arrived at this second phase, after a magnificent period of preparation, followed by one of an essentially economic and industrial imperialism; both these nations have yielded to the spells of proud, violent, and military imperialism. Is this a sign that their power has reached its zenith and must begin to decline? Certainly, it is not for nothing that, in the actual presence of an arrogant imperialism that laughs scornfully at the rule of right which formerly gave it prestige, we see more liberal and humane theories arise throughout the civilized world. It is not for nothing that in our age, more than in any that have gone before, we see an absolute opposition between thought and action. It is not for nothing that the Peace Conference at The Hague was convened while the world continued to prepare and to use munitions of war, and that proposals and projects of international arbitration were considered, while in practice it is the sword that cuts the knots. These attempts, even if useless and Platonic, have nevertheless, a significant value. They mean that, in spite of, and over and above, the brutal eloquence of facts, the world of thought believes and hopes, not indeed in the omnipotence of force, but in the inevitable march of an industrial and pacific civilization.

Let us bear in mind that true supremacy is based on the noble ideas of those who, in all time, have combated prejudice and injustice. England, for instance, became a great power through the liberal principles of Gladstone, and the United States through those of Franklin and Washington. Therefore, we must recognize that only by carrying out the humanitarian movements of today can the nations in reality maintain and augment their present power.

And holding this view, we believe that if the three glorious fellow workers in economic imperialism (Germany, England, and the United States), will only turn away from the dangerous precipice

on the verge of which they are standing, and follow, instead, the ways of a pacific civilization, their future will bring increased lustre to their glory, together with the gratitude of all humanity. But if they obstinately continue to pursue their violent and militarist imperialism (of which there seems every probability), their triumphant march will soon be interrupted and their place taken by others. Taken, perhaps, as Malagadi says, by that old Europe, by those Latin nations which are now in the shade and in the background of the scene of history, but of which some appear to be even now emerging to the light, because they are quietly pursuing the development of their own energies.

So the old figure of the pendulum of history will again force itself upon us; for if only sometimes true in the field of international policy, this stern logic of events never fails as regards the internal policy of a nation.

Among all peoples there is a germ of progress in the lower strata of society which, little by little, raises them to supersede the richer and higher classes that have degenerated by success; and in like manner, the humbler among the nations may supersede the greater, corrupted and weakened by excess of power and by their overweening pride.

FROM WAR TO PEACE

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I.

Two strikingly diverse views with reference to war are current in our day among men of discriminative intelligence. There are some who maintain that however much we may deplore the economic waste and human suffering resulting from war, we must acknowledge, nevertheless, that war is a necessary evil,—an evil which man must accept as his portion if he is to advance in civilization. On the other hand, there are those who as strenuously maintain that war is not a necessity among nations which have reached a high degree of civilization; that it is, indeed, but a reminiscence of barbaric times and conditions; that it can and ought to be suppressed; and that, could the leaders of men be convinced of its futility and degrading inhumanities, war would henceforth cease, and universal peace prevail.

It is clear, of course, that the continuance of human activities which are initiated by man's voluntary acts is altogether dependent upon the nature of human sentiment in reference to them; and it follows that did all men feel convinced of the baseness of war, and were all consistent lovers of peace, no wars would occur. It seems probable, therefore, that the study of the development of the sentiment of men in relation to war may serve to clarify our thought with reference to the diverse positions above considered; and to this study we shall give our attention in the following pages.

We may note, at the outset, that within the times of recorded history there has been a marked change in the trend of enlightened public opinion as to the institution of war. For war is now almost universally looked upon by men in civilized communities as an evil; it may be held to be a necessary evil, or an evil not unmixed with good, but few men of intelligence will today contend that war is in itself a good thing. But it is evident that such a sentiment as this has not prevailed among the intelligent classes of men for any great length of time, as the eras of human existence are now measured: for if we look back but a few centuries we find that then almost all men considered the calling of the soldier the only vocation to which worth and dignity attached; and evidently such a view could not have obtained had there existed any general conviction that war was in its very nature an evil.

That the sentiment of man in relation to war is changing in accord with his development in civilization is therefore evident; and it seems worth our while to consider the modifications which are occurring, in the light of certain of the corollaries of the doctrines of evolution which have been forced into so much prominence during the century which has just passed.

No conception of modern science has proved more fascinating to thoughtful men than that which leads us to look upon society as a special form of organic growth; nor is any likely to prove more potent in the near future. It is indeed true that those who have made use of this conception have too often misconstrued its meaning,—have attempted to trace analogies between the organic life of individuals, and the activities of societies composed of individuals, which have been altogether fanciful and unwarranted. It must be acknowledged that the basis of the conception is an hypothesis which we cannot as yet claim to be firmly established, and it is not surprising that the visionary character of many current deductions from it has led men of conservative temperament to cast aside the conception altogether, as useless and misleading. But the fact which is fundamental to

this conception can surely not be questioned,—the fact that a bond exists between the individual elements of society which is of the same general nature as that bond which unites the living elements of an individual organism; and it can be shown, as the writer has elsewhere argued, that the misapplications of analogy, to which some students of social science have been led in the elucidation of this conception, have for the most part been due to the assumption that social organization is of a high grade similar to that observed in human beings, rather than of a grade comparable with that noted in the study of living aggregates of low organic type.

The most effective generalization resulting from the study of the conception above referred to is that which leads us to affirm that the steps in the development of society, and those observed in the evolution of the organic life of the individual, follow in the main an order which is closely correspondent in the two cases. As individual men are the units from which social aggregates are formed, we therefore naturally look to the development of individual life for clues which may help us to discover the laws governing the growth of societies into which men are gathered. This procedure is especially justified where the social activities of men subserve some end in relation to the social body, which corresponds with an end subserved by the actions of the individual in relation to his own welfare. Of such ends of individualistic import none is more important than that of self-preservation, and, corresponding therewith, none more important to social life than that of social conservation.

The application of these considerations to the subject before us appears clear as soon as attention is called to them; for it is evident that the establishment of the institution of war has been due to nature's efforts to maintain the integrity of social aggregates; and that, correspondingly, for the protection of individual life, were established in man, in the dim past, the instincts which result in assault and murder. It is naturally suggested, therefore, that we may gain some notion of the probable future development of the sentiment of man in relation to war by studying the

development in the past of his sentiment in relation to murder.

The saying is trite that war is murder in organized form; nor was reference to evolutionary theory necessary to press this view upon us, for it is evident that the activities of warrior bands have their inception in the same hate, or greed of self, which leads individual men to slay their fellows. We all realize that our barbarous ancestors, led by the same instincts which appear in many species of animals of higher and of lower grade, resorted to murder as the easiest means of ridding themselves of those who thwarted their wishes, or as a convenient method of gaining for their own enjoyment the property which had been accumulated by others. We realize, also, that in like manner when, in the beginnings of social life small bands of individuals came to live together in greater or less amity among themselves, the members of these bands acquired habits of coöperative attack in the effort to destroy other like bands whom they found thwarting them, or whose accumulation of wealth or food they coveted. The organization of aggressive attack followed upon the resort to murder as social life was evolved.

It is to be especially noted, also, that as a fairly full development of individual life was necessary before the very beginnings of social consolidation could appear, so the individualistic instincts relating to self-preservation must have been long established before those relating to the conservation of the social group can have become fixed in the race; the instincts, therefore, which have led men to assault and murder must have been acquired by man long before those which have led to the establishment of war. On the other hand, the sentiments of men in relation to murder must have been essentially modified before their warlike instincts could have been acquired: for even the low grade of social consolidation which is implied in the simplest kind of coöperative assault is incompatible with a condition in which each man's hand is against every other man.

Habits of individual violence did not, of course, disappear with the establishment of that coöperation between individuals

without which the organization of warlike attack would have been impossible. The earlier formed instincts which are expressed by murder must have been already too deeply entrenched in the individual to be quickly crushed. As tribal preservation became important, murder of individual by individual must indeed have been curbed, but in the beginnings of social life it was certainly not eliminated. We know, in fact, that not until the importance of social coöperation had become impressed upon men did there arise any sentiment antagonistic to murder even within the tribe; and among the savage races whose historic record is open to us (and this is still true among barbarous tribes now existing) all of those outside the tribal collection were thought of as enemies, and murder beyond the tribal limits was not only condoned, but was even encouraged. Gradually, but only very gradually, was this reprobation of murder for aught than self-protection extended beyond the tribal limits to include all of mankind; and although the condemnation of murder in general is today usually looked upon as a certain characterization of all higher civilizations, nevertheless, if we speak strictly, such condemnation cannot yet be said to have become universal, among even the most advanced of nations, in whom we not only find some relatively small number of individuals, principally among the so-called "lower classes," who do not hesitate to plan and execute murder for purposes of revenge or robbery, but a very large number, among the so-called "higher classes," who uphold the most deliberate form of murder in the duel, of which we shall speak more fully below.

We have seen, above, that the institution of war cannot have been established until long after the instincts which lead men to assault and murder had become firmly fixed as a heritage of the individual, and that the existence of war is necessarily coördinate with a modification of the sentiments of men in relation to murderous attack. But it is to be noted that as the institution of war implies a system of coöperation between men which, theoretically, is incompatible with the prevalence of murderous

assault ; so evidently such more intricate coöperation as is necessary to the existence of an inter-racial civilization is, theoretically, incompatible with the prevalence of war. We should expect, therefore, to find a change in man's sentiments in relation to war due to the broader civilization which, in our day, we seem to see developing ; for this broader civilization implies bonds of inter-relation between diverse races corresponding closely with the bonds existing between the individuals of social groups. And, as a matter of fact, we do find gradually arising in mankind a sentiment which reprobates war if entered into for its own sake, or for purposes of pure revenge, or for acquisition ; and which condones only such wars as are undertaken for the protection of national life or honor.

We must confess, to be sure, that we can say no more than that this sentiment condemnatory of reckless war is beginning to appear distinctly among us, as becomes evident when we note how common it is for men today to question the honesty of those who claim in any special case that war is undertaken without thought of revenge or aggression. A large part of the intelligent people of the continent of Europe, and even many of our own citizens, are unable to believe that the people of the United States were uninfluenced by the desire for territorial acquisition when in 1898 they declared war upon Spain ; and the same men are equally unable to believe in the honesty of England's assertion that she did not incite the war with the Boers that she might avenge Majuba Hill, or that she indulged no hope of gaining for herself territory rich in gold and diamond mines.

Nevertheless, it is surely a significant fact that those in power in both the United States and in England have been loud in protestations that war in each of the cases above referred to was undertaken solely for the protection of national interests, and not for purposes of national aggrandizement. And this is clear evidence that there is beginning to arise in man a powerful sentiment which would limit war to national self-protection, just as in advance of it there has grown up in regard to individual life

a sentiment, now fairly well established, which reprobates the killing of a fellow man except where this seems needful in order to preserve the life of the one attacked.

This observation adds strength to the notion, to which the general conceptions of evolutionary doctrine would naturally lead, that the steps in the growth of public sentiment in relation to war have in the past followed, and are therefore likely in the future to follow, those observed in the growth, in the individual, of the moral sentiment in relation to murder. It will be of interest to examine this subject in greater detail to see whether we find corroboration of the view thus suggested.

II.

We all recognize the fact that the moral sentiment which leads to the reprobation of wanton murder has been evolved by slow and faltering steps as man's social life has gradually unfolded. Not all of us, however, realize how long has been the process which has finally led to the establishment of this sentiment. Evidently no such change could have occurred except as coördinate with the establishment of social bonds, and of the restraints connected therewith, which have led to the rise of judicial systems based upon, and enforced by, governmental authority. The laws which have been established under these systems have ever tended to restrain the murderer, on the one hand by fear of punishment which they could administer, and by offer of protection on the other. Gradually they have reduced the temptation to murder by producing the conviction that he who submits to the authority of established law avoids most effectively the risk of finding his personal rights overridden by an aggressive neighbor.

That many ages have been required for the formation of these judicial systems is a commonplace of history. Confidence that protection and punishment for aggression were, in some measure, to be attained under the law must have been slowly gained before individuals would have been willing to waive the right of trial of strength; and only after a long continuance of such gen-

eral confidence, could that abhorrence of the taking of human life, which we look upon as the most certain mark of all higher civilization, have become established.

It is certain, then, that while the sentiment which reprobates murder, as we know it today, is a comparatively modern development, on the other hand, its germ, could we discover it, would be found in the lives of those of a long gone day, whose history has been forever lost.

Just as legal systems have developed which tend to remove the temptation to murder, so we find arising among the nations of highest civilization the beginnings, but only the beginnings, of international judicial systems which aim at the elimination of grounds for war. We note the gradual recognition of certain broad principles which, it is agreed, should govern the conduct of different peoples in international relations. There is slowly being created a vague code of what we speak of already as international law. The "Great Powers" are beginning to take upon themselves the functions of international judgment; they are binding themselves and their fellows to adopt certain modes of action which tend to avoid disturbance of friendly relations in connection with matters which experience has shown to be liable to arouse international hostility. They have materially reduced the prospect of war in the fact that they thus yield to international customs which they have themselves aided in establishing. They have actually taken action which, as we foresee, may result in the codification of a body of really effective international law which, if agreed to as binding upon all, will tend to prevent aggression by any one. They have even begun to act in common to repress the hostile activities of those less powerful nations who would wantonly destroy their own still weaker neighbors. The suggestion of arbitration of international disputes would, but a few centuries ago, have been received with scorn and derision; yet, during the nineteenth century, we have not only heard this principle vigorously urged, but have seen it actually carried into effect, and, indeed, we may say fairly established as a principle

of international usage looking to the avoidance of ground for warlike attack. We are, in truth, witnessing the awakening to life of a germ from which we foresee there may eventually develop a complete international judicial system which will grant protection to the weak nations against aggression, and which will punish the wanton national aggressor; a system which will necessarily tend to reduce the chances of war, by the same fear of punishment, on the one hand, and by the same confidence in protection, on the other, which have produced so marked an effect in the restraint of the individual from resort to murder.

It is to be noted, further, that as in social bodies the sentiment which reprobates murder has grown up in connection with the strength of judicial systems, and with acquiescence in the judgments emanating from them; so, in international relations, the sentiment which reprobates war, which is just awakening among men, must surely become established and strengthened in connection with the growth of international agreements of the type we have been considering.

But we must not allow ourselves to hope for too rapid progress in the growth of such international judicial systems, or of the sentiment in reprobation of war which this fosters. We must recall, as we have before said, that although the beginnings of the judicial systems devised by individuals to subserve social ends have become fixed in the race in the dim past, nevertheless they are not even today in all cases acquiesced in without question. And we must again note that we see today but the inception of an international judiciary, and but the very germ of the sentiment which reprobates war as war; and that probably many centuries must pass before this sentiment can become firmly established.

Even if we examine still further the growth of human sentiment in relation to murder and to war, the comparison above suggested appears to hold, and leads us to feel more assurance that it is determined by a common process of development. As we have already noted, we live in an age in which the right to murder, except in defense from violence, is altogether denied

among the most advanced of men. So far, indeed, is this protection of life carried in our day in civilized communities that the punishment of murder by the killing of the murderer is now, and long has been, placed by law exclusively in the hands of the State; although we are able to look back to an olden time when this avenging of murder was by custom and primitive law placed in the hands of the kinsmen or friends of the murdered man. This change of custom is evidently one which tends to repress murderous assault.

Beyond this we must apparently look forward to a time when even the avenging of murder by the State, by the killing of the murderer,—killing which may be looked upon as legalized murder,—will itself be replaced by other forms of punishment. We note, in the first place, the constantly lessening number of crimes to which the death penalty is attached. We recall that Blackstone enumerates one hundred and sixty offences which in his time were, under the law, punishable with death; that shoplifting of goods valued at five shillings, for instance, was legally avenged by capital punishment in England as late as the reign of George III. In our day, however, not only is the capital sentence generally limited to the crimes of treason and murder, but discrimination is made in many countries between deliberate murder and that murder which is due to sudden passion, the former only being held punishable by legalized killing by the State. We note, further, a growing hesitancy on the part of juries to convict the killer of the crime designated as murder in the first degree, in those lands where this condemnation alone carries with it the death penalty. We note even the steady growth of a sentiment in favor of the abolition of the death penalty altogether, of an opposition, in other words, to all legalized killing by the State; the advocates of this change looking forward to a near day when the occurrence of murder will be so rare that the fear of the death penalty will not be required to prevent the crime, and some even holding that the time has now come when society can afford to treat the murderer as one whose activities should be restricted by imprisonment in order that society may be protected, but whose

life should not be taken, lest this very act of the State weaken the sense of the sacredness of human life upon which depends that abhorrence of murder which alone will result in the disappearance of the murderer from our midst.

When we turn again to the consideration of war, we here again find a suggestive comparison. For as between individuals the law acts to prevent attack by one man upon another, and the State undertakes the function of the avenger of wrong-doing just so far as the law prohibits the individual from acting thus in his own behalf; so do we nowadays see at times the greater States determining terms of peace between their less powerful neighbors, and actually in certain cases undertaking to punish, by war itself, aggressors among the nations who have without justification attacked their less powerful neighbors. It is, of course, impossible to carry out this special comparison in full detail, but the correspondence is sufficiently clear to suggest that the same forces which are repressing murder are likely in the end to work towards the repression of war.

We must not fail, however, to recognize here again that the tendencies in relation to war of which we speak are relatively new developments; and although this should not lead us to doubt the advance of our race in the direction indicated, it should lead us to face the fact that we are making but our first steps towards long continued peace, and that we must expect the lapse of many centuries before the abhorrence of war will be so fixed in the race that the dream of universal peace will approach its realization.

A further corroboration of this view is gained by the consideration of those special cases where murder is still condoned even among highly developed races, the consideration of which we deferred in speaking of this subject above.

Even among people of the highest civilization, who in general agree in the reprobation of murder, we find a widespread feeling that there are certain crimes which cannot be adequately punished by the State, and that in such cases an individual's

resort to murder is warranted. When attempt is made to determine the rational ground of this feeling, we find it held either that the crime is exceptional and inadequately punished under legal codes, which have been devised to cover general conditions; or that the machinery of the law is too deliberate and cumbersome, and that quicker retribution than the law can give is needed to prevent the recurrence of the crime.

We need not refer for example to the "lynching" of the cattle thief on the sparsely settled plain, where man, though of civilized lineage, has reverted to the practices of ancient days; nor to the shameful mob-murders of negroes charged with violence against the weaker sex, which all too frequently occur in the Southern and Western parts of the United States,—crimes against humanity which show how little we are removed from barbarism. But, turning our thoughts from these examples of mob-violence, which represent momentary passion rather than enduring sentiment in men, we find a notable case of the condonation of murder in the practice of dueling, the history of which will serve well to illustrate our present contention.

The institution of the duel, the germ of which existed long before the beginning of the crudest civilizations, is based upon the notion that there is a class of injuries to an individual's self-respect which the law cannot adequately punish; that for indignities to, or crimes against, a man's honor, or the honor of kinsman or friends, the mortal combat of the duel is the only available satisfaction.

In the early stages of civilization the practice of dueling was resorted to upon the very slightest provocation, and the contest was conducted without attempt at secrecy, and with distinct effort by each of the opponents to kill the other. But it is to be noted that gradually, with the strengthening of the power of the law and the broadening of its applicability, the number of offences which are considered sufficiently grave to warrant a resort to the duel have been greatly reduced, and that finally in civilized countries, very generally, the practice has been declared illegal, and in many States today can be resorted to only under

conditions of great secrecy because the sentiment of the people fully upholds the law which prohibits the practice. Furthermore in our day, in countries where the resort to dueling is most frequent, there appears a tendency to lessen its rigor, to avoid fighting to the death; the satisfaction for wounded honor being held by the sentiment of the people to be amply given by the temporary disablement of one of the duelists. Indeed, this willingness to accept satisfaction in connection with the disablement of an opponent has been carried so far that in some countries where the practice of dueling still persists the combat has become purely perfunctory, and is so little fraught with risk of death to either combatant that it has become a source of ridicule amongst those people who, in the development of their civilization, have abandoned the duel, and have preferred in its place the less exciting and slower process of resort to judicial proceeding in satisfaction of injured self-respect.

If now we again turn our thought to the institution of war we discover an analogy here also. If we look backward but a few centuries we find that any kind of international disagreement was thought to be a sufficient warrant for the resort to arms. But in later times, as we have already noted, there has grown up a sentiment which opposes war except under the utmost provocation. It admits that wanton attack of one nation by another must be restricted by war just as in the social community the individual is held to be warranted in killing the highwayman who attacks him,—but beyond such resistance of wanton attack it reprobates war in general; always, however, making express exception of cases where there are involved questions of national honor, which it is held can be settled only by the resort to arms.

The reader will remember that at the late Peace Congress at The Hague, an attempt was made to induce the Powers to agree to the establishment of a formal national court of arbitration to which, in many cases of dispute, all nations should necessarily resort; and it is to be noted that the failure to establish such compulsory arbitration was due to the fact that all of the govern-

mental representatives appeared to agree that there were of necessity certain points of *national honor* which could never be settled except by resort to war. They thus placed war in direct comparison with dueling; indeed nothing was more interesting in the accounts of these deliberations at The Hague, as given by the commissioners, than the almost naïve manner in which this comparison of war and the duel was maintained.

The sentiment of mankind seems thus to be tending to force the restriction of national dueling to the avengement of national indignities. Those who favor the establishment of national courts of arbitration hold that national aggression may be prevented by resort to such courts; but apparently all are agreed that national honor must be protected by threat of, or actual resort to, war; the only open question being the narrowness or breadth of one's notions as to what constitutes this national honor, and what must be considered the marks of international indignity.

It would seem thus that we have reached a stage in the development of the sentiment regarding war comparable to that which existed in relation to dueling long ago, when men were just beginning to recognize the value of substituting judicial adjustment for mortal combat, and when they had scarcely begun to reduce the number of offenses which, as involving the honor of the one wronged, were thought to be possible of settlement only by the shedding of blood.

But happily there are indications that war is likely eventually to become as perfunctory as dueling in our day has for the most part become. As dueling has long since been governed by rules of procedure which enable the "seconds" at times to prevent the mortal combat, so the complex rules of diplomacy very commonly serve in our day to delay, and at times to prevent, breaches of the peace; and certain of the representatives of the Powers at The Hague conference, it will be remembered, attempted to establish a more formal code to govern the modes of warfare than now exists, and more effective methods of peaceful intervention. They suggested the propriety of establishing neutral commissions of inquiry to aid in the settlement of national disputes, distinctly

comparing the function of these proposed commissions to that of the seconds of the combatants under the dueling code. They attempted, furthermore, to add new regulations to those adopted at the Geneva Conference tending to the amelioration of the horrors of war, looking to the abolition of the use of cruel weapons, and to the broadening of the protection given to the merciful Red Cross service.

In all this we see distinctly an advance from that stage of barbarism where war was carried on for destruction and rapine, to a stage where it is waged only that one of the combatants may obtain acknowledgment of superiority; even as in personal combat the few remaining duelists nowadays fight only for acknowledgment of defeat, not as of old to cause the disablement or death of the antagonist. Seldom in these days among civilized nations do we find, as in olden times, the national contestants in war fighting to the death. More often now than in the past the vanquished nation is found willing to surrender after early defeats, and the conqueror satisfied to accept surrender without destroying or inflicting debasing punishment upon his opponent. We are, indeed, led to look forward to brighter days when war will never occur until strenuous efforts to pacify the national disputants have been made through the friendly offices of neutral Powers, acting as national seconds; and when, if finally war has been entered into, these friendly Powers, still acting as do the seconds of the duelists, will stand ready to effect a pacification so soon as it appears clear that one of the disputants has suffered thorough defeat, and to prevent the complete humiliation and national effacement of the vanquished. In some cases in late decades this procedure has actually been almost completely realized. When it becomes the rule, and not the exception, we may indeed begin to hope for the near approach of the day when war will become constantly less and less frequent, less and less serious, and of shorter and shorter duration, until finally it will be acknowledged by all highly civilized men that the resort to violence between nations is as inexcusable as such resort between individuals now appears.

III.

If, then, the comparison above presented has significance, we are evidently warranted in expecting that the sentiment of men in regard to war will change correspondingly with those changes of sentiment in regard to murder which have taken place during man's progress from savagery to civilization.

As in the relations between individual men of civilized race, we are led to look forward with full assurance to the age, not far distant as time is now measured, when murder will no longer occur, when our police will be maintained only to prevent all possible ground for the vengeance of man upon man, and when the sentiment against the killing of one's brother man will be so strong that even this function of government will gradually become inoperative: so, also, we may look forward to a day when nation will act with nation to prevent the occurrence of war, when national armaments will be maintained merely to enable the Powers to act as an international police to prevent aggression by those of lower civilization. Indeed, we may even look for the coming of a happy age when the hatred of war will be so fully established that even the need of this form of international coöperation will disappear.

Before we can hold this position to be unassailable, however, we must consider a view in opposition which is held by not a few influential men in our day.

While a large proportion of those whom we are accustomed to regard as of the noblest type of men look forward to the future day of universal peace with hope and satisfaction, nevertheless we are compelled reluctantly to note, on the other hand, that a great number of our most effective political leaders show by word and deed that they do not sympathize with this hope; and the fact that they are leaders of powerful parties in our most civilized lands, indicates how great is the number of those who feel with them, who do not long for this era of universal peace, who on the contrary glory in the anticipation of successful war

almost as much as their early ancestors ever did. People of high civilization are loth to acknowledge the existence in them of these barbaric traits; yet there can be no other explanation of the fact that there exists so widespread and intense an interest, even among those of the gentle sex, in the characters of the world's great conquerors,—of Alexander the Great, of Julius Cæsar, of Napoleon Bonaparte; in no other way can we account for the beligerent spirit which appears, for instance, in the stirring writings of Rudyard Kipling, and for the enthusiasm which they arouse among those whom he influences.

This is a fact that we must face; and we must acknowledge, furthermore, that the advocates of peace are, as a whole, students rather than men of action. We must acknowledge that there is some possible force in the contention of these men of action that the advocates of peace are mere theorists, men for whom, may be,—

“The native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought.”

In all fairness, we are compelled, therefore, to ask ourselves whether it is perfectly clear that the change of sentiment from the approval to the reprobation of war, to which we look forward, is a sign of social progress which we are bound to encourage; whether, on the contrary, it may not possibly be a sign of social degeneration which we are bound to oppose and prevent, as we would ward off the diseases which threaten social life, as we would foster national health and push from us the day of national death. If it is true that social life passes through phases corresponding with the individual being's birth and vigorous manhood and senile decay, is it not a significant fact that among the masses of those who live under the influence of the great Eastern civilizations, which we commonly assume to be slowly degenerating, the disposition to fight is already to a great extent lost or is rapidly losing ground? Is it not true, also, that in the ages preceding those of definite historic record these very people have passed through the age of war; and is it not fair to

contend that their loss of the fighting habit is indicative of that decline which appears to us so marked in other directions? In other words, is not the love of peace after all merely a sign of the love of ease, a mark of that social laziness which goes with a widespread tendency to degeneration?

These are questions which we surely cannot afford to ignore; and they gain significance when we consider that the very study of human development which has guided our thought in this essay, convinces us that our ancestors who waged aggressive war, and those of our day who follow in their footsteps, have been and are led to these activities by the pressure within them of inborn instincts; and when we consider further that, in general, instincts can have become firmly established only because the activities which express them have in the past been of value, in relation to their biological persistence, to the ancestors of the race in which they appear; and also that, unless the conditions of racial life today are materially different from the conditions in those past times, the instincts which exist in us, because they have once been of biological significance, are not unlikely to be still of importance to our kind. We realize that we cannot quench any deeply ingrained instinct within us, that we cannot even thwart its expression, without incurring great risk in relation to the biological persistence of our branch of the human family; nor can we witness a radical change in this expression without being reminded that this change carries with it danger of loss of the predominance of that civilization of which we boast.

With greater force, then, arise the questions which have been presented above. Is this failure of warlike spirit a movement away from, rather than in the direction of, our ideals of social life? Is it a sign of degeneration rather than of progress towards perfection? Is it a movement towards social old age, decrepitude, and death? Is it rather to be feared than to be encouraged?

Plausible as the suggestions of the previous section appear, a more careful consideration recalls to mind another of the impli-

cations of developmental theory which serves to modify the conclusion to which we should be forced did the principles to which we have thus far referred stand alone.

The evolutionist tells us, indeed, as we have seen, that no instinct is firmly established, unless in the past it has proved of service in furthering the persistence or prosperity of our race. But he teaches us more than this, and what is most important in this connection; he shows us that specific instincts are long in forming, and become established only when the conditions of life which determine their efficacy have remained relatively permanent.

But, beyond this, he tells us that as instincts are with difficulty impressed upon a race, so when once formed they are with equal difficulty modified or transformed or displaced, even when the conditions which originally determined their efficacy no longer hold. As in individual life, rudimentary organs, like the "vermiform appendix," which have in the past been of service to the animal ancestors of man still persist in our organisms, though their functioning has apparently become unimportant to the conservation of our lives; so certain tendencies to instinctive reaction persist in us, not so much because they subserve useful purpose in our lives as because they have in the past been of value to our progenitors, and have not proved serious sources of peril to our race, as it has advanced. To illustrate this, we may recall that our barbarous ancestors were subject, as are all wild animals, to conditions which often rendered most uncertain the maintenance of a plentiful food supply; and those men in the early days of human life must have had the greatest chance of survival who, like the carnivorous beasts of today, were able to gorge themselves when food was to be found, that they might be prepared to withstand the strain of prolonged fasting when food was scant. Such conditions of man's existence have in our day almost disappeared; nevertheless the instinct remains which leads the healthy man to eat more than he actually requires for daily sustenance; his appetite for food outlasts his satisfac-

tion of the needs of the hour, and his digestive system is still constituted to function normally when he allows his appetite to guide him.

With this thought in mind we are led to ask whether it may not be true that the instincts which today lead the most advanced of nations to wage war may not be of this rudimentary type; may they not be what biologists call "vestigial" in their nature? It is clear that they were often necessary to the very existence of our early ancestors, and to the persistence and advance of their race; but it may well be held that the conditions of man's environment have so altered with the development of social life that these fighting instincts are no longer of service to us; that they still persist merely because the very processes which were slow in making them dominant are equally slow in freeing us from their dominance. May it not be true, even, that these instincts under present conditions are of actual disadvantage to us; may they not be thwarting our advance; and may it not be that their modification, their curbing, and their final displacement, are of vital importance to us if we are to persist as social organic forms, and are to advance to higher perfection?

The thought thus suggested gains greater weight when we consider that in their inception the instincts which lead to war, like those which lead to individual combat, were, according to evolutionary hypotheses, fixed in the race because they resulted in the "survival of the fittest," and thus tended to produce a race in which the individuals grew stronger and keener and more capable of adaptation to new conditions. But it is clear that war, as it has developed in modern times under the influence of the conditions which have produced our complex social life, does not function to this same end; for those who initiate the conflicts of today are seldom those who do the fighting; rather are they political leaders who for one reason or another incite wars which they direct with little personal risk, using their fellow men as tools to effect the ends they have in view. It seems probable, therefore, that if the instincts which lead to war still persist, as

they do, it must be because they are vestigial and rudimentary; for otherwise it becomes necessary to maintain that they function now, under new conditions of life, to advantageous ends other than those which led to their establishment in the race.

Such a position, however, cannot be defended: for if it be claimed that the warlike instincts still function to the perfecting of physical vigor, we are reminded, on the one hand, of the ravages of disease which follow the long exposure of the modern soldier in camp and field; and, on the other hand, are led to consider the ample opportunities to cultivate strength of body in the normal course of active peaceful life. If it be held that they function to the establishment in the individual of courage and persistence in effort, it is easy to show that the manifold demands of modern life in peaceful fields give far greater scope for the encouragement of these very virtues. If it be claimed that at least war brings into play, and develops by practice, keenness of foresight and adaptability to new conditions, we are led to note that the more perfect the discipline of armies the more is this encouragement of keenness and adaptability limited to the few, and these not the men who fight, but those who merely direct the campaigns from a distance, and who do not risk their lives; and but a moment's thought is required to prove to us that modern political and civil life is full of greater opportunities to enforce these qualities than can be gained by those few leaders who play with human pawns the modern game of war.

There can, indeed, be but one forceful claim to support the encouragement of the warlike spirit in our day, namely, the claim that war although not directly, yet indirectly, still functions as of old; that it tends to keep alive and to strengthen the individual's power of personal self-defense. But were the strengthening of this capacity demanded by nature as the price of man's persistence, surely far better adapted to the end desired were the encouragement of prize-fighting and dueling, which on the contrary are nowadays encouraged by any among the more enlightened of men only on the ground that they themselves serve as schooling for men who some day may be called to war. If this

special argument leads to any effective conclusion at all, it must teach us not to encourage war, but rather to encourage the individual's readiness to avenge personal insult without recourse to law. But this position cannot, of course, be seriously defended; for, clearly, modern progress moves *pari passu* with the gain to the individual of safety from passionate assault by his fellow, and this safety in its turn depends upon the development of the tendency to appeal, in cases of dispute, to the judgment of calmer minds through the instrumentality of the established law.

It appears, then, that in the normal life of a peaceful community we have ample opportunity for the establishment of that power of body and force of character which in the beginning were strengthened by the resort to war; and if this be true then modern warfare, which is evidently of very marked disadvantage to social development in many directions, may very properly be displaced by other means which lead to the same result; and we are bound to give our earnest effort to uphold all that can tend to curb the warlike instincts of man, all that can tend to modify their expression, all that can tend to the establishment of peaceful coöperation, of the courage which contends against the evils of a more subtle nature than those which wars can effect, and of the willingness to forgive national as well as individual wrongs, as we recognize the common grounds of harmony on which we are able to agree to work for the betterment of humanity.

IV.

Our study, then, leads us to believe that as murder tends to disappear from communities of civilized men, so war will in the end be displaced by peace; and that this will be no mark of failing racial vigor, but rather a sign of the better adjustment of life, as it has developed in social complexity, to the new conditions of its environment. Our study leads us, however, also to ask whether we can allow ourselves to believe that this day of universal peace is near at hand. And when we turn our thought to this question, it must be confessed that we find ourselves con-

fronted with facts which indicate that we have little reason to hope soon to see the day when wars will cease.

The very considerations which have led us to the conviction that war must eventually give place to peace show us not only that the steps in the development of the sentiment which reprobates war have always been far behind those in the development of the sentiment which reprobates murder; but beyond this that this sentiment in opposition to murder itself can scarcely be said to be as yet thoroughly established in man, if we except possibly some few of the most highly civilized of races. Nor can we blind ourselves to the fact that a vast proportion of the peoples of the world are still in the early stages of civilization; that mighty nations exist, a large proportion of whose most efficient citizens still look upon war as proper for the sake of pure aggression; and that there is no small risk that some day these less advanced nations may gain an ascendancy which will push back the civilization of the world in this regard to a position held many centuries ago. Nor can we fail to see that the coterie of nations which today keep the less civilized aggressors in check are themselves not in agreement concerning questions of deep importance, and that they feel forced to bear the burden of costly armaments that they may avoid danger of aggressive action on the part of their neighbors among those very nations which we have described as the more civilized.

We must remember, also, that civilization in its advance moves wave-like, as does the rising tide; a temporary gain is often followed by rhythmical retrogradation, and it is not unlikely that this moment's hopeful strengthening of the sentiment which opposes war may be followed by a less happy time when war will again for long hold sway. We must, indeed, look forward to the possibility of the occurrence of many such successive steps of advance and of relapse, through many centuries, before men can hope to see the perfect realization of the dream of universal peace. We cannot forget that the instinct which leads to war is, as we have seen, one of the deepest seated of all the instincts in man. As it is an instinct upon which has depended his

advance in the past, it cannot be totally and quickly quenched, and can only be modified by processes which work most slowly. Indeed, the best hope that we can allow ourselves to entertain is that the active expressions of the warlike instincts, as they are thus modified, may at some near day be directed out of the old and into new channels which will prove of service to our race as it progresses.

The reader who longs eagerly for the dawn of universal peace may perhaps feel that if our argument is valid then the teaching of evolutionary doctrine in this particular is deeply discouraging. Such a conclusion, however, does not seem to the writer to be in any way warranted. In any event, whether we are led to hope or to discouragement, it surely will not in the end aid us, or the cause in which we are interested, to refuse to face the facts; and there can be no doubt that these facts, so far as we can interpret them, uphold the view just stated.

That discouragement is unwarranted by the conclusions we have here reached seems, however, very clear. For he who accepts the hypothesis of evolution, if he would be logical, must cast aside cynicism and assume a persistent attitude of hopefulness and courage. The study of the recorded history of human endeavor shows us often that ideals for which we are contending, and which many of our optimistic contemporaries hope to realize at no distant day, have been fought for, and believed to be nearly gained, by our forefathers in other eras long past. And the study of history thus leads all too often to the cynic's disbelief in the importance of all ideals, and to the pessimist's loss of faith in their final establishment.

But if we realize the fact, which the study of evolution presses upon us, that processes of development must work most slowly and with many faltering steps; then, although we are led on the one hand to avoid unwarranted expectation, yet, on the other, we are strengthened in the defence of our ideals, are called upon to cast aside discouragement, are taught to be unwearied in effort, and to be hopeful to the very end. It is hope deferred that maketh the heart sick; and it is the course of wisdom, therefore,

to keep ever in mind the fact that our progress must be slow if it is to be of permanent form. For all but morbid minds, courage should be the natural product of the conviction that the struggle toward the realization of our higher ideals must be long and persistent if in the end it is to be successful; the establishment of this fact, indeed, appears to the writer to be one of the most valuable and practical ethical teachings of evolutionary doctrine.

Not only then may we hope, but we may well have the firmest faith, that this dream of universal peace will eventually become realized in fact. And if it does, it will evidently result from the strengthening of the conviction, which will grow in power with increase of intelligence, that all the nations of the earth are bound together by ties of brotherhood, by bonds of common interest, which cannot be broken, and which must not be lightly weakened.

The strongest reason we have to believe that this conviction is being materially strengthened in our day is given by the present world-wide spread of intercommunication and intercourse, and the growth of national interdependence. The "commercialism" which is so marked a characteristic of our age, and which leads in many directions to results which we as idealists so justly deplore, must nevertheless be recognized as a by-product of a moment in which we are awakening to the value of that national interdependence upon which in the end must rest the advance of human civilization as a whole. Much as we may contend against the deplorable effects of this "commercialism" upon individual character which we see about us, we surely should not forget that these effects indicate but momentary morbid developments connected with the establishment of new relations in human life which, on the whole, and in the end, must be of benefit to the race,—relations which will finally unite the nations of the earth in so close a bond of brotherhood that universal peace will in time become a necessity of national existence. Then, but not till then, war will be read of with languid interest in the archives of history, but will no more be thought of as an imminent peril.

THE TRUE NATURE OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN EUROPE

GUSTAV GOTTHEIL, *New York.*

Anti-Semitism would be simply ridiculous if it were not so terribly in earnest. People who make that word a war cry upon a whole race ought to know its meaning, especially if it is to express the chief reason for their hostility. Before they prefix the "anti" to a word they should be sure that they understand the "pro," lest they be found to fight shadows merely, spectres of their own creation. But how far is this the case? How many ever tried to learn the sense of the designation under which they have enrolled themselves? Suppose we ask, What does Semitism mean? Only this, must be our answer,—that it is a summing up of the ruling dispositions, habits, mental endowments, and moral peculiarities of all the races comprised under the name of Semites, so named from their supposed descent from the eldest of the three sons of Noah. So ineradicable are these features supposed to be that, no matter where the races have lived or are now living, no matter what stage of civilization they have passed through or have reached now, no matter what influence non-Semitic races have exercised upon them, they remain essentially the same. What are these features? Who will formulate the precise standard by which a descendant of Shem is unfailingly known and set apart from those of Ham or Japhet? When we consider that we are pointed back for the meaning of Semite to antediluvian times, that is to say, to

one of the oldest myths of the world, we must admit that it would indeed be the wonder of wonders if a large section of mankind have a family likeness so clear that they are marked off from the rest. And this, despite the long ages that have passed since the supposed separation of the sons of Noah and their wide dispersion; despite their triumphs and defeats in wars, in state building, and church formation; despite the wide diversity between them in their literature, their philosophy, their art, their trades and industries. Are the Semites still characterized by the same gifts and tendencies of mind and heart, ruled by the same passions, subject to the same limitations, as were their ancestors in all their generations?

Amongst them there is a fraction, and that fraction again scattered over vast areas, in various states of civilization, and under diversified kinds of governments, enjoying liberty and rights of citizenship in the one, and groaning under relentless oppression in the other,—are they still none other than Semites? Are they so permeated with Semitic features that they can never amalgamate with their surroundings and become full-weighted citizens of the state where they pitch their tents,—offer them what inducements you may,—but must be kept at arm's length and treated as suspects? Has nature lost all her power in this instance and become faithless to herself? Will the Hebrew child not love the land of its birth and feel the kinship with the people whose language and mode of life become its own? But why heap up improbabilities and impossibilities? The designation fastened upon us as a stigma was a fraud from the beginning, a conscious fraud and a malicious invention. It was “conceived in mischief and brought forth in iniquity.” What was meant was not anti-Semitism, but *anti-Judaism*; but that name had to be avoided because it implies hostility to a religion and a creed; and that, again, might be construed as springing from an awakened zeal for the instigator's own Church; a suspicion they could not permit to rest upon them. No, it is not the Jew's religion that makes him obnoxious and a danger to the state, but it is his descent from the eldest son of Noah. True, the Jews

have at no time adopted it as a national name. "Semitic," is of comparatively recent date, an abstract word intended merely for scientific classification, never meant for discrimination of any portion of the Semitic races, or to become a hissing and a byword or a mask for robbers of human rights and destroyers of human happiness.

The victims of this crusade are not a nameless horde for whom a designation had to be coined; they are known to history for three thousand years as Hebrews, Israelites, Jews, and they have no mind to exchange these names for any other. But a new "Hep Hep" was wanted, and so "Semites" was hauled from the world of books, disfigured, and fastened upon the Jewish gabardine in noble emulation of the barbarism of the Middle Ages. The more senseless, the more welcome it was as a bugbear to frighten the populace and to stir into flames the sparks of fanaticism which are always smouldering in the hearts of the vulgar, whether of low degree or high degree, worldly or ghostly.

The strangest thing, however, in this learned falsification is that it should have succeeded so well with people calling themselves Christians and clinging to that name often after they have given up all its historic substance. Is Christianity not purely Semitic at the core? not based upon the Semitic conception of the relation between man and his Creator? The great efforts to liberalize and rationalize the Church which the last century witnessed, up to Professor Harnack's recent attempt to sum up "Das Wesen des Christenthums,"—what are all these but endeavors to free it from foreign accretions and envelopments and to bring its Semitic character into greater prominence?

It is the only Asiatic conception of religion that has subdued Europe and America, and that still holds undisputed sway over all its diverse nationalities. The very name which symbolizes to them all that is noblest, purest, and most blessed, points to that source as unfailingly as the needle of the compass to the poles. Harnack claims that Christianity is not one religion amongst others, but *The Religion*, the only one fulfilling all the conditions of its highest ideal. The Being in whom that fulness of light was

revealed,—was he not a Semite of the Semites? Did he ever deny his origin? Christianity means *Messianity*, and the whole idea of a Mashiach,—the anointed, namely, anointed ruler,—is most intensely national and, therefore, intensely Semitic,—from which indisputable fact it follows that the loftiest conception of religion came to the world from that source. Thence came the Bible,—the book of the world which has been translated into every living tongue and dialect, and to the elucidation of which hosts of scholars still devote their lives. Painting, sculpture, music, poetry, have attempted their highest flights under its inspiration. From countless pulpits its moral and religious truths are expounded, week after week, and on every great occasion of national significance,—in whatever part of Christendom it may occur,—the Songs of Zion are awakened as the fittest expressions of the prevailing sentiment. The Psalter is the most wonderful of existing books,—at home alike in the palace of the king and the cottage of the peasant, the inexhaustible theme of our masters of music. Noeldeke, Protestant professor at the University of Strasburg, one of the great lights of Semitic scholarship, declares that “by the side of the Psalms all other religious hymns appear as pale imitations merely.” On that field were gathered the sheaves which a master hand has wound together into the One Universal Prayer, in which all Churches join with one accord. And the Universal Day of Rest,—that one sure blessing of the laboring man,—whence did it come? What other legislator had the divine audacity to make its observance one of the foundation laws of his constitution, and to give it precedence, even over all moral enactments?

Professor R. F. Grau, of the conservative school of theology, writes :—

“God is a living, holy, loving Being. He is not first and foremost to be scientifically comprehended, but worshipped and revered in the heart, and because He is such a Being, the Semites had to be chosen as His apostles to the whole world. For they had a heart for Him in the beginning. * * * The Semite has the religion of the Infinite, and as this is the perfect religion, * * * the Church, as the Community of Christ,

has sprung from the Semitic mustard seed, although at present myriads of Indogermanics dwell under the branches of the tree."

In the face of admissions like these by men who have a right to be heard in the matter, and considering that the tree can never change the nature of the root from which it sprang, the conclusion is not unwarranted that "anti-Semitic" is a synonym for "anti-Christian."

Its success is due to the still persistent prejudice against the Jews amongst so many Christians,—all their professions to the contrary notwithstanding. And it continues for several reasons. One is its long duration; it has lasted for ages and is ingrained in their feelings and ideas. What if it be shown ever so clearly that it is unjust, unreasonable, yea, even unchristian!—that will not materially change the temper of the great masses of the people. The common man is rarely swayed by the force of arguments; the power of a principle, so weighty with the thinkers, is of no consequence to him. He belongs to the material world, and to make good his place in it is the aim toward which all his energies are bent. For things spiritual he has neither time nor capacity. He is ruled by the sentiments which were implanted in him in his youth and by his immediate surroundings. All thinking must be done for him; all new ideas must be presented to him, as it were, ready made and in tangible form. He does not push himself forward, but must be led onward by hands that understand him and his ways. But in this instance, his guides are not particularly anxious to bring about a change for the better,—even if we suppose that they consider the liberation from prejudice against the Jews a betterment. They have their own theological difficulty to contend with. The Jews are still unconverted, and the missions established and maintained for the purpose of winning them over can show no better results now than in the past. The chief controversy between the Church and Israel stands today where it stood when it was first raised at Jerusalem, eighteen centuries ago. A judicial sentence of a court at Jerusalem has grown into a pivotal point on which, as

the Church declares, turns the salvation of mankind for time and eternity; and if she is right, the Jews must be wrong. Since that fatal occurrence Christianity, in one form or another, has conquered Europe and America, and has planted outposts in almost every part of the earth, but has not been able to subdue the Jew. Every conceivable means to make him surrender has been tried, including that of the jailor and the executioner and all the horrors that lie between them,—expulsion, pillage, social degradation, impaling in ghettos, and what not?—but in vain. The same policy is continued to this day as far as the present more civilized state of the Christians permits; but still in vain. So far are their persecutors from having brought the Jews to their knees, that the self-consciousness of the race, as a whole, has deepened; and their advance in general culture enables them to measure swords, intellectually, with their accusers and to give a reason for the faith that is in them.

All the conditions of this interminable conflict are against them. In numbers they are a vanishing minority, and still more weakened by their dispersion over the face of the earth, unorganized, without any ecclesiastical authority in their Church that could direct them or act in their name. Every individual Jew must face the world's hostility single handed, and be, religiously, his own priest, his own pope. Allies he has none, advocates of his cause are few and far between. The favors of his friends are often more humiliating than the attacks of his enemies. Still he holds his own, and if for the last century or so he has carried on a reformation of his ancient rituals, he has done so from his own initiative and in his own way, which is not that into which it has been tried so long to force or to lure him. At the same time a revival of Jewish literature has taken place which not only has brought to light the long forgotten treasures of the past, but has shown the large part the Jews have in the general progress of mankind. The ecclesia triumphant has no victory to record in this section of her battle-fields, and it is not in ordinary human nature frankly to admit a defeat in such an unequal struggle. Only one had a right to expect that a Church that

claims to have regenerated the human race and to have lifted the slave of his blind instincts into "the glorious liberty of the children of God" would have risen superior to the common weakness. Instead of that, almost throughout Christendom, the crusade against the Jews is being preached and the policy of repression loudly demanded.

On what ground? It is said that they dominate everywhere,—in finance, in law courts, in politics, in art, in literature, in the press, in trade and manufacture. But how do they achieve this astounding feat? How do the Jews succeed in so lording it over the immense majority? By witchcraft? Is it by magic that a few bankers and brokers keep all their competitors in subjugation and handle them at their will and to their own profit? Is it by sorcery that they force their way to the universities and academies? Are they in possession of secret formulas by which they can direct the currents of trade at their will? Recently, loud complaints were raised in several of the German state parliaments that there were too many Jewish judges and lawyers in their lands, and the governments were exhorted to put an end to the scandal. No charges of incompetency or exploitation were raised against the Hebrews that "handle the law." Only it was declared that a Christian shrunk from taking an oath at the hand of a Jewish lawyer. If this be so, how is it that the people go to them in numbers that excite the envy of their non-Jewish colleagues? All the statements about the alleged power of the Jews are ridiculous exaggerations, trumped up to scare the imagination of the thoughtless, as has been proved over and over again. But even reduced to their true measure, they prove, not the possession of magic, but of soundness of mind, of unimpaired energy, and of all the other needful conditions for success, which the Jews have kept intact despite all the attempts made to crush the unbelievers into the dust. The outcry against them is their vindication; people do not fear weaklings, do not raise alarms against perils which can be pushed aside by an effort of the will. The few must own inherent sources of strength if the many resort to the coward's weapon of lies and slander. And in this

instance the admission of the truth is an implied homage to the religion which the victors in the unequal struggle profess and defend. For it is indisputable that this is the source to which the formation of the Jewish mind and heart must be attributed. Let me cite, for one proof, the admission of the most persistent and most powerful oppressor of the Jews,—the procurator of the Russian synod. Half the number of all Hebrews are subjects of Russia. They came under her dominion when she conquered and incorporated the Polish provinces; they are kept there under the most stringent laws, and life is made to them as burdensome as possible. “The Pale” is a gigantic ghetto where the oldest form of rabbinism prevails to this day. Yet the same fear of the superiority of the Jewish mind haunts the government; it is the alleged reason for practically closing up all the avenues of the higher education for them. Only *three per cent* of the total number of students are admitted to the universities and to the technical schools. But more than a hundred thousand common soldiers are drafted from the Jews into the armies and sent to all parts of the gigantic empire, kept there during the best part of their lives, without any prospect of promotion, and often going only to die in the defence of territories which, if they were civilians, they would not be permitted to enter. The Russian Torquemada, not long ago, openly declared that not a single Jew should be permitted to settle amongst the peasantry, even within the Pale, because he would be the only sober man amongst a population that cannot resist the temptations of strong drink. Strange spectacle indeed! men banished from places where they wish to live because they are too good for their surroundings! forced to remain where they can hardly eke out a miserable living. The question, surely, is justified. How did that poverty stricken mass of oppressed people succeed in preserving its freedom from a national vice in a country where its ancestors have dwelt for long generations? Can a great virtue be maintained by sorcery? The common experience is that of the poet:—

“Misery doth bravest mind abate.”

What but their religion made them proof against the arrows of a fate which, for duration and cruelty, is without a parallel in history! This conclusion is further corroborated by the fact that the same virtue of sobriety characterizes them everywhere, and makes them an object of envy to their non-Jewish neighbors,—nay, forces the honest temperance advocate to hold them up before his Christian audiences as examples to shame them into going and doing likewise; rather, let me say, into staying at home and doing likewise. For one of the witchcraft mysteries of Judaism is that its home is not in the church, but that the church is in the home. The Jew's salvation is in nowise dependent upon rabbi and synagogue, but upon wife and children. They are his congregation to whom he ministers as priest in fulfillment of the great charter word of dedication, Ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation. The deepest roots of the Jewish faith rest and are nourished in the domestic soil. The synagogue has nothing to offer to the faithful which he cannot find in his own tent. Ten men gathered together, with a Sepher Tora (scroll of the Mosaic law) in their midst, form a Kahal Hakodesh (sacred body). No man becomes a drunkard with wife and children and aged parents near him for guardian angels. The greatest difficulty the Jewish reformation has to face is what to substitute for the old ceremonies, where they have become impracticable, and thus to preserve the essentially domestic character of the ancient faith. Is it thinkable that the Jew would be less objectionable to his surroundings were he to lose his sturdy horror of intemperance, and thus "assimilate" more freely with his neighbors of different faiths? It is not thinkable when we consider the great efforts made by Christians everywhere to redeem their people from their bondage to strong drink and the misery resulting from it. The Jew is the *natural ally of the temperance advocates*; and if he is not found in their ranks, it is simply because he never knew from experience the need of that reformation.

And never will he know, as long as his passionate fondness for home and his longing for family love abide within him. At

present, this, generally speaking, is still the case; the poorest and least cultivated classes are not excepted; nay, just in that class it is one of the most noteworthy features. If the uncouth immigrant from Eastern Europe stoops to the lowest kinds of peddling, or, for a mere pittance, wastes his life in the stifling sweatshop; if he is not very scrupulous in his dealings with his transient patrons, and does not hold city ordinances as inviolable as those of the "Shulchan Aruch" (code of ceremonies), the central motive is his ever present thought of his family; even when he has not yet scraped together enough pennies to pay for their fare to the new home, they are constantly with him in his mind. This is not offered as a defence for over-reaching and cannot be allowed by a magistrate as a plea for law-breaking; but it is offered to the unprejudiced reader in compliance with Spinoza's golden rule:—human errors must not be ridiculed and condemned, but *understood*. *Si duo faciunt idem, non est idem*. This wise caution is the more to be heeded in the present instance, as, from the same source, devotion to home life, springs another fine feature of Jewry; go down in the scale as deep as you may, they are an industrious, toilsome class of people, often turning their narrow homes into workshops where old and young ply a handicraft from early morn to the late evening hours. Hundreds of men and women, arriving in this country after they have passed the middle life, learn trades and work at them till their trembling hands can hold the tools no longer or the light fades from their overstrained eyes. Amongst them there are not a few that have seen better days at their native places, or are deeply learned in the Law. They are quick in seizing the secret of a successful trade or paying manufacture, and not rarely better the instruction; a skill for which they are hated and despised by their own aristocracy in the markets, and branded as spoilers of every good thing as soon as it appears. If this aptitude and eagerness for trade be a fault, the Christians have themselves to blame for it. Even a superficial glance at the history of Israel proves that as long as the people lived on their native soil, and could live out their own lives, they showed neither skill nor

desire for mercantile pursuits ; that their legislation, their religion, their poetry and prophesying, and their ethical ideas presuppose a nation of shepherds and tillers of the soil. For the great change in the ruling disposition of the Jews, since their dispersion, those alone are responsible who now reproach them for it. The first Christians were Jewish ploughmen and herdsmen ; the Apostles mostly Judæan peasants and fishermen. The finest parables and similes in the speeches of Jesus are taken from the peasant's occupation and experience. And even to this day thousands of the scattered race are ready to seize again the plough and the spade, if they are given a chance, and not a few have done so even under the most disheartening conditions. The fact is, the pagan Mercury proved a more merciful god to the Jews than the Christian Jesus, as he was taught and practiced by the mediæval Church. He gloated over the sufferings of those who were of his own flesh and blood. No wonder they sought refuge under the wings of the heathen deity and became adepts in the art which he symbolized.

But suppose it were true that all the Jews dote on traffic as their dearest occupation,—what of it? The British have the nickname of “a people of shopkeepers” fastened on them ; yet they were and are the greatest benefactors of the human race, carrying the blessings of civilization to half the peoples of the globe. Commerce has done more for the peace of the world than all the preaching, praying, and prophesying taken together. A great railroad, a steamship line, a cable or a telephone wire, a commercial treaty, a tariff convention,—these are the modern bonds that hold the remotest parts of the earth together, and make them equally abhor war and its ravages. A falling off in the exports, a shrinking of the value of investments, an unforeseen competitor in the markets of the world, cause the rulers of the most civilized nations more anxiety than any adverse political combination. For the former threaten the peace and welfare of the home life of the people, on whose contentment they rely for the defence of their claims in all their political intricacies. A class of people credited with the mastery of the art of buy-

ing and selling should, therefore, be welcome to every country and given the amplest freedom and encouragement to ply their skill, provided, of course, they do not carry their hoarded profits out of the country and enrich other nations by them. But where do the Jews think of such a thing? Their own country, if Palestine may still be so denominated, is one of the poorest in the world, and what little revival there has lately been perceptible is due to the colonies established there by Jewish peasants who, under most trying conditions, labor to restore the soil to its ancient fertility, after the long sleep into which it has sunk. Jewish wealth can be enjoyed, and is being enjoyed, in no other way than non-Jewish. Its owners are charged by its religious teachers with being only too willing to imitate the luxuries and extravagancies of their neighbors. The same snares are spread for the feet of their offspring as for those of gentile birth; the tempters that lie in wait for them are liberal enough to ignore distinctions between the various creeds. I will not stoop to any defence of any race from the vulgar charge that they are cheaters; that each and all will always try, right or wrong, to secure the best of any bargain into which a poor gentile may enter with them. Those whom the commercial standing of the Jews, here and elsewhere, has not yet cured of this slanderous prejudice will not be converted by my pleading. Envy is an incurable disease; jealousy makes blind, and the common saying is surely true, that none are so blind as those who will not see. But neither have I the least desire to hide or gloss over our real failings and shortcomings. Those who cannot rest on their own real merits and accept the blame for their undeniable demerits must not dare to challenge the judgment of the world. The Jew does dare it, and all he asks of his critics is fairness, impartiality, justice. What I have said to his praise and for his defence was intended solely to assist the fair-minded reader in forming a just opinion of an agitation which in Europe embitters, cripples, and darkens thousands of lives, which, under better treatment would be spent in contentment and general usefulness.

It is for this purpose only that I will briefly add two more traits

of the Jews, equally valuable and undeniable. One is their charity; they care for their poor, their sick, their aged, if destitute, as the numerous institutions prove, found in every place where they dwell in sufficient number to maintain them. Ungrudgingly they assume the heavy burdens which this "exclusiveness" imposes upon them. Blame them for it who may; the right-minded will not, especially when assured that this feeling of pity is not the privilege of the well-to-do amongst them only. The working classes have always something to spare from their scanty earnings for "Z'dakah," the religious term in common use for charity, which, significantly enough, in biblical Hebrew means "justice." The idea that charity is an essential part of worship has been bred into them by long tradition, and continues to be regarded as such, wherever rabbinical Judaism survives in full force. From childhood every Jew knows the saying of Simon the Just, one of the last men of the Great Synagogue:—

"The whole world rests on these three pillars;
Law, Worship, and Charity."

The other trait is their zeal in the education of their children.

One of the standard objections to the Hebrews is their "forwardness"; socially, it is a disagreeable and annoying fault, but otherwise a gift of no little value. Forwardness is the soul of all progress and advancement. Call it that, call it self-help, call it energy, call it self-reliance, call it by the popular name of wide-awakeness, and you transfigure the fault into a merit. How the Jew was able to preserve it in any one of its forms is one of the many miracles of his history, seeing that the world has left nothing untried to cast the Jews backward to the last depth of self-despair. An exhibition of his forwardness might be seen at the doors of the public schools in the lower districts of the city, notably at the time of admission of new pupils. The poorest of the Jewish fathers and mothers would be seen wrangling for the registration of their little ones, as if it were for their daily bread. And may this not also serve for a proof that

the parents are willing to surrender their offspring to the influence of these schools, and see them thoroughly Americanized?

By these signs ye shall know the Jews wherever ye find them; they may, therefore, be called racial. In every other respect they are neither better nor worse than other people of the corresponding stages of life. Every variety of character is found amongst them; virtue and vice are distributed among them. Let Americans not stigmatize them as "undesirable immigrants," and close their hospitable gate upon them. They bring with them qualities which are an ample compensation for their defects, and their well-to-do brethren are not behindhand in seeing to it that they become no public burden. The American people have repeatedly shown the door to those who came hither for the purpose of preaching anti-Semitism, thereby publicly testifying that they would have none of that disgrace to our age. What exists of it in social life is not worth arguing against. It will and must disappear in a country, the civil order of which is based upon the principle of equal rights to all law-abiding citizens, to whatever race or religion they may belong. "A fair field and no favor." This good old saying comprises all our demands.

THE SOCIAL LIFE OF ANTS¹

AUGUST FOREL, *Chigny, Switzerland.*

(*Concluded from May number.*)

I have discovered a singular fact; it is that in certain extremely rare and exceptional cases, some very ordinary varieties of ants live in common with other species, whose instinct, like their own, leads them to live by themselves or with slave-holding species. These disturbing phenomena give a key to the understanding of others that I shall speak of later, and may be explained in two different ways.

Sometimes fecundated females of different species have united in the formation of an ant-swarm, which then becomes mixed, that is, is composed of two or three different species. The fact becomes patent when the winged sexes or the fecund mothers reveal themselves in the nest. I found, in North Carolina, in 1899, an association of this kind between *Dorymyrmex flavus* and *Dorymyrmex niger*. In other cases, the combination has been brought about as the result of a war at the close of which the nymphæ of working ants of one species have been conquered and brought up by another species. This is generally the case with the fortuitous associations of *Formica sanguinea* and *Formica pratensis*, which it is easy to bring about artificially by placing a heap of *Formica pratensis* with their nymphæ in front of a nest of *sanguineæ*, and probably also it is in this way that have been formed the mixed associations of *Formica rufa* and *fusca*, or of

(1) Translated by Professor F. C. de Sumichrast of Harvard University.

exsecta and fusca. Last year, in the Valais, I discovered a triple swarm of *Polyergus rufescens*, *Formica pratensis*, and *Formica fusca*. I found there were fecund females of *Formica pratensis*, a fact which excludes the possibility of that particular species having been pillaged by the *Polyergus*, which is not capable of transporting the huge female nymphæ. I was therefore able to prove that this was a case of complexity. It was a fortuitous association of fecund females of *Formica pratensis* and of *Polyergus rufescens*, the working ants of the *Formica fusca* having been carried off, while in the condition of nymphæ, by the *Polyergus*, following their normal instinct. It should be added that *Formica sanguinea*, associated with *pratensis*, in consequence of a war, also continue to pillage the *Formica fusca*, and thus similarly constitute mixed ant-swarms of three species.

Formica sanguinea is possibly the most interesting ant known, on account of the plasticity of its instincts. While it is fitted for all manner of domestic work, it has, at the same time, an instinct that leads it to attack, in small, scattered groups, the nests of *Formica fusca* or *rufibarbis*, to besiege them, to charge their inhabitants, to drive them from the nest, and to snatch from them their larvæ and nymphæ. Once the nest has fallen, its contents in the way of larvæ and nymphæ are transferred to the abode of the *sanguineæ*. The nymphæ are then bred up, hatch out among their ravishers, where they fancy themselves at home, and the young ants thus labor instinctively for the benefit of the community. This enables the *sanguineæ* to work less hard than other ants do, to lead a life more in the open air, and to indulge in sport, while leaving to their gentler mannered auxiliaries or slaves the major part of the work, that is, the garnering of the liquor of aphides, and the domestic duties. At times, however, the *sanguineæ* take few or no slaves, and then they perform all their work themselves. At other times, on the contrary, they obtain many slaves, this being especially the case with the American varieties,—save one that does not take slaves. The *Formica sanguinea* also brings up the nymphæ of other species of its own genus (*pratensis*, *rufa*, *trancicola*, *exsecta*), when the

occasion is presented to it by means of a war purposely provoked. I have seen this fact occur, also, in consequence of a spontaneous war of which I was a witness. The bold way in which the *Formica sanguinea* fights, its instinctive tactics, which consist in never hanging on to its foes during the fight, but in terrifying them by throwing itself upon them rapidly and biting them right and left, gives it great superiority. In Connecticut I saw a large colony of *Formica subsericea*, larger and more numerous than their foes, attacked and routed in a twinkling, thanks to their audacity and their tactics, by a small company of the American variety of little *sanguineæ*.

The most characteristic slave-holding ants, however, are those included in the genus *Polyergus*, the *rufescens* of Europe, or Amazonian ant of Pierre Huber, and the American races,—*lucidus*, *breviceps*, and *Mexicanus*. In these cases the instinct has been modified and fixed to an extraordinary degree. The mandibles are toothless and have become transformed into two curved poniards. These ants have lost the instinct of work, and even that of nutrition. They are unable to feed themselves even, unless the food is disgorged into their mouth from the mouth of their slaves. Incapable of caring for their offspring, these strange “working ants” instinctively collect in phalanxes on fine afternoons in July, August, and September. They almost all leave their nest at a signal given by the leaders of the movement, which strike them with their foreheads, and they start in serried ranks in a direction already determined, progressing at the rate of about one metre in forty seconds on turf, and in twenty-five to thirty seconds on bare ground. The army or phalanx is composed of three hundred to fifteen hundred ants, and advances without hesitation in a fairly straight line. The leading ants, however, often retrace their steps, as if to take their bearings, or to make sure that they are being followed, so that the head of the army changes. Very often the head itself hesitates, looks to the right and to the left, and even stops. Then the whole host scatters, and searches around, for quite a long time, occasionally feeling every object with the antennæ.

In such cases it is possible to observe individual signals and general movements. Some few ants, perhaps a single one, hesitating until now, at last make out with their antennæ the road that should be followed, suddenly start off again at a rapid pace, strike the others with their foreheads, and proceed in a direction often at an angle with that hitherto followed. The impulse thus communicated is followed by the whole army, sight aiding somewhat the senses of touch and smell in the combined evolutions. A number of similar halts may occur in the course of a single expedition. At times they are no more than brief hesitations; at others the ants are unable to find the way and return home empty handed and discouraged. Generally, they manage to light upon some nest of *Formica fusca* or *rufibarbis*, dash at the entrances, which they widen if necessary, penetrate into them in dense masses, and emerge a moment later, each carrying with its mandibles a larva or a nymphæ with which they hurry back to their own home. They attempt neither to do the least harm to the working ants of the nest they storm, nor to take possession of it. But the poor ants thus robbed defend themselves and try to rescue their nymphæ. When they grasp an Amazonian ant by the leg, so as to hold it back, the latter passes its mandibles over the nymphæ and threatens to run its assailant through. If the *fusca* or *rufibarbis* does not then let go, its brain is transpierced; its mandibles are thus paralyzed, and the Amazon goes off again with its booty. There is never any hesitation on the return march of the army; the trip to the foe's nest has sufficed to make each ant acquainted with the exact road. On reaching home the Amazons at times throw the stolen nymphæ to their slaves, and start back to pillage the same nest a second time, if it happens to contain any booty, or to attack another nest, if they have already cleared the first. But, generally, they themselves carry the produce of their raid into the nest and do not issue forth again that day. As a matter of fact they know whether the nest they have looted contains more nymphæ or not, and it is only in the former case that they return to it, sometimes the same day, sometimes the next, if it

happens to be late, but there is no hesitation on the second journey. This fact seems to me to be conclusive of their power of memory. They must remember whether the nest they have raided contains more nymphæ or not, and neither reflexes, odors, nor polarized traces can explain that.

I have myself observed, or have caused to be observed, during a single summer, forty-four such expeditions in the course of thirty afternoons, all carried on by a single swarm of *Polyergus rufescens*, and I have calculated that these ants must have brought home, in the course of that single summer, nearly twenty-nine thousand slave nymphæ.

At home the Amazonian ants do nothing but saunter around and call upon their slaves to disgorge honey for them, striking them, for this purpose, on the forehead with their antennæ. It is absolutely the slaves that do the whole of the work, that build the nest, that milk the aphides, and nourish the *Polyergus* and their families. But these slaves work freely, instinctively, and are in reality the mistresses of the house. If they were only capable of willing it, they could starve their supposed masters to death, for the latter use no force towards them.

No ant better enables one to observe signs, antennary language, memory for places, and the mode of orientation. How do the *Polyergus* manage to discover nests of *Formica fusca* situated often forty or sixty metres away from their own? In springtime and on summer mornings working *Polyergus* ants go out by themselves; they explore in the vicinity of their nest to a very great distance, and thus discover the nests of the slave species. These ants may be accepted with certainty as being those that indicate the direction to be followed, both at the start and when the army stops and hesitates. And it is here that the relational sense of smell, the topo-chemical sense of the antennæ, plays its part. When a stop occurs, one of the working ants that are searching around, recognizes, thanks to its memory of localities, guiding marks that enable it to find its bearings, and thus it starts again, taking the others with it.

The *Polyergus* is remarkable for its courage, its love of fight-

ing, and its instinctive tactics. It is afraid of nothing, and does not hesitate to attack single handed numerous troops of ants larger than itself, such as *Formica sanguinea* and *Formica pratensis*. They spring upon them, bustle them about, pierce the brains of any that seize them by the legs, and die biting rather than flee. I have never seen a single one retreat. When two armies of *Polyergus* are set over against each other, they mutually annihilate each other. It is, therefore, easy for a small company of these ants to create a panic in a numerous army of another species, larger and stronger than themselves. I have seen a handful of sixty Amazons put to flight a whole swarm of the huge *Formica sanguinea*, comprising probably two thousand ants, after a quarter of an hour's fighting. The panic among the *sanguineæ* was such, that in less than ten minutes they had all evacuated their nest, leaving behind them on its surface a thick layer of more than a million nymphæ.

I have often observed similar panics, which are just as quickly contagious among ants as among men. What is the cause of the singular emotional condition that causes the tall to flee suddenly before the small, the strong before the weak, and which by its reaction considerably increases the courage and boldness of the latter?

The American *Polyergus* has other species (*Formica pallidula*, *Schaufussi* race) for slaves. In other respects their manners appear to be similar to those of the European *Polyergus rufescens*.

The *Strongylognathus testaceus* is a small ant provided with mandibles having the form of poniards, like the *Polyergus*, and about as poorly adapted to feed itself and to work. It is found in the abodes of the *Tetramorium caespitum*, a very common ant, which is larger and stronger than the *Strongylognathus*. The nests of these ants contain a great number of males and females of the *Strongylognathus*, but few working ants, and larvæ and nymphæ of the three forms, while of the *Tetramorium* are to be found working ants only with a very great number of nymphæ and larvæ of working ants. When

a fight is brought on by introducing strange individuals of the Tetramorium, it is observed that the Strongylognathus take part in the battle, and weakly endeavor to stab the enemy in the head, but never succeed in doing so. They generally get killed, and it is their slaves that bear the brunt of the defence or the attack. Wasmann discovered the explanation of these mixed ant-swarms. They contain two fecund females, the one a Tetramorium, the other a Strongylognathus, which have entered into partnership in order to establish a swarm, the latter having sought out the former. The Tetramorium working ants find it much more convenient to raise the female and male larva of the Strongylognathus, which are considerably smaller than those of their own kind, and they eat their own larvæ, sparing the working ant larvæ alone. The Strongylognathus testaceus working ants, becoming thus absolutely useless and superfluous, tend to disappear, and that is the reason so few of them are found. Whence, then, come the traces of fighting spirit they exhibit and their useless attempts to stab the Tetramorium in the head? Is it not a remnant, an atavism, in other words the rudiments of an instinct possessed by their ancestors and transmitted to them by phylogenesis? Is it not a marvelous proof that they had slave-holding ancestors, but that their females, as they acquired a parasitical instinct for association, have transformed them into parasites?

I was already convinced of this, following Von Hagens, when in 1872, I discovered in the Valais a second species of this genus, Strongylognathus Huberi, a larger and stronger species, among whom working ants are very numerous, and which, as my experiments showed, is fully capable of forming an army, of attacking the Tetramorium in the same manner as the Polyergus, of bustling them about, of throwing them into disorder, of compelling them to take flight, and of robbing them of their nymphæ, which they then carry off to their abodes. Since then, that species has been found in Southern Europe, and varieties of it are to be met with in the East and in Algeria. I suspect, however, that it has already tried the plan of female parasitical partnership, and this may be shown by later investigations. In

any case, the slave-holding instincts and faculties are very highly developed in this species, although it has not yet been observed to start spontaneously upon raids.

The *Anergates atratulus* is a small ant, the working ant of which has disappeared by regressive metamorphosis. The male is wingless and the female winged, and they live parasitically with the *Tetramorium caespitum*. The swarm contains but a single fecund female, that of the *Anergates*, which has found means to cause the disappearance of the female *Tetramorium*, only the working ants of which can be found. The pairing of the *Anergates* takes place within the nest, between brothers and sisters. Then the winged females fly away to form new swarms, probably causing the female of the *Tetramorium* to disappear by means of a process that is still unknown. In America, the *Epoecus pergandei* appears to have manners similar to these, but this is merely a supposition that is supported by no proof whatever.

The *Anergates atratulus* is the highest development known of regressive metamorphosis of slave-holding transformed into parasitism. Accidental mixed swarms, on the contrary, are the beginnings of the slave-holding habit, to which they give an opportunity of developing. Among the *Formica sanguinea* slave-holding is growing, though it has not yet become a condition of existence. Among the *Polyergus*, it has become fixed, has attained its apogee, and has become a *conditio sine qua non* of existence. Among the *Strongylognathus*, it is degenerating more and more into parasitism according to the species. Among the *Anergates*, the working ant has disappeared and the two remaining sexes are the meanest of parasites. The beautiful evolutionary series which the slave-holding instinct of certain ants thus furnish us with, affords food for reflection. It is so clear that any comment seems superfluous.

There are, however, other curious social relations between ants.

I have given the name of parabiosus to the following case which I came upon in Colombia, the two species concerned being *Dolichoderus debilis* and *Cremastogaster brasiliensis*, smaller

than the other, but of the same black color. The two species occupied the same nest, taken from tree termites. Although set in between one another, the apartments were distinct, the *Cremastogasters* occupying cells separate from those of the *Dolichoderus*; but there was open communication and no partition between the apartments. Each species worked on its own account, and perfect harmony reigned between them as each attended to its own business. They left the nest in common, in long files, in search of food on the plants, parting only at the ends of the lines for the purpose of attaining each its special final goal, and they met on the return journey at the same forks where they had parted earlier. I have often met with the companion files of these two species in the virgin forests of Colombia. Their object seems to be mutual protection.

Wasmann has given the name of *Symphilia* to the relations between ants and certain small coleoptera, such as the *Lomechusa*, *Atemeles*, and *Claviger*, which live with the ants and acquire their habits. These insects are provided with glandulous hairs that secrete a substance of which ants are very fond. In return, the ants feed them, as they do their own comrades, by disgorging. Strange to say, these coleoptera have so thoroughly acquired the habits of ants that they disgorge honey to each other. This might be doubted had not careful observers such as Wasmann and Charles Janet seen the fact for themselves.

But there is more; the larvæ of the *Atemeles* are raised, fed, and cared for by the ants just as are their own larvæ. I was the first to observe this, though at the time I did not know what these larvæ were. Wasmann made the matter clear, and in addition, showed that in ant-swarms where there are many such guests, there occurs a singular degenerescence among the ants on account of the production of bastard forms that are neither working ants nor females, being barren like working ants, and microcephalous like females, so that they are of little use to the community. I had already described these curious individuals and their intellectual inferiority, without suspecting how they were produced. It seems as though the myrmecophilæ produce in

ants a toxical degenerescence analogous to that caused in man by alcohol, and like the latter, due to a means of pleasure.

Wasmann has shown that these myrmecophile guests are international, that is, are accepted and cared for successively and in friendly fashion by different swarms, even of diverse species. The fact is very interesting, in relation to the faculty of distinguishing by means of the sense of smell, of which I have spoken.

Aphides, coccides, the larvæ of telligometers, and the caterpillars of *Lycænides*, are, according to cases and species, treated as cattle by the ants; they are their milch cows. They care for them, move them, build them sometimes stables of stone, defend them, and transport them to the roots that occur in the walls of their nests. Nicélide affirms, even, that the ants help the butterfly that emerges from the chrysalis of *Lycænides* to hatch out and spread its wings. Huber showed that the *Lasius flavus* takes care of the eggs of its aphides.

I have mentioned here only facts that are absolutely certain, confirmed by the observations and experiments of the ablest myrmecologists as well as by myself. I believe, however, that this brief sketch will give an idea of the general social life of ants, and of various special cases more particularly interesting. I have endeavored to render intelligible the part played by the senses, and more particularly by the antennæ. The theories recently brought forward by Bethe, Uexküll and others, which are theories of Descartes warmed over, and by which it is sought to explain all the mental faculties of ants by the use of the terms "machine" and "reflex," to deny that ants possess any memory and any plastic adaptability to circumstances, as well as the power of mental association (any "phenomenon of modification by the inward working of the brain," to quote Bethe's words,)—these theories, I maintain, are as ill-matured as they are imperfectly thought out.

Unquestionably hereditary, automatic activity, that sort of blind intelligence, crystallized and fixed by heredity, which we call instinct, plays a most important part among ants as it does among all articulated beings. And I have said and repeated this

at every opportunity. But it is always accompanied, to however slight a degree, by that nervous central activity which I have called plastic, which is modified by and adapts itself to circumstances. Both on account of this fact and because of our absolute ignorance of the laws of protoplasmic life, it is impossible to compare this life to any machine, nor can it be deduced from the mechanical laws with which we are acquainted, whether it be reflex, instinctive, or plastic. We find all the transitions from reflex nervous action to automatic instinct, and from that to plastic activity, but we do not find any from our machines to the simplest reflex.

For the rest it is not difficult to convince one's self that mere reflexes or even mere complicated automatic acts of inherited instinct fail to explain the full sequence of the actions of ants.

Among the mental phenomena they exhibit in a striking manner, and for which we can find analogies in ourselves and in the higher animals only, so that we are driven to use anthropomorphic terms by which to designate them, I will cite memory, simple associations of remembrances, emotions, sentiments, and will. Perseverance in action cannot be explained without some form, rudimentary and rather automatic, it is true, of the will. What shall we call the operation that goes on in the brain of an ant that, having found some twenty metres from its damaged and upset nest, a spot suitable for the construction of a new abode for the community, returns home, brings one after another, and with difficulty, to the place she has chosen as suitable, her companions, whom she is obliged to pull about and to urge to make up their minds to roll themselves round her mouth, and that then begins building operations with the help of the ants she has thus recruited? To call all these acts coördinated and subsequent reflexes is to play upon words. At that rate, we can reduce the whole of human intellectuality to reflex, which becomes as general a notion as Schopenhauer's will.

What ants lack is the power of storing up within their brain a sufficient stock of individual experiences to modify markedly their mode of life, to allow themselves to be trained or tamed in

complex fashion, after the manner of the higher vertebrates. Yet they do possess some germs of this power. Thus, some large Algerian ants, *Myrmecocystus altisquamis*, which I had brought alive from Oran, where they construct nests that open outwards always with a very large aperture, were placed by me in a garden in Zürich. There they were worried by our *Lasius niger*, a small ant that does not exist in Oran. It was only after many weeks of suffering and experience, after they had seen their nymphæ carried off at times by the *Lasius*, that they gradually learned to close up the opening of their nest by means of particles of earth, in order to defend themselves against the little thief's raids,—a thing they never do in Algeria, not being there exposed to that danger. That is a case of experience turned to account, of individual plastic adaptation, of "modification by the inward work of the brain." I have cited other cases in my "Ants of Switzerland." But these reveal already very complex phenomena, and there are many simpler cases of plasticity among much inferior animals. The main point is to observe these cases carefully, to judge them soundly, without indulging in too much anthropomorphism on the one hand, or falling into the opposite excess on the other.

I must be permitted to cite a case which Lombroso, the famous Italian alienist and criminologist, considered to be a case of crime among ants.

In very dry weather, and evidently in consequence of the lack of food, the fusca slaves of a swarm of *Polyergus rufescens*, which I had long been observing, began to grow impatient at the obsession of the latter that called for the food they were in want of. A number of them began to nip and bite a few of the *Polyergus*, ending by carrying them as far from the nest as they could, and there casting them out. But it was in vain, for the *Polyergus* let them have their own way, and got back to the nest ahead of them. The fusca repeated the performance many times in succession, and with the same result,—that attained by Sisyphus. They became all the more impatient, and unequivocally manifesting their anger, they began to nip numbers of the

Polyergus and to bite them. Angered at last, the latter turned upon their slaves, and repeatedly threatened their heads with their terrible poniard mandibles. Some of the fusca, more obstinate than the others, not having released their hold when thus ordered, were stabbed in cold blood in the head and thus done to death.

If the "crime" was committed by the Polyergus, which alone were strong enough to do so, the primary intention of committing it, and upon the Polyergus, unquestionably came from the fusca. The affair was a regular civil disturbance with fatal results. Rain, which suppressed the cause, put an end to the trouble. "Reflex, mere reflex," Bethe will say. But if we succeeded in suppressing the cause of crimes among men, crimes would cease also, as is shown by the teachings of deep, social psychology. "Reflex, mere reflex," will say Lombroso in that case, and I shall be willing to say it with him, if it be desired (and very wrongly) to generalize all nervous cerebral activity under the term "reflex."

There is here a very important point that I have not been able to do more than touch upon, I mean the influence of emotionalism, of the sentiments of sympathy and antipathy upon the actions of ants. It is well known that a dog that has been ill-received by a stranger on first meeting him, bears the man a grudge, and that his hatred of him grows every time he meets him, while a kindness received by the dog produces the contrary effect. This point has been studied a great deal among vertebrate animals. Now the same fact is to be observed in the relations between ants. I have already spoken of the cruel bitterness of some individuals towards others after the first fighting is over. On the other hand, I have seen a starving female *Formica pratensis* placed in a bowl with some working ants, *pratensis* and *sanguinea*, though repelled at first by individuals of its own species, then beg for disgorged food from a *sanguinea* belonging to a strange swarm, and receive it. The friendly act of the one called out reciprocity, in spite of the "hostile odor." From that moment the female *pratensis* joined the *sanguinea* definitely

against the pratenses. I have observed several cases like this, and they afford much food for reflection.

In order not to leave my readers under the impression of crime among ants, I shall close with the account of a trait of devotion to the common weal. A swarm of *Formica pratensis* was closely pressed in its nest by an army of the same species, and crowds of alarmed defenders issued from the entrances to the nest and flew to take part in the fight. Like Satan, the tempter of old, I placed near them a beautiful drop of honey on a piece of paper. At any other time the honey would have been covered in a few instants with ants gorging themselves, but this time, numerous working ants came upon it, tasted it for scarcely a second, and returned to it restlessly three or four times. Conscientiousness, the feeling of duty, invariably prevailed over gormandism, and they left the honey to go and be killed while defending the community. I am bound to own, however, that there are ants less social, in whom gormandism does prevail.

Compared to the manners of other sociable animals, and especially to those of man, the manners of ants exhibit a profound and fundamental aggregation of facts of convergence, due to their social life. By means of the inherited, automatic activity of the nerve centres, of instinct, these communities succeed in producing phenomena believed to be the exclusive portion of human societies. Let me mention devotion, the instinctive sentiment of duty, slavery, torture, war, alliances, the raising of cattle, gardening, harvesting, and even social degenerescence through the attraction of certain harmful means of enjoyment. It would be ridiculous and erroneous to see in the fulfilment of this series of acts, individual reasoning, the result of calculated reflection, analogous to ours. The fact that each is fixed and circumscribed within one species, as well as the fatalistic character it has in that species, prove this superabundantly. But it would be as grave a mistake to refuse to recognize the deep natural laws that are concealed under this convergence. The same causes bring about the same results by different means. No doubt hidden laws regulate the acts of ants; but is the case different as regards our actions,

though they are infinitely more plastic and more complex individually ? I do not believe it.

I have been unable to give more than a short sketch of the social life of ants. Let each one study it for himself, and he will experience in doing so the deep enjoyment that comes from sounding the secrets and laws of nature, while at the same time he will enjoy the most delightful satire upon human wretchedness, and will perceive at least the main lines of a social example that we ought to be able to imitate, though we cannot do so, on account of the too large dose of egotistical and ferocious instincts that we have inherited from our ancestors.

I have said that ants have realized the anarchistic theory, and in doing so they show us why man of the present day cannot adapt himself to it. And that is the reason why laws and socialism remain, as far as we are concerned, "a necessary evil."

THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE AND THE CRUSADES:

CHARLES DIEHL, *Paris.*

When Pope Urban II., in the month of November, 1095, began to preach the crusade at Clermont, Alexius I., Comnenus, was reigning over the Greek Empire of the East. Borne to the throne in 1081 by a feudal and military revolution, this great lord had revealed himself to the world as a remarkable leader of the state. An excellent general, a good administrator, a clever and adroit diplomatist, he had by dint of energy and skill dispelled the perils which threatened the Empire; he had turned back the invasion of the Petchenegs and the Poloutzes, and the still more dangerous invasion of the Normans of Italy; he had reorganized the army and the fleet; he had triumphed over the discontent and conspiracies which threatened his growing power; and he had done much to make the imperial authority more absolute and to reëstablish in the monarchy the unity so essential to its existence. After fourteen years of efforts, in which time he had pacified his European possessions and extended the Byzantine frontiers to the Balkans, Alexius began to think of taking up in Asia the struggle against the Turks; and although of late years the unbelievers had made great progress, the death of the Sultan Malek-Shah (1092), and the anarchy which followed, seemed likely to favor the success of the Byzantine arms. It was at this moment that the crusade, in that it caused the Greek

(1) Translated by Mr. C. H. C. Wright of Harvard University.

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Emperor new and anxious cares and obliged him to devote to other purposes the time, money, and men which he would have used in combating the Turks, seriously disturbed the situation of the Byzantine monarchy and perhaps hastened its decline and ruin.

It was said afterwards, and for a long time believed, that Alexius himself called the West to his aid, and there was current in Europe a pretended imperial letter addressed to the Count of Flanders, in which the Basileus, in order to persuade the Franks to give him assistance, boasted of the wealth of Constantinople, the relics preserved there, and especially of the beauty of Greek women. No one today doubts the spuriousness of this document.¹ To be sure, for several years Alexius had preserved fairly cordial relations with the papacy; he displayed before the eyes of Urban II. vague prospects for the union of the two Churches; he endeavored to take advantage of the papal good will in order to recruit in Italy the mercenaries needed by him. Like his predecessors, indeed, he was ready to seek among the adventurers of the West a vigorous support and reinforcement for the Byzantine arms; and in 1087 he had even requested Count Robert of Flanders, then staying in Constantinople, to send him a reinforcement of five hundred horsemen against the Petchenegs. But he was too wise to turn loose of his own accord on the Empire those numberless hosts of crusaders who reminded the Byzantines of the ancient migrations of the peoples; and his first care, when he learned of their approach, was to collect troops, in order, if necessary, to give them battle.

At the time when the disorderly mobs of the popular crusade, soon followed by the scarcely more disciplined army of knights, poured into the Greek Empire their invading tide, Constantinople was still one of the most admirable cities of the world. In its markets were collected or exchanged merchandise from all parts of the earth. From the homes of its artisans issued everything that was known to the Middle Ages in the way of

(1) See, however, Hagenmeyer, *Der Brief des Kaisers Alexios I. an den Grafen Robert I. von Flandern*, Byz. Zeitschr, 1897.

refined and elaborate luxury,—silks and purples, brocades, gold and silver wares, jewels, wrought ivory caskets, bronzes inlaid with silver, manuscripts with splendid miniatures, and reliquaries with enamel set in gold. Through the streets passed a multi-colored and noisy crowd, in gay array, so richly dressed that according to a contemporary writer they all “seemed like the offspring of kings.” In the public squares surrounded by palaces and porticos were displayed the masterpieces of ancient art.

In the churches, with their giant cupolas, the mosaics emitted flashes of gold through the profusion of porphyry and of marble. In the imperial palaces, Blachern or Boucoleon, so vast that they seemed like cities within the city, the long, vaulted rooms displayed an unexampled luxury. The travelers who visited Constantinople in the course of this twelfth century, the pilgrims of the crusade who took the trouble to record in their naïve language the feelings they experienced,—Benjamin of Tudela, or Edrisi, or Villehardouin, or Robert of Clari,—cannot refrain from exclamations of admiration, and from wondering descriptions. The Western troubadours who heard the echoes of these splendors, spoke of Constantinople as of a fairyland, and were never weary of celebrating the enchantments of the imperial palace,—the children in bronze winding their horns, the revolving room, turned by the breezes of the sea, the resplendent carbuncle which lighted up the apartments during the night. Other writers enumerate the precious relics which filled the churches. But one expression is constantly repeated by every one,—the marvelous and wonderful wealth of the city, which, says Villehardouin, “was supreme over all others.” Nor is this all. When the great cities of modern Europe were, for the most part, but sorry and insignificant villages, Constantinople was the sovereign of good taste, the true centre of the civilized world. While the coarse knights of the West cared only for hunting or fighting, Byzantine life was infinitely luxurious and refined, manners were curiously elaborate, the love of exquisite pleasures and a taste for art and letters universally predominant. And even more than by material prosperity, the rude Latin barons

were dazzled by the wonders of the pompous ceremonial that surrounded the person of the Basileus, by the complicated etiquette which placed an abyss between the proud ruler of Byzantium and the remainder of the human race, by the theatrical apotheosis in which the Emperor appeared to them as the representative of God,—indeed as an emanation from him. And if one reflects that to this piling up of wealth, so likely to arouse envy, to this display of insolent arrogance, so well-calculated to ruffle sensitive self-esteem, was to be added the old misunderstanding increased by the recent memories of the schism still existing between the West and the East; if we consider, on the other hand, that in this elaborate society, in this court with its minutely determined hierarchies, the Franks appeared like ill-bred boors, like inconvenient and annoying elements of disturbance, it may be readily understood that from the first day of the meeting between Greek and Latin, the fundamental antagonism of the two civilizations immediately appeared in mutual suspicion, continual difficulties, incessant conflicts, reciprocal charges of brutality and treachery. The echoes of this conflict have reached through the ages, from the times of the crusades to our own day, and have contributed in no small degree to perpetuating in the West so many deeply-rooted and unjust prejudices against the Byzantine Empire.

I.

Alexius was, with good reason, troubled by the approach of the crusaders. He could not fully understand the great outburst of religious enthusiasm which carried Europe across the Greek Empire to the conquest of the Holy Sepulchre; he was suspicious of the violent ways of the Westerners, their inconstancy, their readiness to break compacts. He had hitherto known the Latins especially by the ambitious schemes of Robert Guiscard, and he was rightly annoyed at finding among the leaders of the crusade Robert's own son,—Bohemond. He incessantly feared some sudden onslaught upon Constantinople. And thus, while, as befitted a Christian prince, he gave a welcome to the Franks and furnished them freely with the necessary supplies, the Emperor

took care to watch and regulate their advance, to let these armies, in their interminable passage, halt only one by one under the walls of his capital. The crusaders, on their part, did nothing to diminish the anxieties of the Byzantine ruler. Dazzled by the wealth of the Empire, full of contempt for the schismatic Greeks, they went through the Byzantine land like professional bandits, burning, pillaging, ravaging everything on their way. The companions of Peter the Hermit, according to their own leader, behaved like "robbers and brigands." When the army of the princes appeared in turn before Constantinople, its behavior was scarcely more reassuring. Many great barons, oblivious of the religious object of their undertaking, were tempted to neglect Jerusalem in order to throw themselves upon their prey, and thought chiefly of their own private interests. It is easy to appreciate why, in the presence of these multitudes "more numerous than the stars of Heaven or the sands of the sea," in the presence of the ambitious lords "who dreamed of the Empire of Byzantium," Alexius Comnenus was, 'as his daughter wrote in the *Alexiad*, "immersed in a sea of troubles."

With undeniable skill he tried to make the best of the situation. The Empire had never renounced its claims to the lost provinces of Syria and of Asia; Alexius planned to make use of the crusaders in regaining these territories. Persuaded that by the use of money he would obtain from the Latins whatever he desired, he lavished bounties upon the soldiers and magnificent gifts upon the leaders, expecting, in return for these great expenditures, to induce them to acknowledge him as their lord. Very proud, moreover, of his imperial dignity, he had no intention of treating them as equals. They appeared to him mercenaries whom he was taking into his pay, and the better to bind them to him he tried to enter into their feudal ways, and to obtain from them an oath of fidelity and of homage, by which they should pledge themselves to hand over their conquests to him or to hold them as his vassals. The leaders of the crusade understood very well that without the help of the Greeks they would not be able to carry out their undertaking. Accordingly, after

more or less resistance, they ended by yielding to the wishes of the Basileus. Alexius, on the other hand, tried by an adroit admixture of generosity and of severity to prove to them that without him they would not be able to do anything, and with unparalleled skill, he took advantage, to reach his end, of all the weaknesses and all the defects of the Latins. After lengthy negotiations they reached a semblance of agreement.

It was not easy. Godfrey of Bouillon, one of the first among the chiefs of the crusaders who arrived at Constantinople (December, 1096), began by a peremptory refusal to take the oath as exacted. He had to be constrained by hunger and even by an appeal to force. The proud Raymond of Toulouse displayed quite as much ill-will, and by his arrogant bearing towards the Emperor came near causing a war among the Christians. Others, Robert of Flanders, Stephen of Blois, and Bohemond himself were more diplomatic. But significant anecdotes betray the distrust and antipathy felt by both sides. Anna Comnena, for instance, relates that when on one occasion Alexius sent to Bohemond a large quantity of meat, the crafty Norman took care not to touch it himself, but gave it to his companions to eat, asking them the next day, with great interest, particulars as to their health. Another day, at a formal reception, one of the Frankish barons insolently sat down on the Emperor's own throne, and when Count Baldwin made him get up and called his attention to the necessity of conforming with the customs of the country, the other discontentedly muttered, as he gazed at the Basileus, "Well, look at that boor, who remains seated when so many great captains are standing." Alexius, "who had long been familiar with the overweening ways of the Latins," said nothing. To endure such insolence, Comnenus needed remarkable patience, a ready supply of good temper and kindness, and a real desire to humor dangerous allies. The Byzantines relate, in a horrified way, how all day long the barons used to come and annoy the prince by their familiarities, their gossip, their demands for money, without even allowing him time to take his meals. At any rate, by well-timed concessions he achieved his

ends, and he made a good impression, on the whole, upon the majority of the crusaders. Stephen of Blois, one of the most learned of the Latin barons writes to his wife that "there is not in Heaven a man to be compared with the Emperor" for generosity and graciousness. By this means, as much as by his skill as a diplomat, Alexius succeeded in May, 1097, in concluding a definite treaty. The Basileus pledged himself to take the cross, to follow up the Latin army, and he at once furnished it, under the orders of Tatikios, with a corps of auxiliaries. In return, the Christian princes took an oath of homage to the Emperor, and pledged themselves to return to him the cities of Asia and of Syria that they might chance to conquer. Immediately afterwards the Latin army collected at Nicæa; Alexius could flatter himself that he had, by his skill, warded off the danger with which the crusade threatened him.

Indeed, this first contact had sufficed to show the absolute lack of harmony that existed between the crusaders and the Byzantines; good feeling could never be very sincere between them. The Emperor wished to make use of the barons as mercenaries, to recover for the Greek monarchy lost Asia; the Frankish princes wanted to conquer lands for themselves. A rupture, therefore, must perforce soon take place between them. But is that any reason why the Greek Emperor should have been made alone responsible, and why his ingratitude, his perfidy, and treachery should be criticised as was done in the West? When the difficulties and hardships of the crusades were known in the West, it seemed convenient to lay all the blame on Alexius without considering whether incapacity, rivalry of the Latin chiefs, lack of foresight, and want of discretion, were not the main reasons. When, a little later, Bohemond was in open conflict with Alexius, he found it to his interest to spread the legend unfavorable to Comnenus and to represent him in the West as the persistent enemy of all the crusaders. In fact, though misunderstanding arose early between the Latins and the Basileus, it was not from him that the first difficulties came. "Once he had contracted a treaty with them," says the most recent historian of Alexius Comnenus,

"the Basileus proved faithful to his word, and the rupture between him and the Latin princes is largely to be attributed to the bad faith of the latter."¹

It can, in fact, hardly be truthfully alleged against the Emperor, inasmuch as Nicæa after its conquest was to be handed over to him, that he had wished to save the city from the horrors of an assault and capture, and that he had secretly negotiated with the inhabitants for its direct surrender to his troops. And, indeed, the crusaders with whom Alexius shared a large part of the booty did not, in general, seem to have considered his act treacherous; at the time of parting from the Basileus, who had come to Asia to give them advice, they received from him, writes one of them, gifts of priceless value, and most of the barons left him with kindly feelings. Alexius, on his part, prided himself on having behaved towards them "not as a kinsman or a friend, but as a father." It was only before Antioch that things began to go wrong, when the council of the crusade, yielding to the demands of Bohemond, promised him, notwithstanding the treaty concluded with the Basileus, the lordship of the city (January, 1098). It may be understood why, at this news, Tatikios withdrew with his contingent from the Latin army and that the Emperor, who had employed the spring of 1098 in reconquering this part of Asia Minor, was rightly displeased at losing, in violation of promises, the strongest citadel of Northern Syria. The handing over of Antioch to Bohemond justified all the fears that he had first felt at the arrival of the crusaders. He considered himself deceived, and, altering his demeanor, he not only made this incident a pretext for interrupting his advance towards Constantinople, and for leaving the Latins to get out of the clutches of Kerboga as well as they could, but he took every step thereafter to thwart the growing ambitions of Bohemond. He first used diplomacy; he skilfully spread dissension in the Frankish army; he fostered, to oppose the Normans, the dissatisfaction of

(1) Chalandon, *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis Comnène*, Paris, 1900, p. 166. Cf. the recent work by R. Röhrich, *Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzuges*, Innsbrück, 1901.

Raymond of Saint-Gilles, and promised particularly, in case Antioch were restored to him, to join once more, in accordance with his agreement, the crusading army (April, 1099). When he saw his proposals neglected; when he saw in reconquered Syria independent states arise at Edessa, Antioch, and Jerusalem; when, especially, he saw Bohemond, whom he rightly judged the one most to be feared among the Latins, increase his principality at the expense of the Greeks as well as of the Turks, the dissatisfied mutterings soon broke into open war. By 1100 the Byzantine fleet was cruising in the waters of Cyprus and Syria, and although Alexius was hostile to Bohemond alone, although he treated very well, in spite of the disorders which they committed, the crusaders in the great expedition of 1101, public opinion of the West, incapable of understanding the lamentable disaster which overcame this last expedition, believed more and more in treachery on the part of the Byzantine Emperor. Indeed the alliance was broken. Instead of endeavoring to maintain against the common foe, the Turk, that close union which was equally advantageous to the Franks and to Byzantium, of which Godfrey of Bouillon dreamed, Alexius, in his wounded pride, thought only of taking back Antioch; the imperial troops entered Cilicia and attacked Laodicea by land and sea; there were mutual reproaches of violated oaths, of failure to keep pledges, and things went so far that at the end of 1104 Bohemond sailed for the West to stir up a new crusade,—this time against Constantinople. In 1107, with thirty-four thousand men, the Normans landed at Avlona, and planned to repeat the triumphal campaign of his father in 1081. Again the skill and composure of Comnenus prevailed over the invaders; a treaty signed at Deabolis (September, 1108) made Bohemond the Emperor's liege-man, and Antioch a vassal state, much reduced in size and no longer dangerous to the Empire, inasmuch as the passes of the Amanus and of Cilicia were handed over to the Byzantines. And though it be true that the death of Bohemond (1111) by enabling Tancred, his successor, to refuse to carry out the convention, deprived Alexius of the real benefit of this great

success, the pact of Deabolis nevertheless gave imperial ambitions a claim which they could continue to maintain.

Alexius Comnenus has often been reproached for his conduct towards the crusaders. But we have seen that he was not the crafty and cowardly deceiver that tradition has made him, and that his bad faith seems less evident than that of the Latins. Undoubtedly he was wrong in not understanding the advantage to himself of a united action with the men of the West. But Comnenus, it has been said, was before all a Byzantine Basileus, interested above everything in the welfare of the Byzantine state. He had not summoned the crusaders; he tried to use them for the best advantage of the Empire, and he achieved the difficult but meritorious result of both avoiding a conflict with the Latins and of leading them, by his skill, to the point he desired. Later, when he found out that he could not obtain from them what he had at first hoped, he continued without them, and against them, the task of reconquering Asia, which he had undertaken. Moreover, it must be remembered that he broke off openly only from Bohemond, and that he remained to the end on good terms with the other crusaders.

II.

The policy of Manuel, at the time of the second crusade,—that of Isaac Angelus during the third,—was not very different from that of Alexius.

Manuel Comnenus had no hostility against the Latins; he had married a German princess, Bertha of Salzbach, sister-in-law of the king of Germany, Conrad III. After her death, he sought a second wife among the nobility of French Syria. He gladly surrounded himself with Latins; he found among them the best soldiers of his army and some of the high dignitaries of the court. He himself was, in many respects, like a Western knight. Tall, of commanding appearance and remarkable strength, he admired feats of swordsmanship and dangerous adventures, and his bravery more than once verged on foolhardiness. He delighted in the violent physical exercises of the West,—hunts and tourneys,—

in which he held his own against the best Latin combatants. Like a paladin, he wished by great exploits to deserve the love of his lady, and she readily acknowledged that, though born in a land where people were familiar with feats of prowess, she had never heard of a man capable of such brave deeds. And so, Manuel made a deep impression on the Latins, and the Frankish chroniclers of Syria never cease sounding his praises. But the doughty knight was also a Byzantine Emperor, very conscious of the grandeur and majesty of the Empire, and very anxious to restore its former prestige; he was full of ambition and pride. In the Norman rulers of the Two Sicilies he saw the hated obstacles on which all of his plans for the conquest of Italy had been dashed to pieces; in the emperors of Germany he was inclined to see mere usurpers; though in the very middle of the twelfth century, he was dreaming of Justinian, and during his whole life he had one aim,—the reconstitution of the old Roman Empire. With such convictions it is easy to understand how the crusade of 1147 seemed to Manuel a peculiar annoyance. By energetic means he had just imposed his suzerainty upon the prince of Antioch; he was at open war with the Normans of Sicily. This was the time chosen by the West to solicit his interest in the cause of the Holy Sepulchre, to the end that he might allow the two great armies of Conrad III. and of Louis VI. to march unmolested across the Greek Empire. Manuel was all the more disturbed because, though he deemed himself fairly sure of the Germans, his allies, he knew that the French were rather unfavorably disposed toward the foe of the Normans of Antioch and Sicily, and he was even more disturbed than Alexius had previously been at the prospect of their appearing before Constantinople. Finally, the Emperor and his subjects, too, began to grow weary of these perpetual passings of crusaders, who exhausted the land and emptied the treasury. The West continued to insist that the Basileus should take an interest in the crusade; but the crusade was in his opinion only a hindrance to his policy, and he hoped to find in it only a means of furthering his private plans.

From the beginning, a misunderstanding was certain and a conflict unavoidable. Manuel, like Alexius, had given a cordial reception to the Germans who went by first, and though he took military measures to watch their progress he had them supplied with provisions. But soon the ill-disciplined troops of Conrad began to pillage, and quarrels broke out to which the greed of the Greeks contributed, by the way, quite as much as the brutality of the Latins. Like Alexius, Manuel had tried to keep the Frankish army away from Constantinople. He was unable to succeed, and the Germans even plundered the suburbs of the capital. It was only with difficulty and by a combination of diplomacy and force that he succeeded in making them pass on to Asia. With the French, things went scarcely better; the inhabitants, already exasperated by the passage of the Germans, treated them with great distrust; the Emperor could be reconciled to according them a favorable reception only in the hope of profiting by their conquests. What Manuel asked of the crusaders was, like the demands of his grandfather, a pledge of fidelity and homage, and, moreover, a treaty of alliance against the Normans. Nor did he expect, any more than Alexius did, to treat them as equals; he had already had certain disputes about etiquette with Conrad III., and, though Louis VII., more devoted to the interests of the crusade, showed less haughtiness, yet some of his barons were shocked at the Byzantine demands. The victories, moreover, that the Normans were winning at that very time in Greece added to their fury at the truce concluded by the Emperor with the Sultan of Iconium, and they openly proposed to take possession of Constantinople. It may be understood why the Emperor, to rid himself of such dangerous neighbors, should not have refrained from deceit, especially when he had obtained from Louis VII. the pledge which he desired. Does this imply that he is to be held responsible for the failure of the crusade? Nothing goes to show that the guides he gave to the Germans intentionally misled and betrayed them, and the allegation that Manuel notified the Turks is more uncertain still. He received, on the contrary, the remnants of the German army,

offered a kind welcome to Conrad, who was beaten and ill, gave the French the best advice for their progress, and, though he refused to assist them by the force of arms, his attitude personally towards them was irreproachable. It must be acknowledged, however, that the Greek inhabitants fleeced or starved the Latins. But we must remember, also, the crusaders' lack of discipline, their plundering, and the well-grounded fears that their presence inspired. Add to this that at the same time the Normans were plundering the Empire, the Venetians, by their cupidity, their arrogance, and the increasing influence which they were acquiring in the East, exasperated the Greeks against all Westerners. However this may be, the second crusade served but to increase the misunderstandings which dated from the first. Once more, in the West, and especially in France, the Greeks were made responsible for the failure of the undertaking, and the expedition of 1147 narrowly escaped being followed by a European war. In 1150 Suger himself thought of uniting in a crusade against the Greek Empire Louis VII., Conrad III., the Pope, and Roger of Sicily; and if the plan failed, it was only because the king of Germany refused to violate the compact of friendship and alliance which, in 1148, he had made with Manuel at Constantinople.

Between the second and the third crusade hostility constantly increased between the West and Byzantium. The ambitious policy of Manuel, by entangling the Empire in important European questions, had, by multiplying points of contact, sharpened the antagonism between Greek and Latin. The ten years of the Norman War left behind long-enduring hatreds; the vast schemes of the Basileus soon brought him into latent hostility, and then open conflict, with the powerful Emperor of Germany,—Frederick Barbarossa. Venice was disturbed by the sight of the Byzantine fleets cruising through the Adriatic, and the knowledge of the growing Byzantine influence in Hungary, Dalmatia, and Italy. On their part, the Greeks were indignant at the encroachments of the Venetians in the Empire, at their wealth, and at their plans to monopolize the commerce of the Orient. And

so the breach grew wider every day. Violent incidents attest the bitterness of accumulated hatred. In 1171, on one day, Manuel had arrested all the Venetians established in the Empire and war broke out for a period of four years. In 1182 Andronicus set the mob of the capital upon the Venetians, who were massacred with all the refinements of cruelty. The West took vengeance by the capture of Thessalonica, where the Normans pillaged and massacred (1185). Under such circumstances it is easy to imagine the terror caused by the news of the third crusade (1188). Isaac Angelus hastened to send a formal embassy to Nuremberg to obtain assurances that the proposed expedition concealed no hostile purpose against the Greek Empire, and in spite of the promises made, his anxiety increased when he saw Frederick Barbarossa enter into friendly relations with the rebellious subjects of Byzantium,—the zupan of Servia, Stephan Nemanya and the Asans, who had just reestablished the independence of Bulgaria. As usual the imperial government had promised supplies to the crusaders; as usual, also, the Basileus had collected troops to watch their progress; naturally, too, hostilities took place between the populations and the Latins. Isaac, in his agitation, spoiled everything by his mistaken policy; he asked for hostages, demanded a pledge that one half of the conquests won by the Latins should be turned over to the Byzantines, quibbled over points of etiquette, and finally thought it proper to hold as prisoners the hostages sent him by Barbarossa and to attack the Germans with his troops. Frederick, wounded in his pride, and outraged in his sense of loyalty, had no further scruples. They fought at Philippopolis; Adrianople was pillaged, together with the country round about, and a halt for the winter was made in the Empire as in a conquered land. The most disturbing rumors traveled through the army as to the bad faith and treachery of the Greeks; moreover, Isaac was blamed for the treaty he had just concluded with the foe of Christianity,—Saladin. And already Barbarossa was planning to march on Constantinople; he requested the assistance for the spring of 1190 of the fleets of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa; he entered into negotiations with the

Servians and the Bulgarians; he invited the Pope to preach a crusade against the disloyal Greeks,—when fortunately for Byzantium, on February 14, 1190, Isaac signed the agreement which assured to the crusaders their passage to Asia. More fortunate than his predecessors, the Basileus this time succeeded in keeping the Latins away from his capital; Frederick consented to embark at Gallipoli. But all these disagreements had merely accentuated the hatred, and to save the Empire in its straits another ruler was needed than the incompetent Isaac. And so, when, on January 1, 1203, the barons of the fourth crusade saw arrive at Zara the young prince, Alexius, who asked for their protection and urged them to conquer Constantinople, they yielded without much resistance to the temptation offered by the opportunity of satisfying at one and the same time both their greed and their grudges, and they easily succumbed to the suggestions of the Venetians, who had long been eager to destroy the Greek Empire and to obtain possession of the best part of it. From the beginning of the crusades, force had seemed the best way to solve a hard problem, and since then people had more than once thought of resorting to it. When the repeated disasters of the crusades had spread through the West legends hostile to Byzantium, when the incidents of the twelfth century had embittered old grudges, when especially to the accumulated hatred and the awakening of greed was added a consciousness of the weakness and exhaustion of the Empire, the Latins could no longer resist. The fourth crusade, preached for the freedom of the Holy Land, changed its purpose before completion and ended in the capture of Constantinople and the ruin of the Greek Empire, through the desires of the Venetians, with the tacit complicity of the Pope, and amid the unanimous applause of the West.

III.

While the imperial course of action was involved in the entanglements caused by the crusades, the Basileus did not lose sight of the states that the crusaders had established in Syria.

Godfrey of Bouillon, it would seem, had understood the necessity of combining against Islam all the Christian forces of the East, and he had endeavored to group the Latin principalities into a confederation of states with its centre in Byzantium. His plan ran counter to the prejudices of his companions against the Greeks as well as to the ambitions of the emperors. But the latter, by other means certainly, pursued in general the same aim; during the whole of the twelfth century they persistently endeavored to turn the oath of allegiance taken in 1097 by the crusading princes into the foundation of a real sovereignty of the Greeks over the states of Latin Syria; and by no means one of the lightest proofs of the power of the Byzantine civilization is the influence which it exerted over the Frankish principalities of the East.

Against Bohemond and Tancred, Alexius, as we have seen, had not ceased to lay claim to imperial rights upon Antioch, and the treaty of 1108 had at least theoretically acknowledged his claims. His son John and his grandson Manuel tried to make them a reality, and to turn the material results of the crusade to the advantage of the Empire. Towards the middle of the twelfth century circumstances were particularly favorable to these ambitions. In 1137, the Emperor, John Comnenus, had just imposed his authority by force of arms on the Armenian princes of Cilicia. At Antioch, divided by internal contentions, one party requested his intervention. At this very moment King Fulk of Jerusalem, beaten by the Emir of Mossoul, was reduced to impotence, and unable to assist against the Basileus, Prince Raymond, his vassal. Confronted with a threatened attack by the Greeks, Antioch, left to itself, was obliged to capitulate; Raymond was forced to take an oath as vassal to the autocrator. Moreover, he must even promise to give up his principality to the Byzantines as soon as they should have conquered a sufficient compensation for it in Saracen territory. After his example, Raymond of Tripoli and Josselin of Edessa acknowledged themselves vassals of the Emperor, and during the whole of 1138 John Comnenus, at the head of the Latin princes, waged war

against the Mussulmans, and appeared as the undisputed master of Northern Syria. Soon, carried away by his first success, he dreamed of still more ambitious feats with Cilicia, the principality of Antioch, and the island of Cyprus; he hoped to form a considerable endowment for his favorite son, Manuel, and, with this purpose, in 1142 he reappeared in Syria. He obliged the Count of Edessa to give him his daughter as a token of fidelity; he ordered Raymond of Antioch to hand over his capital; finally, he extended his ambitions to Jerusalem and announced to King Fulk his plan of visiting the Holy Sepulchre, at an early date, and at the head of a large army. For a moment, the unexpected death of the Emperor (April, 1143), gave confidence again to the Latins; and the impetuous Raymond of Antioch thought the moment a fitting one for reconquering the citadels that the Byzantines had deprived him of in Cilicia. But Manuel Comnenus was not less energetic than his father or less punctilious about his rights of sovereignty. Briskly attacked by land and sea, Raymond had to come and humbly sue for pardon at Constantinople before the tomb of the dead Basileus; he was obliged, at the sacred palace, to do homage to Manuel; on these conditions his capital was restored to him, but a Byzantine duke was set up by his side (1144). Thenceforth, and particularly after the failure of the second crusade, the Emperor embraced every opportunity to assert his suzerainty. When, in 1149, the Prince of Antioch was killed in battle, Manuel offered his protection to the widow, and tried to induce her to accept as her husband a prince of the imperial house. When, in 1150, Count Josselin of Edessa fell into the hands of the Saracens, the Basileus gave protection and support to the wife. He was soon to manifest inclinations toward a still more ambitious activity.

In 1155 Renaud of Châtillon was reigning at Antioch.¹ The type of an adventurous knight, recklessly brave but utterly unscrupulous, greedy, plundering, oblivious to pledges, and at times a mere highway robber, he had first very humbly sued for

(1) Cf. G. Schlumberger, *Renaud de Châtillon*, Paris, 1898.

the good will of Manuel, and had readily become his ally against the Armenian princes of Cilicia, who were in rebellion against Byzantium. Then, not judging his services sufficiently rewarded, he had thrown himself upon Cyprus, which belonged to the Emperor, and had ferociously plundered it. This was to invite the thunderbolt upon his own head, as was soon evident,—in 1158. Manuel, exasperated, invaded Syria with a large army; his sudden arrival and the rapid conquest of Cilicia caused an extraordinary panic at Antioch. Resistance was impossible. Renaud had to submit to humiliation. Barefooted, with a rope around his neck, the sleeves of his jacket rolled up to the elbows, holding his sword by the tip, so that the Basileus might grasp the hilt, the Prince of Antioch came to the imperial camp, “crying for mercy,” says a contemporary writer, “so long that it made everybody sick.” After a long delay, in which the proud baron was obliged to remain prostrate at the Emperor’s feet, in the presence of the envoys of Christian and Mussulman Syria, Manuel finally consented to restore him to favor, “and admitted him among the vassals of the Empire.” A little later, the King of Jerusalem appeared in turn, and, like Châtillon, promised the Emperor to supply him, on demand, with a certain number of men at arms and knights. The state entrance of the Basileus into Antioch was a still stronger proof of his victory (May, 1159). He rode in on horseback, wearing a crown and magnificently robed, while Prince Renaud, Count Amaury,—brother of the King,—and the other great lords went on foot holding his stirrups; and King Baldwin came a long distance behind, on horseback but without arms, and without the royal insignia. Pompous celebrations, tournaments, and the chase commemorated the triumph of the Basileus. Undisputed master of Syria, Manuel really appeared as the protector of the Latins. At his demand Nouredin gave liberty to six thousand Christian prisoners; through his instrumentality measures were taken to ensure the safety of pilgrims on their way to Jerusalem. When Manuel left for Constantinople, whither important business called him,

he could flatter himself on having fulfilled the great ambitions of his predecessors.

To the end of the twelfth century these close relations lasted. Family unions strengthened and cemented the ties. As early as 1157, the King of Jerusalem, Baldwin, had married Theodora, the Emperor's niece; his brother Amaury had married a princess of the race of the Comneni. On his side Manuel, after the death of the first queen, sought the hand of the Princess of Tripoli, Melisenda, and finally, in 1161, married the beautiful Maria of Antioch. The sovereigns of Frankish Syria came constantly at this period to Constantinople, either to renew the homage which they owed to the Emperor, or to ask for his support; and the Greek influence spread more and more in Syria. In 1164, Prince Bohemond III., brother-in-law of the Emperor, freed from imprisonment at Aleppo, thanks to the energetic intervention of Manuel, accepted the establishment of a Greek patriarch at Antioch; in 1169 the King of Jerusalem, Amaury, obtained for his crusade against Egypt the help of the Byzantine forces; in 1177, again, the Greeks and the Latins fought side by side. Syria of the second half of the twelfth century seemed completely subservient to the imperial policy, and the Greek traveler, John Phocas, who visited it in 1177, notices with satisfaction at each stage of his travels the works due to the liberality of "our Emperor and master Manuel Porphyrogenitus Comnenus, the Saviour of the world."

Undoubtedly the death of Amaury (1173), which left the throne of Jerusalem to children, the conquest of Syria by Saladin (1174), and the death finally of Manuel (1180) soon brought to naught these apparent successes of Byzantine policy. The Latin principalities of Syria were daily growing weaker; the Emperor, their lord, was unable seriously to protect them against the Mussulmans. The disaster of Hittin and the capture of Jerusalem by Saladin (1187) were mortal wounds to the Latin ports of Syria, though they succeeded in dragging through some kind of an existence for another century. But, though from a political point of view, the work of the Byzantine emperors was only temporary, still Byzantine

civilization at any rate made a deep impression on the Frankish principalities of the East. It was from the traditions of Byzantine military architecture that the Latin builders borrowed the main arrangements of their castles, the proud citadels of Margra or Karak of the knights,—the ruins of which are still an object of admiration; it was from Byzantine art that the Frankish barons took a part of the luxury with which they adorned their palaces or their churches. For them, as well as for the emperors, the artists of Byzantium were accustomed to make precious specimens of the goldsmith's art and of carved ivory, like those of the Princess Melisenda preserved in the British Museum; for them, as for the emperors, the mosaic makers of Byzantium displayed all their elaborate artistic skill. In the Basilica of the Nativity at Bethlehem may still be seen the remains of the mosaics which, under the reign of King Amaury, by the orders of the Emperor Manuel Comnenus, Ephreas wrought for the decoration of the church. By their general arrangement as by the subjects represented, by their style as by the accompanying inscriptions, these works are purely Byzantine. And, indeed, they date from the time when between the Latins of the East and Byzantium the political and religious intimacy had become close enough to permit a Frankish bishop to place in this Latin church a portrait of the Basileus, Manuel, as one of a benefactor, and for a Latin chronicler to speak of the Greek Emperor in these terms, "He was an eminent man, the most kindly of all princes upon earth; his memory will be blessed forevermore." Such a perfect understanding is of itself sufficient to show the injustice of all the disastrous prejudices which were nourished against Byzantium by the crusaders of the West; and it is no slight token of the power of assimilation which belonged to the Greek Empire in the twelfth century to find in these states of the Latin East, where one would least expect them, such profound traces of the political activity of the Basileus and of Byzantine civilization.

THE FORMAL GARDEN: ITS REVIVAL AND ITS RECENT LITERATURE

FRANK MILES DAY, *Philadelphia.*

That the controversy between the formal and the natural schools in gardening has been in progress these two hundred years is news to no one. The conflict has lasted to our own day and the rumble of the latest engagement is still in our ears. To whom the mead of victory is given depends on the temperament and inclination of the arbiter. But with whichever party we take our stand, or if, with the philosophic few, we are able to discern something of truth on each side, we cannot fail to see that the very eagerness of the dispute has stimulated that interest in gardens which exists wherever the human race has escaped from the grip of the purely material. For two or three thousand years an orderly arrangement in the garden, straight lines and well-marked boundaries, seemed obviously right. But in the art of gardens, as in all other arts, there come times of decadence when false taste takes the place of true, when follies are exalted, and the judicious have cause for grief. So it was, at least in England, in the seventeenth century. The revolt against ridiculous excesses in clipped box and yew and against the puerilities of a parterre made of colored earths and broken minerals,—a revolt started as a protest against tasteless absurdities,—gained such an impetus that in the end it resulted in a new school of gardening, the principles of which were fundamentally at variance with those of the older method. How rapid and complete was this

change of thought we may gather from the fact that in 1728 Batty Langly, a staunch adherent of the new method, was able to ask, in full hope of a negative answer from every reader, "Is there anything more shocking than a stiff, regular garden?" For two hundred years, although Kent, Capability Brown, and their successors have had it almost all their own way, the formal manner in England has never been quite dead. Even in the middle of the nineteenth century a number of large gardens were laid out in the Anglicized Italian manner, a manner which lent itself with fatal facility to the tastelessness of the "bedding out" system. Now and then throughout the century something has been done worthily in the old way, as at Penshurst, Blickling, or Montacute, but it is only within the last twenty years that there has been in England a definite, even though not very general, revival of the formal method.

In America the case is different. Although many of the earlier colonists came here at a time when the ideas of the landscape school were making great headway in England, the gardens about their new homes were in almost all cases formal. Stately houses of the eighteenth century from Virginia to Massachusetts had their surroundings laid out in harmony with their architectural lines. The abundant remains of these old gardens, possessed as they are of a quiet charm all their own, bear witness to the fact that our ancestors not only loved their gardens, but took a most intelligent interest in them.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the ideas of the landscape school made great headway in America, with the result that before the middle of the century the formal manner was practically dead. Valuable as has been the landscape method to us in the laying out of our many public parks, it is greatly to be regretted that there came a time when even the immediate surroundings of houses were designed in utter disregard of what had for ages seemed fundamental principles. Not even a path was permitted to run in a straight line. So persistent are some of the errors of the system that even to the present time the destruction of the reasonable boundaries of

individual ownership goes on, and by a treatment which ignores them we carry on a pretense that deprives the home of that privacy in its immediate surroundings to which it is justly entitled. Hard as it is to make headway against what the public has long been taught to consider the only right method, much has been done of late years. A great body of men among us has been trained as architects. They have traveled in Europe, studying their art. They have learned that a well-designed building is doubly beautiful in well-designed surroundings, and they have set to work to design such surroundings for their buildings. Examples spring up on every hand, from the simple terraces that now so often form the setting of a suburban house, to the fully developed architectural treatment such as that of the Foster garden at Lenox.

Interest in gardening being greatly quickened, publishers have not been slow to show that they realize the fact. It may therefore be well to cast a glance over some of the more important books on the subject which have of late years made their appearance.

Of those who praise the formal garden, few command the magic words of Sedding. His "*Garden-craft*"¹ is a realm of fancy. No page of it is without music and inspiration. An artist to his finger tips, blending originality and conservatism in all his work, Sedding was by nature and experience well-fitted to urge a study of the older modes of gardening as a help in bettering the designs of our own day. That such a gentle book, so well-attuned to nature and to art, should have aroused the indignation of the landscapists is an evidence of the persistent bitterness of the old contention between the schools. Yet it did arouse them, even in spite of the fact that Sedding saw much good in the natural method, and ended his book with a chapter "in praise

(1) John D. Sedding, *Garden-craft, Old and New*. 215 pp. Nine illustrations by the author. 6" x 9". First edition, 1890. Second edition, 1895. London: Kegan Paul; French, Trubner & Co. New edition, 1902. London and New York: John Lane.

of both," finding that it was "the English taste for landscape which gives the English garden its distinction." Sedding is at his best when he writes on the theory of a garden, why it is made, what is its right treatment, what should be its relation to the house. Plain enough questions, to be sure. But he answers them with such a charm of style, with such a calling up of exquisite images that one scarcely knows whether he is reading a treatise on gardens or a work of imagination all compact.

In Blomfield's "The Formal Garden in England,"¹ which appeared a couple of years after Sedding's book, there was far more to arouse the ire of the opponents of the architectural method. It is, in effect, a brief history of gardening in England, but from the point of view of one who can see little good in the so-called natural method and every excellence in the formal. He speaks his mind with the utmost plainness, and in a way not in the least calculated to allay the irritation which Sedding's book had caused. He gives an admirably clear account of the surroundings of an old English house. What purpose the fore-court served and how long its use lasted, what was the base-court and where it was placed, the use of terraces, the arrangement of walks,—all these were fully treated, and the various divisions of the garden, the parterres, bowling greens, and fish ponds, are described. Of the minor structures, such as tool houses, gateways, bridges, and flights of steps usually found in old-fashioned gardens, many examples are given. For one who wishes to know what manner of garden it was that pleased our English ancestors from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, no better book can be found.

After the appearance of "The Formal Garden," but a few months elapsed until Mr. W. Robinson, the champion of the landscape method, published his "Garden Design and Architects' Gardens," which was intended as a counterblast to "The Formal

(1) Reginald Blomfield and F. Inigo Thomas, *The Formal Garden in England*. 249 pp. Sixty-seven illustrations. 5'' x 8''. First edition, 1892. Third edition, 1901. London: Macmillan.

Garden," and to Sedding's "Garden-craft." Before the year ended it had met a spirited reply from Blomfield. Robinson's book reached by no means as high a plane of usefulness and interest as that admirable work, also from his pen, "The English Flower Garden."¹ Thus far, the books of which we have spoken have dealt exclusively with the design of gardens, and with the arrangement of their constituent parts and only remotely with the things grown therein. But with "The English Flower Garden" it is different. It is chiefly a discourse upon the plants that are grown in the British Islands, their habits, the positions most suitable for them, the best ways of cultivating them, their forms and colors. Robinson's knowledge of this subject is vast. His sympathy with growing things and his enthusiasm for them are very stimulating. The book is much more than a list of plants with cultural directions. Opening it at random, one is sure to come upon a passage so full of matter and so interesting, that he is constrained to read it to the end. For us in America, its only drawback is that it treats of plants under English conditions often so different from our own as to impair for us the value of many of the writer's statements. Apart from the specific object so worthily filled by the book, it has a lengthy introduction largely given up to an able exposition of the landscape gardener's point of view, and of his theory and practice. It is a fair statement of all that is best in the "natural method," and it contains much that not even the staunchest advocate of the formal would wish to gainsay. But, though he has firmly fixed ideas about design, Mr. Robinson is less a garden artist than a horticulturalist. For him, in his own words, "the true use and first reason of a garden is to keep and grow for us plants not in our woods and mostly from other countries than our own." Great is the difference between this way of looking at the thing and that of Sedding, for whom a garden is "man's

(1) W. Robinson, *The English Flower Garden*. 866 pp. Many hundred illustrations. 6" x 9½". First edition, 1883. Eighth edition, London: Murray, 1901.

report of nature at her best," "made to express his delight in beauty and to gratify his instincts for idealization." In gardening, as in many another way, one man's food is another man's poison, and Robinson, after reading "Garden-craft," could find no apter word with which to characterize Sedding's web of gossamer than "drivel."

After following so long the heated controversy of the styles, it is pleasant to take up the work of Miss Gertrude Jekyll,¹ who, while she has as deep a love for growing things as Mr. Robinson, has powers of observation and description surpassing his, and who is at the same time a genuine artist in gardening. Her leaning, if she has any, is toward the natural method; at least so it would seem, to judge from the way in which her own most interesting garden in Surrey is laid out; yet in her books we do not find her taking sides with either school. Flowers are her delight. The right placing of plants so that they may grow well, so that they may bear the proper relation of size to one another, so that the colors of their flowers may harmonize or contrast pleasantly, so that each one may be happy and at home,—these are the things about which she mostly writes. But she is, above all, an artist in gardening. The composition of beautiful garden pictures is her greatest pleasure. In analyzing the work of other artists, in subtly criticizing the great works of the garden designers of past times, she shows how catholic is her taste and how the preceptions of a well-trained artist lead her into admiration of what is best and noblest in her art. Of all the books of recent years about the garden, Miss Jekyll's are the most delightful, because

(1) Gertrude Jekyll, *Wood and Garden, Notes and Thoughts, Practical and Critical, of a Working Amateur*. 286 pp. Seventy-one illustrations. 5½" x 9". London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1899. *Home and Garden, Notes and Thoughts, Practical and Critical, of a Worker in Both*. 301 pp. Fifty-three illustrations. 5½" x 9". London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1890. *Wall and Water Gardens*. 177 pp. One hundred and twenty-two illustrations. 5½" x 9". London: Geo. Newnes & Sons; New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1901.

she, more than any other writer, has a sound and intimate knowledge of her subject, keen observation, and ideas worthy of the felicitous expressions in which she clothes them. In brief, if one who cares for more than the mere growing of flowers were limited to the books of a single writer, he would find the maximum of pleasure and of profit in those of Miss Gertrude Jekyll.

Mr. Robinson and Miss Jekyll have taken us somewhat afield; so, to return to our formal garden, the book which enables us best to study the existing examples of it in England, owes its origin to that entertaining paper, "Country Life." Publishing as it does from week to week photographs from the apparently inexhaustible wealth of English gardens, "Country Life" has accumulated a store of material worthy of presentation in the form of books. Some of these, while throwing a side light on garden design, are largely horticultural, as, for example, "The Century Book of Gardening."¹ But it is "Gardens Old and New"² that most interests the designer. From no other book can so comprehensive an idea of the variety and beauty of the surroundings of English mansions be gained. Whatever our taste in gardening, if it have its expression in England, the finest examples may be found in "Gardens Old and New." Do we affect quaint topiary work, box and yew clipped into the fantastic forms that excited the ridicule of Pope, we have but to turn to Levens Hall, Cleeve Prior, or Elvaston Castle. Would we study the influence of the Italian on the English garden, Trent-ham or Longford gives us every chance. If the right relation of a stately mansion to its surrounding landscape interests us,

(1) *The Century Book of Gardening, a Comprehensive Work for Every Lover of the Garden.* Edited by E. T. Cook. 610 pp. Many hundred illustrations. 8½" x 12". London: George Newnes; New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1900.

(2) *Gardens Old and New, The Country House and its Garden Environment.* 295 pp. Many hundred illustrations. 10" x 14¼". London: George Newnes; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901.

Prior Park affords an unexcelled example, or if we care more for that close *intimité*, the personal touch that binds together the house and garden as nothing else can, Sydenham House, St. Catharine's, Bath, and a dozen other places of equal beauty express this subtle relation. The book's illustrations show the highest level of work in landscape photography and in half-tone reproduction, and they constitute its real interest, few people caring to spend much time upon the historical and descriptive text which accompanies them.

While "Gardens Old and New" is sadly lacking in plans, the recently issued "Formal Gardens in England and Scotland,"¹ by H. Inigo Triggs, is so abundantly furnished with them as to be an invaluable supplement to the former book. Mr. Triggs' skill as a draughtsman enables him to present plans and sections which, while pretending to be nothing more than accurately measured sketches, have an admirable clearness and give the facts about many an old place in a way not equaled even by the photographs with which he accompanies them. His collection is particularly interesting because it includes many Scotch gardens, pictures of which are rarely seen. These, though not on the large scale of many of their English neighbors, have an individuality, a charm entirely their own. Among them the finest is Barncluith, a masterly treatment of a hillside so steep as to seem an impossible site for any garden.

Before turning to America, it may be well to say a few words about Miss Amherst's "History of Gardening in England"² and about Sieveking's "Gardens Ancient and Modern." Since the early part of the nineteenth century no history of gardening in England at all approaching the completeness of that of

(1) H. Inigo Triggs, *Formal Gardens in England and Scotland*. 180 plates. 13" x 17". London: B. T. Batsford; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1892.

(2) The Hon. Alicia Amherst, *A History of Gardening in England*. 405 pp. Sixty-eight illustrations. 6½" x 10". London: Bernard Quarich, 1895.

Miss Amherst, has been published. It is an extremely satisfactory book and although as a history of design it is less lucid than Blomfield's, it nevertheless covers its ground in a way quite beyond the scope of that book. Beginning with the influence of the Romans upon the gardens of England, it follows its subject through the Middle Ages, watches the transition from the Gothic to the Renaissance, and advances, step by step, through the reign of landscape gardening to the present day. Much space is given to a study of the kind of flowers or fruits that were grown at any given period, and to the time and manner of the introduction of new species. The old herbalists and their books, and English garden literature in general are well-treated, and there is a good bibliography at the end of the work.

If we are inclined to go farther afield than England for our garden literature, Sieveking's "Gardens Ancient and Modern" is the book for us. It consists of passages touching the garden, selected from the literatures of all peoples and all ages. It begins with a bit of an Egyptian manuscript of the nineteenth dynasty and ends with a selection from Gabriele d'Annunzio. Breadth of scholarship dominates the work. The reader's interest is constantly maintained by the ingenious way in which the varying impressions made upon great minds are presented. How widely separated are the sources from which come the extracts may be seen by skipping rapidly from page to page and noting at random such names as Solomon, Homer, Theocritus, Pliny, Petrarch, Erasmus, Luther, Montaigne, Bacon, Evelyn, Pope, Kant, Heine, and Thoreau. A most valuable portion of Sieveking's book is its "Historical Epilogue" which, in the guise of a pleasant running comment on written things, gives an excellent brief description of the various kinds of gardens in vogue in many countries and in many ages. The book is by all odds the one

(1) Alfred Forbes Sieveking, *Gardens Ancient and Modern, an Epitome of the Literature of the Garden-art, with an Historical Epilogue*. 423 pp. Thirty-four illustrations. 5½" x 8½". London: I. M. Dent & Co., 1899.

best worth having if we would know the garden's place in the world's literature.

Thus far we have spoken only of books published in England. The continental nations have of late years contributed nothing worthy of mention to the literature of garden design, but America has produced at least one book that has greatly aided the revival of formal gardening. This is Mr. Charles A. Platt's "*Italian Gardens.*"¹ It comes from the hand of one known, at the time of its publication, as a painter deeply in sympathy with wild nature, but one who has since demonstrated his remarkable aptitude as a garden designer. The book, though it pretends to no thoroughness, gives us a delightful insight into the general scheme of the Italian garden, with its grove, its terraces, its fountains, and its flowers, and into the causes that made it what it was and is. It affords glimpses of some of the most typical examples of the garden in Italy such as the Villa Lante, or of some of the highest achievements of the art of the garden as the Villa d'Este.

The widespread interest in the formal garden now unquestionably astir in America has given rise to innumerable garden articles in our periodicals, and even to the publication of a magazine called "*House and Garden,*" especially devoted to the relations which should exist between the country house and its surroundings,—a magazine in which the formal garden, whether old or new, plays the leading part.

Of the books of the year two at least deal with gardens in America. Mrs. Alice Morse Earle's "*Old Time Gardens*"² is written, like her other books, for the lovers of all things colonial. Yet it deals not alone with the garden of the eighteenth century. Its various lore covers a host of things from Josselyn's quaint list

(1) Charles A. Platt, *Italian Gardens*. 154 pp. Fifty-two illustrations. 8" x 11". New York: Harper & Brother, 1894.

(2) Alice Morse Earle, *Old Time Gardens*. 489 pp. 206 illustrations. 5" x 7½". New York: The Macmillan Co., 1901.

of plants growing in New England gardens three hundred years ago to a discourse on the "Roses of Yesterday," old time favorites thrust into the background by the latest creations of the rose grower. Mrs. Earle's book is pleasantly discursive. Its very lack of haste is one of the things that helps it to seize so perfectly the spirit of an earlier time.

Mr. Lowell's book, "*American Gardens*,"¹ treats the subject from the architect's point of view, yet with fairness and with an evident sense of the fact that there may be other points of view from which it may be seen with advantage. His essay is a brief one, partly historical, largely critical, serving as an introduction to a series of plates which show the fairest achievements of formal gardening in America, whether before the dominance of the landscape school or since the revival of the formal method. The subjects are wisely chosen and the value of the photographic views is greatly enhanced by sketch plans which accompany them. To those unfamiliar with the great strides made by garden design in America within the last five years, the book will prove a revelation of beauty of which they have not dreamed.

In looking broadly over the field of garden design in America at the present day, we see the two old forces striving for the mastery just as they have striven these many years. On the one hand, we have the formal designers, for the most part architects, earnest that the effect of their work shall not be ruined by the juxtaposition of the work of others untrained in the arts of design, or trained in a school utterly at variance with their own. However skilful as designers, the architects find themselves, with the rarest exceptions, handicapped by their lack of knowledge of plants, a knowledge to be gained only by years of patient study. However delightful the general arrangement of the architect's garden, his planting plan, if he be so ill-advised as to attempt one unaided, is generally a thing for laughter. On the other hand, our professional landscape gardeners, skilful as they may be in

(1) *American Gardens*. Edited by Guy Lowell, Architect. 31 pp. 112 plates. 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 12". Boston: Bates and Guild Company, 1901.

the design of park-like areas, fail with scarcely an exception, when their work has to be seen in association with architecture. Strong as they may be in their knowledge of plants, their training has been too one-sided, too lacking in sustained effort at the solution of great problems in design, to enable them to deal successfully with one of the most important phases of their work. Their way of solving the problem of the transition from the purely formal lines of a building to the purely informal lines of the landscape about it, has consisted too largely in an attempt to ignore the formality of the building and to glorify the informality of the landscape. But it is reasonable to believe that a set of men, better trained for the practice of garden design than are either the architects or the landscape gardeners, will shortly be among us. The demand creates its own supply. Already there are young men well-trained in design who are taking up the serious study of horticulture and *vice versa*. Our schools of landscape architecture are prepared to give, and are giving us, well-rounded men who need only a few years of practical experience to demonstrate that they are capable of raising their art to a higher level than it has ever before reached in America.

THE IDEA OF BEAUTY

ETHEL D. PUFFER, *Cambridge, Mass.*

The Idea of Beauty has been greatly widened since the age of Plato. Then, it was only in order, proportion, unity in variety, that beauty was admitted to consist; today we hold that the moderns have caught a profounder beauty, the beauty of meanings, and we make it matter for rejoicing that nothing is too small, too strange, or too ugly to enter, through its power of suggestion, the realm of the æsthetically valuable; that the definition of beauty should have been extended to include, under the name of Romantic, Symbolic, Expressive, or Ideal Beauty, all of the elements of æsthetic experience, all that emotionally stirs us in representation, is, no doubt, easily to be understood. But while this view is a natural development, it is not of necessity unassailable; and it is permitted us to question whether the addition of an independent element of expression to the older definition of beauty can be justified by its consequences for art.

Such an inquiry, however, cannot stop with the relation of the deeper meanings of modern art to the conception of beauty. It must go further and find out what elements, the sensuous form or the ideas that are bound up with it, in a work of art, of the classical as well as of the idealistic type, really constitute its æsthetic value. What is it that makes the beauty of the Venus of Milo? Is it the pose and the modeling, or the idea of the eternal feminine that it expresses to us? What is it that makes the beauty of St. Mark's or of Giotto's tower? the relation of the lines and

masses or the sacred significance of the edifice they go to form? What is it that makes the beauty of the Ninth Symphony? the perfection of the melodic sequence, or the Hymn of Joy, the message from the Infinite which they are meant to utter?

The antithesis between these two points of view is, of course, not the same as that other antithesis between "art for art's sake" and art in the light of its moral meanings and effects. What we now call romantic or expressive art can certainly be made the more fruitful in moral suggestions; but this fact bears not at all on the question of what belongs fundamentally to the nature of beauty. We know, moreover, that on this matter the camps of the formalists and the romanticists are divided. The Greeks, the lovers of formal beauty, were so alive to the moral effects of art that their theories were in danger of being quite overwhelmed by this view. On the other hand, the idealists in art, the natural enemies, as one would have thought, of art for art's sake, have been most often impatient of any consideration of its moral elements or effects. This second question, then, of art as pleasure or as moral influence can be once for all excluded from the discussion of the Idea of Beauty. So far as yet appears, the issue is between form and expression.

There is, perhaps, some point of common agreement from which to survey and distinguish more exactly these two diverging tendencies. Such a coign of vantage is offered by the nature of the æsthetic attitude,—for since Kant there has been among æstheticians no essential difference of opinion on this point. The æsthetic attitude, all agree, is disinterested. We care for the image or appearance of the object, for the way its form affects us, and not for the actual existence of the object itself. If I delight æsthetically in a cluster of grapes, I do not want to eat them, but only to enjoy their image, and my feeling of pleasure, as æsthetic, would not be changed if before me were only a mirage, an hallucination, or a picture. It is just the pleasure in perception that appeals to me,—therein both schools agree,—and the only matter at issue is the question of what this disinterested pleasure of perception includes. Is that pleasure

bound up with the powers of perception itself, or does it come from the end of the process and the ease with which it is reached,—from the *idea*, in the contemplation of which we delight?

One school asserts that the real pleasure in perception comes only from form. The given object is beautiful, through its original qualities of line, color, or sound, which strike the special senses in a way that is pleasing to them; and through its combinations of these qualities, which affect the whole human organism in a directly pleasurable way. What is outside of the given object of art,—is meant, suggested, or recalled by it,—belongs, it is said, to absolutely unæsthetic processes, as is shown by the fact that many things, which we are the first to acknowledge as ugly, are the exciting cause of great thoughts and delightful associations. The opposed school maintains that the meanings of a work of art are all that it exists for. The presentation of an idea, by whatever sensuous means, so only that they be transparent, and the joy of the soul in contemplating this idea, must be the object and the end of art. The later idealists admit value to the form only in so far as it may express, convey, symbolize, or suggest the content, whether as pure idea, or as a shadowing forth of the Divine World-Meaning.

These theories are certainly intelligible; but the results of applying them with logical consistency are rather terrifying. Andrew Lang says somewhere that the logical consequence of the formal theory of art in all its nakedness would make Tennyson the youth, Swinburne, and Edgar Poe the greatest poets of the world, and those delicious effusions of Edward Lear, "The Jumblies" and "On the Coast of Coromandel," masterpieces. Yet if we allow the idealists to pass sentence, what shall become of our treasures in "Khubla Khan," or "Ueber Allen Gipfeln," or "La Nuit de Décembre"? The results of such a judgment day would be even more appalling to the true lover of poetry. Moreover, if the idea, the end of art, need not reside in the object itself, but may arise therefrom by subtle suggestion, the complications of poetry or painting are unnecessary. A geometric

figure may remind us of the constitution of the world of space, a sun-dial, of the transitoriness of human existence, and with a "chorus-ending from Euripides," the whole sweep of the cosmic meanings is upon us. In the words of Fra Lippo Lippi:—

" Why, for this,
What need of art at all? A skull and bones,
Two bits of stick nailed crosswise, or what's best,
A bell to chime the hours with, does as well."

In spite of this, however, a place for ideas must clearly be found in our definition of beauty; and yet it must be so limited and bound to the beautiful form that corollaries such as we have just drawn will be impossible. An interesting attempt to reconcile these two points of view,—to establish an organic relation between form and idea,—is found in "The Sense of Beauty" by Professor George Santayana. The central point of this writer's theory is his definition of beauty as the objectification of pleasure. *Æsthetic* experience, he says, is based partly on form, partly on expression, but the pleasure felt is always projected into the object, and is felt as a quality of it. All kinds of external associations may connect themselves with the work of art, but so long as they remain external, and keep, so to speak, their values for themselves, they cannot be said to add beauty to the object. But when they are present only in their effect,—a diffused feeling of pleasure,—that diffused feeling is attributed directly to the object, is felt as if it inheres therein, and so the object becomes more beautiful, for beauty is objectified pleasure. Professor Santayana designates form as beauty in the first term, and expression as beauty in the second term. Beauty in the first term can exist alone,—not so beauty in the second term. It must have a little beauty of the first term to graft itself upon. "A map, for instance, is not usually thought of as an *æsthetic* object, and yet, let the tints of it be a little subtle, let the lines be a little delicate, and the masses of land and sea somewhat balanced, and we really have a beautiful thing, the charm of which consists almost entirely in its meaning."

Now here, it seems to me, is a weak point in Professor Santayana's armor. If such wonderful elements of beauty can be projected into a fairly colorless object by virtue of its fringe of suggestiveness, why should not beauty of the second term be felt in objects without that little bit of intrinsic worth of form? Is not such indeed the fact? What else is the meaning of the story of Beauty and the Beast? The squat and hideous Indian idol, the scarabæus, the bit of Aztec pottery, become attractive and desired for themselves by virtue of their halo of pleasure from dim associations. And all these values are felt as completely *objectified*, and so fulfill the requirements for "beauty in the second term." That small amount of intrinsic beauty on which to graft the beauty of the second term is, therefore, not a necessary condition, so that we are left, on Professor Santayana's theory, with the strange paradox of so-called beautiful objects which are, nevertheless, confessedly ugly.

What, then, is the flaw in this definition? While we concede the objectification of pleasure in all these cases, we cannot, it would seem, admit a corresponding change from non-æsthetic to æsthetic feelings. The personal attitude towards an object, based on the sentiments objectified in it, and the æsthetic attitude are two different things. The truth is, that all this objectified tone-feeling is directly dependent on the original real existence of the object that calls it up, and on our practical, personal relation to it, and is thus, by universal agreement, definitely non-æsthetic. I enjoy the cast of the great Venus very nearly as much as the original,—but who cares for casts of the Aztec gods, or of the prehistoric carvings of the reindeer period? Who wants an imitation scarabæus? To have the real thing, to see it, to touch it, to know that it has had real experiences that would fill me with wonder and with awe, "to love it for the dangers it has passed,"—to feel that I, myself, am through it actually linked with its mysterious history,—that is the value it has for me; not a pleasure of perception at all, but a very definite, practical interest in my own personality. If the pleasure lay only in disinter-

ested perception, any representation of the object ought to have the same value.

What, then, the author of "The Sense of Beauty" calls "the beauty of the second term,"—the power to suggest feeling through the medium of vanished ideas,—we may deny to impart any æsthetic character whatever. Professor Santayana has, indeed, mediated between the formalists and the idealists; but his theory would lead us to attributions of beauty from which common sense revolts; and we have seen the secret of its deficiency to lie in the confusion of the personal with the æsthetic attitude. If now we amend his definition, "Beauty is objectified pleasure," to "Beauty is objectified æsthetic pleasure," we are advanced no further.

The problem stands, then: how to provide for the presence of ideas in the work of art, and the definite emotions aroused by it, either by bringing them somehow into the definition of beauty in itself, or by showing how their presence is related to the full æsthetic experience. But, first of all, we have to ask how the æsthetic pleasure even in formal beauty is constituted, and to what extent expression belongs to the beauty of pure form. Form is impressive, or directly beautiful, through its harmony with the conditions offered by our senses, primarily of sight and hearing, and through the harmony of its combinations of suggestions and impulses with the entire organism. I enjoy a well-composed picture like Titian's "Sacred and Profane Love," because the good composition means such a balanced relation of impulses of attention, of incipient movements, as harmonizes with such an organism as mine, tending to move on both sides at once, and yet unified and stable. So much for *impression*, beauty of the first term. But it is not only that harmonious state of motor impulses that I get out of the form of a picture—it is not only the balance of nervous tensions and relaxations, of yearnings and satisfactions, that I experience from what they call nowadays "absolute music." No, I have, besides all this pleasure, a real exhilaration or emotion, a definite mood of repose or gayety or triumph, without any fringe of association, which yet certainly

contributes to my feeling of the beauty of the experience, and so of the work of art. How did it come out of the form?

Well, this very harmonious excitation of the organism has brought with it just such an organic reverberation as, the current theory of emotion asserts, must be at the bottom of all our emotional states. A certain sequence of nervous shocks and of vaso-motor changes, certain stimulations and relaxations and contractions of the internal organs have been set up as the "diffusive wave" from the sense stimulations and a particular emotional tinge is the result. That is a direct impression, but an expression too. Take the same case on a much lower level. A glass of wine makes me cheerful, not because it arouses cheerful ideas directly, but because the organic changes it sets up are such as belong to the *motived* expression of joy, and have the same effect. A deep, slow movement played by an orchestra can affect me in two ways. It may be that I have usually connected that sort of music with religious experiences, and all the profound and inspiring feelings belonging thereto; and so I transfer those feelings to the music and give it those adjectives. Or the slowness of the rhythmic pulse that is set up in me, the largeness, the volume, the depth of sound, all bring about in me the kind of nervous state that belongs to a reposeful and yet deeply moved feeling. The second experience is expression through impression, through the inward changes that the form itself sets up. The first is expression through the medium of something external,—an idea which brings with it a feeling,—something that does not belong to the music itself, but to my own individual experiences.

This distinction between internal and external expressiveness is perfectly clear for music, and also for architecture. In painting, too, it can easily be traced. We know the effect that is produced by broken lines, by upward moving ones,—like the "always aspiring" of the Gothic cathedral. The low-lying, wide expanses of some of the old Dutch landscapists give us repose, not because they remind us of the peaceful happiness of the land, but because we cannot melt ourselves into all those horizontal lines without

that restful feeling which accompanies such relaxation; and our emotion is read into the picture as *æsthetic* pleasure, because it came out of the abstract forms,—the *painting* in the picture.

The beauty of form is thus seen to be inseparably allied with a certain degree of emotional expressiveness in a way that does not distract, like the association of ideas, from the pure *æsthetic* experience. This quality of expressiveness should not, however, become a part of the definition of beauty, so that it should be said that the greater the emotional expressiveness, the more beautiful the object. For if that were true, such music, for instance, as all acknowledge quite mediocre, would be felt as most beautiful by those who find in it a strong and definite emotion; and a Strauss waltz, which makes us more merry than one by Mendelssohn, should be in so far more beautiful. This, of course, we are not ready to concede; and it seems, therefore, most logical to regard the special emotional effects of formal beauty rather as a corollary to, than as a part of, the essential *æsthetic* mood. But if we give the name emotion to that perfectly vague but unmistakable excitement with which we respond to purely formal beauty,—that indescribable exaltation with which we listen to “absolute” music,—then we must say that that emotion is but another name for *æsthetic* pleasure. Objectively, we have formal beauty; subjectively, on the physiological side, a harmonious action of the organism, and on the mental side the undefined exaltation which is known as *æsthetic* pleasure.

Up to this point, however, we have considered only the relation between purely formal beauty and the various shades of emotional response to it; now we may turn to the original question which we set ourselves, how to provide, in our definition of beauty, for the presence of ideas in the work of art. No one will deny that the full *æsthetic* experience cannot be dismissed with the treatment of formal beauty; and, although Professor Santayana’s “beauty in the second term” may be rejected as a purely individual, arbitrary, interested, and hence un*æsthetic* element, the explicit content of a work of art cannot be ignored. The suggested ideas aroused by an old rose garden may be no

addition to its beauty; but the same cannot be said of the great ideas directly contained in Shakespeare's poetry. Yet great ideas alone do not make great art, else we must count Aristotle and Spinoza and Kant great poets too. Must we then be satisfied to rest in the dualism of those who maintain that great creations of art are the expression of great truths under the laws of poetic form? Is the æsthetic expression indeed the recognition of truth plus the feeling of beauty of form, or is it a fusion of these into a third undivided pulse of æsthetic emotion? Is there no way of overcoming, for those arts which do express ideas, this dualism of form and content in our theory of the beautiful?

Let us analyze a little more closely this notion of the content. Music and architecture cannot properly be said to have any content, although they have a meaning according to their uses, like a funeral dirge and a hymn of joy, a prison and a temple. But this meaning is extraneous. It is given by the work itself only so far as the form induces the emotion which belongs to the idea,—as the dirge, sadness; the temple, awe. The idea of burial or of worship is nowhere to be found in the work of art. In the hierarchy of arts, painting and sculpture show the first trace of a content. This content, however, is at once seen to be susceptible of farther analysis. The "Sistine Madonna" pictures a mother and child worshiped, which may be called the subject,—but this does not exhaust the content. The real meaning of the picture, to which may be given the name of *theme*, is the divine element in maternal love. The subjects of Donatello's "John the Baptist" and "Saint George," of Michael Angelo's "David" and "Moses," can be described only as men of different types in different attitudes; their themes, however, are moral ideas, expressing the moral significance of each personality. The subject of "The Angelus" is given in its name; its theme is humble piety. From the infinite number of possible examples one more will suffice,—the well-known "War" by Franz Stuck, in the Neue Pinacothek,—the subject a youth, under a lurid sky, trampling under his horse's feet the bodies of the slain. The theme is again a moral idea,—the horrors of war.

If we now ask whether we can attribute beauty to the ideas of painting and sculpture, a negative answer is at once suggested. It is manifestly impossible to establish an order of æsthetic excellence between these subjects. The idea of peasants telling their beads is more beautiful than the idea of a ruthless destroyer only in so far as it is morally higher; and this destruction, therefore, has reference to the theme and not to the subject. How far, however, moral and æsthetic excellence are coincident is a question for which we are not yet ready. At this point we care only to point out that the mere idea of a picture is neither æsthetic nor the reverse.

But, it may be objected, is not our first thought in stopping before a picture like the "War," "What a wonderful idea"? It is the idea and not the form which strikes us, it may be said, even though we may be quite unimpressed by the value of its moral significance. Nevertheless, this view of our own mental processes may be held to be illusory. What really strikes us is the *unity* of the conception. The lurid sky, the dark, livid faces of the dead,—the whole color scheme, in short, is so contrived as to impress directly, as previously explained, without the medium of an idea, with that particular tinge of emotional tone which ought to be also the accompaniment of the idea of the horrors of war. The emotion is thus the enveloping unity which binds the subject and theme and the pictorial form together. In this sense, when we say, "What a wonderful idea!" we really mean, what a wonderful fitness of form to idea,—which is the same as saying, what a wonderful form, or more technically, what a wonderful unity. That part of the effect of beauty in a picture which is due to the idea is thus the fundamental but merely abstract element of unity, contributing to the complex æsthetic state only the simplest condition.

The distinction so far maintained for painting, etc., between subject and theme, has seemed somewhat artificial; but it is natural enough in the case of the various forms of literature. On the principle of the "Laocoön" that painting takes for its subject the pregnant moment, and poetry the succession of events,

we may say that the content, as subject, of poetry, is merely the story, whether that be a cadence of emotion, as in lyric poetry, the simple tale of a ballad, or the complicated plot of a tragedy. The theme is, as always, the general significance or moral idea of what is expressed. Now, what I wish to bring out is that the subject, so far as it has æsthetic quality at all, has it, not by virtue of its quality as idea, but by virtue of its form. Anything which is made up of parts,—beginning, middle, and end, climax and resolution,—possesses form, just as truly as does a sonata or a symphony. A picture has spatial order; music has temporal order; and poetry has temporal order, not only in respect to its musical form, so to speak, but also in respect to its subject. In literature, it is just the relation of these parts, the succession of events, the movement, the combination, the resolution of separate ideas and emotions, which affect us with pleasure or its opposite. This movement is the form of the subject, just as the movement and relations of melodious sounds in the verse constitute the auditory form. But there is a distinction. We have seen that visual form is æsthetically explained by its relation to the psycho-physical organism; it is beautiful when it brings us into a state of harmony and repose. Auditory form is certainly less well understood, but it is interpreted in the same way,—as a succession of bodily responses so related to each other that they bring out a sense of harmonious completeness. But the form of the subject addresses primarily not the psycho-physical organism, but the psychological constitution. And any interplay of ideas and their attendant emotions will be æsthetic in so far as it heightens, and at the same time harmonizes, the activities which are called into play. Just as in music the feeling of “rightness” ensues when the awaited note slips into place, so the feeling of “rightness” comes when the inevitable consequences follow the premises of a plot. And yet this “rightness” must not be taken as synonymous with the psychological truth. The note is “demanded” by the melodic sequence in a somewhat different way from that in which action must follow excitement, or despair satiety. The final note gives the last touch of pleasure

to that which was incomplete,—it is adapted, not only to the necessary, but to the harmonious functioning of the sense of hearing; and so the sequence of ideas must be not only psychologically true, but psychologically pleasant. Just as in music the *forte* and *piano* are related, so the porter's scene in "Macbeth" is related, in a form of psychological beauty, to the neighboring scenes, as De Quincey has shown in his famous essay. And just this feeling of "rightness," or its heightened form of triumph and exaltation is, as the psychologist, Edmund Gurney, has made clear, the typical form of æsthetic pleasure in music. So, also, the feeling of rightness, of triumphant acquiescence and welcome, is the characteristic feeling of æsthetic pleasure with which we go on from scene to scene of a great novel or play. This principle alone can explain how it is that we approve in tragedy, for instance, the most appalling deeds,—that we feel æsthetic pleasure in the deaths of Ophelia, of Desdemona, and of Lear. It is the relation, and not the absolute fact of these events that we approve,—and that relation constitutes the essential part of the form of literature. If the story were not told *so*, though the same story, it would be quite unbeautiful. The scenes of a tragedy, if slightly changed in order, would produce not a tragic but a grotesque effect. We are coming nowadays more and more to the view that the character of the tragic hero is not necessarily either good or bad, guilty or innocent, weak or strong. It is the order in which his ideas and moods work themselves out which has to constitute the æsthetic value of the tragedy. *What* Hamlet was, we may hate or condemn; but *how* he was what he was,—that is, the order, contrast, and relation of the scenes in which he reaches his doom,—gives us keen joy, the typical triumph and exaltation of the essential "rightness" of development.

The particular separate ideas of such a subject partake of beauty, then, in so far as they minister to the movement of the whole, just as the separate lines in a swaying, swirling robe of one of Botticelli's women minister to the whole conception. The catastrophe, in other words, must be as inevitably related to

the sequence of ideas as the final chords of a symphony to the sequence of notes. The attitude of mind with which we welcome it is the same, whether on the plane of the responses of the psycho-physical organism or of the ideal understanding.

But before finally relegating the idea to its place in the æsthetic scheme, we must ask whether the specific emotional content can claim independent æsthetic value; for we can scarcely ignore the fact that almost all naïve response to literature, and indeed to all forms of art, is, or is believed to be, specifically emotional. Maupassant, in his introduction to "Pierre et Jean," distinguishes thus between the demand of the critic—"Make me something fine according to your temperament"—and the cry of the public—"Move me, terrify me, make me weep!" And yet to the assertion of common sense that the desire of the naïve enjoyer of art is definite emotional excitement, we may venture to oppose a negative. The average person who weeps in the theatre, or over a novel, would no doubt repudiate the suggestion that it is not primarily the emotion of terror, or pity, that he feels. But a closer interpretation shows that it is almost impossible to disengage, in such an experience, the particular emotions. What is felt is rather pleasurable excitement, pleasure raised to the pitch of exaltation. The notion of specific emotions is illusory in the same sense that our notion of pleasure from specific emotions in listening to music is illusory. The ordinary descriptions of music are all couched in emotional or even ideational terms,—from the musical adventures of "Charles Auchester" down,—and yet we know, as Gurney says, that when, in listening to music, we think we are yearning after the unutterable, we are really yearning after the next note; and when we think it is the yearning that gives us pleasure, it is really the triumphant acceptance of the melodic rightness of that next note. So the ever discussed *Katharsis*, or "purification" of tragedy, is not the experience of emotions and pleasure in that experience, but only pleasure in the experience of ideas, accompanied by emotions, which belong to each other with, metaphorically, precisely that musical rightness. *Katharsis* is not, indeed, the mark of tragedy

alone; it is,—if I may venture to make so tremendous an assertion by the way, for I am quite aware that I should devote a volume instead of a page to sustaining this last thesis,—it is, I say, only a designation for the specific æsthetic pleasure, to which I can give no better name than the oft repeated one of triumphant acquiescence in the rightness of relations. We think we feel the situation directly, but what we really feel is pleasure in the rightness of the manner of the event. Such specific emotion as may be detected in any æsthetic experience is, then, covered by the definition of beauty only in so far as it has become form rather than content,—is valuable only in its relations rather than in itself. The experience of pity or fear, even though generalized, unselfish, etc.,—after the various formulas of the expounders of dramatic emotion,—does not impart æsthetic character of itself; it becomes æsthetic only if it appears at such a point in the tragedy, linked in such a way to the developing plot, that it belongs to the unified and reciprocally harmonious circle of experiences. Æsthetic pleasure, the general Katharsis, is the feeling of the way and not the way of feeling; and the Beauty of Ideas is adverbial, not substantive.

It is thus, I believe, that the question must be answered which we asked ourselves just now,—what place, in the definition of beauty, can be found for ideas? The subjects of those branches of art in which ideas are of most consequence, are reducible to a species of form; and beauty can be attributed to them in so far as they conform to the laws of satisfactory functioning in the psychological realm. There is nothing which may not take the *way* of beauty, and no idea, as I said in the beginning, too insignificant, too strange, or too unpleasing, to enter thus the realm of the beautiful.

So much for pure æsthetics. But we have up to this time consistently neglected the theme, the moral idea of the work of art, and its claim to be included in the æsthetic formula. We have defined beauty as that which brings about a state of harmonious completeness, of repose in activity, in the psycho-physical and psychological realms. This harmonious repose can exist

only with a disinterested attitude toward the objects which have brought this state about. Whether the Melian Venus or "Hamlet" or "Lohengrin" live, we care not; only that if they live, it shall be so. In this sense, our attitude is interested, our will is active, but only toward the existence of the form. But with the introduction of the moral idea, we cease to be disinterested,—our hypothetical is changed to an affirmative. The moral idea we must accept or reject, for it bears a direct relation to our personality. We will, or do not will, that, in the real world in which we ourselves have to live and struggle, certain forces shall be operative,—that there shall be the beauty of health, as in the "Discobolus"; maternal love which is divine, as in the "Sistine Madonna"; that war shall be horrible; that sloth unstriven against shall triumph over love, as in "The Statue and the Bust"; that defiance of the social organism shall involve self-destruction, as in "Anna Karénina." The person or the combination of events expressing this idea we do not ask for ourselves, but we do demand for our own a world in which this idea rules. Thus it must be admitted that there is, strictly speaking, at the core of every æsthetic response to a work of art containing an idea, a non-æsthetic element, an element of personal and interested judgment.

On the other hand, this affirmation or acceptance of a moral idea implies the quietude of the will,—the negation of the will, in the Schopenhauerian sense, of a desire for change,—just that state of harmony, of repose, which we have found to be the mark of the æsthetic on the lower planes of being. In so far, then, as we accept the moral idea which a work of art presents, in so far that idea has the power of bringing us to the state of harmony, and in so far it is beautiful. And *vice versa*, works of art which leave us in a state of moral rebellion, are unbeautiful, not because they are immoral, but because they are disturbing to the moral sense. Literature which ignores the fundamental moral principle of the freedom of the will, like the works of Flaubert, Maupassant, much of Zola, Loti, and Thomas

Hardy, fails of beauty, inasmuch as it fails of the perfect reposeful harmony of human nature in its entirety.

Thus a thoroughgoing analysis of the nature of the æsthetic experience in its simplest and most sensuous form has given us a principle,—the principle of unity in harmonious functioning,—which has enabled us to follow the track of beauty into the more complex realms of ideas and of moral attitudes, and to discover that there also the law of internal relation and of fitness for imitative response holds for all embodiments of beauty. That harmonious, imitative response, the psycho-physical state known on its feeling side as æsthetic pleasure, we have seen to be, first, a kind of physiological equilibrium, a “coexistence of opposing impulses which heightens the sense of being while it prevents action,” like the impulses to movement corresponding to geometrical symmetry; secondly, a psychological equilibrium, in which the flow of ideas and impulses is a circle rounding upon itself, all associations, emotions, expectations indissolubly linked with the central thought and leading back only to it, and proceeding in an irrevocable order, which is yet adapted to the possibilities of human experience; and thirdly, a quietude of the will, in the acceptance of the given moral attitude for the whole scheme of life.

This is the Feeling of Beauty. The Idea of Beauty is the idea of those objective qualities which bring this feeling of beauty about—this unity of consciousness, impassioned contemplation, dynamic repose!

CHRONICLE OF THE MONTH

JOSEPH B. BISHOP, *New York.*

THE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING TRUST.

Community of ownership and consolidation in ocean transportation trade is a logical result of railroad combination. That one should follow the other is only a natural development which was certain to come. When the great trunk railways of the United States established a community of ownership for the transportation of freight within the United States, nothing followed more naturally than another combination by which continuous transportation between inland markets and foreign ports could be secured. It virtually extends the terminals of the great American railways across the Atlantic, giving fixed rates on both land and sea. There can be no retarding of shipments because of excessive ocean carrying charges; for the chief effect of the new combination will be a close community between the steamship trust and the heads of the iron, coal, and railroad industries of the United States.

The fact of dominating significance in the new combination is that it has been formed by American financiers with American capital, and gives that capital virtual control of an industry in which it has hitherto had no representation worth mentioning. The exact terms of the plan are not revealed in all instances, but its general scope is known. It provides that before December 31 of the present year a corporation organized by J. P. Morgan and Company under the laws of New York, or some other State,

shall purchase the ocean ships of four companies,—the White Star, Dominion, American, and Atlantic Transport, making with the Leyland, already purchased, five companies, and with the Cunard, which is likely to be added, six. In addition to these there are the two great German companies,—the North German Lloyd and the Hamburg-American,—which have made an agreement with the trust to work harmoniously with it. The combined North Atlantic fleet of the new trust, if the Cunard line is added, will number 140 vessels, old, new, and in process of construction, aggregating 1,168,310 tons. The North German Lloyd and Hamburg-American together have 594 vessels with a tonnage of 1,288,425. The purchasing company is to have a capital of \$170,000,000, of which \$60,000,000 is ten per cent common stock, \$60,000,000 six per cent cumulative preferred, and \$50,000,000 is to be four and one half per cent debentures. The valuation of the properties to be acquired is fixed at ten times the net income of the companies for the year 1900. For their services in forming the trust and underwriting the \$50,000,000 bonds Morgan and Company are to receive \$2,500,000 in preferred stock and \$25,000,000 in common stock.

There is a so-called “builders’ agreement” which is the only feature of the trust that gives satisfaction in England. Under this the Morgans bind themselves to give all orders for new vessels, and for heavy repairs that must be made at a shipyard of the United Kingdom, to Harland and Wolff, the famous ship-builders of Belfast, except that it is provided that “nothing herein contained shall prevent the purchasers from placing orders for new steamers and repairs at shipyards in the United States.” And in return, Harland and Wolff agree not to build ships for any persons not in the combination, except the Hamburg-American Company, so long as orders from the combination keep the builders’ works busy. Harland and Wolff are to be paid for work which they do for the combination the cost of the work plus five per cent on new ships, ten per cent on new machinery in old vessels, and fifteen per cent on repairs. This agreement

runs for ten years and is terminable thereafter only on five years' notice from either side.

There are misgivings in England about this feature of the plan, as well as about all others. Some of the English journals say that so long as it is possible to build twenty-five per cent cheaper on their side than in America, the most probable effect of the new combination will be a benefit to British ship-building as represented by the Harland and Wolff Company. Others speak of Harland and Wolff as the servants of Mr. Morgan, and say that the Belfast ship-building firm will have no alternative but to cross the Atlantic and to set up an establishment there. The express stipulation that nothing in the agreement shall prevent the trust from placing orders for new steamships in American shipyards excites some uneasiness in view of the progress which is being made in this country in steel construction, both in efficiency and in economy. One of the arguments that have been made in this country against steamship subsidies has been that they are not needed, that it is only a question of time when American capital will turn its attention toward ship-building, and that when it does so, and brings to bear upon that industry the same ingenuity, the same superior application of machinery to the work of construction that has been applied to bridge-building, the question of building as cheaply here as anywhere else in the world will be solved. There can be no doubt that the formation of the ocean trust has put an end to the subsidy agitation. The bill before Congress had very little chance of passage before the trust was announced, and none whatever afterwards. Practically all of the vessels belonging to the allied companies are foreign built, and consequently are not entitled to the bounties provided in the bill before Congress. There may be no coincidence between the shelving of the subsidy measure and the latest achievement of American finance, but it certainly appears as if Mr. Morgan and his associates decided that they were working on the line of least resistance when they laid their plans for acquiring control of the shipping trade on existing conditions, abandoning the idea of legislative encouragement. In doing this

they have accepted the plea of the friends of the subsidy plan, that it costs much more to build and man vessels here than abroad; and have used this very argument as a reason why it is better economy to let the foreigners build and run the ship, and then for American capital to purchase control. Mr. Carnegie takes this view, for he says, "The Americans have resolved to become a maritime power commercially, and will soon be able to build ships quite as cheaply as Great Britain."

What most alarms England in this new form of what is called the "American peril," is the possibility that the ultimate effect will be to destroy British mercantile supremacy. It is feared that ultimately all the ships in the trust will pass from the British to the American flag. As bitter English opponents of the plan put it, the combination converts the North Atlantic into an American ocean, British liners into an American fleet, and Belfast into an American shipyard. Many English journals express panicky fear lest their auxiliary navy in time of war be taken entirely away by the transfer of the vessels of the fleet to American registry. There is no danger of this until the present trust agreements shall have expired, for these provide that all vessels shall keep the flags they are now flying, and shall be bound to obey the subsidy stipulations which place them at the disposal of their respective governments in time of war. That they may all be under American ownership when the present agreement shall terminate, or be replaced by a new one, is more than probable,—in fact, it is virtually certain. The organ of the British shipping trade sought, when the combination was announced, to give its readers comfort by saying philosophically that it was inevitable that the United States should refuse to be forever content with the state of things under which not less than ninety per cent of its vast export trade is conducted in foreign bottoms. It is equally inevitable that once it gets its export trade into American bottoms, it will never allow it to be taken away from them again. Nothing approaching the value of this combination to American exports could be devised. It means the largest degree of coöperation possible for the expan-

sion of those exports, and hence for the expansion of American industry and commerce. One effect of uniform rates will be to stop ruinous competition in passenger service during the winter, and possibly another effect of the combination will be to supply, during the months of heavy travel to and from Europe, a daily passenger steamer, though that is not likely to come until the number of steamers has been increased.

There is one other aspect of the trust which is of far-reaching importance. Mr. Morgan is working in the interest of the peace of the world. The more closely the nations of the world are brought together in business interests and enterprises, the more firmly will they stand together against war or against anything that will disturb or injure their common welfare. With the leading nations of the earth united in the ownership of a fleet of commerce, the need of naval armaments for the protection of the commerce of each nation will be eliminated.

THE CUBAN REPUBLIC.

Speaking to a personal friend, on the eve of his visit to Cuba on April 17, last, Secretary Root said: "I am going there to take a last look around the establishment and try to be sure that when we turn over the government and put the power out of our hands, we leave as few seeds of future misunderstanding as possible. It is really a great and wonderful trust which we are winding up and turning over to the heir who becomes of age on the twentieth of May." The heir is in possession, and the use which he shall make of his opportunities and powers is the most intensely interesting political problem in the immediate future. The hearty greeting which was extended to the President of the new Republic in all parts of the island, as he journeyed over it previous to his inauguration, and the enthusiastic unanimity with which the people of the island joined in the festivities of the formal inauguration, extending over an entire week, indicate that he began his administration amid popular good-will, whatever troubles and disappointments may lie before him.

The government of the new Republic is modeled closely upon

that of the United States. There is the same coördination of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. The President's term is four years. There is a Congress with a senate of twenty-four members, four from each of the six provinces into which the island is divided, and a house of representatives of sixty-three members, one for every twenty-five thousand inhabitants or major fraction thereof. The senatorial term is eight years, but one half the senators elected to the first Congress are to go out at the end of four years; the question of who are to go to be decided by lot. In the same way half the members of the house, whose term is four years, are to go out at the end of two years. There will thus be in each house a half representation that will hold over at every election. This is the only radical respect in which the Cuban congressional system differs from the American. Congress is to meet twice a year,—in April and November,—and is to remain in session not less than forty days. No president can be elected for more than two successive terms. He has the veto and most of the other powers of an American president. A vice-president, a cabinet, and a supreme court are provided on the American model. There are no war or navy ministers, as in the United States. The treasury department will have charge of the revenue cutters and also of the small coast patrol boats. Coast artillery and the rural guards are to be the only military forces in Cuba. The latter force, which does police duty, will be increased.

The first Congress assembled on May 5, and after a brief session adjourned till the date of the inauguration of President Palma on the twentieth. The majority of members in both houses are lawyers, many of whom had been members of the convention which formulated the constitution. Fully one third of the members of both houses are residents of Havana, there being no limitation as to residence in the constitution, as in the United States. A resident of Havana can be a candidate in any other province. This fact has enabled men of ability in Havana, who had no chance of election in that city because of the large number of available candidates, to stand in provinces where desirable candi-

dates were lacking and to be elected. Havana, which is really the centre of the intelligence and civilization of the island, is thus enabled to secure a dominating influence in the government. Some of the members thus chosen will represent provinces in which they formerly lived. Others are total strangers to the constituency which they represent. Among the senators are several men who have achieved prominence within the last few years. Others owe their influence to the insurrection, while a few go back to the Ten Years' War. One of the senators from the province of Havana is Estrada Mora, who was a candidate for mayor a year ago, and whose defeat everybody regretted. There is also Alfredo Zayas, who has studied closely American political methods, and who is denounced by his opponents as a "boss." The province of Matanzas numbers among its senators General Pedro Betancourt, who has been civil governor since the occupation; Manuel Sanguily, an educator and literary man; and Domingo Mendez Capote, who has made various visits to the United States. These were all members of the constitutional convention. Santa Clara is represented by General Carillo, who was very close to Maximo Gomez during the insurrection, and was noted for his conservatism; General Montegudo Marua Delgado, colored, was one of the moderate men in the constitutional convention, and Dr. Jose Frias, who controls the politics of the city of Cienfuegos. Salvador Cisneros and Ramon Silva, who were among the radical members of the constitutional convention, reappear as senators from the province of Puerto Principe. Bravo Carreoso and Eduardo Tamayo, radicals from Santiago, were also in the constitutional convention.

In the house there are four or five editors, several planters, two cigarmakers, a priest, many men who have been mayors in the provinces, and some who are set down as "soldiers." It was said by some of the members on the eve of the assembling of the Congress that their first business would be to pass a general law fixing their pay. They are somewhat afraid of President Palma's declared policy of low salaries for all public officials. A few of the congressmen, who are professional men with large

practice, have declared in favor of the English system of members serving without pay. This does not meet with widespread approval. Cuba enters upon the experiment of independent government in a very impoverished condition; but it is denied that she is too poor to pay her congressmen something. If she should fail to do this, many really good men would have to resign. If President Palma has his own way, the annual salary of senators and representatives may be limited to \$2,000 or \$2,500.

It is likely that the Congress will devote its first attention to the subject of a reciprocity treaty with the United States. President Palma declared in his speeches, on his tour of the island previous to his inauguration, that the proposed reduction of twenty-five per cent in sugar duties would not be sufficient, and foreshadowed similar utterance in his inaugural address. He said in one instance: "Until I returned to Cuba my knowledge of affairs was the result of reports made to me by others. Since my personal observations, made on this trip, I can speak with more freedom and authority. I am more convinced now than ever before that Cuba needs a greater tariff reduction from the United States than Congress has allowed. It is absolutely necessary to the welfare of the country that we should have a reasonable reduction, not only on sugar and tobacco, but on all Cuban products." In that view the best judges in the United States, including President Roosevelt and his cabinet, heartily concur. Anything less from Congress will be a violation of national duty.

DATE DUE


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